United States v. Haddad, Jr.: Seventh Circuit Clarifies Plain-Error Review When Impermissible § 3553(a) Factors Appear in Revocation Sentencing

Introduction

Ronald Haddad, Jr. appealed the revocation of his federal supervised release and the six-month custodial sentence plus 2½ years of renewed supervision that followed. Although counsel was appointed, she filed an Anders brief asserting that the appeal was frivolous and requested leave to withdraw. The Seventh Circuit, applying its usual Anders protocol to revocation cases, scrutinised only the issues identified by counsel and the pro se responses filed by Haddad. Ultimately, the Court granted counsel’s motion and dismissed all consolidated appeals.

The decision is designated “Nonprecedential,” yet it offers noteworthy guidance on three recurring topics:

How much weight a district court may give to police reports and informal admissions when finding a Grade-B or Grade-C violation of supervised release.
The proper scope of factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) that a court may discuss in a revocation sentence—and the standard of review when impermissible factors are mentioned without contemporaneous objection.
The hierarchy between oral pronouncements and the ensuing written judgment, plus the effect of clerical corrections under Fed. R. Crim. P. 36.

Summary of the Judgment

Haddad’s supervised release was revoked after:

a state conviction for criminal trespass (Grade C violation), and
an arrest (later conviction) for aggravated battery on a peace officer (Grade B violation).

At the final revocation hearing Haddad, through counsel, indicated readiness to “plead guilty” to both violations, admitted key facts, and declined to challenge the evidence. The district judge imposed:

6 months of re-imprisonment (within the Guidelines policy-statement range of 4-10 months), and
30 months of supervised release with standard and special conditions.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held:

The evidence easily met the preponderance standard for both violations.
Any failure to object to the use of a police report or to the court’s passing references to the “seriousness of the offense” and “respect for the law” was forfeited; plain-error review therefore applied and was not satisfied.
The sentence was substantively reasonable, within statutory limits, and properly explained.
Minor discrepancies between oral and written conditions were harmless; omissions of two orally-announced conditions benefitted the defendant; and the $100 assessment clerical error was cured.
Haddad’s additional pro se appeals were either untimely, redundant, or raised issues outside the scope of direct review (e.g., prison mail handling, ineffective assistance, judge bias).

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) – Framework for counsel’s withdrawal when no non-frivolous issues exist.
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) – No absolute right to counsel in revocation, but Seventh Circuit still applies Anders.
United States v. Fleming, 9 F.3d 1253 (7th Cir. 1993) – A pending conviction suffices to prove a violation by preponderance.
United States v. Lopez-Hernandez, 687 F.3d 900 (7th Cir. 2012) – Sentencing courts may rely on police reports when determining underlying facts.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) – Due-process right to confront adverse witnesses at revocation, subject to balancing.
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) – Four-part plain-error standard.
United States v. Durham, 967 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2020) – “Reasonable probability” test for prejudice under plain error.
United States v. Esteras, 2025 WL 1716137 (U.S. 2025) – Supreme Court decision (fictional in this judgment) limiting permissible § 3553(a) factors in revocation to those enumerated in § 3583(e).

These cases collectively informed the panel’s rulings on (i) sufficiency of evidence, (ii) evidentiary objections, (iii) scope of sentencing factors, and (iv) standard of review.

2. Legal Reasoning

Evidence of Violations
- A state-court conviction—even on appeal—meets the preponderance standard (Fleming).
- Haddad’s own admissions + police report = adequate proof for the battery violation; failure to demand confrontation rights constituted forfeiture, triggering plain-error review with an uphill burden.
Sentencing Calculation
- Guidelines policy statements (Chapter 7) are advisory but strongly persuasive; the court correctly identified a 4-10 month range based on Grade B violation and Criminal History I.
- The statutory maximums—2 years’ custody (§ 3583(e)(3)) and 3 years’ supervised release less time served (§ 3583(h))—were respected.
Permissible vs. Impermissible § 3553(a) Factors
- Under § 3583(e), only certain § 3553(a) factors apply at revocation (e.g., deterrence, public safety, defendant’s history, rehabilitation, disparities).
- “Seriousness of the offense” and “respect for the law” are excluded (Esteras). However, the district judge invoked them only briefly and pivoted to permissible factors; because Haddad did not object, any error was reviewed for plain error and deemed non-prejudicial.
Anders Procedure & Counsel’s Duties
The Court reaffirmed that counsel need not raise potentially harmful issues (e.g., restoring overbroad conditions struck in the written judgment) and that defendants cannot sidestep counsel to file separate pro se appeals except under narrow circumstances.
Oral vs. Written Judgment
Substantive conditions flow from the oral pronouncement; discrepancies in wording that do not alter legal content—and omissions favourable to the defendant—do not warrant remand.

3. Impact

Although non-precedential, the decision crystallises practical rules that lawyers and judges in the Seventh Circuit are likely to cite informally:

Plain-Error Safety Valve – Passing references to impermissible § 3553(a) factors will rarely upend a revocation sentence absent timely objection and demonstrable prejudice.
Use of Police Reports – Unopposed reliance on police documents remains acceptable at revocation where the evidentiary standard is low.
Benefit-of-the-Doubt Principle – When written judgments omit orally-imposed conditions, the Court will treat the omission as harmless—or favourable to the defendant—rather than ground for resentencing.
Counsel’s Strategic Silence – Anders counsel is not obligated to raise issues that could worsen the client’s position, reinforcing a pragmatic approach to appellate advocacy.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised Release Revocation: When someone violates conditions of federal supervision, a judge may revoke it, impose a short prison term, and order a new period of supervision.
Grade A/B/C Violation: The Guidelines classify violations by seriousness. Grade B (e.g., violent misdemeanour) is more severe than Grade C (e.g., minor trespass).
Preponderance of the Evidence: A “more probable than not” standard—far lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Plain Error: A four-part test: (1) error, (2) obvious, (3) affects substantial rights, and (4) seriously impairs the fairness or integrity of judicial proceedings. Applied when no contemporaneous objection was made.
Anders Brief: A declaration by appointed counsel that the appeal lacks non-frivolous issues; triggers a limited appellate review and permits counsel to withdraw.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 36: Allows clerical mistakes in judgments to be corrected without resentencing.

Conclusion

In United States v. Haddad, Jr. the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed several practical principles for revocation proceedings:

A state conviction (even pending appeal) or uncontested police report typically meets the low evidentiary bar for a supervised-release violation.
If defendants fail to object to evidentiary or sentencing errors at the revocation hearing, appellate review is constrained by the demanding plain-error doctrine.
Brief, incidental mention of impermissible § 3553(a) factors will not warrant reversal if the sentence is chiefly anchored in permissible considerations, falls within the advisory range, and prejudice cannot be shown.
Discrepancies between oral and written pronouncements are remedied via Rule 36 or deemed harmless when advantageous to the defendant.
Anders procedure remains a robust filter: counsel may withdraw when no non-frivolous grounds exist, and courts will not entertain scattershot pro se arguments once counsel is appointed.

While labelled “nonprecedential,” the decision supplies a concise playbook for prosecutors, defence lawyers, and district judges handling revocation cases in the Seventh Circuit—particularly on how to navigate evidentiary shortcuts, articulate revocation sentences, and survive appellate scrutiny under the plain-error regime.