United States v. Guevara-Lopez:
A Tenth-Circuit Roadmap for Explaining Major Upward Variances
& the Emerging Role of JSIN Data in § 3553(a)(6) Analysis

1. Introduction

United States v. Guevara-Lopez, No. 24-2045 (10th Cir. Aug. 4, 2025), vacates a five-year sentence for attempted bulk-cash smuggling and remands for resentencing. Although the district court’s sentence fell within the statutory maximum, the Court of Appeals held that it was substantively unreasonable because (i) the judge relied on misstated facts, and (ii) the justification for doubling the top of the Guidelines range inadequately addressed 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (avoidance of unwarranted disparities). In sweeping dicta, the panel also signal-boosts the Sentencing Commission’s Judiciary Sentencing Information (JSIN) database as a legitimate—but not dispositive— reference point for disparity analysis.

The case therefore matters on two fronts:

• Explanation Duty: It tightens the demand that district courts give a “robust” explanation when imposing a “major” variance, especially upward to the statutory ceiling.
• Statistical Evidence: It legitimises reliance on JSIN data in assessing whether disparities are “unwarranted,” while cautioning that courts must still provide a defendant-specific rationale.

Key Actors

• Defendant–Appellant: Raymundo Guevara-Lopez, 19 at the offense, no criminal history; admitted 25–30 prior cash runs for a Mexican cartel.
• District Judge (D.N.M.): Imposed 60-month sentence (statutory max), characterising the conduct as “extremely egregious.”
• Tenth Circuit Panel: Phillips, Hartz, and Federico, with Judge Hartz dissenting.

2. Summary of the Judgment

1. The panel unanimously vacates the sentence and remands for resentencing.
2. The majority (Phillips, J.) holds the sentence substantively unreasonable under abuse-of-discretion review, because:
   • The district court devoted “only a cursory” discussion to § 3553(a)(6) despite JSIN data showing no other defendant with the same offense level/criminal history had received an upward variance since 2018;
   • The court relied on a mistaken belief that the federal offense was committed while the defendant was on state bond, which infected its analysis of § 3553(a)(1) (nature of offense / characteristics); and
   • A single legitimate factor—general deterrence—cannot by itself justify a 100 % increase over the guideline ceiling.
3. The dissent (Hartz, J.) would affirm, criticising the majority for anchoring reasonableness to statistical rarity and for trespassing into procedural-error territory.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited & How They Shape the Holding

• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) – establishes abuse-of-discretion review and the “holistic” requirement to explain major variances. Majority leans heavily on Gall’s admonition that a “major” variance needs a “more significant justification.”
• United States v. Lente, 759 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2014) – Tenth Circuit precedent requiring “articulable facts” to support a large variance; majority quotes Lente repeatedly.
• United States v. Crosby, 119 F.4th 1239 (10th Cir. 2024) – recent case vacating an extreme downward variance based on inadequate explanation; majority analogises to show symmetry (same scrutiny for up & down variances).
• United States v. Garcia, 946 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2020) – had rejected reliance on “bare national statistics.” Majority distinguishes Garcia, arguing JSIN data here are more granular because they specify primary guideline, criminal-history category, and offense level.
• United States v. Allen, 488 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2007) – teaches that a sentence based on misstated facts can be substantively unreasonable; cited to emphasise how the bond-status error “tipped the scale.”
• United States v. Valdez, 128 F.4th 1314 (10th Cir. 2025) & United States v. Cortez, 139 F.4th 1146 (10th Cir. 2025) – illustrate that JSIN statistics alone rarely doom a sentence when the district court offers a fulsome rationale; majority differentiates present case on ground that rationale was missing.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

3.2.1 Standard of Review

Substantive reasonableness is reviewed for abuse of discretion, looking to whether the sentence “exceeded the bounds of permissible choice.” A Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable; a non-Guidelines sentence invites closer scrutiny, but no mathematical formula or presumption of unreasonableness applies.

3.2.2 Section 3553(a) Factor–by–Factor Critique

1. § 3553(a)(1) – Nature & Circumstances / History & Characteristics
   The district court’s reliance on an erroneous chronology (thinking defendant was on bond when federal crime occurred) was pivotal. Because the court cited that fact as making the offense “extremely egregious,” the Tenth Circuit found the explanation tainted.
2. § 3553(a)(2)(B) – Deterrence
   The judge emphasised the need to deter cash couriers, but the panel held deterrence alone cannot justify doubling the guideline ceiling absent further support.
3. § 3553(a)(6) – Avoiding Disparities
   This was the decisional linchpin. The panel said the district court “glossed over” disparity concerns—even though JSIN showed zero upward variances nationwide for similarly situated offenders over five years. A mere statement that any disparity “would be warranted by the facts” was inadequate.

3.2.3 The Role of JSIN Statistics

The majority stakes out middle ground:

• It rejects the government’s view that JSIN data are too crude to matter.
• It rejects the dissent’s stance that national stats are irrelevant.
• But it stops short of requiring district courts to consult JSIN in every case; statistics simply heighten scrutiny when a variance is large and other explanations are thin.

3.2.4 Misstated Facts as Substantive Error

Although Gallic doctrine classifies reliance on “clearly erroneous facts” as a procedural flaw, the panel treats the bond-status error as a substantive concern because it directly drove the severity of the sentence. The court emphasises that “procedure and substance overlap” when the sentencing explanation is itself challenged.

3.3 Impact Assessment

A. On District Courts within the Tenth Circuit

• Heightened Explanation Requirement – Judges must now expressly grapple with JSIN (or comparable) data when invoked by the defense and the variance is “major.”
• Fact-Checking – Even seemingly minor factual slips (sequence of state v. federal arrests) can undo a sentence if they bear on § 3553(a) analysis.
• One-Factor Rationale Insufficient – Deterrence alone rarely sustains an extreme upward variance.

B. On Appellate Litigation

• Defense counsel are incentivised to mine JSIN for disparity arguments; the opinion provides a roadmap for leveraging that data.
• Prosecutors must anticipate and rebut JSIN-based claims with finer-grained comparators or qualitative distinctions.
• The decision blurs, but does not erase, the line between procedural and substantive error—expect increased litigation on “mixed” arguments.

C. National Ripple Effects

• Although not binding beyond the Tenth Circuit, the case contributes to a growing inter-circuit conversation about statistical evidence in sentencing, aligning partially with the Ninth Circuit’s Brewster approach and diverging from stricter views in some other circuits.
• May influence Sentencing Commission policy debates on whether to integrate JSIN more formally into guideline commentary.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1 Upward vs. Downward Variance

A variance is a sentence outside the advisory Guideline range based on statutory factors. A major variance—generally, one that doubles the top of the range or more—needs an especially detailed justification.

4.2 Substantive vs. Procedural Reasonableness

• Procedural = Did the judge follow correct steps? (calculate range, address arguments, rely on accurate facts).
• Substantive = Is the length itself a reasonable choice, given the facts and factors?
• They overlap when the explanation contains factual or analytical gaps—the heart of this appeal.

4.3 JSIN Database

The Judiciary Sentencing Information system is a public, interactive tool hosted by the U.S. Sentencing Commission. It aggregates data from all federal sentences and allows filtering by primary guideline, criminal-history category, offense level, and several other variables. It does not reveal detailed fact patterns.

4.4 Section 3553(a) Cheat-Sheet

1. (a)(1) – Nature/circumstances & defendant’s history/character.
2. (a)(2)(A-D) – Purposes: punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation.
3. (a)(3-4) – Kinds of sentences & Guideline range.
4. (a)(5) – Guideline or policy statements.
5. (a)(6) – Avoid unwarranted disparities.
6. (a)(7) – Need to provide restitution.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Guevara-Lopez does not bar tough sentences for cash couriers tied to cartels; rather, it insists that if a court maximises punishment beyond the Guideline band, it must (i) base its decision on accurate facts, and (ii) meaningfully engage with the risk of disparity—especially when national statistics suggest the sentence is an outlier. The precedential weight lies less in the ultimate remand than in the doctrinal clarifications: district judges remain free to impose upward variances, but only after a transparent, data-aware explanation that survives abuse-of-discretion review.

For practitioners, the case is a reminder to cross-check facts, to marshal JSIN evidence when helpful, and to object explicitly if the court brushes those statistics aside. For judges, it underscores that in the post-Booker world, discretion is broad but not boundless; reason-giving is the currency that buys deference on appeal.