United States v. Grenon: Post‑Loper Bright Agency Interpretation, Self‑Representation, and Speedy Trial in FDCA Criminal Contempt Prosecutions

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Case: United States v. Jonathan David Grenon & Jordan Paul Grenon, No. 23‑13478
Panel: Jordan, Luck, and Kidd, JJ. (per curiam)
Disposition: Convictions and sentences affirmed
Publication status: Not for publication (non‑precedential, but still persuasive authority)

1. Introduction

1.1 Factual Background

The Grenon brothers, Jonathan and Jordan, operated under the banner of the “Genesis II Church of Health and Healing,” selling a product called “Miracle Mineral Solution” (“MMS”). The product contained sodium chlorite and, when mixed with an activator as directed, produced chlorine dioxide — essentially industrial bleach. They aggressively marketed MMS as a panacea, claiming it could cure serious diseases and conditions, including cancer, autism, and COVID‑19.

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Justice first proceeded civilly, obtaining a temporary restraining order (TRO), preliminary injunction, and ultimately a permanent injunction barring the sale of MMS. The Genesis II “Church” did not appear; default judgment issued. The orders were aimed at stopping the Grenons and their organization from selling MMS.

The Grenons ignored the injunctions and continued selling MMS. Federal prosecutors then brought criminal charges in the Southern District of Florida. The indictment ultimately charged:

Count 1: Conspiracy (under a theory that included distributing an unapproved drug and misbranded drug under the FDCA).
Counts 2–3: Criminal contempt for willfully violating the civil TRO and preliminary injunction.

The case was procedurally complex. Two co‑defendants (their father and a third brother) were in Colombia and had to be extradited, causing substantial delay. The Grenons themselves repeatedly invoked “sovereign citizen”‑style rhetoric, questioned the legitimacy of the court, and oscillated between insisting on self‑representation and making ambiguous requests for counsel.

1.2 Key Issues on Appeal

The Eleventh Circuit structured its opinion around six issues raised by the brothers:

Pro se representation: Whether their waiver of the right to counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the Sixth Amendment and Faretta.
Speedy trial: Whether their statutory rights under the Speedy Trial Act and constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment were violated by the lengthy delay between arrest, indictment, and trial.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA): Whether the indictment should have been dismissed under RFRA because MMS was allegedly a religious “sacrament” of their “church.”
Agency interpretation and “intended uses”: Whether the district court improperly relied on FDA regulations — particularly 21 C.F.R. § 201.128’s definition of “intended uses” — in jury instructions and expert testimony, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo.
Validity of civil orders and jury trial rights: Whether the TRO and preliminary injunction underlying the contempt counts were “lawful orders,” given they issued without a jury trial in the civil case.
Sentencing: Whether the sentences were procedurally and substantively unreasonable, focusing on loss and victim enhancements, presentence report (PSR) timing, and sentencing disparities with co‑defendants.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected all six arguments and affirmed in full.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court held:

Self‑representation: The Grenons knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived their right to counsel at critical stages. Repeated Faretta colloquies, extensive warnings, and the defendants’ persistent insistence on self‑representation, coupled with standby counsel, rendered the waivers valid.
Speedy Trial (Statutory): The delays between arrest and indictment, and between indictment and trial, were excused by statutory exclusions under the Speedy Trial Act, including delay attributable to co‑defendants, competency evaluations, and ends‑of‑justice continuances to allow time for counsel and extraditions.
Speedy Trial (Constitutional): Although the two‑plus‑year delay between indictment and trial was presumptively prejudicial, the reasons for delay were at worst neutral and often attributable to the defendants. Because the defendants failed to show actual prejudice under the Barker v. Wingo factors, there was no Sixth Amendment violation.
RFRA: The Grenons never clearly raised a RFRA defense or RFRA‑based motion to dismiss in the district court. Vague references to religious rights and sacraments did not suffice to put the court on notice. On plain‑error review, and in the absence of controlling precedent, the panel found no reversible error.
Agency deference and “intended uses”: The jury instructions and expert testimony did not impermissibly defer to FDA’s regulatory definition of “intended uses.” The district court used a commonsense, reasonable‑person standard consistent with the statutory term “intended for use” in 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1). Even after Loper Bright, it is not error to adopt instructions and testimony that reflect the plain meaning of the statute, even if they resemble a regulation. No plain error was shown.
Contempt and civil orders: Under the collateral bar rule, the validity of the TRO and preliminary injunction could not be attacked as a defense in the criminal contempt prosecution. Any argument that the civil orders were invalid for lack of a civil jury had to be raised in the civil case or on direct appeal from those orders, not collaterally in the contempt case.
Sentencing:
- Any possible error in applying enhancements for number and type of victims or loss amount was harmless under United States v. Keene, because the district court explicitly stated it would impose the same sentence regardless of those enhancements, and the resulting 151‑month sentences were substantively reasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
- A technical violation of the 35‑day PSR disclosure rule in Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e)(2) was harmless because the reports were available 42 days before sentencing and any delay in actual receipt was caused by the brothers’ own refusal to accept court documents.
- Alleged sentencing disparity with two codefendants failed because those codefendants were convicted only on one count (due to extradition limitations) and therefore were not “similarly situated” for purposes of § 3553(a)(6).

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Self‑Representation and Waiver of Counsel

3.1.1 Legal Framework

The court draws extensively on established Sixth Amendment doctrine:

Right to counsel and self‑representation: The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel at all “critical stages” of prosecution (Iowa v. Tovar). But it also protects a defendant’s right to represent himself (Faretta v. California).
Mutual exclusivity of rights: Because the rights to counsel and self‑representation cannot be exercised simultaneously, a defendant can exercise one only by waiving the other (United States v. Hakim).
Requirements for waiver:
- The waiver must be unequivocal — the defendant must clearly invoke self‑representation (United States v. Owen).
- The waiver must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, a mixed question of law and fact reviewed de novo (United States v. Garey (en banc)).
Initial appearance as critical stage: The right to counsel attaches at the initial appearance before a judicial officer (Rothgery v. Gillespie County).
Faretta inquiry / colloquy: Courts must warn defendants of the dangers and disadvantages of self‑representation but need not ensure that a defendant has the skills of a lawyer. What matters is that the defendant understands that rules exist and that he will be bound by them (Kimball).
Obstructionist defendants: Garey acknowledges that defendants can frustrate a traditional back‑and‑forth colloquy by refusing to engage. In such cases, a “Faretta‑like monologue” is sufficient if the court is assured that the defendant:
1. Understands the choices before him;
2. Knows the dangers of going pro se; and
3. Has rejected the lawyer to whom he is constitutionally entitled.

3.1.2 Application to the Grenons

Initial appearance: At their first appearance in July 2020, both brothers declared that they wished to proceed pro se. Jonathan stated he was “going to be pro se.” Jordan initially asked if the decision was “only for this meeting,” to which the magistrate judge explained he could change his mind later. Jordan then said he would be “pro se until further notice.”

The magistrate judge:

Explained the right to counsel;
Outlined maximum penalties;
Warned of the pitfalls of self‑representation and complexity of federal rules;
Offered the assistance of a federal public defender present in court; and
Offered to postpone proceedings to allow them to secure counsel.

Both brothers unequivocally insisted on self‑representation. The magistrate found their waivers knowing and voluntary.

Ongoing reaffirmations and Faretta hearings: At subsequent hearings, the magistrate and district court repeatedly revisited the issue:

At the detention hearing, they again refused assistance from the public defender.
After the district court characterized one of their motions as “bizarre” and considered possible psychiatric examination, it again conducted a Faretta hearing before trial, appointed standby counsel, and concluded that they were capable of representing themselves.
When Jordan at one point requested counsel, the court appointed counsel, but later — at his request and after a Faretta inquiry — that counsel was allowed to withdraw, and Jordan reverted to self‑representation.

Late‑stage ambiguity: Shortly before trial, Jonathan said he was trying to obtain counsel but refused to have counsel appointed and refused to answer financial questions necessary to determine eligibility for appointed counsel. The magistrate proposed simply appointing a lawyer; Jonathan flatly refused, insisting on “exhausting [his] administrative remedies,” and the magistrate set follow‑up hearings.

By the Friday before trial, at a final status conference, the district court asked directly: “Do any of you wish to have counsel appointed to represent you in this case?” The brothers refused to answer. They remained silent despite repeated questioning and warnings, and standby counsel confirmed the brothers had not asked for their help. At trial, the brothers chose to remain almost entirely silent.

3.1.3 The Court’s Holding and Commentary

The court concluded that:

The initial waivers were valid and unequivocal.
The district court and magistrate judge repeatedly re‑examined the issue, conducted multiple Faretta inquiries, and appointed standby counsel.
The brothers’ later behavior — silence, refusal to answer, “sovereign citizen” rhetoric — did not negate the prior valid waiver and in fact confirmed a continuing desire to self‑represent.
Under Garey, the court was not required to force counsel on obstreperous or uncooperative defendants who had been fully warned and had deliberately rejected representation.
Jonathan’s “request” for counsel was not effective because:
- The formal motion was filed by an unauthorized third party and properly rejected; and
- Jonathan refused to provide financial information showing eligibility for appointed counsel (Owen requires an “appropriate inquiry” into financial ability).

The decision is a strong reaffirmation that:

Courts may treat persistent, informed insistence on self‑representation — even combined with later strategic silence — as a binding waiver of counsel.
Defendants cannot manufacture reversible error by selectively refusing to answer straightforward questions about counsel after long, clear warnings.
“Sovereign citizen”‑type filings and rhetoric do not, by themselves, trigger incompetence or negate a prior valid Faretta waiver, absent more concrete evidence of incapacity.

From a practical standpoint, this opinion serves as a model for trial judges handling difficult pro se defendants: create a robust record of repeated warnings, ensure standby counsel is present, and document defendants’ silence or refusal to cooperate so that an appellate court can confidently uphold the waiver.

3.2 Statutory and Constitutional Speedy Trial Rights

3.2.1 Statutory Speedy Trial Act Analysis

The Speedy Trial Act (18 U.S.C. § 3161) imposes:

a 30‑day limit from arrest to indictment (§ 3161(b)); and
a 70‑day limit from indictment (or first appearance) to trial (§ 3161(c)(1)).

However, § 3161(h) enumerates multiple categories of excludable delay. Three categories were crucial here:

Codefendant delay – § 3161(h)(6): Excludes “[a] reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has been granted.”
Competency proceedings – § 3161(h)(1)(A): Excludes “[a]ny period of delay resulting from any proceeding, including any examinations, to determine the mental competency of the defendant.”
Ends‑of‑justice continuances – § 3161(h)(7): Permits exclusion when a judge finds that “the ends of justice served” by a continuance outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, considering factors including whether failure to continue would deny the defendant “reasonable time to obtain counsel” (§ 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv)).

Chronology:

Arrest: July 8, 2020
Indictment and arraignment: April 22, 2021 (~9.5 months later)
Final co‑defendant’s initial appearance (after extradition from Colombia): July 28, 2022
Order for competency evaluations: early August 2022
Trial: July 17, 2023 (about 2+ years after indictment)

The court held that the entire period between arrest and trial contained only excludable delay:

Codefendant‑related delay: The government originally waited to proceed, hoping to try all defendants together, and significant time was consumed by extradition from Colombia. Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, reasonableness is judged by totality of circumstances, prejudice, and length of delay (United States v. Davenport). The panel pointed to United States v. Mendoza‑Cecelia (18‑month delay held reasonable) as analogous.
Competency evaluations: Once the final co‑defendant was extradited, the district court ordered competency evaluations for all four defendants. That period was automatically excluded under § 3161(h)(1)(A).
Ends‑of‑justice continuances to obtain/replace counsel: After competency was confirmed, both Jonathan and Jordan sought to “obtain” their own counsel (while rejecting court‑appointed counsel), prompting the court to continue the trial and explicitly find that the delay was “caused” by the brothers and necessary to allow them time to resolve counsel issues. This was within the “broad discretion” recognized in United States v. Henry and reaffirmed in United States v. Ogiekpolor (2024).

Notably, the brothers did not meaningfully challenge the sufficiency of the district court’s on‑the‑record “ends‑of‑justice” findings, and they never sought severance to avoid codefendant‑related delay.

Given those exclusions, the court held that fewer than 70 non‑excludable days elapsed between indictment and trial, so there was no statutory violation. The same analysis essentially shielded the pre‑indictment delay.

3.2.2 Constitutional Sixth Amendment Analysis

The constitutional analysis under the Sixth Amendment follows the four‑factor Barker v. Wingo test:

Length of delay: A delay of about two years from indictment to trial is “presumptively prejudicial” (see United States v. Dunn), triggering full Barker analysis.
Reason for delay:
- Neutral or valid causes: Extradition of codefendants from Colombia, coordination of a multi‑defendant case, and competency examinations were at worst neutral, and in part valid, reasons (Davenport described similar delays as “inherent to the government’s good faith effort to conduct a complex, joint trial”).
- Defendant‑caused delay: The brothers’ shifting positions on counsel, firing appointed counsel, and late‑breaking attempts to claim they were “seeking” counsel after long periods of insisting on self‑representation were attributable to them.
Assertion of the right: The court noted the brothers complained of delay but primarily in the context of their broader “sovereign citizen” rhetoric and RFRA themes. Their stance was inconsistent and bound up with self‑representation tactics, undermining the weight of this factor.
Prejudice: Eleventh Circuit law requires a showing of actual prejudice unless the first three Barker factors weigh “heavily” against the government (Davenport). Here they did not. The brothers did not even attempt to show specific prejudice (e.g., lost witnesses or impaired defense). They argued only presumptive prejudice from length, which is insufficient under circuit precedent.

Because the reasons for delay were not heavily weighted against the government, and because no actual prejudice was shown, the court found no constitutional speedy trial violation.

Collectively, this portion of the opinion illustrates how, in complex multi‑defendant, cross‑border prosecutions, the Act’s exclusions and the Barker framework intersect to tolerate substantial delays — especially where defendants themselves contribute to the timing problems.

3.3 RFRA and Religion‑Based Defenses

3.3.1 Background on RFRA

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb‑4, provides that the federal government may not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion unless it demonstrates that application of the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. RFRA is enforceable as:

a basis for affirmative claims; and
a defense in criminal cases to federal laws that substantially burden sincere religious exercise.

In theory, the Grenons might have argued that prosecuting them for distributing MMS substantially burdened their religious practice (treating MMS as sacrament), requiring strict scrutiny.

3.3.2 Failure to Preserve a RFRA Defense

The opinion stresses a basic but critical appellate rule: issues must be clearly presented to the district court to be preserved on appeal. The Eleventh Circuit notes:

Pro se filings are construed liberally (Tannenbaum v. United States), but the court is not required to invent arguments or theories not actually advanced.
To preserve an issue, a party must “clearly present it to the district court, in such a way as to afford the district court an opportunity to recognize and rule on it” (United States v. Pon, quoting Juris v. Inamed Corp.).

Here, the panel agreed with the district court that the Grenons did not raise a RFRA‑based motion to dismiss:

Jonathan’s statements at his initial appearance — that “the First Amendment is being broken,” MMS is their “sacrament,” and calling the proceedings “against [their] religious rights” — were too vague and contextually tied to his “sovereign citizen” narrative to alert the court to a distinct RFRA claim.
The early motion to dismiss referenced “religious freedoms” allegedly violated by FDA “policies”, but did so within a mélange of arguments about “vessels,” a de facto corporate government, and inapplicability of federal “by‑laws” to “G‑d fearing sons.” The panel characterized this as sovereign‑citizen‑style rhetoric, not a discernible RFRA claim.
Later, when the government filed a motion in limine to preclude a RFRA defense before the jury, the district court expressly advised that RFRA was a question of law for the court, not the jury, and said that if the defendants wanted to invoke RFRA they needed to file a motion to dismiss. They never did.

Therefore, RFRA was not preserved for appeal. The court reviewed the issue, if at all, only for plain error.

3.3.3 Plain‑Error and Absence of Controlling Law

Under plain‑error review, the brothers faced a high bar: they needed to show (1) error, (2) that is plain (clear/obvious), (3) affecting substantial rights, and (4) seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

The panel emphasized that “when neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has resolved an issue, there can be no plain error” (United States v. Alfonso). Because the brothers could not point to controlling precedent holding RFRA compels dismissal in analogous FDCA‑type prosecutions involving MMS‑like “sacraments,” and had not properly raised the issue, the court found no plain error.

Importantly, the court never reached the substantive RFRA question — i.e., whether Genesis II was a genuine religious organization or a sham and whether MMS distribution was protected religious exercise. That issue is left completely unresolved, because the defense was not properly invoked.

From a practice perspective, this section is a strong signal that:

Courts will not treat scattered First Amendment or “religious rights” references as sufficient to invoke RFRA.
Defendants (even pro se) must make RFRA arguments expressly, in a recognizable procedural vehicle (e.g., motion to dismiss), to preserve them.
Post‑trial, new RFRA arguments raised for the first time on appeal are highly unlikely to succeed on plain‑error review absent clear on‑point precedent.

3.4 Post‑Loper Bright Use of FDA “Intended Use” Regulations

3.4.1 Statutory and Regulatory Context

The FDCA defines “drug” in relevant part as:

“articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals” — 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (emphasis added)

The FDA’s regulation at 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 defines “intended uses” in terms of the objective intent of the persons responsible for the labeling, inferred from their statements, labeling, advertising, etc.

In the indictment’s “regulatory framework” section, the government cited § 201.128 and relied on the concept of “intended use” to show that MMS was a “drug” (because it was sold as curing or treating disease) and that it was unapproved and misbranded.

At trial:

The government’s expert testimony discussed the definition of “drug” and how MMS fit that definition.
The jury was instructed that a product’s “intended use” is what a reasonable person would conclude the manufacturer
or seller intended, based on labeling, promotional materials, advertising, oral statements, and the circumstances of distribution.

The brothers did not object at trial. On appeal — after the Supreme Court decided Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which rejected Chevron deference — they argued the district court had improperly “deferred” to FDA’s regulatory interpretation rather than independently construing the statute.

3.4.2 The Court’s Use of Post‑Loper Bright Principles

Loper Bright held that courts may not defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes in the Chevron sense. Instead, courts must exercise their own independent judgment about statutory meaning. However, Loper Bright expressly allows courts to consider agency views as persuasive and to follow them if they reflect the best reading of the statute.

The Eleventh Circuit’s key moves in response to the Grenons’ argument were:

Factual clarification: The jury instructions did not simply parrot § 201.128. Instead, the court used a reasonable‑person formulation:
“A product's intended use is what a reasonable person would conclude the manufacturer or seller intended based on all the relevant information,” including labels, promotional materials, advertising, oral representations, and circumstances of distribution.
That is essentially common‑sense language consistent with the statutory phrase “intended for use.”
Expert testimony grounded in statute, not regulation: The expert testified using the statutory definition of “drug” and considered labeling and promotional materials to determine “intended use.” The court emphasized that no special deference to the regulatory text was shown.
Overlap vs. deference: The panel drew an important distinction: even if a regulation defines a statutory term, there is no problem if the trial court’s instructions simply reflect the plain meaning of the statute, even where that overlaps with the regulatory language. What Loper Bright forbids is substituting the agency’s interpretation for the court’s own, not a court independently adopting the same interpretation.
“To the extent that a regulatory definition overlaps with the plain meaning of the statute, it is not error when the district court admits expert testimony or crafts a jury instruction consistent with that plain meaning.”
No plain error without clear post‑Loper authority: The court further held that, even if one could argue the district court had erred, the error was not “plain” because no Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit case had yet explained the implications of Loper Bright for FDA’s “intended uses” regulations. Absent controlling authority, Alfonso precludes finding plain error.

3.4.3 Significance

While unpublished, this is an early example of how a federal appellate court in the post‑Loper Bright era will treat longstanding FDA regulations:

Courts will continue to use agency definitions where they coincide with the best reading of the statutory text, but will characterize that as application of plain meaning, not deference.
Attacks on FDA regulations in criminal cases, especially when raised for the first time on appeal, face substantial hurdles on plain‑error review unless there is a direct conflict between the regulation and the statute.
Defendants seeking to leverage Loper Bright must do more than argue “any reference to a regulation equals deference”; they must show that the court abdicated its interpretive role or adopted an agency view inconsistent with statutory text.

For FDCA practitioners, the case suggests that the concept of “intended use,” as operationalized through labels, advertising, and seller representations, remains firmly embedded in how juries will be instructed and how experts will testify, despite the demise of Chevron.

3.5 Collateral Bar Rule and Criminal Contempt for Violating Civil Injunctions

3.5.1 Elements of Criminal Contempt

To sustain a criminal contempt conviction, the government must prove (as articulated in United States v. Robinson):

The court entered a lawful order of reasonable specificity;
The defendant violated that order; and
The defendant did so willfully.

The contempt charges here were based on the TRO and preliminary injunction issued in the prior civil FDA enforcement action. Those orders barred the Grenons and Genesis II from distributing MMS.

3.5.2 The Collateral Bar Rule

The “collateral bar rule,” reaffirmed in United States v. Straub, generally prohibits a defendant in a criminal contempt proceeding from challenging the validity of the underlying order as a defense. The logic is:

Court orders must be obeyed unless and until they are stayed, modified, or reversed on direct review.
Allowing collateral attacks in the contempt proceeding would undermine the authority and stability of court orders.

There are narrow exceptions, as suggested in In re Novak, for cases where:

The issuing court lacked subject‑matter jurisdiction; or
The order is transparently invalid in a way that makes obedience unreasonable.

None of those exceptions were plausibly raised here.

3.5.3 Application to the Grenons’ Jury‑Trial Argument

The brothers argued that the TRO and preliminary injunction were not “lawful orders” because they had been entered without a jury trial in the civil case. They contended that, lacking a jury, those orders violated their Seventh Amendment rights and thus could not support criminal contempt.

The panel rejected this argument outright as barred by the collateral bar rule:

Any alleged constitutional defect in the civil process — such as denial of a jury trial — had to be raised in the civil case or on appeal from that civil case, not in the criminal contempt proceeding.
The Grenons never appeared in the civil case, never requested a jury, and did not appeal the injunctions.
No claim was made that the civil court lacked subject‑matter jurisdiction or that the orders were transparently beyond its power; rather, the argument went to procedural regularity.

Consequently, the TRO and preliminary injunction remained “lawful orders” for purposes of the contempt convictions, and the contempt counts stood untouched.

This reinforces the strong national rule that defectively‑obtained injunctions — even allegedly unconstitutional ones — must still be obeyed until properly vacated, except in rare, clearly defined circumstances.

3.6 Sentencing Issues

3.6.1 Guidelines Enhancements and the Keene “Same‑Sentence” Doctrine

The presentence investigation reports (PSRs) calculated guideline ranges of 151–188 months for each brother. Enhancements were applied for:

Number of victims;
Vulnerable victims;
Number of vulnerable victims; and
Loss amount (over $1 million in revenue).

The brothers did not lodge specific, line‑item objections to these enhancements. At sentencing, they made only generalized assertions that there were “no victims,” no “valid claim by a man or woman,” and therefore no restitution — rhetoric that the court reasonably read as attacking the legitimacy of the prosecution rather than contesting guideline facts.

On appeal, they argued that the district court should have construed their amorphous statements as objections and found those enhancements unsupported, making their sentences procedurally unreasonable.

The Eleventh Circuit invoked United States v. Keene:

When a district court explicitly states that it would impose the same sentence regardless of any potential guideline‑calculation error, an error in the guideline calculation is harmless if the resulting sentence is substantively reasonable.

Here, the sentencing judge expressly stated that the brothers’ sentences “would be the same regardless of the additional enhancements.” Accordingly, the panel bypassed a granular guideline analysis and proceeded to evaluate substantive reasonableness under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

3.6.2 Substantive Reasonableness (Irey / § 3553(a))

Substantive reasonableness is reviewed for abuse of discretion (United States v. Irey): a sentence will be reversed only if the court:

Failed to consider a factor due significant weight;
Gave significant weight to an improper factor; or
Committed a clear error of judgment.

The Eleventh Circuit highlighted these aggravating facts:

The brothers had no criminal history, but their conduct was serious and prolonged.
They sold MMS over a period of years, reaching hundreds of victims, many gravely ill (cancer, Alzheimer’s, HIV/AIDS, etc.).
They earned over $120,000 per month, totaling over a million dollars.
They continued selling MMS even after the TRO and preliminary injunction were entered in the civil case, demonstrating willful defiance of court orders.

Given these circumstances, the panel had no “definite and firm conviction” that a clear error of judgment had occurred. The 151‑month sentences — at the bottom of the guideline range — were within “the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case” (Irey), and thus substantively reasonable even if the guideline enhancements had been misapplied.

3.6.3 PSR Timing and Rule 32(e)(2)

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(e)(2) requires that the PSR be disclosed to the defendant at least 35 days before sentencing unless waived.

The PSRs were made available 42 days before sentencing, but the brothers had refused to accept court documents generally. Prior to sentencing, the probation office hand‑delivered the reports to them in jail, and at sentencing Jordan confirmed he had seen his report.

The panel acknowledged a technical violation of Rule 32(e)(2) — the brothers did not physically receive the reports 35 days in advance — but deemed it harmless (United States v. Willis):

The delay was a direct consequence of the brothers’ refusal to accept documents.
They had the reports before the hearing and made no specific objections linked to the timing.
They demonstrated no prejudice from any shortened review period.

3.6.4 Sentencing Disparity with Co‑Defendants

Jordan also argued that his sentence was unreasonably harsh compared to two co‑defendants (father and third brother), who received 60‑month sentences.

Section 3553(a)(6) instructs sentencing courts to consider the need to avoid unwarranted disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of “similar conduct.”

The court rejected the argument because:

The co‑defendants were not convicted of the same set of offenses — they were convicted only on the conspiracy count, not criminal contempt.
The government dismissed the contempt counts as to those co‑defendants due to limitations in the extradition agreement with Colombia, not because their conduct was less culpable.
Thus, they were not similarly situated for purposes of § 3553(a)(6).

The opinion underscores that sentencing disparity arguments must compare true “apples to apples”: same or similar conduct, similar conviction profiles, and similar culpability.

4. Clarifying Complex Concepts and Doctrines

4.1 Faretta Hearing and Faretta‑Like Monologue

Faretta hearing: A colloquy where the judge explains to a defendant the right to counsel, the dangers of self‑representation, and the rules governing trial, and then asks whether the defendant still wishes to proceed without a lawyer.
Faretta‑like monologue (Garey): When a defendant refuses to answer questions or is obstructive, the court may, instead of a dialogue, make a detailed statement on the record about the defendant’s rights and risks. If the record shows the defendant understands and nonetheless persists in refusing counsel, the waiver can be valid.

4.2 Speedy Trial Act vs. Sixth Amendment

Speedy Trial Act: A statutory scheme (18 U.S.C. § 3161) setting specific timeframes (30 days to indictment; 70 days to trial) with detailed exclusions for certain delays (e.g., codefendants, motions, competency exams, ends‑of‑justice continuances).
Sixth Amendment right: A constitutional guarantee evaluated under Barker v. Wingo, focusing on:
- length of delay,
- reason for delay,
- whether the defendant asserted the right, and
- prejudice to the defendant.
The Act and the Constitution are related but distinct. Compliance with the Act does not automatically guarantee compliance with the Constitution, though the same facts often support both findings.

4.3 Plain‑Error Review

Plain‑error review applies when an issue was not properly raised in the district court:

There must be an error;
The error must be plain — clear or obvious under current law;
The error must affect substantial rights (usually meaning it affected the outcome); and
The error must seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

If there is no binding precedent on point, the Eleventh Circuit will rarely find plain error (Alfonso).

4.4 RFRA as a Defense

RFRA requires a defendant to show that a federal action substantially burdens a sincere religious exercise.
If that is shown, the government must prove a compelling interest and that it used the least restrictive means.
RFRA is not self‑executing: defendants must clearly articulate a RFRA claim or defense in a motion or other pleading, rather than making generic references to “religious rights.”

4.5 Collateral Bar Rule

A person subject to a court order must obey first, challenge later.
If they violate the order, they cannot usually defend a criminal contempt charge by arguing that the underlying order was unlawful.
Exceptions are narrow (e.g., no jurisdiction) and were not present here.

4.6 Loper Bright and Agency Regulations

Pre‑Loper (Chevron): Courts often deferred to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.
Loper Bright: Courts must independently interpret statutes and cannot defer in the Chevron sense to agency interpretations as binding.
Still allowed: Courts may consider agency interpretations and adopt them if they are persuasive and consistent with statutory text.
In Grenon: Jury instructions and expert testimony mirrored FDA’s “intended use” concepts but were grounded in a plain‑meaning reading of the FDCA, not in Chevron deference.

4.7 Keene “Same‑Sentence Regardless” Doctrine

If a sentencing court explicitly states it would impose the same sentence even if the guideline calculation were different, appellate courts can affirm without resolving alleged guideline errors if the sentence is substantively reasonable.
This doctrine encourages sentencing judges to provide such statements where appropriate and makes it harder to win appeals based solely on guideline disputes.

5. Impact and Future Implications

5.1 Treatment of “Sovereign Citizen” and Similar Pro Se Litigants

The opinion provides a blueprint for trial courts dealing with defendants who:

Disavow standard legal concepts;
Refuse to accept counsel while simultaneously insinuating they might want counsel;
File unconventional or “bizarre” documents; and
Switch tactics close to trial to raise delay or competence concerns.

The Eleventh Circuit approves robust use of Faretta colloquies, appointment of standby counsel, and a willingness to treat silence and refusal to engage as continuation of an earlier valid waiver. This minimizes the ability of such litigants to derail proceedings or secure reversal based on their own obstruction.

5.2 Speedy Trial in Multi‑Defendant, Cross‑Border Cases

The case reaffirms that significant delays can be permissible when:

Multiple defendants must be extradited from foreign countries, and foreign legal systems inherently take time; and
Defendants’ own actions (e.g., firing counsel, late attempts to retain counsel) require additional time.

It emphasizes:

The importance of clear, on‑the‑record “ends‑of‑justice” findings;
The possibility of “reasonable” exclusion of lengthy codefendant‑related delays under § 3161(h)(6); and
The high bar for establishing constitutional speedy trial violations without specific prejudice.

5.3 RFRA in FDCA and Public‑Health Prosecutions

While the court did not reach the merits, Grenon has two practical implications for RFRA in this context:

Defendants cannot rely on generic religious language or prior civil filings to preserve RFRA defenses. They must expressly invoke RFRA and target specific government actions.
Given the evidentiary record (the “nonreligious church” designed to avoid regulation), future attempts to cloak MMS‑type schemes in RFRA may face significant skepticism, although that question remains legally open.

5.4 Post‑Loper Bright FDCA Prosecutions

The decision suggests that, in the Eleventh Circuit:

Use of FDA regulatory definitions and frameworks in jury instructions and expert testimony remains permissible when those definitions track the statute’s plain meaning.
Loper Bright does not bar courts from relying on longstanding regulatory concepts such as “intended use” when they are consistent with, and merely instantiate, statutory terms.
Defendants raising post‑Loper challenges for the first time on appeal will rarely satisfy the plain‑error standard in the absence of clear conflicting authority.

5.5 Collateral Bar and Enforcement of Public‑Health Injunctions

Grenon confirms that courts will enforce civil injunctions through criminal contempt even in controversial or novel regulated areas (like alternative “church‑based” health claims). Those subject to such injunctions must:

Obey them immediately; and
Pursue challenges on direct appeal or through appropriate civil motions, not by unilateral noncompliance.

5.6 Sentencing—Guidelines vs. § 3553(a)

Finally, the case reinforces three sentencing messages:

The Eleventh Circuit gives substantial deference to district courts that carefully articulate § 3553(a) reasons, especially where vulnerable victims and defiance of court orders are involved.
Alleged guideline errors may be practically irrelevant if the sentencing judge states on the record that the same sentence would be imposed regardless and the sentence is substantively justifiable.
Sentencing disparity arguments under § 3553(a)(6) must focus on defendants with similar records and comparable convictions. Extraterritorial constraints (like extradition agreements) can legitimately differentiate defendants.

6. Conclusion

United States v. Grenon is officially unpublished and thus non‑precedential in the Eleventh Circuit, but it provides a detailed and instructive application of several important doctrines in a factually vivid setting: a high‑volume, pseudo‑religious bleach‑as‑medicine scheme pursued through both civil and criminal enforcement.

Key takeaways include:

A reaffirmation of rigorous but flexible Faretta procedures, allowing courts to treat persistent, informed insistence on self‑representation — even coupled with silence — as a valid waiver of counsel.
Confirmation that substantial delays in multi‑defendant, cross‑border cases can be consistent with both the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment, particularly when defendants contribute to delay and cannot show actual prejudice.
A strong signal that RFRA defenses must be clearly and procedurally correctly raised; stray invocations of “religious rights” are insufficient to preserve complex statutory defenses.
Early post‑Loper Bright guidance that FDCA prosecutions may continue to rely on longstanding FDA interpretive frameworks, including “intended use,” so long as they reflect the statute’s plain meaning and are not treated as binding because of Chevron‑style deference.
A strict application of the collateral bar rule to contempt prosecutions arising from civil orders, underscoring that the place to challenge an injunction is in that case or on direct appeal, not by defying it.
Robust application of the Keene “same‑sentence regardless” doctrine and deference to district courts’ § 3553(a) analysis, particularly where vulnerable victims, high profits, and defiance of judicial orders are present.

Taken together, the opinion illustrates how federal courts are likely to handle similar prosecutions involving self‑styled religious or “sovereign” entities in the public‑health and consumer‑protection arena, and how they will navigate agency regulations, constitutional claims, and procedural safeguards in a post‑Loper Bright landscape.