United States v. Goldy: “Official Act” Is a Legal Definition for the Court; § 666 Requires State-Level Funding Proof Without a Bribe-to-Federal-Funds Nexus

I. Introduction

United States v. Ronnie Lee Goldy arises from a corruption prosecution of an elected Kentucky Commonwealth Attorney (a county prosecutor) alleged to have exchanged prosecutorial assistance for sexual acts and sexually explicit images from a young adult woman, M.H., who faced repeated criminal justice involvement. A jury convicted Goldy of Honest Services Wire Fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346), Travel Act violations (18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3)), and Federal Program Bribery (18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B)).

On appeal, Goldy challenged (1) limits placed on his trial testimony about Kentucky law and whether his conduct involved an “official act”; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence as to interstate nexus, the federal funding element of § 666, and quid pro quo; (3) whether the evidence showed illegal bribes as opposed to permissible gratuities under Snyder v. United States; and (4) two sentencing issues—an alcohol-related supervised release condition and the district court’s refusal to consider collateral consequences (disbarment and loss of income) as mitigating factors.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed across the board. It held that the district court properly curtailed Goldy’s attempt to present what amounted to expert legal opinion (and in part, argument) about Kentucky law to negate “official act” status. The panel emphasized that the legal definition of an “official act” is for the court to supply, while the jury decides whether the defendant agreed to perform such an act as part of a quid pro quo.

The court also rejected Goldy’s sufficiency attacks:

• Interstate nexus: Evidence that Facebook/Apple messaging necessarily routed communications through out-of-state servers, plus the general “internet transmission” principle, supported federal jurisdiction for Wire Fraud and Travel Act counts.
• § 666 federal funding element: Trial evidence that the Commonwealth of Kentucky received federal funds exceeding $10,000 and that Commonwealth Attorneys are state officers sufficed—particularly given Goldy’s failure to preserve a more granular, nexus-based instructional theory.
• Quid pro quo: Text messages and M.H.’s testimony overwhelmingly supported a bribery-style exchange of “things of value” for prosecutorial assistance.

The panel further held that Snyder did not convert the evidence into “gratuities”; the timing of the agreement—not merely the timing of delivery—controlled. Finally, the supervised-release alcohol condition and the district court’s adherence to Sixth Circuit law on collateral consequences did not constitute plain error.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Outcome)

1. Defining honest-services bribery and “official acts”

• Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010): The opinion uses Skilling to anchor the honest-services theory: § 1346 covers only bribery and kickbacks, not generalized “ethical lapses.” This narrowed framework forced the appellate analysis to focus on bribery’s core components—quid pro quo and “official act”—rather than broader misconduct narratives.
• McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550 (2016): McDonnell supplies the controlling two-part structure for “official act” (a pending or potentially pending “question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy,” and an action/decision—or agreement to act—on that matter). The Sixth Circuit used McDonnell to reject Goldy’s attempt to narrow “official acts” via Kentucky jurisdiction/probation technicalities and to reiterate that routine facilitation alone (“setting up a meeting, calling another public official”) is not enough unless used to pressure or advise in a way intended to form the basis of an official act.
• Snyder v. United States, 603 U.S. 1 (2024): The court treats Snyder as extending the “official act” requirement to § 666 and as clarifying that § 666 does not criminalize mere gratuities. But it also uses Snyder’s “rewarded” discussion to defeat Goldy’s timing defense: post-act delivery does not negate bribery if the agreement preceded the act.
• United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398 (1999): Cited for the quid pro quo formulation—“a specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an official act.” The panel used this to frame the sufficiency question and to characterize Goldy’s “no meeting of the minds” argument as incompatible with the record viewed in the government’s favor.

2. Right to present a defense vs. evidentiary limits on legal opinion

• Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986): Goldy invoked Crane’s guarantee of a “meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” The court did not dispute the principle; instead it held the record refuted the premise (Goldy was allowed factual testimony and argument about probation/jurisdiction) and that the excluded material was improper legal/expert opinion that would usurp the court’s role.

3. Preserving sufficiency arguments and standards of review

• United States v. Osborne, 886 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2018): Supplies the waiver rule: when a Rule 29 motion asserts specific grounds, unasserted grounds are waived.
• United States v. Mercer-Kinser, 149 F.4th 870 (6th Cir. 2025): The panel relied on this to soften strict waiver where the district court itself raised and discussed the missing sufficiency issues, making waiver “not entirely clear.”
• United States v. Maya, 966 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2020); Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237 (2016); United States v. Steele, 919 F.3d 965 (6th Cir. 2019): Together provide the sufficiency framework—viewing evidence in the government’s favor and asking only whether any rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, while deferring to credibility choices supporting the verdict.

4. Interstate nexus via internet communications

• United States v. Napier, 787 F.3d 333 (6th Cir. 2015): Central to affirmance on the interstate element. The opinion quotes Napier for the proposition that internet transmission is sufficient circumstantial evidence of interstate wires.
• United States v. Drummond, 255 F. App'x 60 (6th Cir. 2007): Reinforces Napier’s logic in an unpublished decision.
• United States v. Shah, 95 F.4th 328 (5th Cir. 2024): Cited as confirmatory out-of-circuit authority that internet use supplies the “interstate hook.”

5. § 666’s federal funding element and the “nexus” debate

• Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667 (2000): Goldy relied on Fischer’s warning against turning “almost every act of fraud or bribery into a federal offense,” urging a program-structure inquiry. The Sixth Circuit distinguished this reliance by invoking binding circuit precedent rejecting a bribe-to-federal-funds nexus requirement.
• United States v. Suarez, 263 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2001): The controlling circuit authority for the proposition that § 666 “does not require a nexus between the alleged bribes and the federal funding received by the recipient agency.” The panel also flagged Goldy’s misleading reliance on the Suarez dissent.
• United States v. Sullivan, No. 3:17-cr-00012, 2018 WL 4924093 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 10, 2018): Used to support the “state-level” framing—if the defendant is a state agent, the government need prove the state received the funds, “not any particular agency or program.”
• Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment): The concurrence is cited to acknowledge serious federalism-based criticisms of broad § 666 coverage—critiques Goldy sought to harness—even though they do not reflect controlling limits adopted by the Sixth Circuit.

6. Plain error (jury instructions and sentencing conditions)

• United States v. Hoyle, 148 F.4th 396 (6th Cir. 2025): States the standard four-part plain error test.
• United States v. Robinson, 133 F.4th 712 (6th Cir. 2025): Adds a jury-instruction-specific gloss: instructions must be “so clearly erroneous as to likely produce a grave miscarriage of justice,” and any claimed mistake must be “clear under current law.”
• United States v. Prather, 138 F.4th 963 (6th Cir. 2025); United States v. Thompson, 119 F.4th 445 (6th Cir. 2024): Provide plain-error review framing for unpreserved supervised release challenges.
• United States v. Penaloza, 648 F. App'x 508 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Inman, 666 F.3d 1001 (6th Cir. 2012): Support the legality and reasonableness of a condition requiring a defendant to “refrain from excessive use of alcohol,” reflecting statutory authorization and public-protection/rehabilitation goals.

7. Sentencing and collateral consequences

• Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481 (2022): Cited by Goldy for a broad view of what sentencing courts may consider. The Sixth Circuit did not reject Concepcion outright; rather, it found no “plain” error because the district court followed binding circuit precedent restricting reliance on collateral consequences as mitigation.
• United States v. Bistline, 665 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2012) and United States v. Musgrave, 761 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2014): The pivotal constraints. They stand for the proposition (as applied here) that sentencing courts may not treat collateral consequences—such as disbarment, reputational harm, or income loss—as reasons to reduce the seriousness of the offense or lower the sentence in a way that would create inequities and undercut uniformity.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. “Official act” is defined by the court; the jury applies it

The opinion’s core evidentiary holding is role-based: legal meaning is for the judge, facts for the jury. Goldy sought to testify—based on his experience—as to Kentucky law and the Kentucky criminal process to argue that M.H.’s legal posture (probation/jurisdiction) meant his conduct could not be an “official act” (or part of an “official proceeding”). The district court allowed factual testimony but blocked Goldy from “explain[ing] the law to the jury,” including opinions “contrary to law,” and from contradicting the court’s own legal determinations.

The Sixth Circuit framed this not as “wholesale exclusion” but as a conventional limit on unqualified expert testimony and on testimony that would invade the judge’s province. Importantly, the panel underscored that federal “official act” analysis comes from McDonnell and § 201(a)(3), not from a defendant’s interpretation of state-law jurisdictional nuances. The jury’s task was to decide whether Goldy agreed to perform the “official act” as defined in the instructions, not to decide what the legal definition should be.

2. Sufficiency: internet routing, state-level funding proof, and overwhelming quid pro quo evidence

On the interstate element, the court treated Agent Holliday’s testimony about server routing as sufficient and bolstered it with Sixth Circuit precedent that internet transmission itself typically satisfies the interstate nexus. This approach reflects pragmatic jurisdictional proof: the government need not map every packet route; it needs enough circumstantial evidence for a rational juror.

On § 666’s federal funding element, the opinion is as much about preservation and standards of review as it is about statutory meaning. Goldy’s trial acceptance of the jury instruction (requiring only that the Commonwealth of Kentucky received qualifying federal benefits and that Goldy was its agent) made any appellate “more granular nexus” theory, at best, a late-arising instructional complaint subject to stringent plain-error review. Under that review, Sixth Circuit law (especially Suarez) foreclosed any claim that it was “clear or obvious” error not to require proof that the bribe related to the specific federal program or that the particular judicial district received the funds.

On quid pro quo, the panel emphasized the appellate lens: it must view the record in the government’s favor. The messages and M.H.’s testimony provided repeated, explicit linkage between sexual content/acts and prosecutorial assistance (warrants, release, reductions, dismissals). The court thus rejected Goldy’s attempt to recast the exchange as unsolicited “gifts” or “gratuities.”

3. Snyder and the bribery-vs.-gratuity line

Goldy’s most doctrinally current argument invoked Snyder to claim that sexually explicit content was a “gratuity” rather than a bribe. The Sixth Circuit answered with Snyder’s own limiting principle: the critical distinction is whether there was an agreement before the official act (bribery), not whether the benefit arrived after (which still may be bribery if agreed-to beforehand). Because the record showed a continuing arrangement and contemporaneous bargaining (“incentive never hurt”), Snyder did not help Goldy.

4. Sentencing: “excessive alcohol” condition and collateral consequences

The court disposed of the alcohol condition on plain-error grounds. Even assuming arguendo the condition was unnecessary given the PSR’s description of Goldy’s alcohol use, Goldy failed to show prejudice to substantial rights or harm to the integrity of proceedings—requirements that are not presumed.

On disbarment and lost income, the opinion’s logic was straightforward: even if broader sentencing principles might permit consideration of many personal circumstances, it cannot be “plain error” for a district judge to follow binding Sixth Circuit precedent (Bistline, Musgrave) that constrains reliance on collateral consequences as a mitigating basis for reducing punishment severity.

C. Impact

• Clarifies boundaries of defendant testimony in public-corruption trials: The decision reinforces that defendants cannot use “experience” to deliver quasi-expert instruction on state law to reframe federal elements like “official act,” especially where the judge has already ruled on the legal framework. Expect trial courts in the Sixth Circuit to cite Goldy when limiting testimony that effectively argues the law through the witness stand.
• Reaffirms broad, circuit-settled § 666 funding proof: By leaning on Suarez and rejecting the “granular nexus” theory as neither preserved nor “clear under current law,” the opinion strengthens prosecutors’ ability to prove § 666 with state-level evidence of federal benefits and the defendant’s agency relationship to the state.
• Strengthens practical jurisdiction proof for wire-based crimes: The court’s reliance on internet-routing principles and Napier supports continued use of circumstantial proof (platform routing/server architecture) to establish interstate commerce elements.
• Post-Snyder guidance: The opinion provides an early, concrete application of Snyder’s bribery/gratuity distinction in § 666 litigation, emphasizing “timing of agreement” over “timing of delivery.”

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Honest Services Wire Fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346): A form of wire fraud where the “scheme” is depriving the public of an official’s honest services through bribery or kickbacks. After Skilling, it does not cover vague conflicts of interest without bribery/kickbacks.
• Federal Program Bribery (§ 666): Criminalizes bribery involving agents of governments/organizations that receive at least $10,000 in federal benefits in a one-year period, where the bribery relates to transactions worth $5,000 or more. In the Sixth Circuit (per Suarez), the bribe need not be tied to the federal dollars themselves.
• Travel Act (18 U.S.C. § 1952): Targets use of interstate travel or facilities (including interstate communications) to promote certain unlawful activities. The “interstate” component is essential.
• Quid pro quo: Latin for “this for that.” In bribery law it means an exchange: something of value given or promised in return for an official act.
• “Official act” (post-McDonnell): Not every helpful act by an official qualifies. It requires action (or agreement to act) on a specific, focused governmental matter involving formal power. Pressure/advice aimed at another official’s decision can qualify.
• Rule 29 motion: A request for judgment of acquittal asserting the evidence is insufficient. If a defendant makes specific Rule 29 arguments, other grounds may be treated as waived on appeal.
• Plain error review: A demanding appellate standard used when an issue was not properly preserved. Relief typically requires a clear legal mistake that likely mattered to the outcome and seriously affects the proceedings’ fairness or legitimacy.
• Collateral consequences: Non-prison penalties that flow from conviction (e.g., disbarment, reputation damage, loss of employment). Sixth Circuit precedent limits using these consequences as a basis to reduce the seriousness of sentencing.
• Avowal testimony: Testimony taken outside the jury’s presence to preserve the record of excluded evidence for appellate review.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Goldy is a high-salience public corruption decision that consolidates several practical trial and appellate principles. Substantively, it applies McDonnell, Skilling, and Snyder to uphold bribery-based honest-services and § 666 convictions grounded in a sustained quid pro quo. Procedurally, it underscores that “official act” is a legal definition supplied by the court, not a topic for defendant “state-law” instruction masquerading as testimony, and it illustrates how preservation failures push defendants into the narrow corridor of plain-error review. Finally, it confirms (at least in the Sixth Circuit) that § 666’s federal funding element is satisfied at the state-benefits level without a bribe-to-federal-program nexus requirement, and it reiterates restrained appellate intervention in supervised release and sentencing decisions when objections were not timely made.