United States v. Gianatasio: Plain‑Error Limits on Challenging Sentencing Reliance on Self‑Incriminating Admissions and JSIN Data

United States v. Gianatasio: Plain‑Error Limits on Challenging Sentencing Reliance on Self‑Incriminating Admissions and JSIN Data

Introduction

In United States v. Gianatasio, No. 23-1631 (1st Cir. Nov. 4, 2025) (not for publication), the First Circuit affirmed a 144‑month sentence imposed following a guilty plea to one count of distributing child pornography and two counts of possession of child pornography. The district court substantially varied downward from a correctly calculated advisory Guidelines range of 210–262 months after expressing policy disagreement with the child‑pornography Guidelines and weighing mitigating factors, including the defendant’s detailed admissions and post‑offense rehabilitation.

On appeal, the defendant mounted both procedural and substantive reasonableness challenges. Procedurally, he argued—raising the point for the first time on appeal—that the court should not have considered his own uncorroborated confessions regarding uncharged conduct (a self‑reported photograph involving his sleeping daughter). Substantively, he argued that the court misused statistics from the Judiciary Sentencing Information (JSIN) platform, failed to adopt his proposed “guidelines‑based anchoring” method in light of ubiquitous enhancements, over‑relied on his uncharged admissions, and undervalued his cooperation and rehabilitation.

The First Circuit, applying plain‑error review to the unpreserved claims, rejected each argument and affirmed.

  • Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
  • Panel: Judges Gelpí, Thompson (author), and Kayatta
  • Date: November 4, 2025
  • Disposition: Sentence affirmed
  • Statutory ranges: 60–240 months (distribution); up to 240 months (possession)
  • Guidelines range: 210–262 months
  • Sentence: 144 months (concurrent on all counts), a substantial downward variance
  • Plea waiver: Appeal waived up to 102 months; did not bar this appeal

Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed the sentence, holding:

  • Procedural reasonableness: No plain error in the district court’s consideration of the defendant’s confessions regarding uncharged conduct. The defendant neither objected below nor identified binding authority barring consideration of such admissions at sentencing, especially where he himself relied on those admissions as mitigating evidence of candor and acceptance. The district court treated the admissions cautiously (not as a sentencing “driver”) and chiefly as evidence of contrition and acceptance.
  • Substantive reasonableness: The below‑Guidelines sentence fell within the “wide universe of supportable sentencing outcomes.” None of the defendant’s arguments—concerning JSIN data, the court’s rejection of his proposed anchoring method, renewed objection to use of the uncharged admissions, or the weight assigned to cooperation/rehabilitation—demonstrated an abuse of discretion. A substantial downward variance typically defeats claims of substantive unreasonableness.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

  • Standards of review and preservation:
    • United States v. Tavares, 705 F.3d 4, 24 (1st Cir. 2013): Articulates review for procedural/substantive reasonableness claims (abuse of discretion for preserved claims; plain error for forfeited ones).
    • United States v. Sánchez‑Berríos, 424 F.3d 65, 74 (1st Cir. 2005) and United States v. Rodriguez, 311 F.3d 435, 437 (1st Cir. 2002): Distinguish waiver from forfeiture; waived issues generally cannot be resurrected; forfeited issues may be reviewed for plain error.
    • United States v. Acevedo‑Sueros, 826 F.3d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 2016): The court may assume plain‑error review where the claim fails even under that standard.
    • United States v. Cruz‑Ramos, 987 F.3d 27, 44 (1st Cir. 2021); United States v. Fargas‑Reyes, 125 F.4th 264, 270 (1st Cir. 2025): Plain error is demanding—error must be clear under binding authority, affect substantial rights, and seriously impair the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of proceedings.
    • United States v. McCullock, 991 F.3d 313, 317–18 (1st Cir. 2021); United States v. Correa‑Osorio, 784 F.3d 11, 22 (1st Cir. 2015): Plain‑error doctrine deters “sandbagging”; errors must be so obvious that the judge should have acted without objection.
  • Use of confessions and reliability at sentencing:
    • Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488–89 (1963): A conviction cannot rest on an uncorroborated confession. The panel distinguished this trial/conviction context from sentencing, and noted the lack of binding authority prohibiting reliance on the defendant’s self‑inculpatory admissions at sentencing—especially where the defendant himself urged the court to credit them as proof of acceptance.
    • United States v. Tavano, 12 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir. 1993): Sentencing must be based on reliable and accurate information. The panel found no clear authority rendering the district court’s measured consideration of the defendant’s own statements unreliable or impermissible.
  • Substantive reasonableness and variances:
    • United States v. Munyenyezi, 781 F.3d 532, 542 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Del Valle‑Rodríguez, 761 F.3d 171, 177 (1st Cir. 2014): There is no “perfect sentence”; many supportable outcomes exist.
    • United States v. Floyd, 740 F.3d 22, 39–40 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. Irizarry‑Sisco, 87 F.4th 38, 52 (1st Cir. 2023): A substantial downward variance typically makes a substantive unreasonableness challenge an uphill battle.
    • United States v. Azor, 881 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2017): Within‑Guidelines sentences are presumed reasonable; below‑Guidelines sentences are even harder to assail as too long.
    • United States v. Flores‑Gonzalez, 86 F.4th 399, 421 n.12 (1st Cir. 2023) (equally divided en banc; opinion of Thompson, J.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 181 (2024): Defines “variance” as a non‑Guidelines sentence based on § 3553(a) factors.
  • JSIN data and national statistics:
    • United States v. Brewster, 116 F.4th 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1148 (2025): Describes the JSIN platform as a tool for information on offenders sentenced under the same primary Guideline.
    • United States v. Joubert, 778 F.3d 247, 256 (1st Cir. 2015): Rejects the proposition that national statistics must be used to reduce a sentence; here, the defendant lacked binding authority requiring the court to “filter” JSIN data by removing within‑ and above‑Guidelines sentences.
    • United States v. Ruperto‑Rivera, 16 F.4th 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2021): Whether a claim is framed as procedural or substantive may not matter when the outcome under either lens is the same.
    • United States v. Langston, 110 F.4th 408, 419 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 581 (2024); United States v. Morosco, 822 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2016); United States v. Jones, 748 F.3d 64, 70, 73 (1st Cir. 2014): Under plain‑error review, the absence of binding on‑point authority supporting the challenger’s position generally defeats relief.
  • Considering and rejecting defense proposals; weighting mitigation:
    • United States v. Baptiste, 8 F.4th 30, 37 (1st Cir. 2021); United States v. Pupo, 995 F.3d 23, 30 (1st Cir. 2021); Morosco, 822 F.3d at 24: When a sentencing memorandum is reviewed, courts may infer the judge considered and rejected arguments rather than ignored them.
    • United States v. Tosi, 897 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 2018): Substantive arguments that merely rehash rejected procedural claims are unavailing.
    • United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 593 (1st Cir. 2011): A sentence is not substantively unreasonable simply because the court declined to assign the degree of weight to mitigation urged by the defendant.
    • United States v. Pinkham, 896 F.3d 133, 141 (1st Cir. 2018); Town of Norwood v. FERC, 202 F.3d 392, 405 (1st Cir. 2000): Undeveloped arguments are deemed abandoned; courts do not craft arguments for parties.

Legal Reasoning

The First Circuit’s reasoning turns on two pillars: (1) rigorous application of preservation and plain‑error principles, and (2) deference to the district court’s § 3553(a) balancing, particularly in the context of a substantial downward variance.

1) Procedural reasonableness: No plain error in considering self‑inculpatory admissions about uncharged conduct

The defendant’s principal procedural claim—that the district court erred by considering his self‑reported uncharged conduct (a photograph involving his sleeping daughter)—was raised for the first time on appeal. The court therefore applied plain‑error review and found none.

  • No binding prohibition: Although the defendant cited general propositions (e.g., Wong Sun’s corroboration rule for convictions and Tavano’s requirement of reliable information at sentencing), he identified no binding authority forbidding a sentencing court from considering a defendant’s own detailed, repeated admissions, particularly where he strategically relied on those admissions to seek leniency for extraordinary candor and acceptance.
  • Context and balance: The district judge explicitly stated it would be “a mistake” to have the uncharged conduct “drive” the sentence, mindful that it was not charged. The judge chiefly credited the admissions to enhance acceptance‑of‑responsibility considerations and as evidence of contrition, which factored into a substantial downward variance.
  • Sandbagging concerns: The panel emphasized that plain‑error review deters strategic silence. The defendant touted the admissions below as mitigating and later attempted to recast them as unreliable when convenient. Under McCullock, plain error must be “glaring” under binding law; this was not.

2) Substantive reasonableness: A substantial downward variance and a “wide universe” of outcomes

The substantive challenge confronted the First Circuit’s well‑worn observation that there is no “perfect sentence,” only a range of supportable outcomes. The 144‑month sentence represented a significant downward variance (66 months below the Guidelines floor).

  • JSIN data: The defendant argued the judge erred by relying on JSIN statistics without “filtering out” within‑ and above‑Guidelines sentences, especially after expressing policy disagreement with the Guidelines. Assuming forfeiture (and applying plain‑error review), the panel found no binding authority requiring such filtering. It noted that in Joubert the First Circuit had declined to mandate use of national statistics to drive a lower sentence; by parity of reasoning, it was not plain error to consult JSIN without the defense‑proposed edits. The court also observed that the claim would fail whether labeled procedural or substantive (Ruperto‑Rivera).
  • Defense “anchoring” method: The defendant urged a particular guidelines‑based formula excluding “ubiquitous” enhancements in child‑pornography cases. The district court reviewed the sentencing memorandum, expressly disagreed with child‑pornography Guideline policy judgments, and imposed a sentence “outside of and below” the advisory system while citing similar concerns. Under Baptiste/Pupo, it is fair to infer the court considered and rejected the defense’s precise method. Choosing not to adopt a defense rubric—while varying downward on overlapping policy grounds—is well within discretion.
  • Re‑packaged admissions argument: The substantive complaint about reliance on the uncharged admissions failed for the same reasons as the procedural challenge (Tosi).
  • Cooperation and rehabilitation: The district court repeatedly credited the defendant’s “extraordinary acceptance of responsibility,” “detailed interviews with investigators,” and “commendable” ongoing rehabilitation, but balanced those against signals of future dangerousness (“he couldn’t stop”). Under Clogston, a sentence is not substantively unreasonable merely because the court assigned less weight to mitigation than the defendant wanted.
  • “As a whole” arguments: Aggregating non‑meritorious arguments does not transform them into a successful substantive challenge.

Impact and Implications

  • Plain‑error rigor and issue preservation: The opinion underscores the First Circuit’s insistence that sentencing objections be raised in real time. When a defendant fails to object, relief requires “binding on‑point” authority compelling the claimed rule. Advocates should object contemporaneously to the use of particular information (e.g., uncharged conduct, data sets) or analytic methods, and offer their own reliable evidentiary proffers and frameworks.
  • Use of a defendant’s self‑inculpatory admissions at sentencing: The court’s approach confirms that, absent binding authority to the contrary, a district judge may consider a defendant’s own admissions about uncharged conduct when assessing § 3553(a) factors—especially where the defendant himself invites reliance as proof of acceptance and candor. Defense counsel should anticipate that volunteering uncharged conduct may carry both mitigating and aggravating valences. If reliability is disputed, that dispute must be joined below with specificity.
  • JSIN as a legitimate reference point: The panel’s treatment of JSIN suggests district courts in the First Circuit may consult JSIN data as one of many inputs without a mandatory duty to “filter out” within‑ or above‑Guidelines sentences. Parties seeking to shape the use of JSIN should present tailored, methodologically sound analyses and explain why any proposed filters are necessary to avoid distortion—preferably with supporting authority.
  • Child‑pornography Guidelines and policy variances: The district court’s policy disagreement with child‑pornography Guideline enhancements (often criticized as “ubiquitous”) led to a substantial downward variance. The First Circuit’s affirmance illustrates continued space for district‑level policy variances, while reminding defendants that even sizable downward variances may still yield double‑digit sentences that are difficult to overturn as too long.
  • Weighting acceptance and rehabilitation against public safety: The court approved balancing meaningful acceptance and rehabilitation against signs of recidivism risk and offense gravity. This reinforces that mitigation, though important, does not eclipse other § 3553(a) considerations, and that judges have broad leeway in assigning weights.
  • Appeal waivers and charging decisions: Although the plea agreement’s waiver did not bar this appeal (it applied only up to 102 months), the case is a reminder that waiver contours matter and that uncharged conduct can still factor into sentencing.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural looks at how the sentence was reached (correct Guideline calculations, accurate information, proper consideration of § 3553(a)); substantive asks whether the sentence’s length is reasonable given the totality of circumstances.
  • Waiver vs. forfeiture: Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right; forfeiture is the failure to timely assert it. Waived errors are generally unreviewable; forfeited errors may be reviewed for plain error.
  • Plain error: A stringent standard requiring a clear error under binding law that affects substantial rights and seriously undermines the fairness or integrity of the proceeding.
  • § 3553(a) factors: Statutory sentencing considerations such as the nature and circumstances of the offense, history and characteristics of the defendant, the need for deterrence and public protection, and the need to avoid unwarranted disparities.
  • Policy variance: A sentencing court’s decision to vary from the Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with a Guideline (e.g., believing child‑pornography enhancements overstate culpability).
  • JSIN (Judiciary Sentencing Information): A Judiciary tool providing national sentencing statistics for similarly situated offenders under the same primary Guideline. Courts may consult it as a reference point; there is no binding First Circuit rule mandating any particular “filtering” of JSIN data.
  • Acceptance of responsibility: Credit for acknowledging wrongdoing and cooperating—typically reduces Guideline offense level and can influence variance decisions, but does not control the outcome.

Conclusion

United States v. Gianatasio reinforces several practical and doctrinal points in federal sentencing review. First, preservation matters: unpreserved objections face the steep hill of plain‑error review, which demands binding, on‑point authority and a serious impact on fairness. Second, district courts may, within their ample discretion, consider a defendant’s own admissions about uncharged conduct—especially where the defendant affirmatively urges the court to credit them as evidence of contrition—while guarding against undue reliance when the conduct is uncharged. Third, JSIN can be consulted as one data point without any current First Circuit requirement to exclude within‑ or above‑Guidelines outcomes. Fourth, district courts retain broad authority to vary on policy grounds from the child‑pornography Guidelines, and substantial downward variances are rarely overturned as substantively unreasonable.

The opinion, while nonprecedential, offers clear guidance for practitioners: raise specific, timely objections to sentencing inputs and methods; support requests to shape JSIN usage with authority and methodology; and recognize that compelling mitigation must still be weighed against offense gravity and public‑safety concerns under the § 3553(a) framework.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

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