United States v. Gary: Elevating General Deterrence in Fentanyl-Death Cases – The Eleventh Circuit’s Refined Approach to § 3553(a) Balancing

Introduction

United States v. Chase Michael Gary, No. 24-11248 (11th Cir. May 15, 2025) is an unpublished but instructive decision in which the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a thirty-year sentence imposed on a defendant who distributed fentanyl inside a county jail, leading to the death of another inmate. Although the Court formally “merely” reviewed the substantive reasonableness of a guidelines-range sentence, the opinion carves out two practical guideposts that will resonate in future fentanyl-death prosecutions:

First, when distribution occurs in a custodial setting, the location itself may be treated as a “huge aggravator.”
Second, general deterrence—especially of fentanyl trafficking—can permissibly receive dominant weight in § 3553(a) balancing, even where a defendant presents powerful mitigation rooted in childhood trauma, addiction, and remorse.

The parties were the United States (appellee) and Chase Michael Gary (appellant). Gary pled guilty to one count of distribution of fentanyl resulting in death in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The district court (N.D. Fla.) imposed a 360-month (30-year) sentence, near the midpoint of the advisory range (324–405 months) but far above the 20-year mandatory minimum. Gary contended on appeal that the sentence was substantively unreasonable; the Eleventh Circuit disagreed.

Summary of the Judgment

Applying the deferential “abuse of discretion” standard, the Eleventh Circuit held:

The district court properly considered all relevant § 3553(a) factors.
It lawfully attached substantial weight to the aggravating circumstances—distribution of “lethal, potent” fentanyl inside a jail and the resulting death—while still acknowledging the defendant’s extensive mitigation.
A within-guidelines sentence that is well below the statutory maximum (life) is presumptively reasonable; Gary failed to rebut that presumption.
No clear error of judgment occurred; therefore, the 360-month sentence is “in the ballpark of permissible outcomes.”

The Court therefore affirmed the sentence.

Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022) – Reiterates the three-prong test for substantive reasonableness review; frequently quoted standard.
United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015) – Phrase “in the ballpark of permissible outcomes.”
United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008) – Burden lies on challenger to show unreasonableness.
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) – Explains abuse-of-discretion framework and “range of choice.”
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) – Guidelines as starting point; district court discretion to vary.
United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2009) – Within-guidelines sentences are ordinarily reasonable.
United States v. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2021) & United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633 (11th Cir. 2014) – “Well below the statutory maximum” supports reasonableness.
United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007) – Court need not tick through every mitigation argument on the record.
United States v. Heindenstrom, 946 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2019) – Used illustratively for fentanyl’s “extreme peril” to human life.
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) & California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987) – Cited to acknowledge mitigating force of disadvantaged backgrounds.
United States v. Boone, 97 F.4th 1331 (11th Cir. 2024) – Recent confirmation that individualized, guidelines sentences pass muster.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Eleventh Circuit’s analytical path can be broken into four logical steps:

Framework identification. The panel started with the substantive-reasonableness template: abuse of discretion, § 3553(a) factors, and the guidelines benchmark.
Indicators of reasonableness. Two “safe-harbor” signals dominated: (i) sentence within the adjusted guideline range; (ii) sentence far below the life maximum.
Aggravating vs. mitigating balance. The panel meticulously recounted the district court’s discussion of both sides, concluding that the court explicitly considered:
- Aggravators: in-jail distribution, knowledge of fentanyl’s potency, and an actual death.
- Mitigators: horrific childhood abuse, longstanding addiction, mental-health diagnoses, homelessness, remorse, no profit motive.
Giving heavier weight to the aggravators was found to be within the “range of choice.”
No impermissible factors. The panel found no evidence the lower court relied on an irrelevant factor or mis-calculated the guidelines.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

Although unpublished, Gary sends a clear signal within the Eleventh Circuit—and potentially beyond—on three fronts:

Fentanyl Policy Clarity. Courts may place heavy emphasis on general deterrence to stem fentanyl deaths, especially in controlled environments such as jails or prisons.
Custodial Setting as Aggravator. Bringing drugs into detention facilities will almost certainly elevate sentences; this opinion gives prosecutors a citation for that proposition.
Re-affirmation of Guidelines Deference. Even robust mitigation may not suffice to push a district court below the guideline range when the offense involves a death. Appellate courts will rarely disturb such sentences.

Future defendants facing § 841(b)(1)(C) “resulting in death” charges should expect that:

Mitigation rooted in addiction and trauma, though relevant, may be muted where potent opioids and custodial security are implicated.
Requests for the 20-year mandatory minimum will be difficult to win absent extraordinary circumstances.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Substantive Reasonableness: An appellate inquiry into whether the length of a sentence is fair, after accepting that the sentence was imposed using the right procedure.
Abuse-of-Discretion Standard: A highly deferential test. The appellate court asks only whether the lower court’s choice falls within a permissible range; it does not decide if it would have reached a different result.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) Factors: A statutory checklist (e.g., seriousness, deterrence, protection of the public, defendant’s history) that judges must balance when choosing a sentence.
Guidelines Range: An advisory sentencing span calculated under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Courts start here but may vary up or down.
Mandatory Minimum: The lowest sentence Congress allows for a specific crime; judges cannot go below it absent statutory safety-valve or co-operation exceptions.
General vs. Specific Deterrence: General deterrence aims to discourage the public at large; specific deterrence targets the defendant. The district court leaned heavily on the former.

Conclusion

United States v. Gary illustrates how powerfully the interplay of an in-custody drug distribution, the uniquely lethal nature of fentanyl, and an actual death can drive sentencing outcomes. The Eleventh Circuit’s affirmation cements two practical doctrines:

A within-guidelines sentence for opioid-caused deaths will seldom be disturbed on appeal, even when defendants present compelling personal mitigation.
General deterrence—particularly of fentanyl trafficking—may justifiably outweigh significant mitigating factors, especially in correctional settings.

For practitioners, Gary serves as both warning and roadmap. Defendants seeking sub-guidelines sentences in fentanyl-death cases must marshal exceptional circumstances and perhaps proactive rehabilitation evidence beyond standard mitigation. Prosecutors, conversely, gain persuasive authority that tough, guidelines-level sentences are necessary to honor Congress’s goal of deterring the distribution of lethal opioids.