United States v. Franco-Constante: Appellate Confirmation of Broad District Court Discretion to Withhold § 5K1.1 Departures in Retroactive Amendment 821 Proceedings

Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished opinion in United States v. Oscar David Franco-Constante (No. 24-12328, decided 23 July 2025) addresses the burgeoning wave of sentence-reduction motions filed after the U.S. Sentencing Commission made Amendment 821 retroactive. Amendment 821 created the new zero-point offender reduction in § 4C1.1 of the Guidelines and immediately generated thousands of § 3582(c)(2) petitions from inmates who—like Mr. Franco-Constante—had received zero criminal-history points at their original sentencing.

Mr. Franco-Constante, a first-time offender convicted for participating in a high-volume maritime cocaine conspiracy, requested that the district court slice his 94-month sentence to 75 months. Although the court acknowledged his eligibility under Amendment 821, it refused to trim the sentence further, emphasizing the seriousness of the crime and the fact that he had already benefitted from a substantial four-level downward departure for providing post-arrest assistance to the Government. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

At first glance, the decision appears routine: an appellate court defers to a district judge’s discretionary balancing of § 3553(a) factors. Yet the ruling crystallizes an important principle that is likely to recur: a district court has wide latitude to withhold re-application of earlier § 5K1.1 substantial-assistance departures when adjudicating a retroactive § 3582(c)(2) motion—even when the defendant remains “otherwise” eligible for the reduction under Amendment 821.

Summary of the Judgment

1. Eligibility concession. The district court agreed that Amendment 821 applied retroactively and lowered the defendant’s offense level from 33 to 31 (before departures), producing a new guideline range of 108–135 months.

2. Denial on discretionary grounds. Weighing the § 3553(a) factors, the court found that an additional reduction would erode deterrence, respect for the law, and just punishment for an offense involving more than 1 ton of cocaine, particularly in light of the existing four-level § 5K1.1 departure already granted at the original sentencing.

3. Affirmance. The Eleventh Circuit, applying abuse-of-discretion review, held that (i) no legal error tainted the court’s two-step Dillon framework; (ii) it was permissible to decline to re-credit the substantial-assistance departure at step two; and (iii) the district court’s brief order adequately demonstrated individualized consideration.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010) – The cornerstone two-step analysis for § 3582(c)(2) motions: (1) eligibility/extent, (2) discretionary reduction consistent with § 3553(a). The Eleventh Circuit confirmed the district court’s faithful adherence.
United States v. Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2017) – Provided the abuse-of-discretion review standard reiterated in the present opinion.
United States v. Vautier, 144 F.3d 756 (11th Cir. 1998) & United States v. Marroquin-Medina, 817 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2016) – Each recognized that a district court may, but need not, replicate earlier substantial-assistance departures when resentencing under § 3582(c)(2). These cases powerfully support the discretion exercised here.
Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481 (2022) – Clarified that district courts need not provide “detailed explanations” so long as the record reflects consideration of parties’ arguments, a principle leveraged to reject the defendant’s “boilerplate ruling” argument.
Additional Eleventh Circuit authorities—Jordan, Williams, Butler, Doyle—supplied the doctrinal scaffolding for standards of review, factor-weighing, and the permissive consideration of post-sentencing conduct.

Legal Reasoning of the Court

Correct application of the two-step § 3582(c)(2) rubric. The district judge: (a) confirmed Amendment 821’s retroactive listing in § 1B1.10(d) and recalculated the amended guideline range; (b) turned to § 3553(a) to decide whether, and how much, to reduce the sentence.
Emphasis on already-imposed leniency. The court considered the four-level § 5K1.1 discount as part of the “history and characteristics of the defendant,” and the need for “adequate deterrence” and “just punishment.” While the assistance departure helped the defendant initially, the judge determined that further erosion of the sentence risked under-punishing an international smuggling venture worth ≈ $30 million.
Dismissal of rehabilitation argument. Post-sentencing conduct (e.g., course completion, one disciplinary infraction) was deemed insufficiently weighty to override the gravity of the offense. Citing Doyle and Pepper, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that consideration of rehabilitation is discretionary, not mandatory.
Individualized assessment. Despite issuing similar orders in other Amendment 821 cases, the district judge enumerated facts particular to Franco-Constante (jettisoning bales during a Coast Guard chase) demonstrating a tailored analysis.

Impact of the Decision

The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion, though unpublished, achieves three meaningful effects:

Guidance on § 5K1.1 departures in retroactive proceedings. Defendants cannot assume that prior substantial-assistance credit will automatically carry forward when Amendment 821—or any retroactive amendment—lowers their baseline offense level.
Affirmation of minimalist order writing. District courts within the circuit may continue to issue succinct, form-like orders denying reductions, provided they (i) acknowledge eligibility, (ii) reference pertinent § 3553(a) factors, and (iii) tie conclusions to case-specific facts.
Increased sentencing stability for major drug-trafficking offenses. The ruling signals that large-scale narcotics conspiracies—particularly maritime cases under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act—will often justify maintaining existing sentences even when defendants are technical beneficiaries of retroactive guideline changes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

§ 3582(c)(2) Motion: A statutory mechanism allowing a federal inmate to request a lower sentence when the Sentencing Commission retroactively lowers the guideline range that applied at original sentencing.
Amendment 821, § 4C1.1 (“Zero-Point Offender”): Grants a two-level reduction to defendants who, among other criteria, have zero criminal-history points, reflecting their relatively lower recidivism risk.
§ 5K1.1 Substantial-Assistance Departure: A discretionary reduction awarded at the Government’s request when a defendant provides “substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person.” Nothing in law mandates re-granting that departure in later § 3582(c)(2) proceedings.
§ 3553(a) Factors: The statutory sentencing goals—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation—as well as the nature of the crime, defendant’s history, guidelines range, and need to avoid unwarranted disparities.
Abuse-of-Discretion Review: An appellate court may reverse only if the lower court’s decision is arbitrary, uses an incorrect legal standard, relies on clearly erroneous facts, or is manifestly unreasonable.

Conclusion

United States v. Franco-Constante reinforces that retroactive guideline amendments do not create an entitlement to a lower sentence. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision underscores three key takeaways:

District judges retain expansive discretion at step two of the Dillon analysis to deny reductions, especially in serious drug-trafficking cases.
Courts may decline to re-apply previous § 5K1.1 substantial-assistance departures when evaluating a § 3582(c)(2) motion, so long as the resulting sentence stays within—or, as here, above—the newly calculated guideline floor.
Brief, fact-specific orders survive appellate scrutiny, signaling that efficiency in handling the Amendment 821 docket surge is permissible provided core procedural safeguards are observed.

Going forward, defendants who benefited from meaningful § 5K1.1 departures at original sentencing should temper expectations of further leniency under Amendment 821. Conversely, prosecutors and sentencing courts now possess authoritative reassurance that maintaining current sentences—where justified by offense gravity and deterrence needs—will withstand appellate review.