United States v. Ford – 2025:
Fourth Circuit Endorses “Minimal-Colloquy” Standard for Waiver of Counsel and Clarifies Harmless-Error Doctrine for Rule 43 Violations

Introduction

United States v. Jarred Ford, No. 23-4011, is the Fourth Circuit’s latest unpublished—but highly instructive—decision on three recurring criminal-procedure questions:

1. How searching must a trial judge’s inquiry be before accepting a defendant’s pro se election?
2. When does an ex parte discussion about sentencing violate Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43, and can the resulting error be cured?
3. Under plain-error review, when does a district court’s failure to articulate § 3553(a) factors justify vacatur?

The Court affirmed Jarred Ford’s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and his 120-month sentence—the statutory maximum—despite acknowledging certain procedural missteps below. Although the opinion is officially “unpublished,” its detailed treatment of waiver-of-counsel standards and harmless-error analysis portends real influence in future Fourth Circuit litigation.

Summary of the Judgment

• Waiver of Counsel: The district court’s truncated inquiry—essentially one admonition that Ford “needed legal skill” to appear in court—was sufficient because the record as a whole showed a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver.
• Rule 43 Violation: The court’s ex parte scheduling conference, where sentencing exposure was discussed without Ford present, did violate Rule 43(a)(3). Nevertheless, the error was harmless since Ford later received a full, in-court sentencing hearing.
• Sentencing Explanation: The district court plainly erred by failing to reference the § 3553(a) factors, but Ford could not demonstrate prejudice: he received the only sentence legally available (the 120-month cap).
• Disposition: Conviction and sentence AFFIRMED. Judge Benjamin concurred in part, faulting the colloquy but agreeing reversal was unwarranted.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1997)
   Singleton remains the leading Fourth Circuit authority on waiver-of-counsel colloquies. The Ford panel drew heavily on Singleton’s “record-as-a-whole” approach, emphasizing that no “formula or script” is required.
2. United States v. Roof, 10 F.4th 314 (4th Cir. 2021)
   Cited for the Supreme Court’s refusal to mandate a set script. The majority relied on Roof to justify looking beyond the brevity of the district judge’s warnings.
3. United States v. Bernard, 708 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2013)
   Furnished the three-part test for valid waiver and clarified that unpreserved waiver challenges are reviewed for plain error—important because appellate counsel actually supported pro se status below.
4. United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020) & United States v. Lawrence, 248 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2001)
   Both mandate resentencing for Rule 43 violations unless harmless. Ford refines these cases by holding that a later, full sentencing hearing can cure the defect.
5. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2009) & United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572 (4th Cir. 2010)
   Provide the framework for sentencing-explanation errors under plain-error review. Ford leverages Lynn’s ask-for-a-different-sentence preservation rule to deny relief.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Waiver of Counsel (“Minimal-Colloquy” Standard)

Under Johnson v. Zerbst, waiver must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The Fourth Circuit reiterated that assessment is contextual, not formulaic. Key facts supporting waiver here:

• Ford was 34, a U.S. citizen, Marine Corps veteran with prior convictions—thus “experienced with the judicial process.”
• He had already chosen self-representation on parallel state attempted-murder charges.
• He acknowledged understanding the firearm charge and its 10-year cap at his initial appearance.
• The case—one § 922(g) count—was deemed “pretty easy to try,” reducing the need for elaborate warnings.

The majority conceded the colloquy was “spare” but relied on Singleton to hold that these cumulative facts satisfied Constitutional minimums. Judge Benjamin’s concurrence critiqued this, warning that equating a one-sentence admonition with Singleton’s fuller dialogue dilutes defendants’ Sixth-Amendment protections; nevertheless, she agreed the error was not “plain.”

2. Rule 43 and Ex Parte Sentencing Discussion

Rule 43(a)(3) requires defendant presence “at sentencing.” The district court and prosecutor discussed guideline exposure at an ex parte continuance hearing. The Government confessed error, but the panel found no prejudice because:

• The “hearing” lasted four minutes, chiefly scheduling logistics.
• No final sentence was announced; discussion was “tentative.”
• Ford later enjoyed a full adversarial sentencing hearing—functionally the remedy that appellate courts would otherwise impose.

Thus, United States v. Ford articulates that post-error curative proceedings can render a Rule 43 violation harmless, limiting automatic resentencing demands.

3. Sentencing Explanation & Plain Error

Failure to articulate the § 3553(a) factors is “plain” under Carter; but under Puckett plain-error review, Ford needed to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome. Because:

• The statutory max (120 months) equaled the guideline recommendation after application of § 5G1.1(a).
• Ford never requested a lower sentence or variance.
• The imposed sentence already slashed the un-capped guideline range (360 months–life) by two-thirds.

…the panel held no prejudice and left the sentence intact.

C. Anticipated Impact

1. Waiver Colloquies: District judges within the Fourth Circuit may feel emboldened to accept waivers after far leaner inquiries, so long as the overall record reflects defendant awareness. Defense counsel, conversely, should build a record of confusion or misunderstanding if intending to challenge waiver on appeal.
2. Rule 43 Errors: The decision narrows the automatic resentencing remedy. Prosecutors can argue that any later, full sentencing cures earlier ex parte missteps; defendants must now show concrete prejudice.
3. Sentencing Appeals: Ford underscores the importance of preservation. Unless counsel expressly asks for a different sentence or variance, appellate courts may deem explanation errors harmless, particularly when statutory caps apply.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Waiver of Counsel: A defendant can give up the right to a lawyer if he does so clearly and understands what he is giving up; the judge must ensure this is the case.
• Rule 43(a)(3): A federal rule requiring defendants to be physically present whenever their sentence is discussed or announced—analogous to the idea that a patient should be present for any major medical decision.
• Plain-Error Review: A four-step appellate test: (1) error, (2) obvious, (3) affects outcome, (4) harms judicial integrity. If any prong fails, relief is denied.
• Sentencing Guidelines § 5G1.1(a): When the guideline range exceeds the statutory maximum, the maximum itself becomes the “guideline sentence.”
• Cross-Reference (Guidelines § 2K2.1(c)): Allows courts to calculate sentences based on a more serious related offense proved by a preponderance (here, attempted murder).

Conclusion

United States v. Ford reinforces three doctrinal signposts in Fourth Circuit criminal practice. First, a defendant’s decision to proceed pro se will stand absent a clear showing that he misunderstood the stakes, even when the court’s colloquy is skeletal. Second, Rule 43 violations tied to ex parte scheduling conferences will not trigger automatic resentencing if a subsequent, proper hearing occurs. Third, appellate relief for sentencing-explanation errors remains elusive unless counsel both preserves the issue and demonstrates potential prejudice.

Though unpublished, the Court’s reasoning is poised to shape district-court procedures and appellate strategies alike. Practitioners should respond by (1) demanding a fuller waiver colloquy when appropriate, (2) objecting immediately to any off-record sentencing discussions, and (3) articulating concrete variance requests to preserve sentencing issues for appeal.