United States v. Fletcher: Mootness of First Step Act § 404(b) Motions After Denial of Companion Compassionate Release

I. Introduction

In United States v. Fletcher, No. 25-6020 (10th Cir. Dec. 10, 2025) (unpublished), the Tenth Circuit addressed two interrelated post-conviction issues arising under the First Step Act of 2018 and the compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A):

whether the district court abused its discretion in denying John Charles Fletcher’s motion for compassionate release; and
whether the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction (framed as “standing”) to entertain Fletcher’s motion for a sentence reduction under § 404(b) of the First Step Act.

Fletcher, a career offender, was serving multiple concurrent life sentences for a large-scale cocaine and crack cocaine conspiracy and related firearms and drug offenses. He sought to leverage two major statutory reforms:

the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which reduced crack/powder sentencing disparities; and
the First Step Act of 2018, which made those changes retroactive (§ 404) and expanded compassionate release (§ 603(b)).

The Tenth Circuit affirmed both:

the denial of compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A); and
the dismissal of the § 404(b) First Step Act motion for lack of a live case or controversy (characterized by the district court as lack of standing, but clarified on appeal as constitutional mootness).

The decision is nonprecedential but carries significant persuasive value in two areas:

Compassionate release practice: It reinforces the Tenth Circuit’s flexible, “any-prong-suffices” approach to the § 3582(c)(1)(A) three-step framework and its deference to district courts’ § 3553(a) analyses.
Article III limits on First Step Act relief: It refines the circuit’s earlier standing analysis in United States v. Mannie by distinguishing between standing at filing and mootness later, where a defendant pairs a § 404(b) motion with a compassionate release motion and then loses the latter.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Underlying Offense Conduct and Sentencing

Fletcher was indicted in 2009 on thirty-nine counts arising from a long-running drug conspiracy between May 2003 and September 2008. The charges included:

conspiracy to distribute cocaine base (crack) and cocaine powder;
maintaining a drug-involved premises;
two counts of felon-in-possession of a firearm; and
thirty-five additional drug counts involving manufacture, distribution, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and crack.

The government also filed a 21 U.S.C. § 851 information, invoking prior drug convictions to enhance mandatory minimum penalties. After a jury trial, Fletcher was convicted on all thirty-nine counts.

The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) calculated:

Total offense level: 46
- base offense level 38 (drug quantity);
- +2 for possession of a firearm during the offense;
- +4 as organizer/leader of criminal activity with five or more participants;
- +2 for obstruction of justice based on harassing, threatening, and assaulting a government witness during trial preparation.
Criminal history category: VI (based on six criminal history points and career offender status).

The resulting Guidelines recommendation was life imprisonment. The district court adopted the PSR and imposed:

life imprisonment on numerous counts (including Count 9, later critical for jurisdictional analysis);
360 months on several others;
240 months on one count; and
120 months on two counts;

all to run concurrently. The Tenth Circuit affirmed on direct appeal.

B. The Fair Sentencing Act and Dorsey

The timeline matters:

Fletcher’s conduct: 2003–2008 (pre-Fair Sentencing Act).
Fair Sentencing Act enacted: 2010 (before sentencing).
Sentencing: October 2011.

At the time of sentencing, Tenth Circuit authority (United States v. Reed, 410 F. App’x 107 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished)) held that the Fair Sentencing Act did not apply to defendants whose offense conduct preceded its enactment, even if sentencing occurred after. The district court therefore used pre-Fair Sentencing Act penalty ranges when calculating Fletcher’s sentence.

In 2012, the Supreme Court decided Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012), holding that the Fair Sentencing Act does apply to offenders whose conduct occurred pre-enactment but who are sentenced post-enactment. Dorsey thus overruled the approach reflected in Reed, but too late to benefit Fletcher at his original sentencing.

C. The 2022 Motions: First Step Act § 404(b) and Compassionate Release

In January 2022, Fletcher filed:

a motion under First Step Act § 404(b) seeking retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act to his “covered” crack offenses; and
a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), asking the court to reduce his total sentence to 240 months.

He argued, in essence:

His sentence was unjustly harsh because it was imposed under pre-Fair Sentencing Act ranges even though Dorsey now makes the Fair Sentencing Act applicable.
First Step Act changes and sentencing disparities between him and his co-defendants (and other similarly situated defendants) warranted relief.
His rehabilitation, the non-violent nature of his offenses, and other mitigating factors supported a shorter sentence under the § 3553(a) factors.

Importantly, the parties agreed that Count 9—one of Fletcher’s life counts—was not a “covered offense” under § 404(b). Thus, even if the court reduced the sentences on all covered counts, Fletcher would still face a concurrent life sentence on Count 9 unless that count was reduced through some other mechanism (e.g., compassionate release).

D. The District Court’s Ruling

The district court:

Denied compassionate release:
- Found that the alleged illegality of his sentence (pre-Fair Sentencing Act treatment) must be challenged via 28 U.S.C. § 2255, not via compassionate release.
- Determined that the length of his sentence alone was not an “extraordinary and compelling” reason, especially because, even with Fair Sentencing Act ranges, his Guidelines range remained life.
- Rejected the idea that a Guidelines sentence is itself “extraordinary and compelling”.
- Concluded that any disparity with co-defendants was justified by Fletcher’s leadership role, obstruction, and the fact that co-defendants pled to a single count while Fletcher was convicted on 39 counts after trial.
- Held that the § 3553(a) factors weighed strongly against any reduction, citing:
  - his leadership of a major drug conspiracy;
  - witness harassment and intimidation; and
  - prior incarcerations failing to deter him.
  The court acknowledged his rehabilitation but found it insufficient to outweigh the seriousness of his conduct and other considerations.
Dismissed the § 404(b) motion for lack of standing:
- Reasoned that because Fletcher was serving a concurrent life sentence on non-covered Count 9, any reduction of covered counts under § 404(b) could not shorten his overall incarceration.
- Citing United States v. Mannie, the court held his injury (ongoing incarceration) was not redressable and thus he lacked standing.

Fletcher appealed both determinations.

III. Summary of the Tenth Circuit’s Opinion

The Tenth Circuit:

Affirmed the denial of compassionate release, holding that:
- the district court properly applied the compassionate release framework;
- it was permissible to deny relief based purely on the § 3553(a) factors, without granting that “extraordinary and compelling” reasons existed; and
- the court adequately considered and rejected Fletcher’s disparity and mitigation arguments.
Affirmed dismissal of the § 404(b) motion, but clarified the jurisdictional analysis:
- At the time Fletcher filed his motions, he did have standing, because the combination of § 404(b) relief (for covered offenses) and compassionate release (for non-covered offenses) could have reduced his incarceration.
- Once the district court denied compassionate release, the § 404(b) motion could no longer reduce Fletcher’s total imprisonment (due to the concurrent non-covered life sentence). The case thus became constitutionally moot because no effective relief remained possible under § 404(b) alone.
- The district court used the term “standing,” but the correct doctrine is mootness; either way, the result is lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Fair Sentencing Act and Dorsey

Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372:
- Raised the quantities of crack cocaine needed to trigger mandatory minimums.
- Eliminated mandatory minimums for simple possession of crack.
United States v. Reed, 410 F. App’x 107 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished):
- Held pre-Dorsey that the Fair Sentencing Act did not apply to defendants whose conduct predated enactment, even if sentenced afterward.
- Explains why Fletcher was sentenced under pre-Fair Sentencing Act ranges.
Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012):
- Overruled the Reed-type approach.
- Held the Fair Sentencing Act does apply to offenders sentenced after its enactment, even for pre-enactment conduct.
- The Tenth Circuit notes Dorsey to acknowledge that Fletcher would have had lower statutory ranges if sentenced properly post-Fair Sentencing Act—but stresses that this does not automatically translate into compassionate-release relief.

2. First Step Act § 404 and Standing: United States v. Mannie

The core First Step Act precedent is:

United States v. Mannie, 971 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2020):
- Held that the only cognizable injury in a § 404(b) First Step Act motion is the defendant’s ongoing incarceration.
- To have standing, the court must be able to redress the length of the defendant’s ongoing incarceration.
- Where a defendant has concurrent sentences for non-covered offenses that would remain unchanged even if the § 404(b) motion succeeded, there is no redressable injury and thus no standing.

The district court relied heavily on Mannie to dismiss Fletcher’s § 404(b) motion. The Tenth Circuit, however, nuances Mannie by clarifying:

Fletcher did have standing at filing because he paired the § 404(b) motion with a compassionate release motion that could have reduced the non-covered count.
His case later became moot once compassionate release was denied, producing the same practical result (no jurisdiction), but by a different path.

3. Compassionate Release Framework

The Tenth Circuit relies on several prior decisions outlining the § 3582(c)(1)(A) structure:

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (compassionate release):
- Allows a court to reduce a term of imprisonment, upon motion (by the BOP or the defendant after exhaustion), if:
  1. extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction;
  2. the reduction is consistent with applicable Sentencing Commission policy statements; and
  3. the reduction is justified after considering the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.
United States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821 (10th Cir. 2021):
- Recognized and described compassionate release as an exception to the general rule that courts cannot modify imposed sentences.
- Emphasized district courts’ discretion in assessing what constitutes “extraordinary and compelling” post-First Step Act.
United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035 (10th Cir. 2021):
- Adopted the three-step framework (borrowed from the Sixth Circuit’s Jones decision):
  1. Extraordinary and compelling reasons.
  2. Consistency with Sentencing Commission policy statements.
  3. § 3553(a) factors.
- Critically, held that “district courts may deny compassionate release motions when any of the three prerequisites is lacking and need not address the others.”
United States v. Hald, 8 F.4th 932 (10th Cir. 2021):
- Reinforced that a court may deny compassionate release solely on the basis of the § 3553(a) factors, even without deciding whether extraordinary and compelling reasons exist.
- Emphasized that courts are not bound to proceed in a rigid order through steps one to three.
- Held that a district court is not required to discuss every § 3553(a) factor or respond to every mitigating argument; it need only show it considered the parties’ arguments and had a reasoned basis.
United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027 (10th Cir. 2021):
- Confirmed that denials of compassionate release are reviewed for abuse of discretion, while legal interpretations of § 3582(c)(1)(A) are reviewed de novo.
United States v. Benally, 541 F.3d 990 (10th Cir. 2008):
- Although a direct-sentencing case, it is invoked to analogize: a sentencing court does not commit reversible error by failing to say explicitly that a sentence is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” as long as it gives reasons for the sentence. By analogy, in compassionate release, a court need not explicitly state that a lesser sentence would fail § 3553(a); it suffices to explain why the existing sentence remains appropriate.

4. Standing and Mootness Cases

On the jurisdictional side, the panel cites:

Article III “case or controversy” requirement, U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
People for Ethical Treatment of Property Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 852 F.3d 990 (10th Cir. 2017):
- Restates the three elements of standing: injury in fact, traceability, and redressability.
Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2005):
- Standing is determined at the time the action is brought.
Fletcher v. United States, 116 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 1997):
- Explains that constitutional mootness ensures the case remains alive through all stages; it is essentially standing viewed over time.
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Smith, 110 F.3d 724 (10th Cir. 1997):
- Describes mootness as “the doctrine of standing set in a time frame.”
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997):
- Cited (via SUWA) for the same standing/mootness articulation.
Bacote v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 119 F.4th 808 (10th Cir. 2024):
- Reiterates that a case becomes constitutionally moot if it ceases to present a real, substantial controversy with respect to which specific relief can be fashioned.
Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016):
- Summarizes the relationship between standing and mootness: standing concerns the existence of a case or controversy at filing; mootness concerns its continued existence when the court decides.

These authorities together frame the court’s conclusion: Fletcher had standing at filing but lost a live controversy—i.e., the § 404(b) claim became moot—once compassionate release was denied.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Compassionate Release

a. Application of the Three-Step Test

Fletcher argued the district court “misapplied” the compassionate release framework by:

conflating steps one (extraordinary and compelling reasons) and two (policy statements); and
analyzing § 3553(a) factors at step three even after finding no extraordinary and compelling reasons.

The Tenth Circuit rejects this, pointing to its own prior cases:

Courts may deny at any step: Under McGee, if any one of the three prerequisites is lacking, the court can deny relief without addressing the others.
No required order: Under Hald, the court can deny purely on § 3553(a) grounds without definitively resolving whether extraordinary and compelling reasons exist. The analysis need not be strictly sequential.

Here, the district court:

treated Fletcher’s alleged extraordinary and compelling circumstances (changes in law, disparities, rehabilitation) largely in the context of the § 3553(a) analysis;
assumed arguendo that those circumstances might be “extraordinary and compelling”; but
ultimately concluded that the § 3553(a) factors overwhelmingly counseled against reduction.

The panel finds this compatible with Hald and McGee. The structure and labels used by the district court do not matter as much as the substantive reality: the court considered Fletcher’s arguments and reasonably exercised its discretion.

b. Adequacy of the § 3553(a) Analysis

Fletcher further claimed the district court abused its discretion by:

insufficiently weighing sentencing disparities between him and co-defendants, and between him and similarly situated defendants elsewhere; and
failing to consider whether some lesser sentence, even if still lengthy, would satisfy § 3553(a).

The Tenth Circuit disagrees, emphasizing its deferential standard of review:

Scope of review: The court will reverse only if it has a “definite and firm conviction” that the district court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice.
No requirement to address every argument: Under Hald, the sentencing court is not required to explicitly respond to each mitigating point or each § 3553(a) factor.

On the merits:

Sentencing disparities:
- The district court considered Fletcher’s disparity arguments (even though it did so primarily under the “extraordinary and compelling” rubric).
- It found any disparity with co-defendants justified because:
  - co-defendants pleaded guilty to a single count;
  - Fletcher went to trial and was convicted on 39 counts;
  - Fletcher’s leadership role and obstruction (witness intimidation) made him more culpable.
- The court also noted Fletcher’s Guidelines range remained life imprisonment even assuming post-Fair Sentencing Act treatment—an undisputed fact.
- Given that maintaining a Guidelines sentence normally requires only minimal explanation, any lack of extended discussion of disparities was not error.
Failure to state that a lesser sentence would not suffice:
- The panel analogizes to Benally: a court need not recite that a sentence is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” if its reasons make that implicit.
- Here, the district court articulated reasons why a life sentence remained appropriate and expressly concluded that the § 3553(a) factors “do not support a sentence reduction.” That suffices.

Given the seriousness of Fletcher’s criminal conduct, his leadership role, his history of recidivism, and his obstruction of justice, the Tenth Circuit finds no abuse of discretion in refusing to shorten his life sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A).

2. The § 404(b) Motion: Standing vs. Mootness

a. The Injury and Redressability Framework

Under Article III, a federal court may only decide actual “cases” or “controversies.” Standing requires:

Injury in fact;
Traceability (causation); and
Redressability (likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision).

In the specific context of First Step Act § 404(b), the Tenth Circuit in Mannie defined the relevant injury as:

the defendant’s ongoing incarceration.

Thus, a defendant has standing only if the court can reduce the length of incarceration through the statutory mechanism being invoked.

b. Distinguishing Fletcher from Mannie: Standing at Filing

In Mannie, the defendant’s § 404(b) motion could not reduce his incarceration because he was serving a concurrent sentence for non-covered offenses that would remain unchanged. Accordingly, there was no redressable injury and no standing.

Fletcher’s situation is more complex. Like Mannie:

Fletcher had a concurrent life sentence on a non-covered count (Count 9).
Standing for a § 404(b) motion, considered in isolation, might seem foreclosed because reducing covered counts alone would not shorten his incarceration.

However, Fletcher simultaneously filed a motion for compassionate release, which could—at least in theory—reduce his non-covered count. At the time of filing:

§ 404(b) relief could have shortened his covered-count sentences; and
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) relief could have reduced his non-covered concurrent life sentence.

Taken together, these motions made Fletcher’s ongoing incarceration redressable. The panel therefore holds:

Measuring standing at the time his motion was filed, Mr. Fletcher had a redressable injury sufficient to confer standing.

This is an important clarification of Mannie: redressability can be satisfied where relief from multiple avenues in the same proceeding could combine to shorten incarceration.

. Mootness After Denial of Compassionate Release

Standing must exist at filing. Mootness requires that the controversy remain alive throughout litigation. When circumstances change, a case that began as a genuine controversy may become moot.

In Fletcher’s case:

After the district court denied compassionate release, the non-covered Count 9 life sentence remained intact.
At that point, § 404(b) could no longer shorten Fletcher’s overall incarceration because it applies only to “covered offenses,” and Count 9 is undisputedly non-covered.
As a result, no specific relief could be fashioned under § 404(b) that would affect the only relevant injury—ongoing incarceration.

Thus, although standing existed at filing, the controversy evaporated thereafter:

Mr. Fletcher effectively lost his live case or controversy after the court denied his motion for compassionate release. That is, Mr. Fletcher’s § 404(b) motion became moot because the court could no longer redress his ongoing incarceration.

The district court’s reference to “lack of standing” was a misnomer. Technically, this is a constitutional mootness problem, not an initial standing defect. But both concepts relate to Article III jurisdiction, and the bottom-line conclusion—no subject-matter jurisdiction—is the same.

C. Impact and Implications

1. For Compassionate Release Practice in the Tenth Circuit

Fletcher solidifies—and applies in a particularly tough factual context—the Tenth Circuit’s existing approach to compassionate release:

District courts retain broad discretion in assessing § 3553(a) factors and need not address every argument or explicitly discuss each factor, especially when maintaining a Guidelines sentence.
Order of analysis is flexible: district courts may assume without deciding that “extraordinary and compelling” reasons exist and still deny relief on § 3553(a) grounds alone.
Severity of sentence alone is not extraordinary: a life sentence—even one arguably shaped by pre-Fair Sentencing Act law—does not, without more, constitute an “extraordinary and compelling” reason, particularly when the Guidelines continue to recommend life.
Codefendant disparities must be “unwarranted” to matter: substantial disparities are permissible where grounded in differences in roles, conduct, plea posture (plea vs. trial), and enhancements (e.g., obstruction).

Practitioners should recognize:

Arguments that a sentence is illegal or incorrect under current law (e.g., misapplication of the Fair Sentencing Act) are better suited to § 2255 motions than to compassionate release, particularly in the Tenth Circuit.
Compassionate release remains focused on post-sentencing developments (rehabilitation, health, intervening changes in law or policy) as they interact with § 3553(a), rather than as a vehicle to relitigate original sentencing errors.

2. For First Step Act § 404(b) Motions and Article III Constraints

The most novel aspect of Fletcher is its treatment of standing vs. mootness in the context of combined § 404(b) and compassionate release motions:

Where a defendant, like Mannie, has a concurrent non-covered sentence that independently ensures continued incarceration, a standalone § 404(b) motion may fail for lack of standing (no redressable injury).
Where a defendant files a § 404(b) motion together with a compassionate release motion that could, in principle, reduce the non-covered sentence, standing may be present at filing.
However, if the compassionate release motion is denied and the non-covered sentence remains untouched, the § 404(b) claim becomes moot; it can no longer redress the only relevant injury (ongoing incarceration).

Practical consequences:

Defense counsel may still be wise to file both § 404(b) and § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions when concurrent non-covered sentences exist, as this preserves standing at the outset.
However, success on compassionate release becomes functionally a prerequisite to obtaining meaningful relief under § 404(b) where a non-covered life (or otherwise controlling) sentence exists.
District courts might exercise discretion in deciding which motion to address first; but once one avenue (here, compassionate release) is definitively foreclosed, Article III may compel dismissal of the other if it can no longer alter the term of imprisonment.

This nuanced clarification may influence how litigants structure multi-pronged sentencing-reduction motions and how district courts organize their decisions to avoid creating mootness problems or issuing advisory opinions.

3. Broader Sentencing and Post-Conviction Landscape

Fletcher also contributes to the broader narrative of post-conviction sentencing reform:

It illustrates the limits of retroactivity even in an era of reform: despite Dorsey and the First Step Act, a defendant with a heavily aggravated record and a Guidelines life sentence may find little traction in compassionate release.
It reinforces that the First Step Act, while powerful, operates within the constraints of Article III and is not a general license to revisit sentences that remain insulated by unaffected concurrent counts.
It shows that district courts and appellate courts remain cautious about using compassionate release to correct (or recharacterize) prior legal errors that could or should have been raised under § 2255.

V. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

1. Compassionate Release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)

Compassionate release is an exception to the rule that a criminal sentence is final. After the First Step Act, defendants themselves (not just the Bureau of Prisons) may move for a reduction once they exhaust administrative remedies.

Courts follow a three-part test:

Extraordinary and compelling reasons: Are there unusual, compelling circumstances (e.g., advanced illness, extreme family hardship, sometimes profound changes in law combined with rehabilitation) that justify reconsidering the sentence?
Consistency with Sentencing Commission policy: Historically governed by U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 and commentary, though post-First Step Act, courts vary in how binding they consider pre-amendment policy statements when the motion is filed by a defendant.
§ 3553(a) factors: Would a reduced sentence still reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, and protect the public?

A court may deny compassionate release if any of these conditions is not satisfied and does not have to reach the others.

2. First Step Act § 404(b) “Covered Offense” and Concurrent Sentences

Section 404(b) allows courts to retroactively apply Fair Sentencing Act crack penalties to “covered offenses,” generally meaning crack offenses for which statutory penalties were modified by the Act and committed before August 3, 2010.

If a defendant has multiple concurrent sentences:

If all relevant counts are “covered,” a § 404(b) reduction can shorten actual imprisonment.
If at least one controlling count (e.g., a concurrent life term) is not covered, § 404(b) relief on other counts may not change the total length of incarceration—raising standing/mootness questions under Mannie and now Fletcher.

3. Standing vs. Mootness in Simple Terms

Standing (at filing):
- Do you have a real injury?
- Is it caused by the defendant?
- Can the court do something to fix it?
Mootness (later in the case):
- Even if you had standing when you started, do you still have the same problem now?
- Has something changed so that the court can no longer give any effective relief?

In Fletcher:

At filing: there was a way to shorten his incarceration via the combination of § 404(b) and compassionate release, so standing existed.
After compassionate release was denied: § 404(b) alone could not reduce his imprisonment, leaving no live controversy; the § 404(b) motion became moot.

4. Nonprecedential “Order and Judgment”

The opinion is designated an “Order and Judgment” and expressly states it is not binding precedent except under doctrines like law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. However:

It may be cited for its persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and Tenth Cir. R. 32.1.
District courts within the Tenth Circuit may look to it as a useful, though non-binding, illustration of how the circuit applies Mannie, Hald, and related authorities.

VI. Conclusion

United States v. Fletcher offers a detailed application of existing Tenth Circuit doctrine on compassionate release and First Step Act relief, while adding a clarifying twist on the Article III analysis of § 404(b) motions:

On compassionate release, the decision reaffirms that district courts may:
- deny motions based solely on § 3553(a) considerations;
- incorporate a defendant’s “extraordinary and compelling” arguments into that § 3553(a) analysis; and
- maintain even a Guidelines life sentence where the seriousness of the offense, leadership role, obstruction, and recidivism outweigh mitigation and sentencing disparities.
On First Step Act § 404(b), the Tenth Circuit:
- recognizes that a defendant may have standing at filing if combined avenues of relief (e.g., § 404(b) plus compassionate release) could reduce incarceration; but
- holds that once one avenue (here, compassionate release) is closed, and the remaining one cannot shorten the term of imprisonment because of an unaffected non-covered life sentence, the controversy becomes moot and must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Though unpublished, Fletcher will likely serve as a persuasive guide in the Tenth Circuit for:

structuring combined § 404(b) and compassionate release motions;
understanding the limits of post-conviction relief in the presence of concurrent non-covered sentences; and
appreciating the breadth of district court discretion in applying § 3553(a) during compassionate release proceedings.

In the broader landscape of federal sentencing and post-conviction reform, Fletcher underscores a recurring theme: statutory reforms like the Fair Sentencing Act and First Step Act offer meaningful opportunities for relief, but those opportunities are constrained by both Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement and the continued deference to district courts’ sentencing judgments under § 3553(a).