United States v. Felton: Confidential Informant Credibility Omissions, Probable Cause, and the Right to a Franks Hearing

I. Introduction

In United States v. Donald R. Felton, No. 23‑1352 (7th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025), the Seventh Circuit addressed a recurring—and increasingly important—Fourth Amendment problem: how far officers may go in relying on a confidential informant’s tip to obtain a warrant, and what they must disclose about that informant’s credibility.

Felton was convicted by a jury of possessing with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of methamphetamine, after officers installed a GPS tracking device on his girlfriend’s SUV pursuant to a state warrant, used that device to monitor his travel, and then stopped and searched the vehicle, finding methamphetamine. He did not challenge his trial, but instead attacked the search that produced the drugs.

The appeal raised two interrelated issues:

Whether the state-court warrant authorizing installation of a tracking device was supported by probable cause when it relied heavily on a confidential source whose credibility problems were largely omitted from the affidavit.
Whether, even if probable cause were lacking, the evidence should nonetheless be admitted under the United States v. Leon good-faith exception, or whether Felton was entitled to an evidentiary hearing under Franks v. Delaware to probe intentional or reckless omissions by the affiant.

The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Felton’s suppression motion and remanded for a Franks hearing, making a significant statement about:

How much information about an informant’s incentives and criminal history must be included in a warrant affidavit; and
When omissions about informant credibility, standing alone, can both defeat probable cause and justify a full evidentiary hearing into the officer’s truthfulness and good faith.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Investigation and GPS Warrant

On May 21, 2019, officers interviewed a confidential source (“CS”) who claimed:

Donald Felton regularly drove from Taylorville, Illinois, to St. Louis, Missouri, to buy methamphetamine for resale.
He used a white SUV belonging to his girlfriend, Kourtneigh Oats.
Police had stopped him about two weeks earlier on a similar “drug run,” found a “starter pistol,” and Felton then aborted his trip.
Felton typically bought two to three ounces of methamphetamine per trip.

Inspector Jeffrey Brown of the Christian County Sheriff’s Office and the Central Illinois Enforcement Group undertook limited corroboration:

He already knew Felton from a 2017 methamphetamine arrest at the home Felton shared with Oats.
He had seen a white Mazda SUV in Felton’s driveway a few days earlier, registered to Oats.
He pulled an April 21, 2019 report showing Deputy Goebel had encountered Felton driving Oats’s car.
Goebel confirmed the encounter and added that:
- He saw a “handgun which only shot blanks” (a starter pistol), and
- A “wad” of cash he estimated at about $2,000,
- Felton said he was headed to Mattoon, Illinois, to buy a smoker.

On May 23, 2019, Brown sought a state-court search warrant from Judge Brad Paisley authorizing installation of a GPS tracking device on the white Mazda SUV. His affidavit:

Recounted the CS’s statements about Felton’s trips, vehicle, and quantities of methamphetamine.
Described Brown’s corroboration of Felton’s residence, vehicle, and the April 21 stop.
Included Felton’s criminal history.
Provided only a boilerplate statement that the CS had previously provided reliable information, and that the CS had a felony burglary conviction.

Crucially, the affidavit omitted several facts about the informant’s credibility:

The CS was paid $345 specifically for the information about Felton.
Since 2013, the CS had cooperated in exchange for consideration in his own and his friends’ pending cases.
At the time of the Felton interview, officers had found suspected methamphetamine in the CS’s residence, and the CS might believe continued cooperation would help him avoid charges.
The CS had:
- Eight arrests and four convictions for driving with a suspended license;
- One arrest for resisting arrest;
- One conviction for interfering with judicial proceedings;
- One conviction for assault; and
- A pending methamphetamine possession charge.

Judge Paisley, unaware of this omitted information, issued the warrant. On June 5, 2019, Brown installed the GPS device on the Mazda in Felton’s driveway.

On June 8, 2019, the tracker indicated the SUV left Taylorville, headed southwest on Route 48 in the direction of St. Louis, and later returned. Brown then arranged a traffic stop for a missing front license plate. During the stop:

A K‑9 unit alerted to the presence of drugs in the vehicle.
Officers searched the SUV and found a bag of methamphetamine.

B. Federal Charges and Suppression Motion

A federal grand jury indicted Felton on July 9, 2019, for possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii). Felton moved to suppress the methamphetamine, arguing:

The GPS warrant lacked probable cause because the affidavit withheld key information about the CS’s credibility and motives.
The Leon good-faith exception did not save the search because the omissions showed at least reckless disregard for the truth.
In the alternative, he was entitled to a Franks evidentiary hearing to determine whether Inspector Brown intentionally or recklessly omitted material information.

He also argued that the tracker was installed outside the time limits set by Illinois law and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, but the courts treated that issue as irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment remedy.

C. District Court Ruling

The district court denied both the suppression motion and the request for a Franks hearing. Although the government conceded that more detail about the informant’s credibility should have been provided, the court reasoned:

The CS’s information was sufficiently detailed regarding Felton’s drug activity (vehicle, route, pattern of travel, quantity of drugs).
Inspector Brown’s corroboration of the vehicle, Felton’s history, and the April 2019 stop was enough to support probable cause.
Felton had not made a “substantial preliminary showing” that any misstatements or omissions about the April 2019 encounter were material to the judge’s probable cause finding.
Even if probable cause was debatable, officers reasonably relied on the warrant, so the Leon good-faith exception applied.

Felton appealed, challenging only the suppression/Franks ruling, not his trial or sentence.

III. Summary of the Seventh Circuit’s Opinion

The Seventh Circuit reversed. Its key holdings are:

Probable cause was lacking. The warrant affidavit rested almost entirely on the confidential source’s tip, yet:
- Provided virtually no basis for assessing the source’s reliability;
- Did not explain how the source knew about Felton’s alleged drug activity; and
- Included only minimal, largely non-criminal corroboration (residence, car, prior arrest, cash and starter pistol at an earlier stop).
Without meaningful corroboration of drug activity or sufficient credibility information, the affidavit could not establish a “fair probability” that evidence of a crime would be found via the GPS tracker.
The omissions about informant credibility were materially important. Because the CS was the only real link to ongoing drug dealing, details about his payments, pending charges, prior cooperation, and extensive criminal record were “critical” to assessing reliability. Their omission left the issuing judge “under‑informed” and unable to evaluate whether the tip deserved weight.
Felton was entitled to a Franks evidentiary hearing. He made the required “substantial preliminary showing” that:
- The omissions were material to probable cause (once corrected, the affidavit did not establish probable cause); and
- The pattern of credibility omissions supported an inference that Inspector Brown acted with at least reckless disregard for the truth.
The court emphasized that credibility-related omissions, “even in the absence of more direct evidence” of intent, can themselves be sufficient circumstantial evidence of recklessness.
The good-faith exception could not be resolved without a Franks hearing. Because Leon does not protect officers who obtain warrants through intentional or reckless misstatements or omissions, and because Felton had made the threshold showing required by Franks, the case had to be remanded. The district court must now hold a hearing, take evidence on Inspector Brown’s state of mind, and then decide whether suppression is required.
Procedural violations of state law or Rule 41 did not themselves justify suppression. The late installation of the tracking device, even if it violated state law and Rule 41, did not create a Fourth Amendment violation warranting exclusion of evidence.

The court remanded “for an evidentiary hearing consistent with this decision,” emphasizing the narrow but important remedial step: the district court must determine whether Brown’s omissions were deliberate or reckless and then revisit suppression in light of that factual finding.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Doctrinal Lineage

1. Probable Cause and Informant Tips: Gates and Its Progeny

The court anchored its probable cause analysis in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), which replaced the rigid “two-prong” Aguilar–Spinelli test with a flexible “totality of the circumstances” approach. Under Gates, a magistrate must make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances—including an informant’s “veracity” and “basis of knowledge”—there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found.

The Seventh Circuit has developed this totality approach into a structured set of factors for evaluating warrants based on confidential informants. Citing United States v. Musgraves, 831 F.3d 454 (7th Cir. 2016), and United States v. Bell, 925 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 2019), the panel reiterated five key considerations:

Level of detail in the informant’s tip;
Extent of the informant’s firsthand knowledge;
Degree of police corroboration;
Temporal proximity between the reported events and the warrant; and
Whether the informant appeared personally before the issuing judge.

No one factor is dispositive; the real question is whether, in light of all of them, there is a “fair probability” that contraband or evidence will be found. The panel also cited United States v. Hueston, 90 F.4th 897 (7th Cir. 2024), for the basic probable cause formulation.

2. Tracking Devices as Searches: Jones

The opinion relied on United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), which held that installing and using a GPS tracking device on a vehicle constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the government must obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before installing such a device, absent an exception.

3. The Role of Prior Seventh Circuit Cases: Glover, Clark, Woodfork, and Garcia

Several Seventh Circuit precedents loom large in the background and are explicitly invoked:

United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811 (7th Cir. 2014):
- Held that where an affidavit omits virtually all relevant credibility information about a key informant, the court cannot defer to the issuing judge’s probable cause determination because that judge was “under‑informed.”
- Crucially, it recognized that omissions regarding informant credibility can themselves support an inference of reckless disregard for the truth, sufficient to justify a Franks hearing.
- Felton builds on and tightens this line of reasoning.
United States v. Clark, 935 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2019):
- Required a Franks hearing where the affidavit relied heavily on an informant, yet police made only “minimal” corroboration efforts not clearly related to criminal activity.
- Warned against allowing thin corroboration and credibility omissions to substitute for robust evidence of ongoing crime.
- The Felton panel quotes Clark in emphasizing that merely confirming benign facts (like residence or vehicle ownership) does not meaningfully corroborate drug trafficking allegations.
United States v. Woodfork, 999 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2021):
- Contrasts with Felton and Clark. There, officers conducted four controlled buys and other investigation, which robustly corroborated the informant’s accusations, offsetting credibility concerns.
- The Felton opinion uses Woodfork as a foil: thorough corroboration of criminal activity can “save” an affidavit even when the informant has credibility issues.
United States v. Garcia, 528 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 2008):
- Found probable cause where the affidavit explicitly detailed the informant’s firsthand observations of drugs in the defendant’s apartment and explained why the informant could recognize cocaine.
- Felton uses Garcia to highlight what was missing here: the affidavit did not explain how the source knew about Felton’s alleged drug dealing.

4. Good-Faith Exception and the Exclusionary Rule: Leon and its Descendants

The court discussed the exclusionary rule’s purpose and limits, drawing on:

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) – creating the good-faith exception for officers who reasonably rely on a facially valid warrant.
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011); United States v. Hammond, 996 F.3d 374 (7th Cir. 2021); United States v. Lewis, 38 F.4th 527 (7th Cir. 2022); United States v. Martin, 807 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2015) – emphasizing that exclusion is a costly, deterrence-based remedy, not a personal right.
Seventh Circuit formulations (e.g., in Woodfork) that a defendant can overcome the presumption of good faith by showing:
1. The affiant was dishonest or reckless;
2. The judge abandoned neutrality; or
3. The affidavit was so “bare bones” that no reasonable officer could rely on it.

Felton falls squarely within the first category: the issue is whether Inspector Brown was reckless in omitting material credibility information about the informant.

5. Violations of State Law and Rule 41: Trost, Hornick, Brewer, Moore

Addressing the argument that the GPS device was installed outside the time limits set by Illinois law and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, the panel relied on:

United States v. Trost, 152 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Hornick, 815 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir. 1987) – irregularities in Rule 41’s administration do not, by themselves, justify suppression.
United States v. Brewer, 915 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 2019) – a search can comply with the Fourth Amendment even if it violates state law limits on warrants.
Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008) – state law restrictions do not expand Fourth Amendment protections.

Thus, timing violations mattered only if they rendered the search “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment—something the court rejected.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning on Probable Cause

1. The Core Problem: An Uncorroborated, Undocumented Informant Tip

The panel’s central concern was that “the only evidence tying Felton to any contemporary drug activity was the source’s uncorroborated tip.” Several aspects of the affidavit were decisive:

No clear basis of knowledge. The affidavit did not explain how the CS knew about Felton’s trips, drug purchases, or quantities. There was no claim that:
- The source had personally seen drugs with Felton;
- The source had purchased drugs from him; or
- The source had been in locations where Felton stored drugs.
Thin corroboration unrelated to drug activity. Brown corroborated:
- Felton’s prior 2017 drug arrest;
- His residence;
- Oats’s ownership of a white Mazda SUV; and
- The April 21 stop with a starter pistol, cash, and a trip ostensibly to Mattoon to buy a smoker.
But these facts did not corroborate drug trafficking specifically. No drugs or controlled buys emerged from the April stop; there was nothing inherently criminal about driving with cash and a starter pistol to buy a smoker.
Criminal history not probative of new crimes. Brown’s knowledge of Felton’s prior drug conviction added little. As the court noted (citing Glover), mere status as a convicted felon “is not itself indicative of criminal activity,” especially without evidence of ongoing conduct.
No informant appearance before the judge. The CS did not testify before Judge Paisley, depriving the judge of an opportunity to assess demeanor or probe bias and basis of knowledge directly.

Critically, the corroborated details (prior arrest, car registration, residence) were “innocent” or at most ambiguous. They only looked suspicious when paired with the CS’s claim that Felton was on drug runs to St. Louis—but the veracity of that claim was precisely what was unsupported and under-documented.

2. Missing Informant Credibility Information

The court emphasized that when an affidavit rests almost entirely on a confidential source, the issuing judge must have enough information to assess that source’s reliability. Here, the affidavit contained only a generic statement that the source had been reliable in the past and a bare mention of a prior burglary conviction.

By omitting:

The cash payment for Felton-related tips;
The informant’s long-running, self-interested cooperation history;
The newly discovered suspected methamphetamine in the informant’s home;
The informant’s hope for leniency on pending charges (including a current meth charge); and
The informant’s broader criminal history and misconduct, including interference with judicial proceedings and assault;

Brown left out exactly the kinds of details that would have raised obvious red flags about bias, motive to fabricate, and general trustworthiness. The panel called these “crucial” and “critical” omissions.

Citing Glover, the court held that because the affidavit “did not provide the [issuing judge] with even a minimum of information on credibility that might have triggered further inquiry,” the appellate court could not defer to the resulting probable cause determination. Deference to the issuing magistrate is not blind; it presupposes that the magistrate was adequately informed.

3. Comparison to More Robust Cases

By contrasting this case with Garcia and Woodfork, the panel clarified a practical line:

In Garcia, the informant’s detailed firsthand observations of cocaine in the defendant’s apartment, combined with an explanation of how the informant recognized cocaine, supported probable cause even without perfect corroboration.
In Woodfork, four controlled buys and other investigative steps strongly corroborated the informant’s claims of drug dealing, offsetting concerns about omitted credibility information.
By contrast, in Felton (and previously in Clark), the police did little to corroborate criminal activity; they confirmed only neutral or ambiguous facts about the suspect’s identity, vehicle, and prior record.

The message: when the informant’s credibility is compromised or undisclosed, robust corroboration of the specific criminal conduct alleged is essential. Without either solid credibility documentation or serious corroboration of drug activity, probable cause will not stand.

C. The Good-Faith Exception and Its Limits in Felton

Even when a warrant is unsupported by probable cause, the evidence obtained may still be admissible if officers acted in “objective good faith” under Leon. The Seventh Circuit again restated that:

Obtaining a warrant creates a presumption of good faith.
Defendants can overcome this presumption by showing:
1. The affiant was dishonest or reckless;
2. The issuing judge abandoned neutrality; or
3. No reasonably well-trained officer could think the affidavit supplied probable cause (a “bare bones” affidavit).

Felton did not argue that Judge Paisley was biased or that the affidavit was utterly bare bones; rather, he targeted the first ground—alleged reckless omissions.

The court reasoned that the good-faith analysis could not be completed without a Franks hearing:

If Brown intentionally or recklessly withheld material credibility information to secure the warrant, then Leon would not apply; officers cannot claim good faith when the warrant itself was procured through constitutional bad faith.
Because Felton had made a “substantial preliminary showing” that this might be the case, an evidentiary hearing was necessary to test Brown’s actual state of mind.

In other words, you cannot short-circuit a colorable Franks challenge by invoking Leon at the threshold. The two doctrines interlock: the very facts that justify a Franks hearing (potential recklessness in obtaining the warrant) often also undercut the Leon claim of good faith.

D. The Franks Standard and How Felton Applies It

1. The Two-Prong Franks Test

Under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he makes a “substantial preliminary showing” that:

The affidavit contains a false statement or material omission, and if the affidavit is corrected (false material removed, omitted material added), probable cause would be defeated; and
The false statement or omission was made intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth.

This showing can be made through affidavits, documents, and other proffers; the defendant need not prove his case at the threshold, only present enough to justify a full hearing.

2. Materiality in Felton

The first prong—materiality—was straightforward in Felton. The court had already concluded that, once the affidavit was “reconstructed” to include the informant’s full criminal record, payments, pending charges, and cooperation incentives, it did not establish probable cause:

No clear basis of knowledge;
No corroborated drug activity;
A key informant whose motives to fabricate were strong and whose reliability was seriously compromised.

Thus, the omissions were material within the meaning of Franks.

3. Inferring Reckless Disregard from Credibility Omissions

The second prong—intent or recklessness—typically requires some evidence of the officer’s state of mind. Direct evidence (e.g., emails or testimony admitting an intent to mislead) is rare. Accordingly, courts often rely on circumstantial indications.

Felton is significant because it reinforces and extends the principle, articulated in Glover, that:

“[C]redibility omissions themselves, even in the absence of more direct evidence of the officer’s state of mind, provide sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a reasonable and thus permissible inference of reckless disregard for the truth.”

Here, the panel held that the pattern and nature of Brown’s omissions—focused squarely on the most important witness’s credibility—support an inference that he acted with at least reckless disregard, satisfying the preliminary threshold for a hearing. The court emphasized:

The omitted facts were not marginal or obscure details; they went directly to the heart of whether the informant could be trusted.
Brown was well aware of these facts, given the CS’s extensive cooperation history and the contemporaneous discovery of suspected meth at the CS’s residence.
Yet none of this was shared with the issuing judge.

The panel stopped short of finding that Brown actually acted recklessly or deliberately; that is the district court’s job on remand. But it made clear that Felton had cleared the threshold for a Franks hearing.

E. State-Law and Procedural Violations: Why They Did Not Matter

Felton also argued that the tracking device was installed too late—outside the 96-hour limit of Illinois law and the ten-day limit of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41. The panel acknowledged the timing problem but dismissed it as irrelevant to the suppression remedy, citing a consistent line of precedent:

Mistakes in administering Rule 41 or violating state warrant rules do not automatically trigger suppression; the Fourth Amendment focuses on “reasonableness,” not strict compliance with procedural rules.
Even if state law was violated, the federal constitutional inquiry is separate; states cannot raise the constitutional floor by statute.

Thus, suppression in Felton turned entirely on constitutional adequacy of probable cause and the officer’s truthfulness, not on procedural timing technicalities.

V. Clarifying Complex Legal Concepts

A. Probable Cause

Probable cause does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even a preponderance of the evidence. It is a practical, non-technical standard:

There must be a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched.
The issuing judge looks at the totality of the circumstances: all available facts, including informant tips, corroboration, timing, and context.
Probable cause can rest on hearsay and informant reports, but their reliability and basis of knowledge must be reasonably established.

B. Confidential Informant Credibility

When a warrant depends heavily on a confidential informant, judges need enough information to judge how much weight to give the tip. Relevant factors include:

Past reliability: Has this informant given accurate information before?
Criminal history: Does the informant have prior convictions—especially for crimes involving dishonesty, obstruction, or violence?
Pending charges: Is the informant facing charges that might give an incentive to “help” the police for leniency?
Payments: Is the informant being paid money, which might encourage exaggeration?
Cooperation deals: Has the informant been “working off” charges for years, possibly building a pattern of “telling the police what they want to hear”?
Relationship to the suspect: Friends, enemies, rivals, or former partners may have personal motives.
Basis of knowledge: Did the informant personally see or hear the things reported, or is it secondhand rumor?

Felton underscores that when these factors cut against reliability, they must be disclosed, not hidden.

C. The Franks Hearing

A Franks hearing is a special evidentiary hearing to test the truthfulness of the statements in a search warrant affidavit. It is not granted automatically; the defendant must:

Identify specific statements or omissions in the affidavit that are allegedly false or misleading.
Provide some evidence (affidavits, documents, proffers) supporting the claim of falsity or omission and its materiality.
Show that, if the affidavit is corrected, it no longer supports probable cause.

If these conditions are met, the court holds a hearing at which the affiant can be examined and evidence presented. If the court concludes that, after correction, the affidavit lacks probable cause and that the misstatements/omissions were intentional or reckless, the warrant is void and the fruits of the search must be suppressed.

D. The Good-Faith Exception (Leon)

The exclusionary rule generally bars the government from using evidence obtained through unconstitutional searches or seizures. But under Leon, the evidence may still be admitted if:

Officers reasonably relied on a warrant they believed to be valid; and
The errors were attributable to the judge or to innocent mistakes, not to deliberate or reckless misconduct by officers.

The exception does not apply if:

The officer knowingly or recklessly misled the judge to get the warrant;
The judge abandoned a neutral role; or
No reasonable officer could think the affidavit established probable cause.

Felton operates in this first category: the central question on remand is whether Inspector Brown’s omissions were reckless or deliberate, in which case Leon cannot save the search.

E. “Bare Bones” Affidavits

A “bare bones” affidavit is one that:

Contains only “conclusory” statements that someone is involved in criminal activity; and
Offers no supporting facts that a reasonable officer would find sufficient to establish probable cause.

In such cases, good-faith reliance on the warrant is unreasonable, because any trained officer should recognize the deficiency. Felton does not explicitly label the affidavit “bare bones,” but it highlights a closely related problem: an affidavit that looks adequate on its face may be deeply misleading if it omits critical facts about the only real witness.

VI. Impact and Implications

A. For Law Enforcement and Affiants

Felton sends a clear signal to officers and investigators:

Disclose adverse credibility information about informants. Payments, cooperation agreements, pending charges, and extensive criminal histories cannot be papered over with generic “reliable in the past” boilerplate.
Explain the informant’s basis of knowledge. Affidavits should specify whether the informant personally observed the criminal conduct, participated in it, or obtained the information secondhand, and why the informant can recognize drugs or other contraband.
Corroborate the alleged criminal activity, not just neutral facts. It is not enough to confirm a suspect’s identity, residence, and car. Investigators should seek evidence that directly supports the claims of ongoing drug dealing (controlled buys, surveillance showing hand-to-hand transactions, recorded calls, etc.).
Expect more scrutiny of “single informant” warrants. When the informant is the only link to recent criminal activity, courts will be less forgiving of thin corroboration and undisclosed incentives.

B. For Prosecutors

Prosecutors will likely need to:

Vet affidavits more carefully before seeking warrants or defending them in suppression litigation, ensuring that key credibility information about informants is not withheld.
Anticipate Franks challenges in cases built on informants, especially where there are payments, cooperation deals, or pending charges.
Be prepared, when necessary, to present detailed evidence at Franks hearings about why an informant’s information was still reasonably deemed credible despite shortcomings.

The decision may also influence charging and plea negotiations; in borderline cases where informant credibility is weak and affidavits are vulnerable, prosecutors may be more willing to resolve cases early or eschew prosecution entirely.

C. For Defense Counsel

From the defense perspective, Felton provides a roadmap for challenging warrants based on informants:

Obtain and scrutinize discovery about informants’ payment records, cooperation histories, criminal backgrounds, and pending cases.
Compare that information to what is (and is not) disclosed in the warrant affidavit.
Frame omissions of credibility information as both:
- Material to the probable cause determination; and
- Evidence of reckless disregard for the truth, justifying a Franks hearing.
Emphasize the lack of corroboration of actual criminal conduct, highlighting cases like Clark and contrasting them with Woodfork-style robust investigations.

D. For Magistrate and Trial Judges

Felton reinforces that issuing judges must not rubber-stamp warrants based on thin informant affidavits. Magistrates should:

Ask follow-up questions when affidavits rely heavily on a confidential informant but say little about the informant’s basis of knowledge or incentives.
Be cautious of generic statements of “past reliability” without specifics.
Recognize that deference on appeal is conditional on being adequately informed; if critical credibility information is missing, the warrant is more vulnerable to later suppression.

Trial judges, in turn, may see more Franks motions and must navigate the line between a mere fishing expedition and a genuine showing of potential reckless omissions. Felton makes clear that credibility omissions by themselves can justify a hearing when they are substantial and central to probable cause.

E. Doctrinal Development

At a broader level, Felton:

Pushes back against overreliance on informants. It continues a trend in Seventh Circuit jurisprudence demanding transparency about informants’ incentives and careful corroboration of their claims.
Clarifies the interaction between Franks and Leon. Where there is a plausible claim that affiants recklessly omitted key facts, courts must hold a Franks hearing before relying on the good-faith exception.
Balances deference and accountability. While reiterating deference to issuing judges on probable cause, the opinion underscores that such deference is only appropriate when judges have been fully and fairly informed.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Felton is a significant decision for Fourth Amendment law in the Seventh Circuit. It crystallizes several principles:

When a warrant depends heavily on a confidential informant, courts will scrutinize both the informant’s credibility and the extent to which officers corroborated alleged criminal activity.
Omitting key information about an informant’s criminal history, payments, cooperation agreements, and pending charges can render a warrant affidavit materially misleading and defeat probable cause.
Such credibility omissions, without more, can be enough to justify a Franks evidentiary hearing, because they support an inference of reckless disregard for the truth.
The Leon good-faith exception does not insulate warrants obtained through reckless or deliberate omissions; before applying good faith, courts must resolve credible Franks challenges.
Violations of state warrant statutes or Rule 41 timing rules, standing alone, do not require suppression under the Fourth Amendment.

By reversing the denial of Felton’s suppression motion and mandating a Franks hearing, the Seventh Circuit reinforces that the constitutional command of reasonableness in searches includes honesty and completeness in the warrant process. Officers who rely on informants must not only investigate but also fully inform the issuing judge about why, and to what extent, the informant should be trusted.