United States v. Elias Chiroy-CAC:
Cementing the Presumption of Legislative Good Faith in Equal-Protection Challenges to 8 U.S.C. § 1326

1. Introduction

United States v. Elias Chiroy-CAC (11th Cir. 2025) is a consolidated appeal in which three non-citizen defendants— Jorge Cesar Ferretiz-Hernandez, Ignacio Felix-Salinas, and Elias Chiroy-Cac—sought dismissal of their indictments for illegal re-entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. They argued that § 1326 is unconstitutional because its predecessor (the 1929 Undesirable Aliens Act) was enacted with anti-Mexican animus, and, by reenacting the provision in 1952 and amending it thereafter, Congress allegedly perpetuated the original discriminatory purpose.

The district court denied the motions to dismiss and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. In doing so, the Court:

• Aligned itself with every other circuit to consider the question;
• Applied the Arlington Heights burden-shifting framework rather than reaching the thorny “plenary-power v. ordinary equal-protection” debate;
• Held that challengers must overcome a strong presumption of legislative good faith and cannot rely on remote historical taint alone;
• Clarified the limited probative value of discriminatory statements made by individual actors or earlier Congresses when later Congresses reenact or amend a statute.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit—per Judge Tjoflat, with Judge Jordan concurring in the judgment—affirmed the district court’s refusal to dismiss the § 1326 indictments. Key holdings include:

1. Standard of Review: Constitutional questions are reviewed de novo; factual findings (e.g., whether Congress acted with discriminatory intent) are reviewed for clear error.
2. Framework Applied: The Court proceeded under Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), assuming arguendo that strict scrutiny might be available, but noting that the challenge fails even under the more demanding test.
3. No Discriminatory Purpose Shown: The defendants failed to prove that the 1952 Congress—or any subsequent Congress—reenacted § 1326 because of, rather than in spite of, a desire to discriminate against Mexicans or other Latinos.
4. Presumption of Good Faith: Courts must presume later legislatures act lawfully; past discriminatory motives do not inexorably “taint” future reenactments.
5. Disparate Impact Insufficient: Statistical over-representation of Mexican nationals in § 1326 prosecutions, standing alone, does not establish discriminatory purpose.
6. Affirmance & Alignment: The decision conforms with the 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 7th, 9th, and 10th Circuits.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

• Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)
• Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)
• Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579 (2018)
• City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980)
• Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995)
• Parallel § 1326 challenges rejected in: Sanchez-Garcia (4th Cir. 2024), Barcenas-Rumualdo (5th Cir. 2022), Viveros-Chavez (7th Cir. 2024), Amador-Bonilla (10th Cir. 2024), Carrillo-Lopez (9th Cir. 2023), etc.

These precedents collectively informed three doctrinal pillars:

1. Equal-Protection challenges to facially neutral statutes hinge on proof of both disparate impact and discriminatory purpose (Davis).
2. The burden of proving improper purpose rests squarely with the challenger (Abbott).
3. Reenactment can “cleanse” earlier legislative taint unless the new legislature also harbored forbidden motives (Johnson v. Governor of Fla. line of Eleventh Circuit cases).

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Threshold Choice of Framework
   Immigration laws traditionally receive rational-basis review under Congress’s plenary power, but because the outcome would be the same, the panel used Arlington Heights.
2. Factors Considered
   The Court walked through each Arlington Heights factor:
   • Historical background: acknowledged invidious rhetoric in 1929 but deemed remote.
   • Sequence of events: 1952 Act was a comprehensive re-codification focused on Cold-War concerns, not Mexican immigration.
   • Legislative debates: scant discussion of illegal re-entry; isolated use of the slur “wetback” insufficient to attribute discriminatory motive to Congress as a whole.
   • Departures from normal procedure: none.
   • Statistical impact: high Latino prosecution rates understandable given geography; impact alone not determinative.
3. Presumption & Separation of Powers
   Citing Miller, Abbott, and the Speech-or-Debate Clause, the Court emphasized that shifting the burden to the Government would entangle courts in impermissible motive inquiries and subvert legislative immunity.
4. Standard of Review Applied
   Because discriminatory intent is factual, clear-error review insulated the district court’s finding where “plausible.” Judge Jordan’s concurrence underscores this point, advocating minimalism.

C. Impact and Future Significance

• Uniform Appellate Consensus: With the Eleventh Circuit on board, every regional circuit has rejected the equal-protection attack on § 1326. Supreme Court review becomes less likely.
• Reinforced Evidentiary Burden: Defendants must now marshal affirmative proof that a specific Congress acted with discriminatory purpose; historical taint alone is insufficient.
• Beyond Immigration: The decision strengthens the “good-faith presumption” in other civil-rights contexts—e.g., election law, criminal statutes with disparate impact.
• No Evidentiary Hearings as of Right: Courts may deny requests for hearings when the proffered historical/ statistical materials fail to raise a triable issue.
• Legislative Strategy: Congress can safely recodify or amend statutes originally enacted in less enlightened eras, provided current motives are legitimate.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Disparate Impact vs. Discriminatory Purpose
A law can disproportionately affect a racial group (impact) without violating the Constitution. Illegality arises only when that disproportionate effect is intended.

2. Arlington Heights Framework
Think of it as a multi-factor checklist for courts to sniff out bad motive: history, sequence, statements, statistical impact, procedural irregularities, etc. If enough factors point to intentional discrimination, the burden shifts to the Government.

3. Presumption of Legislative Good Faith
Courts start with the assumption that lawmakers act lawfully; challengers must produce strong evidence to the contrary. This respects separation of powers and avoids putting legislators on trial.

4. Clear-Error Review
On appeal, a factual finding stands unless the reviewing court is “left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” It’s a steep uphill climb for appellants.

5. Speech or Debate Clause
A constitutional shield that prevents courts from forcing members of Congress to explain their motives, thus making motive-based challenges inherently difficult.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Elias Chiroy-CAC is less about immigration policy and more about constitutional methodology. By affirming § 1326, the Eleventh Circuit:

• Endorsed a stringent evidentiary burden for proving discriminatory purpose;
• Reinforced the doctrinal weight of Arlington Heights and Abbott in motive inquiries;
• Shielded post-war legislative reenactments from the sins of earlier Congresses;
• Unified the circuit landscape, rendering § 1326 challenges based on equal-protection grounds effectively foreclosed.

For practitioners, the case signals that § 1326 remains constitutionally sound and that similar “historical-taint” arguments will face formidable barriers unless supported by contemporary, compelling evidence of discriminatory intent.