United States v. Eiland: Context-Driven Limits on Prosecutorial “No Answer” Remarks and Juror Impeachment Under Rule 606(b)

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Case: United States v. Antwan Eiland, No. 24‑1528
Date Decided: December 8, 2025
Panel: St. Eve, Jackson‑Akiwumi, and Maldonado, Circuit Judges (opinion by St. Eve, J.)

I. Introduction

This appeal arises from a federal drug prosecution in which a jury convicted Antwan Eiland of two sales of crack cocaine to an ATF confidential informant, Luis Villegas, in 2017. The prosecution’s theory was straightforward: Eiland was the person Villegas knew as “Black,” and he twice sold crack to Villegas in controlled buys monitored by ATF. The defense theory was equally simple: Eiland was not “Black,” and the government’s identification evidence was too weak and too unreliable to support a conviction.

On appeal, Eiland challenged (1) the sufficiency of the evidence identifying him as “Black,” (2) a portion of the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument which he claimed was an impermissible indirect comment on his decision not to testify, and (3) alleged juror bias arising from a juror’s post‑verdict comments suggesting the jury may have drawn a negative inference from his silence and his apparent mask‑wearing at trial.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In doing so, it did not radically reshape the law, but it did sharpen and reinforce several important doctrines:

The already stringent standard for sufficiency‑of‑the‑evidence review when the challenge is, in substance, a credibility attack on government witnesses.
A context‑driven approach to alleged Fifth Amendment violations by prosecutors—holding that an argument that “the defense has no answer for the evidence” is permissible when clearly directed at defense counsel’s argument rather than the defendant’s silence.
The strict limits imposed by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) on post‑verdict inquiries into juror deliberations, especially where the alleged error is that a juror improperly considered the defendant’s failure to testify.

These points make Eiland an important reference in three recurring areas of criminal practice: closing argument boundaries, post‑verdict juror challenges, and appellate sufficiency review where identification rests heavily on witnesses of questionable reliability.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

The government’s case centered on three events:

The courthouse encounter (February 15, 2017).
Villegas overheard a man negotiating prices for “hard” (crack cocaine) in an Illinois courthouse lobby. After a brief interaction, the man identified himself as “Black” and exchanged phone contact information with Villegas. Villegas later accidentally called “Black” and then reported the number to his ATF handler, Special Agent Mike Ramos.
The first controlled buy at Popeye’s (February 17, 2017).
Using recorded calls and texts, ATF set up a controlled buy in a Popeye’s parking lot. Villegas testified that Eiland arrived in the passenger seat of a car driven by Theresa Robinson. Villegas got in the car, exchanged money for crack cocaine, and then handed the drugs over to Agent Ramos, who had searched him beforehand. Video footage captured only a fleeting, shadowed glimpse of the passenger’s face.
The second controlled buy at McDonald’s (March 29, 2017).
Another controlled buy was arranged, this time at a McDonald’s. Villegas testified that Eiland met him inside, they went to the restroom, and completed the exchange of drugs for money. Again, audio‑video recordings were made, but they did not clearly show the seller’s face.

Agent Ramos linked the phone number to Eiland through a law enforcement database, and he sent Eiland’s driver’s license photo to Villegas, who identified Eiland as “Black.” At trial, both Villegas and Ramos identified Eiland in court. Theresa Robinson, a friend of Eiland’s aunt who drove him to Popeye’s that day, also identified him and confirmed he used the nickname “Black,” though she had not been questioned until five years later and needed a subpoena naming Eiland to recall the event.

Eiland did not testify and presented no affirmative evidence. His defense relied on cross‑examination to expose weaknesses and inconsistencies in the government’s case, especially regarding identification and record‑keeping.

B. Issues on Appeal and Holdings

Sufficiency of the evidence.
Eiland argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove he was “Black,” emphasizing inconsistencies in Villegas’s testimony (especially a time discrepancy), weaknesses in Ramos’s documentation, and the delayed and shaky nature of Robinson’s identification.
Holding: The court held that the evidence was sufficient. The inconsistencies and impeachment went to credibility, which is for the jury. None of the testimony was “incredible as a matter of law,” and the combination of identifications, corroborative records, and recordings allowed a rational juror to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Alleged Fifth Amendment violation in rebuttal argument.
In closing, defense counsel stressed “missing” evidence (buy money, phone records from Eiland’s phone, etc.) and argued the jury should infer that such evidence, if favorable to the government, would have been produced. In rebuttal, the prosecutor responded:
“So you focus on … the evidence that’s before you. And that shows that he is guilty. And I get why Mr. Boyle focused on what there wasn’t, is because they don’t have an answer for what there was.”
Eiland claimed “they don’t have an answer” was an indirect comment on his silence.
Holding: Applying plain‑error review, the court rejected this claim. In context, the statement was aimed at defense counsel’s “missing evidence” argument, not at Eiland’s failure to testify. It therefore did not violate the Fifth Amendment. Alternatively, even if improper, any error was not “plain” and did not affect Eiland’s substantial rights.
Juror bias and Rule 606(b).
After the verdict, a juror (“Juror A”) told prosecutors that Eiland might have worn a mask at trial so jurors could not match his face to the video and that Eiland might not have testified so jurors could not match his voice to the recordings. Eiland moved for a new trial—or at least a juror hearing—arguing that Juror A’s comments showed an improper negative inference from his silence.
Holding: Relief was denied. Under Rule 606(b) and the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Torres‑Chavez, a juror’s post‑verdict disclosure that he or she considered the defendant’s silence is inadmissible; it concerns deliberative process and mental impressions, not “extraneous prejudicial information” or an “outside influence.” The court further held that nothing in Juror A’s statement suggested exposure to any extrinsic influence (such as media reports or outside communications). Because there was no adequate showing of extrinsic influence, the judge was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing or grant a new trial.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence and the “Incredible as a Matter of Law” Doctrine

1. Precedents and Framework

The court began by positioning Eiland’s insufficiency challenge within the well‑settled framework of appellate review for sufficiency of the evidence, citing a long line of Seventh Circuit precedents:

Standard of review.
The denial of a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal is reviewed de novo, but—as the court noted, quoting United States v. Watkins, 107 F.4th 607 (7th Cir. 2024)—that effectively collapses into the ordinary sufficiency standard. Evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government, with all reasonable inferences drawn in its favor (United States v. Coley, 137 F.4th 874 (7th Cir. 2025)).
“Nearly insurmountable” burden.
Echoing United States v. Warren, 593 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2010), the panel reiterated that a defendant faces a “heavy, indeed, nearly insurmountable, burden” when challenging sufficiency, especially after a jury has credited government witnesses.
Deference to jury credibility determinations.
The court leaned heavily on cases emphasizing that assessing witness credibility is “the jury’s job,” not the appellate court’s (United States v. Cruse, 805 F.3d 795, 812 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Godinez, 7 F.4th 628 (7th Cir. 2021); United States v. Foy, 50 F.4th 616 (7th Cir. 2022); United States v. Medina, 969 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2020)).
“Incredible as a matter of law.”
The opinion carefully distinguished between (a) impeached or flawed testimony, which the jury may nonetheless credit, and (b) testimony that is “incredible as a matter of law,” which can be disregarded on appeal. Following United States v. Alcantar, 83 F.3d 185 (7th Cir. 1996), United States v. Conley, 875 F.3d 391 (7th Cir. 2017), and United States v. Jones, 56 F.4th 455 (7th Cir. 2022), testimony is legally incredible only in “the narrowest of circumstances”—for example, if it was physically impossible for the witness to observe what he described, or the events could not have occurred under the laws of nature.
Impeachment vs. legal incredibility.
United States v. Contreras, 820 F.3d 255 (7th Cir. 2016), and Alcantar remind that impeachment—even extensive impeachment—does not make testimony “unbelievable on its face.” A jury is entitled to credit even the testimony of “the most dishonest of witnesses” (Conley, 875 F.3d at 400).

2. Application to the Identification Evidence

The statutory elements under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) required proof that Eiland knowingly distributed a substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base, and that he knew it was a controlled substance. The contested issue was identity: whether the person known as “Black” who engaged in the drug sales was indeed Eiland.

Eiland’s arguments fell into three groups:

Villegas’s timeline discrepancy.
Villegas testified that he accidentally called “Black” after his 9:00 or 9:30 a.m. court appearance. Phone records showed that the call actually occurred at 8:59 a.m. Eiland argued that this contradiction rendered Villegas’s testimony “impossible under the laws of nature,” and therefore incredible as a matter of law.

The court firmly rejected this logic. A misremembered or imprecise time is a classic impeachment point, not a physical or logical impossibility. The court cited United States v. Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354, 1359 (7th Cir. 1992), to emphasize that inconsistencies on tangential details (like exact timing) do not invalidate testimony regarding the “core events” of the crime. The jurors heard the inconsistency, weighed it, and still chose to credit Villegas; that is precisely what jurors are supposed to do.
Agent Ramos’s documentation and identification.
Defense cross‑examination highlighted Ramos’s sparse report, his failure to preserve the database printout linking the phone number to Eiland, and the fact that he had only a “clear line of sight” from roughly twenty feet away during the parking‑lot buy, relying primarily on Eiland’s driver’s license photo for identification.

The court held that these criticisms went to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility or legal sufficiency. On appeal, courts will not “reweigh” such evidence. As long as it is not physically impossible for Ramos to have observed what he claimed—or inherently unbelievable—it remains for the jury to decide how much to credit.
Theresa Robinson’s delayed and limited recollection.
Robinson was not interviewed until 2022, five years after the Popeye’s buy. She did not recall the incident until she saw a subpoena with Eiland’s name. When initially asked about “Black,” she mentioned knowing others with that nickname and specifically named only a man called Mike.

Once again, the court classified these problems as classic impeachment material, not a basis for finding testimony “impossible under the laws of nature.” A jury could rationally accept some or all of Robinson’s testimony— such as the fact she drove Eiland to Popeye’s on the relevant date and knew him as “Black”—while discounting her inability to recall details unaided.

Importantly, the court did not rely solely on individual witness testimony. It emphasized the cumulative effect of:

Multiple in‑court identifications (Villegas, Ramos, Robinson);
Recorded text messages and phone calls arranging the buys;
Audio‑video footage corroborating the logistics of the transactions; and
Corroborative court records placing both men at the courthouse on the initial meeting date.

Given this constellation of evidence, the court concluded that a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Eiland was “Black” and that he knowingly distributed crack cocaine on the two charged dates.

3. Significance

While not breaking new ground, Eiland reinforces that appellate sufficiency challenges rooted in witness credibility face almost insuperable hurdles. The opinion is particularly instructive for:

Defense strategy. It underscores that impeaching government witnesses on cross‑examination is critical at trial but will rarely yield relief on appeal unless the testimony is literally impossible.
Trial judges. It signals strong appellate support for letting juries resolve contested identification issues, even when key evidence consists of imperfect, delayed, or partially impeached eyewitness identifications.
Prosecutors. It validates prosecutions built on informant testimony and law enforcement identifications, so long as there is some corroboration (texts, calls, video, court records) and the inconsistencies do not rise to the level of physical impossibility.

B. Prosecutor’s Rebuttal and the Fifth Amendment Right to Silence

1. Legal Background

The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor cannot invite the jury to draw a negative inference from a defendant’s failure to testify. This includes both:

Direct comments (e.g., “He didn’t testify; that shows he is guilty”), which are plainly forbidden.
Indirect comments that, although not explicitly about silence, functionally signal to the jury that it should hold the defendant’s silence against him.

The Seventh Circuit has articulated a two‑part test for indirect comments. Under United States v. Tucker, 714 F.3d 1006 (7th Cir. 2013), and United States v. Gustafson, 130 F.4th 608 (7th Cir. 2025), an indirect comment is improper only if:

the prosecutor manifestly intended to refer to the defendant’s silence; or
the jury would “naturally and necessarily” understand the remark as a comment on the defendant’s silence.

Separately, a line of Seventh Circuit cases has cautioned prosecutors about describing the government’s evidence as “uncontradicted,” “unrebutted,” or “undisputed” when only the defendant could have contradicted it. Cases like United States v. Cotnam, 88 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Buege, 578 F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1978); and United States v. Handman, 447 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1971), hold that such comments can violate the Fifth Amendment under Griffin if they effectively highlight the defendant’s silence as the only missing contradiction.

Reviewing alleged prosecutorial error in closing arguments also raises a secondary question: what harmless‑error framework applies where the alleged misconduct implicates a specific constitutional right (such as silence)? Older cases like United States v. Mietus, 237 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2001), suggest a bifurcated approach:

Constitutional trial‑right violations (e.g., direct comments on silence) are analyzed under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (requiring the government to show harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt).
More general misconduct is evaluated under a multi‑factor “fair trial” test derived from Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986): whether the remarks, in context, so infected the trial with unfairness that the conviction violates due process.

Recent Seventh Circuit cases, however, have tended to treat all prosecutorial misconduct under the Darden‑style framework, blurring this distinction. The Eiland panel candidly acknowledged this “tension” in its own case law but explicitly declined to resolve it, because it found no constitutional violation in the first place.

2. The Challenged Remarks and Context

Defense counsel’s closing argument stressed that certain types of evidence were “missing” and urged the jury to draw adverse inferences against the government:

no marked buy money introduced into evidence,
no records from Eiland’s own phone,
no location data from that phone, and so on.

Counsel argued that if this missing evidence truly helped the government and linked the crimes to Eiland, the prosecution would have produced it. Because the government did not, the jury should doubt its case.

In rebuttal, the prosecutor responded with the comments at issue. Paraphrased and in context, the prosecutor said:

Defense counsel focused on “what there wasn’t” (missing evidence). But what matters is “the evidence that’s before you,” and that evidence shows guilt. “I get why Mr. Boyle focused on what there wasn’t, [it] is because they don’t have an answer for what there was.”

The prosecutor then walked through the affirmative evidence—testimony, identifications, recordings—and argued that this evidence all pointed to guilt. The prosecutor also remarked that “both sides start at zero,” then immediately clarified that it is the government’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

3. The Court’s Reasoning

Because Eiland did not object at trial, the court applied plain‑error review, under United States v. Page, 123 F.4th 851 (7th Cir. 2024) (en banc), and United States v. Jones, 600 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2010). Eiland had to show:

an error;
that is clear or obvious (“plain”);
that affected his substantial rights (a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent the error); and
that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

The court rejected the claim at the first step, holding there was no error at all. Key to that determination was the court’s insistence on reading the remark “in the larger context of the parties’ closing arguments and the trial itself,” citing United States v. Tanner, 628 F.3d 890, 896 (7th Cir. 2010), and United States v. Chavez, 12 F.4th 716 (7th Cir. 2021).

The panel’s reasoning was driven by three contextual cues:

The prosecutor explicitly framed the comment as a response to defense counsel’s argument.
Immediately before saying “they don’t have an answer for what there was,” the prosecutor referenced defense counsel’s focus on “what there wasn’t” (missing evidence) and directed the jury instead to “the evidence that’s before you.”
The pronoun “they” clearly referred to the defense team, not to Eiland personally.
The sentence began: “I get why Mr. Boyle focused on what there wasn’t, [it] is because they don’t have an answer for what there was.” The court read “they” as referring to the defense’s forensic and argumentative strategy, not the defendant’s decision not to testify.
The prosecutor immediately moved into a recap of the affirmative evidence, not of Eiland’s silence.
After the “no answer” remark, the prosecutor listed the trial evidence and argued that it proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Nothing in this recap invited the jury to consider Eiland’s silence.

The court found Gustafson particularly instructive. There, a prosecutor said, “There’s nothing to contradict” a witness’s testimony, and “No one came in here and said anything different than that.” The Seventh Circuit upheld those remarks because they were a targeted response to defense counsel’s reference to facts not in evidence, not a coded comment on silence. Similarly, in Eiland, the prosecutor was, in the court’s view, “clearly aimed at defense counsel’s” argument—not at Eiland’s failure to testify.

The panel invoked another cautionary principle from United States v. Alviar, 573 F.3d 526, 543 (7th Cir. 2009): courts should “not lightly assume that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through a lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations.” That principle pushed the court toward a benign interpretation.

On the “both sides start at zero” remark, the court emphasized that the prosecutor immediately clarified that “it is the government’s burden to present evidence to show that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” In context, no reasonable juror could have understood this as equating the burdens of proof.

The court also noted that, even assuming arguendo that the comments were improper, they were not “plainly” so under existing precedent, and Eiland could not show prejudice in light of:

the trial judge’s instructions on the presumption of innocence and the defendant’s right not to testify, and
the strength of the identification and corroborative evidence against him.

4. Doctrinal Impact

Eiland adds weight to a trend in the Seventh Circuit to treat potentially problematic “no answer,” “unrebutted,” or “undisputed” remarks in a highly context‑sensitive way. Its main implications are:

Reassurance for prosecutors.
If a prosecutor’s “they have no answer” remark is clearly tethered to defense counsel’s strategy (e.g., complaining about missing evidence or introducing facts not in evidence) and is embedded in a discussion of actual trial evidence, it is unlikely to be considered a Griffin violation.
Caution for defense counsel.
Aggressive “missing evidence” or “why didn’t the government bring X?” arguments may invite equally aggressive rebuttals. As long as prosecutors keep the focus on counsel’s argument (not on the defendant’s silence) and on the existing record, their “no answer” responses will probably withstand appellate scrutiny—even if they come close to the line.
Tension in harmless‑error standards remains unresolved.
By flagging but not resolving the conflict between Mietus (suggesting Chapman harmless‑error review for Fifth Amendment trial‑right violations) and later cases applying a general Darden framework, Eiland signals that future panels may be asked to clarify the governing standard when improper silence comments are preserved. But for unpreserved errors, Page’s plain‑error test will dominate.

C. Juror Bias, Rule 606(b), and Post‑Verdict Inquiries

1. Rule 606(b): Internal vs. External Influences

The third issue involved Juror A’s post‑verdict remarks that Eiland might have worn a mask to thwart identification from video and that he may have chosen not to testify to keep jurors from comparing his voice with recorded calls. The central question was whether these remarks could be used to impeach the verdict.

Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) generally bars juror testimony “about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment.” The rule includes narrow exceptions, allowing jurors to testify about:

“extraneous prejudicial information” improperly brought to the jury’s attention (Rule 606(b)(2)(A)), or
“outside influence” improperly exerted on any juror (Rule 606(b)(2)(B)).

Examples of extraneous information often include:

media reports or news articles about the case;
unauthorized internet research or social‑media information about parties or witnesses;
dictionaries or outside legal materials consulted during deliberations.

Examples of an outside influence include:

attempts to bribe or threaten jurors;
communication from a judge’s clerk or court official that is improper and not part of the official trial record;
interventions by family, friends, or third parties to sway a juror’s view.

Ordinary internal discussions, misunderstandings of the law, misapplications of instructions, or biases and inferences within the jury room are considered part of jurors’ “mental processes” and are off‑limits.

2. Torres‑Chavez and the Inadmissibility of Deliberative Consideration of Silence

The panel relied squarely on United States v. Torres‑Chavez, 744 F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 2014). In that case, a juror revealed post‑verdict that he had improperly considered the defendant’s failure to testify. The Seventh Circuit held that such evidence was inadmissible under Rule 606(b)(1), because it reflected the juror’s mental processes and the effect of information on his vote, not any external or extraneous information.

In Torres‑Chavez, as here, the defense argued that the juror’s consideration of the defendant’s silence violated the Fifth Amendment and therefore should be admissible. The court rejected that argument, emphasizing that Rule 606(b) aims to protect “freedom of deliberation, stability and finality of verdicts, and protection of jurors against annoyance and embarrassment” and that only narrow exceptions for true extraneous information or outside influences justify piercing the secrecy of deliberations.

3. Eiland’s Attempt to Recast Closing Argument as “Extraneous” Information

Recognizing Torres‑Chavez as an obstacle, Eiland tried to bring his case within the Rule 606(b)(2) exceptions by arguing that the prosecutor’s allegedly improper “no answer” remark during rebuttal was itself “extraneous prejudicial information” or an “outside influence.”

His theory was:

Rebuttal argument is not evidence;
It is not part of jurors’ “deliberations” in the strict sense;
Therefore, if the prosecutor’s comment invited jurors to consider Eiland’s silence, that invitation was an improper external influence or extraneous input, opening the door for juror testimony under Rule 606(b)(2).

If accepted, that theory would effectively create a broad exception to Rule 606(b) whenever a party could argue that something during trial (closing arguments, judicial comments, etc.) was improper and thus “extraneous.” It would invite post‑trial juror fishing expeditions and undermine jury‑deliberation secrecy.

4. The Court’s Resolution

The court avoided that broader question by focusing on a narrower, factual point: nothing in Juror A’s remarks connected her (or the jury’s) reasoning to the prosecutor’s closing argument at all.

Juror A simply said:

she thought Eiland might have worn a mask to frustrate facial comparison with the video; and
she speculated that he might not have testified to prevent the jury from comparing his voice to the recordings.

There was no mention of, or link to, the prosecutor’s “no answer” remark. From this, the court drew two key conclusions:

Juror A’s comments fall squarely within Rule 606(b)(1).
They reflected “the effect of anything on that juror’s … vote” and her “mental processes concerning the verdict.” Under Torres‑Chavez, such evidence is inadmissible, even if it reveals unconstitutional reasoning inside the jury room.
No “adequate showing” of extrinsic influence was made, so no evidentiary hearing was required.
Citing United States v. King, 627 F.3d 641, 650 (7th Cir. 2010), and United States v. Davis, 15 F.3d 1393, 1412 (7th Cir. 1994), the court emphasized that a judge’s duty to investigate arises only upon an “adequate showing of extrinsic influence.” Mere allegations, suspicions, or internal biases do not compel an evidentiary hearing. Just as a note expressing juror fear of the defendant in King did not show exposure to outside influences, Juror A’s post‑trial speculation about Eiland’s motives and silence did not show that the jury had received any improper external communications or information.

Because Eiland failed at this threshold step, the court did not decide whether, as a doctrinal matter, statements made in closing argument could ever qualify as “extraneous prejudicial information” or an “outside influence” under Rule 606(b)(2). It simply held that on these facts, the remark was inadmissible as classic deliberative content, and thus the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying both an evidentiary hearing and a new trial.

5. Broader Implications

Eiland’s approach has several important consequences:

Reaffirmation of deliberation secrecy.
The decision strongly reinforces the insulation of juror deliberations from post‑verdict scrutiny, even where jurors candidly reveal impermissible inferences about silence. Except in very narrow circumstances (e.g., the Supreme Court’s racial‑bias exception in Pena‑Rodriguez v. Colorado), courts will not pierce the deliberation veil.
No back‑door Fifth Amendment remedy via Rule 606(b).
A defendant cannot circumvent Griffin and Rule 606(b) by re‑labeling closing argument as “extraneous information” in order to open the record to juror testimony about how the argument affected their votes. Unless jurors were exposed to something genuinely external—like news coverage, social‑media commentary, or out‑of‑court contacts—their internal application of trial arguments remains off‑limits.
High bar for juror‑misconduct hearings.
Trial courts retain significant discretion in deciding whether to hold post‑verdict hearings. The defendant must make a concrete, non‑speculative showing of extrinsic influence; generalized concerns about bias or improper inferences from silence will not suffice.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Incredible as a Matter of Law” vs. Impeached Witnesses

When an appellate court says testimony is “incredible as a matter of law,” it does not mean the judges personally find it hard to believe. It means something much narrower:

The testimony describes events that are literally impossible under physical laws (for example, saying it was sunny and raining heavily at the same moment and place where meteorological records show clear skies).
Or, it would have been physically impossible for the witness to observe what he claims to have seen (for example, someone testifies to seeing a license plate from a location and distance that could not allow that).

By contrast, a witness can be impeached—caught in inconsistencies, shown to have poor memory, or even admitted liar—and still not be “incredible as a matter of law.” In such cases, the jury gets to decide how much, if any, of that testimony to believe.

2. Plain Error Review

If a party does not object to a problem at trial, an appellate court applies “plain error” review. This is a four‑step test:

There must be an error.
The error must be “plain” (clear or obvious under current law).
The error must affect the defendant’s “substantial rights” (usually meaning there is a reasonable probability that it affected the outcome).
The error must seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Failing any one of these steps means the conviction stands. This makes unpreserved claims—especially about closing argument—difficult to win on appeal.

3. Direct vs. Indirect Comments on Silence

A direct comment explicitly points to the defendant’s failure to testify and urges the jury to infer guilt from it. This is clearly unconstitutional.
An indirect comment is more subtle—such as saying “only one person knows what really happened” when that “one person” is the defendant who did not testify. Courts analyze such comments contextually, asking whether the prosecutor clearly intended to highlight silence or whether the jury would “naturally and necessarily” take the remark as referencing silence.

4. Rule 606(b): Internal vs. External Juror Influences

Rule 606(b) draws a sharp line between:

Internal matters—what was said in the jury room, how jurors interpreted the evidence and instructions, and their mental reasoning. These are almost never open to inquiry.
External matters—information or influences coming from outside the trial and deliberations, such as media reports, social‑media research, bribes, or threats. These can sometimes be investigated via juror testimony.

A juror’s statement that she improperly considered the defendant’s failure to testify is an internal mental process, even if it reveals a constitutional error, and is therefore generally inadmissible under Rule 606(b).

V. Overall Impact of United States v. Eiland

1. Reinforcing Deference to Jury Credibility Determinations

Eiland strongly reinforces the notion that appellate courts will almost never overturn convictions where the defendant’s primary complaint is that jurors should have disbelieved flawed witnesses. The opinion makes clear that:

Discrepancies in timing, incomplete law‑enforcement paperwork, and late or imperfect witness recall are matters for cross‑examination and closing argument, not for sufficiency review.
As long as the testimony is not physically or logically impossible, and there is some corroboration, the jury is entitled to credit it—even if the witness is a cooperating informant or has credibility issues.

2. Clarifying the Safe Zone for “No Answer” Rebuttal Arguments

The decision is particularly notable for prosecutors and defense attorneys in how it handles rebuttal to “missing evidence” arguments:

Prosecutors may safely argue that the defense “has no answer” for affirmative evidence, provided it is clear they are talking about defense counsel’s arguments and theories, not the defendant’s personal testimony.
Defense lawyers should be aware that aggressive “they didn’t bring us X” themes will likely invite such rebuttals, and appellate courts will scrutinize the comments in context, not in isolation.

Eiland thus gives prosecutors a roadmap for how to frame strong rebuttal arguments without crossing the Fifth Amendment line: keep the focus on the strength of the evidence and the defense’s forensic “lack of answer,” not on the defendant’s silence.

3. Tightening the Door on Juror‑Deliberation Challenges

On juror bias, Eiland provides clear reinforcement of an already stringent standard:

Even explicit juror admissions of impermissible inferences from silence generally cannot be used to impeach a verdict, because they reveal only internal deliberative processes.
Courts will not treat trial arguments—however flawed—as “extraneous information” for Rule 606(b)(2) purposes absent a clear link showing jurors were exposed to and influenced by something from outside the trial record.
Trial judges have broad discretion to decline evidentiary hearings where defendants cannot show a concrete, non‑speculative extrinsic influence.

This makes it very difficult to obtain relief based on juror comments that, after the fact, suggest internal bias, misunderstanding, or disregard of instructions (including those about the defendant’s right not to testify).

VI. Conclusion

United States v. Eiland is not a radical departure from established law, but a strongly reasoned consolidation of several key principles at the intersection of criminal trials, appellate review, and jury integrity.

First, it underscores the extraordinary deference appellate courts give to jury verdicts when the alleged insufficiency turns on witness credibility. Unless testimony is impossible under the laws of nature, impeachment alone will not justify overturning a conviction.

Second, it clarifies that prosecutors’ rebuttal statements suggesting the defense has “no answer” to the government’s evidence can be constitutionally permissible when they clearly address the defense’s arguments and evidentiary posture, not the defendant’s personal silence. Context is the linchpin in evaluating alleged Griffin violations.

Third, and perhaps most significantly for post‑verdict practice, the decision reaffirms the robustness of Rule 606(b)’s bar on inquiries into juror deliberations. Even where a juror candidly reveals possibly unconstitutional reasoning about a defendant’s choice not to testify, such statements are ordinarily inadmissible, absent a showing of extraneous information or outside influence. Eiland’s attempt to recharacterize closing argument as “extraneous” failed, and the court left intact a strict internal‑external divide.

Taken together, these strands make Eiland a valuable precedent in three recurring areas of criminal litigation: sufficiency challenges based on witness reliability, policing the line between proper and improper prosecutorial comment on silence, and the limited scope of permissible post‑verdict juror inquiries. Defense and prosecution alike will look to this case as a guidepost for structuring trial strategy, closing arguments, and post‑trial motions in the Seventh Circuit and potentially beyond.