United States v. Edwards: Illinois Voluntary Manslaughter as an ACCA “Violent Felony” and the Permissible Use of Force in Terry Stops

I. Introduction

In United States v. Jackie Edwards, Nos. 21‑3114 & 21‑3094 (7th Cir. Dec. 17, 2025), the Seventh Circuit resolved two important questions at the intersection of criminal procedure and federal sentencing:

• How much force can law enforcement use during an investigative stop (Terry stop) without converting it into an arrest that requires probable cause?
• Does an Illinois conviction for voluntary manslaughter under the pre‑1986 statute count as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)?

The case arose out of an extensive DEA investigation involving Title III wiretaps into drug trafficking in the Chicago area. Jackie Edwards, a twice‑convicted federal drug trafficker with a 1982 Illinois voluntary manslaughter conviction, was intercepted discussing drug transactions, fears of being robbed, and his intention to carry a pistol into Chicago. When agents later stopped Edwards—using unmarked cars, multiple officers with drawn firearms (including an AR‑15), and handcuffs—they recovered a handgun from his coat pocket and charged him with being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Edwards appealed his conviction, raising a “kitchen-sink” assortment of arguments: that the gun should have been suppressed because the stop was effectively an arrest without probable cause; that the evidence was insufficient because officers allegedly “planted” the gun; and that trial management and evidentiary rulings (especially concerning the wiretap background) denied him a fair trial. The government cross‑appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court erred in refusing to treat Edwards’s 1982 voluntary manslaughter conviction as an ACCA predicate.

The Seventh Circuit:

• Affirmed the conviction, holding that the stop was a valid Terry stop, the evidence was sufficient, and there was no error warranting a new trial; but
• Vacated the sentence and remanded, holding that Illinois voluntary manslaughter (the predecessor to today’s second‑degree murder statute) is categorically a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s elements clause.

This commentary focuses on the new or clarified legal principles: the scope of permissible force in investigative stops, the application of the collective‑knowledge doctrine, and especially the categorical treatment of Illinois voluntary manslaughter as an ACCA violent felony.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Judge Sykes, writing for a unanimous panel, structured the opinion around four main issues:

1. Fourth Amendment / Suppression:
   The court held that agents had ample reasonable suspicion to stop Edwards based on the wiretap information and surveillance, and that their display and use of force—including approaching with firearms drawn, use of an AR‑15, and handcuffing—did not transform the stop into a de facto arrest. The total encounter lasted less than six minutes and was reasonably calibrated to legitimate officer‑safety concerns, especially in light of Edwards’s resistance.
2. Sufficiency of the Evidence (Rule 29):
   Viewing the trial record in the light most favorable to the government, the court found overwhelming evidence that Edwards possessed the firearm found in his pocket. The jury was entitled to reject his theory that officers planted the gun.
3. New Trial (Rule 33):
   The court rejected Edwards’s claim that evidentiary and trial‑management rulings—striking opening statements; limiting references to the DEA; and tightly constraining evidence of the underlying drug investigation—even if imperfect, denied him a fair trial. If anything, those rulings were “noticeably protective” of his defense.
4. Sentencing / ACCA Predicate:
   Applying the categorical approach, and extending its earlier decision in United States v. Teague, 884 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2018), the court held that Illinois voluntary manslaughter (under the former Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 9‑2 (1961)) is a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s elements clause, § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Because that conviction, together with Edwards’s two federal drug‑trafficking convictions, gives him three qualifying predicates, he must be resentenced under ACCA.

Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the § 922(g) conviction, vacated Edwards’s 60‑month non‑ACCA sentence, and remanded for resentencing under ACCA.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Investigation and the Stop

Edwards surfaced in a federal wiretap investigation of a St. Louis heroin dealer. Agents monitoring Title III interceptions heard:

• Edwards engaging in coded discussions about marijuana in distribution quantities.
• That a supplier, Thayer Daineh, brought a bag to Edwards’s residence and later left with a brown and a white bag; Daineh was soon stopped by Illinois State Police, and about $30,000 in cash was seized from his car.
• Edwards expressing concern about being set up for a robbery, enlisting Chicago associates to identify the robber, and planning a trip into Chicago to “get” the would‑be robber.
• Crucially, Edwards saying that his “pistol” and “everything” were at his home, indicating he would bring his gun when going to the police station or into the city.

Agents also knew Edwards’s criminal history: two federal felony drug‑dealing convictions and a 1982 Illinois voluntary manslaughter conviction. Surveillance teams were expressly warned he “was heard bragging about having a firearm” and had a homicide conviction.

On the day of the stop, four officers followed Edwards’s SUV from his home in Richton Park into Chicago. Near his laundromat at 69th Street and Racine Avenue, Edwards performed a countersurveillance maneuver known as “squaring the block” (five consecutive right turns around a block). After he parked, officers initiated an investigative stop.

One officer, wearing a DEA vest and carrying an AR‑15, approached the driver’s side, identified himself, and ordered Edwards to show his hands and exit the vehicle. Edwards:

• Initially complied but then reached toward the center console.
• Refused to exit, leaned on the horn, and began closing his window.
• Prompted the officer to try to strike the window with the rifle muzzle; the muzzle instead entered the partially open window, nearly striking Edwards’s head.
• Was then pulled from the vehicle, resisted a frisk, and repeatedly turned his body to shield his right side (“blading”).

Officers took Edwards to the ground, handcuffed him, and stood him back up. As he continued to twist his body to conceal his right coat pocket, an officer felt a hard object and recovered a handgun from that pocket. The entire stop, from curb to recovery of the gun, lasted under six minutes.

B. Pretrial Motions and Trial Dynamics

Edwards moved to suppress the gun, arguing:

• The officers lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop and frisk; and
• The show of force turned the stop into an arrest without probable cause.

After a full evidentiary hearing, the district court (Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman) denied the motion.

Pretrial, the parties agreed in principle that the government would not introduce detailed evidence of the underlying drug/Title III investigation. Concerned the defense might suggest Edwards was arbitrarily targeted, the government sought limited flexibility to introduce background evidence if the defense opened the door. The judge initially excluded any such testimony.

At trial, the government’s opening statement briefly referred to “four agents and officers of the Drug Enforcement Administration.” The defense objected to mention of the DEA; the judge ultimately instructed the government to use the term “federal agents” instead and later went so far as to tell the jury to disregard both parties’ opening statements entirely.

The defense strategy became clear: to depict the officers as violent and untrustworthy and argue that they planted the gun on Edwards. During cross‑examination of Officer Campbell, defense counsel questioned whether officers had any reason to believe Edwards was armed, implying a random and unjustified stop. The government argued that this misled the jury under the shield of the pretrial exclusion order and requested permission to introduce limited evidence of the wiretap information about Edwards’s gun.

The judge partially reconsidered her ruling but adopted an extremely narrow modification: the government could call Agent Jola Lech to testify that:

1. She was the supervising case agent; and
2. Before the stop she advised the surveillance team that Edwards might have a gun.

Still excluded were the intercepted calls themselves, including the explicit “pistol” discussion. In closing, the defense pressed the theory that Edwards “never possessed” the gun and that officers must have planted it. The jury rejected that theory and convicted him.

C. Sentencing and the ACCA Dispute

Under ACCA, a defendant convicted under § 922(g) faces a 15‑year mandatory minimum sentence if he has three prior convictions for a “violent felony” or “serious drug offense.” See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), (2).

Edwards had:

• Two federal drug‑trafficking convictions (which all parties agreed were “serious drug offenses” under ACCA), and
• A 1982 Illinois conviction for voluntary manslaughter.

The probation officer concluded that voluntary manslaughter did not qualify as a “violent felony” and therefore recommended against ACCA enhancement. The government disagreed, relying on United States v. Teague, where the Seventh Circuit held that Illinois second‑degree murder (the modern successor to voluntary manslaughter) is a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines’ elements clause, which mirrors ACCA.

The district court sided with the probation officer and imposed a 60‑month sentence without ACCA enhancement. On cross‑appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed on this point.

IV. Analysis of the Opinion

A. Fourth Amendment: High-Force Terry Stops and De Facto Arrests

1. Reasonable Suspicion and the Collective-Knowledge Doctrine

The court treated Edwards’s claim that agents lacked reasonable suspicion as “borderline frivolous,” emphasizing that Terry stops require only:

“specific and articulable facts that when taken together with rational inferences from those facts warrant a brief intrusion on personal liberty for investigation purposes.” (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968))

Key aspects of the court’s reasoning:

• Low threshold for reasonable suspicion.
  Citing United States v. Eymann, 962 F.3d 273 (7th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Reedy, 989 F.3d 548 (7th Cir. 2021), the court reiterated that reasonable suspicion "requires more than a hunch but less than probable cause and considerably less than preponderance of the evidence," and is based on “commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior” (Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000)).
• Collective-knowledge doctrine.
  As in Eymann and relying on Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 n.5 (1983), and United States v. Kahn, 937 F.3d 1042, 1052–53 (7th Cir. 2019), the court held that officers who conducted the stop could rely on information possessed by other agents:

  “When law-enforcement officers or agencies are cooperating in an investigation, … the knowledge of one is presumed shared by all.”

  This legitimates basing reasonable suspicion on the full investigative picture—Title III interceptions, observed drug activity, and prior criminal history—even if the individual officers on scene did not personally collect all of that information.
• Facts supporting reasonable suspicion.
  Considered collectively, agents knew:
  • Edwards was involved in ongoing drug trafficking, including a large cash payment to Daineh that morning.
  • He believed he was being set up for a robbery and intended to “get” the would‑be robber.
  • He was planning a trip into Chicago and stated his pistol and everything he needed were at his home—indicating he would travel armed.
  • He had prior drug‑trafficking and manslaughter convictions.
  • He engaged in a recognized countersurveillance maneuver (“squaring the block”).
  This body of evidence easily satisfied Terry’s standard. The court underscored the objective, holistic nature of the inquiry.

From a doctrinal standpoint, the opinion reinforces that wiretap‑based intelligence, when combined with traditional observations and criminal history, can robustly support reasonable suspicion, particularly in narcotics contexts where weapons are often involved.

2. Use of Force, Handcuffs, and Duration Under Terry

The harder question was whether the officers’ conduct—guns drawn, an AR‑15 present, attempting to strike the window with the rifle, pulling Edwards from the vehicle, taking him to the ground, and handcuffing him—turned the investigative stop into a de facto arrest requiring probable cause. Here, the court leaned on its prior precedents:

• United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1015–16 (7th Cir. 2011): Recognizes that a Terry stop can ripen into a de facto arrest if it continues too long or is unreasonably intrusive, but also that in drug cases, handcuffing can be reasonable given the heightened risk.
• United States v. Olson, 41 F.4th 792, 799 (7th Cir. 2022): Holds that drawing weapons and handcuffing during a Terry stop does not automatically constitute an arrest; the key is whether officer safety justifies the level of force.
• United States v. Askew, 403 F.3d 496, 507 (7th Cir. 2005): Notes the “inherent danger” in stopping suspected drug traffickers, for whom guns are “tools of the trade.”
• Reedy, 989 F.3d at 553: Emphasizes there is no “bright‑line time limit” for Terry stops; officers may “graduate their responses” as the situation unfolds.

Applying these principles, the court concluded:

• The officers reasonably believed Edwards was armed and dangerous based on the wiretap information and his criminal history.
• Edwards’s actions—refusing commands, reaching toward the center console, leaning on the horn, trying to close the window, and physically resisting a frisk—escalated the risk.
• Taking him to the ground and handcuffing him was a proportionate, safety‑driven response, not a step that automatically transformed the stop into an arrest.

The six‑minute duration of the encounter was well within the bounds of a permissible investigative detention. The court noted that any additional time required was attributable to Edwards’s resistance, not police overreach.

Doctrinal significance: The opinion continues a line of Seventh Circuit cases permitting relatively high levels of force in Terry stops when:

1. Officers have concrete, articulable reasons to fear the suspect is armed; and
2. The suspect resists commands or efforts to ensure officer safety.

This further erodes any simplistic notion that drawn weapons or handcuffs equal arrest as a matter of law. Instead, courts will scrutinize the situation’s dynamics and officer safety concerns.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence and the “Planting the Gun” Theory (Rule 29)

Edwards’s Rule 29 challenge rested on the assertion that no rational jury could have found that he possessed the gun, because officers allegedly planted it. The Seventh Circuit applied standard sufficiency principles:

• Deference to jury findings: Citing United States v. Armbruster, 48 F.4th 527, 531 (7th Cir. 2022), the court emphasized that reversal is warranted only when “no rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty.”
• No reweighing or credibility reassessment: Relying on United States v. LeBeau, 949 F.3d 334, 346 (7th Cir. 2020), the court stressed it will not reassess credibility or reweigh evidence on appeal.

The panel found that the video recording of the stop, coupled with consistent testimony from multiple officers regarding the recovery of the gun from Edwards’s right coat pocket, gave the jury more than enough basis to reject the “plant” theory. The challenge was labeled “frivolous.”

This portion of the opinion breaks no new ground doctrinally, but it underscores the extremely high bar defendants face when attacking jury verdicts based on alternative narratives of the facts.

C. Trial Management and Rule 33: New Trial Standards

Edwards’s Rule 33 motion for a new trial centered on:

• The judge’s decision to instruct jurors to disregard opening statements altogether; and
• Rulings limiting the government’s ability to introduce background evidence about the drug/Title III investigation (and later modestly expanding that ability when the defense “opened the door”).

Under Rule 33, a court may order a new trial “if the interest of justice so requires.” The Seventh Circuit, citing United States v. Hamdan, 910 F.3d 351, 357 (7th Cir. 2018) and United States v. Conley, 875 F.3d 391, 399 (7th Cir. 2017), reiterated that:

• Review is “highly deferential,”
• Relief is reserved for “only the most extreme cases,” and
• Errors or omissions must seriously jeopardize the defendant’s substantial rights.

Far from prejudicing Edwards, the court observed, the trial rulings were often quite favorable to him:

• Striking both opening statements.
  After concluding that both sides had made problematic remarks (the prosecutor referencing the DEA; defense counsel emphasizing alleged excessive force in ways potentially untethered from the evidentiary record), the judge told jurors to treat opening statements as non‑evidence and, more strongly, to “not give them any consideration at all.” No party objected at the time. This remedial step neutralized any potential prejudice from either side’s opening.
• Exclusion of drug/Title III background.
  The court’s initial pretrial ruling entirely excluded evidence about the underlying investigation, despite its significant probative value in explaining why agents were following Edwards and why they believed he was armed. This shielded Edwards from potentially damaging drug‑trafficking evidence.
• Narrow “door‑opening” modification.
  When the defense used cross‑examination to imply the officers had no reason to suspect Edwards was armed or involved in wrongdoing, the government requested permission to use the wiretap “pistol” call. The judge declined, allowing only very narrow testimony from Agent Lech that she had advised the team that Edwards might have a gun. The content of the call itself remained excluded.

Taken together, these decisions exemplify a district court trying to strike a balance between limiting potentially prejudicial background evidence and preventing the defense from using that limitation to mislead the jury. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit saw no abuse of discretion and certainly nothing approaching the “extreme circumstance” required to grant a new trial.

D. Sentencing: Illinois Voluntary Manslaughter as an ACCA “Violent Felony”

1. ACCA’s Elements Clause and the Categorical Approach

The central legal question on sentencing was whether Illinois voluntary manslaughter (the pre‑1986 version of what is now Illinois second‑degree murder) constitutes a “violent felony” under ACCA’s elements clause:

A “violent felony” is “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year … that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i))

Key principles the court invoked:

• Categorical approach.
  Following Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021), the court applied the categorical approach: only the statutory elements of the offense (not the defendant’s actual conduct) matter. If the least culpable conduct criminalized by the statute necessarily requires intentional, knowing, or purposeful use of force against another person, the offense is a violent felony.
• Mens rea requirements after Borden.
  In Borden, the Supreme Court held that offenses with a mens rea of recklessness (or negligence) do not qualify under ACCA’s elements clause because they do not involve a sufficiently directed use of force against another person. Thus, if a statute allows conviction for mere reckless or negligent conduct, it will generally fall outside the elements clause.

The task, then, was to determine whether Illinois voluntary manslaughter—as codified in 1961—can be committed recklessly or negligently, or whether it instead requires intentional or knowing use of deadly force.

2. The Illinois Statute and Transferred Intent

Edwards’s conviction was under the prior Illinois voluntary manslaughter statute, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 9‑2 (1961), which provided:

A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by: (1) The individual killed, or (2) Another whom the offender endeavors to kill, but

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