United States v. Duque‑Ramirez: Allegiance as a Historical Justification for Disarming Unlawfully Present Noncitizens

I. Introduction

In United States v. Duque‑Ramirez, No. 24‑6257 (10th Cir. Dec. 16, 2025), the Tenth Circuit addressed, for the first time under the Supreme Court’s decisions in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi, whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A)—which prohibits firearm possession by an “alien … illegally or unlawfully in the United States”—violates the Second Amendment as applied to a long‑term, deeply rooted undocumented immigrant.

The opinion is significant for at least three reasons:

It assumes without deciding that at least some unlawfully present noncitizens are within “the people” protected by the Second Amendment, thereby sidestepping (but not resolving) a foundational question about the Amendment’s scope.
It adopts an “allegiance” principle derived from English and founding‑era loyalty‑oath laws to hold that § 922(g)(5)(A), as applied to an unlawfully present alien who has not followed the statutory path to swear allegiance to the United States, is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
It highlights but does not decide the emerging question whether federal firearm disabilities (including § 922(g)) require an individualized dangerousness assessment, treating that argument as waived on appeal.

In doctrinal terms, Duque‑Ramirez is an important application of the Bruen–Rahimi two‑step framework to immigration‑related gun prohibitions and clarifies how “allegiance to the sovereign” can serve as a historically grounded justification for categorical firearm bans.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Defendant’s Status and Ties to the United States

Jose Antonio Duque‑Ramirez was born in Mexico in 1990 and unlawfully entered the United States as a child in 1997. By 2000 he was living in Oklahoma City, which he has considered home ever since. He attended public school in Oklahoma City from first through eleventh grade.

His personal and family ties to the United States are extensive:

He is married to a U.S. citizen (since 2016).
He is the father of three U.S.‑citizen children, all born in Oklahoma.
He has worked in Oklahoma City, including as a self‑employed security guard at bars.
He has attempted to regularize his immigration status: he obtained an IRS taxpayer identification number, sought multiple provisional unlawful presence waivers (Form I‑601A), and his U.S.‑citizen spouse filed a Form I‑130 (Petition for Alien Relative) that was pending during the district court proceedings.

Despite these ties, Duque‑Ramirez concedes he is an “alien” unlawfully present in the United States and has never obtained lawful immigration status.

B. The Traffic Stop and Firearms

On October 17, 2023, Cleveland County deputies stopped Duque‑Ramirez while he was driving a Dodge Charger outfitted with a fake tag, a spotlight, and emergency lights—features that suggested law‑enforcement use. In plain view, officers observed:

a firearm,
body armor with magazines,
other security‑related gear.

A search of the vehicle uncovered:

three loaded pistols,
several tactical vests,
a long‑expired Oklahoma County Sheriff’s Deputy badge,
a fraudulent commercial driver’s license.

During booking, jail staff found a fraudulent green card and a fraudulent armed security license in his wallet. Immigration authorities confirmed he was not a U.S. citizen and lacked lawful status.

C. The Indictment and the Two Motions to Dismiss

In January 2024, a federal grand jury indicted Duque‑Ramirez under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), which makes it unlawful for “any person … who, being an alien … is illegally or unlawfully in the United States … to … possess … any firearm or ammunition.”

1. First motion: facial Second Amendment challenge under Bruen

Duque‑Ramirez first moved to dismiss the indictment on its face, arguing that § 922(g)(5) was unconstitutional in all applications under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). He advanced two main points:

He belonged to “the people” protected by the Second Amendment because, under United States v. Verdugo‑Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), noncitizens with “sufficient connection” to the national community are within the constitutional phrase “the people.”
There was no founding‑era tradition of disarming noncitizens as such; in his view, firearm restrictions tied to citizenship were a twentieth‑century innovation without historical support analogous to § 922(g)(5).

The government responded that:

The plain text of the Second Amendment—“the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”—did not include unlawful aliens.
In any event, founding‑era laws disarmed those outside the “political community” or with presumptive allegiance to foreign sovereigns (e.g., Indians, slaves, Catholics, and Revolutionary‑era loyalists), providing the required historical analogue.

The district court denied the facial challenge. Following the Tenth Circuit’s pre‑Bruen decision in United States v. Huitron‑Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2012), it assumed, without deciding, that Duque‑Ramirez fell within “the people,” but held § 922(g)(5)(A) consistent with historical tradition based on founding‑era loyalty and allegiance laws.

Duque‑Ramirez then entered an unconditional guilty plea.

2. Second motion: as‑applied challenge under Rahimi

After the Supreme Court decided United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), concerning § 922(g)(8) (domestic‑violence restraining orders), Duque‑Ramirez withdrew his guilty plea and filed a second motion to dismiss, this time raising an as‑applied Second Amendment challenge.

He again argued that he was part of “the people” because of his deep and voluntary connections to the United States—long residence, schooling, taxpaying, marriage to a citizen, and citizen children. He further contended that:

The founding‑era loyalty laws disarmed only after an individualized determination (an oath proceeding) about the person’s allegiance, and therefore modern disarmament of unlawfully present aliens must similarly depend on a case‑specific dangerousness assessment.
Disarming a person in his position solely due to immigration status, without any individualized showing of danger, lacked historical support, especially given his law‑abiding history (no criminal history points) and deep local ties.

The district court rejected the as‑applied challenge, again assuming arguendo that Duque‑Ramirez was within “the people,” but holding that:

The founding‑era loyalty‑oath statutes were “sufficiently analogous” to § 922(g)(5)(A) because both imposed categorical disarmament on those who had not demonstrated allegiance in the manner prescribed by law.
Rahimi did not require an individualized assessment of dangerousness for categorical, status‑based bans like § 922(g)(5)(A), and the historical record did not show that such individualized assessments were a precondition for disarming those who failed or neglected to take oaths of allegiance.

Duque‑Ramirez again pled guilty and was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment (with no supervised release). He appealed solely the denial of his as‑applied Second Amendment challenge.

III. Summary of the Tenth Circuit’s Decision

The Tenth Circuit (Judge Rossman, joined by Judges Moritz and Kelly) affirmed the conviction. The court:

Step One: Assumed, without deciding, that Duque‑Ramirez is one of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment, following Huitron‑Guizar’s approach and declining to resolve the broader, “large and complicated” question of whether unlawful aliens are within the Second Amendment’s text.
Step Two: Held that § 922(g)(5)(A), as applied to Duque‑Ramirez, is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court identified a longstanding principle: those who are presumed loyal to a foreign sovereign and have not manifested allegiance through the legislatively prescribed process may be disarmed. This principle is drawn from:
- English and colonial practices limiting arms to “subjects” and disarming “aliens,” and
- Founding‑era state laws that disarmed people who had not taken oaths of allegiance to the new American states.
Rejected as waived any argument that § 922(g)(5)(A) requires an individualized finding of dangerousness before disarmament, because that theory was not meaningfully briefed on appeal and surfaced only at oral argument.

The court thus concluded that even assuming Duque‑Ramirez has Second Amendment rights, Congress may constitutionally disarm him under § 922(g)(5)(A) because he remains an alien unlawfully present who has not followed the statutory path to swear allegiance (the naturalization process).

IV. The Legal Framework: Bruen, Rahimi, and Tenth Circuit Precedent

A. The Two‑Step Bruen–Rahimi Test

The court applied the now‑settled two‑step framework for Second Amendment challenges, as articulated in Bruen and “clarified” in Rahimi and the Tenth Circuit’s own decision in Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis, 121 F.4th 96 (10th Cir. 2024):

Step One (Textual Coverage): The challenger bears the burden to show that “the Second Amendment’s plain text covers” the conduct at issue (here, possession of firearms) and that he is among “the people” whose rights are protected.
Step Two (Historical Tradition): If the conduct is presumptively protected, the burden shifts to the government to justify the regulation by showing that it is “consistent with the principles that underpin our Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” The court uses “analogical reasoning” to determine whether historical regulations are relevantly similar—focusing on:
- how they burden the right (the “how”), and
- why they burden the right (the “why”).
The government needs only a “representative historical analogue,” not a “historical twin.”

Evidence from the founding era (around 1791) is “most probative,” and courts generally base their analysis on the historical record “as compiled by the parties,” consistent with the principle of party presentation.

B. Precedents Framing the Analysis

Several key precedents shape the analysis in Duque‑Ramirez:

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008): Recognized an individual right to possess firearms for self‑defense and emphasized that the right “is not unlimited.” It also suggested that “the people” refers to members of the “political community” while citing Verdugo‑Urquidez’s “national community” formulation.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010): Incorporated the Second Amendment against the states.
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022): Rejected means‑end scrutiny (such as intermediate scrutiny) and replaced it with the text‑and‑history test.
United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024): Applied Bruen to uphold § 922(g)(8)(C)(i) (firearm ban for individuals subject to certain domestic‑violence restraining orders), emphasizing that modern laws can be justified by “principles” reflected in historical regulations.
United States v. Huitron‑Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2012): Pre‑Bruen, the Tenth Circuit assumed that unlawfully present aliens might fall within “the people” but upheld § 922(g)(5) under intermediate scrutiny. Duque‑Ramirez holds that Bruen abrogated only the scrutiny analysis, not Huitron‑Guizar’s approach of assuming arguendo that such aliens may be within “the people.”
United States v. Harrison, 153 F.4th 998 (10th Cir. 2025): Elaborated the Bruen framework within the circuit and emphasized that the historical record must reveal principles, not rigid molds.
Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis, 121 F.4th 96 (10th Cir. 2024): Applied Bruen in a civil challenge to Colorado firearm regulations, highlighting that while the right to keep and bear arms is fundamental, the government has historically regulated weapons in various ways.
United States v. Verdugo‑Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990): Interpreted “the people” in the Fourth Amendment as persons who are part of the “national community” or have “sufficient connection” to it, and suggested the phrase has a similar meaning in the First and Second Amendments.

These cases create the doctrinal backdrop against which the Tenth Circuit evaluates § 922(g)(5)(A).

V. Step One: Who Are “the People” Protected by the Second Amendment?

A. Duque‑Ramirez’s Argument

Duque‑Ramirez argued that:

The phrase “the people” in the Second Amendment should be interpreted in line with Verdugo‑Urquidez: it includes noncitizens who are part of the national community or have developed “sufficient connection” to it.
He fits this definition given his:
- long and continuous residence in the United States (over 25 years),
- education in American public schools,
- taxpaying and employment,
- marriage to a U.S. citizen,
- U.S.‑citizen children, and
- efforts to regularize his status.

B. The Government’s Argument

The government urged a narrower view, grounded in history:

It argued that, at least for the Second Amendment, “the people” is closely associated with citizenship and membership in the political community, not with unlawful presence.
It drew on English and American sources to contend that the right to bear arms historically belonged to citizens (or subjects) who had sworn allegiance, not to aliens unlawfully present.

C. The Court’s Choice to Assume Without Deciding

The panel declined to resolve this dispute. Instead, echoing Huitron‑Guizar, it:

Assumed, without deciding, that Duque‑Ramirez is among “the people” whose right to keep and bear arms is protected.
Emphasized that whether unlawful aliens are within “the people” is a “vexing” and “far‑reaching” question that need not be decided because § 922(g)(5)(A) survives at step two of the Bruen test even on the assumption that they are covered.

The court explicitly noted that neither the Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit has definitively answered whether “the people” in the Second Amendment refers to members of the “political community,” the “national community,” or some combination. It declined to treat the issue as settled, pointing out the mixed signals in:

Heller (which uses both “political community” and “national community”),
Verdugo‑Urquidez (which gives a “national community / sufficient connection” definition but also quotes Turner v. Williams limiting First Amendment rights of excluded aliens), and
historical references connecting arms‑bearing to citizenship.

In short, Duque‑Ramirez preserves the question for another day and constrains its holding to the historical‑tradition analysis.

VI. Step Two: Historical Tradition and the “Allegiance” Principle

A. The Core Question

At step two, the dispositive question is whether disarming unlawfully present noncitizens under § 922(g)(5)(A), as applied to Duque‑Ramirez, is “consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.”

The panel frames this as asking whether historical analogues show a principle by which the sovereign may disarm:

Individuals presumed to be loyal to a foreign sovereign who fail to follow the process prescribed by law for avowing their allegiance.

If such a principle exists and is comparable in both the burden imposed (how) and the justification offered (why), then § 922(g)(5)(A) survives under Bruen.

B. Historical Analogues Identified by the Government

1. English and colonial practice: “subjects” vs. “aliens”

The government first looked to English history, which Heller recognized as central to understanding the Second Amendment. Key points:

The 1689 English Bill of Rights guaranteed that “the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defence” (emphasis added). This right was explicitly limited to “subjects,” not to “aliens.”
Commentators such as Blackstone identified “having arms” as an “auxiliary right of the subject,” again tying the right to formal allegiance.
Statutes restricted arms‑bearing to certain classes (e.g., landowners) and excluded foreigners from ownership of land, reinforcing the view that arms were for those integrated into the body politic.
Some statutes specifically limited or barred foreigners from weapon use (e.g., bans on foreigners using longbows).

The government argued, and the court accepted, that in the English legal tradition “subject” was the functional analogue of modern “citizen,” and aliens who had not sworn allegiance could be disarmed or barred from arms.

2. Founding‑era loyalty‑oath statutes

The opinion emphasizes a rich body of Revolutionary‑era American laws requiring oaths of allegiance and authorizing disarmament of those who had not taken them. Examples include:

Massachusetts (1776): Disarmed “every male person above sixteen years of age … who shall neglect or refuse to take an oath of allegiance” to the state.
North Carolina (1777): Authorized disarmament of “all persons failing or refusing to take the oath of allegiance.”
Maryland (1778): Allowed sheriffs to disarm any “nonjuror” (a person who had not taken the required oath of fidelity to the state) at their discretion.
Pennsylvania (1779): Empowered officers “to disarm any person … who shall not have taken any oath or affirmation of allegiance to this or any other state.”
Similar loyalty‑oath and disarmament laws in Virginia, New Jersey, and Rhode Island.

These statutes often operated against persons presumed loyal to the British Crown (“loyalists”) and reflected deep suspicion of those who had not formally aligned themselves with the new American governments.

3. State constitutional provisions limiting arms rights to “citizens”

The court also notes that seven state constitutions adopted between 1776 and 1820 expressly framed the right to bear arms as belonging to “citizens.” Heller treated this pattern as powerful evidence that the founding generation understood the right as a civic right of members of the polity, not a universal human right unmoored from allegiance.

C. The “How” and “Why” Comparison

Under Bruen, the key is whether these historical laws are “relevantly similar” to § 922(g)(5)(A) in terms of:

How they burden the right (what the regulation does), and
Why they burden the right (the justification).

1. The “how”: categorical disarmament based on allegiance status

The court finds that the “how” of the historical laws mirrors the “how” of § 922(g)(5)(A):

The founding‑era laws categorically disarmed persons who had not demonstrated allegiance by the procedure set out in law (taking an oath).
Section 922(g)(5)(A) similarly categorically disarms aliens who are illegally or unlawfully present and have not completed the process Congress has established for manifesting allegiance (naturalization, which requires an oath under 8 U.S.C. § 1448).

Both sets of laws, in the court’s view, operate as status‑based bans that turn on whether a person has entered into a legally recognized relationship of allegiance with the sovereign.

2. The “why”: allegiance as a proxy for trustworthiness

The court then examines the “why” and concludes that the justification for the founding‑era laws and for § 922(g)(5)(A) is essentially the same:

Historical laws were justified by the need to prevent those with foreign allegiance or unsettled loyalty from bearing arms that could be used against the new governments.
Allegiance—expressed through an oath—served as a marker of trustworthiness; without it, individuals were presumed insufficiently trustworthy to be armed.
Modern federal law takes the same approach: it presumes that aliens illegally or unlawfully present, who have not followed Congress’s prescribed path to citizenship and sworn the naturalization oath, have not committed themselves to the United States in a way that justifies entrusting them with firearms.

The court explicitly adopts the “allegiance as trustworthiness” rationale cited by the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Carbajal‑Flores, 143 F.4th 877 (7th Cir. 2025), and the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Jimenez‑Shilon, 34 F.4th 1042 (11th Cir. 2022).

On this basis, the court holds that the government has carried its burden: § 922(g)(5)(A), as applied to Duque‑Ramirez, is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of disarming those who have not manifested allegiance in the prescribed manner.

D. Defendant’s Counterarguments and the Court’s Responses

1. “Choice” and the burden of modern immigration law

Duque‑Ramirez’s principal rebuttal is that the founding‑era loyalty laws disarmed only those who affirmatively refused to swear an oath, whereas he would eagerly swear allegiance if he could. He emphasizes:

He was brought to the United States as a child and has known no other country.
The modern path to lawful status requires him to leave the United States for at least 10 years due to inadmissibility bars (see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)), with no guarantee of reentry—a far harsher “cost” than simply appearing to take an oath.
Thus, he argues, the historical laws turned on a genuine choice to reject allegiance, while he is structurally blocked from expressing allegiance in the way Congress demands.

The Tenth Circuit responds in two ways.

a. Historical laws disarmed for “failure” or “neglect,” not just refusal

First, the court rejects the premise that historical loyalty statutes required active refusal:

Some laws (e.g., Virginia’s 1777 statute and a 1776 Continental Congress resolution) did use “refuse” language.
But several others expressly authorized disarmament for mere “failure” or “neglect” to take the oath (e.g., Massachusetts 1776; North Carolina 1777; Maryland 1778; Pennsylvania 1779).

Thus, a person could be disarmed simply for not taking the oath, without any affirmative act of refusal. That undermines the argument that only active loyalists were historically disarmed.

b. The comparative burden of oaths vs. modern immigration law

Second, the court questions the assumption that founding‑era oaths were less burdensome than modern immigration processes. It notes that:

Oaths could require renouncing prior political, religious, or ethnic identities, and were sometimes perceived as harsh or coercive—especially for religious minorities and loyalists.
Refusal to take an oath could lead to a wide range of severe consequences: arrest, imprisonment, confiscation of property, social ostracism, banishment, limitations on travel or economic activity, and loss of civic rights such as voting, holding office, trading, jury service, or practicing professions.

The court explicitly observes that many of these historical practices would be unconstitutional today, but, following cases like United States v. Duarte, 137 F.4th 743 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc), and United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025) (Pryor, C.J., concurring), it treats them as historically informative. They reveal the severity of burdens the founding generation was willing to impose as conditions of allegiance and arms‑bearing.

On the limited historical record presented by the parties, the court concludes that it cannot say modern immigration law imposes a burden so much greater than that of historical oaths as to make § 922(g)(5)(A) non‑analogous. At least at the level of “comparable justification” and “comparable burden,” the analogy holds.

2. Individualized dangerousness assessments

Before the district court, Duque‑Ramirez argued that historical loyalty practices involved individualized determinations that a particular person was dangerous or disloyal and that, under Rahimi, modern disarmament must likewise rest on an individualized assessment of dangerousness.

The district court rejected that contention on the merits, concluding that:

The historical record showed disarmament triggered by failure or neglect to swear allegiance, not by case‑specific proof of dangerousness.
Section 922(g)(5)(A), like many status‑based bans, is categorical and does not depend on any explicit judicial finding of dangerousness.

On appeal, however, Duque‑Ramirez did not brief the dangerousness‑assessment theory. It appeared only at oral argument, when counsel admitted its omission was inadvertent. The Tenth Circuit applies standard waiver principles:

Arguments not adequately developed in the opening brief are waived.
Issues raised for the first time at oral argument are also waived.

Accordingly, the panel treats the individualized‑dangerousness argument as waived and expressly declines to decide:

Whether § 922(g)(5)(A) ever requires a case‑specific dangerousness assessment, or
Whether, as the government suggested at argument, allegiance‑based disarmament never requires individualized assessments.

The court notes that this is an important open question, especially in light of divergent circuit approaches to § 922(g)(1) (felon‑in‑possession) after Bruen and Rahimi, but it finds Duque‑Ramirez an unsuitable vehicle because of the waiver.

VII. Relationship to and Use of Precedents

A. Reinforcing the Continuing Relevance of Huitron‑Guizar

Although Bruen formally abrogated Huitron‑Guizar’s use of intermediate scrutiny, Duque‑Ramirez carefully preserves its methodological lesson:

Huitron‑Guizar assumed arguendo that unlawfully present aliens might be within “the people” but nonetheless upheld § 922(g)(5) based on then‑prevailing intermediate scrutiny.
Duque‑Ramirez adopts the same assumption and reaches the same bottom‑line result, but now through the Bruen–Rahimi historical‑tradition test instead of means‑end balancing.

The opinion further notes that recent Supreme Court Second Amendment cases do not automatically abrogate existing circuit precedent on issues they do not “squarely” address, citing Vincent v. Bondi, 127 F.4th 1263 (10th Cir. 2025).

B. Reliance on Heller, State Constitutions, and “Civic Rights” Scholarship

The court leans on Heller’s use of state constitutional provisions and historical scholarship (notably Saul Cornell) to characterize the right to bear arms as a civic right—a right of those integrated into the polity and considered capable of exercising it virtuously. The prevalence of “citizen” language in early state arms provisions supports the view that arms‑bearing was associated with membership in the political community.

By invoking this civic‑rights conception, the court situates § 922(g)(5)(A) as part of a long tradition of restricting arms to those with legally recognized allegiance, not as a novel or anomalous restriction.

C. Party Presentation and the Scope of Historical Inquiry

Echoing Bruen, the court underscores that historical analysis is constrained by the record developed by the parties. While Duque‑Ramirez carries no ultimate burden at step two, the opinion implicitly encourages both sides in future litigation to develop a richer and more nuanced historical record.

D. Engagement with Other Post‑Bruen Circuit Cases

The opinion positions itself among emerging post‑Bruen decisions:

It cites the Seventh Circuit’s Carbajal‑Flores for the “allegiance as trustworthiness” rationale and for treating aliens’ arms rights as conditioned on oath‑taking or similar demonstrations of loyalty.
It references decisions like Zherka v. Bondi (2d Cir.), Kimble (5th Cir.), and Pitsilides v. Barr (3d Cir.) to illustrate the developing split over whether § 922(g)(1) requires individualized dangerousness determinations, though it takes no position.
It alludes to the now‑vacated Third Circuit decision in Range v. Attorney General, 69 F.4th 96 (3d Cir. 2023) (en banc), as an example of courts scrutinizing the fit between historical disarmament practices and modern felon‑in‑possession laws.

The overall message is that the Tenth Circuit is aligning itself with those circuits reading Bruen and Rahimi to permit a range of categorical firearm disabilities so long as they can be anchored in discernible historical principles.

VIII. Impact and Implications

A. Immediate Consequences within the Tenth Circuit

Within the Tenth Circuit (which covers Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming), Duque‑Ramirez establishes that:

Section 922(g)(5)(A) is constitutional as applied to unlawfully present aliens who have not followed the statutory path to demonstrate allegiance, even if they have long residence, U.S.‑citizen families, and community ties.
Defense litigants cannot avoid § 922(g)(5)(A) simply by arguing that they would swear allegiance if they could; the relevant question, under this precedent, is whether they have in fact followed the path Congress has prescribed.

In practice, this means that undocumented individuals—even those with longstanding de facto membership in American society—remain categorically barred from firearm possession under federal law in the Tenth Circuit, absent statutory relief.

B. The Allegiance Principle Beyond § 922(g)(5)

The allegiance‑based reasoning may have broader doctrinal consequences:

It strengthens the government’s ability to defend other status‑based restrictions that turn on formal political membership or allegiance (e.g., potential future restrictions tied to denaturalization, expatriation, or certain forms of foreign political affiliation).
It contributes to a more general post‑Bruen taxonomy of justifications for disarmament:
- Dangerousness (e.g., domestic‑violence restraining orders in Rahimi),
- Moral blameworthiness (often invoked for felon disarmament, though increasingly scrutinized),
- Allegiance (as in § 922(g)(5)(A) and historical loyalty laws).

Future litigants may seek to leverage this taxonomy, either to defend or to attack other subsections of § 922(g) by arguing that they do—or do not—fit within historically recognized principles.

C. The Unresolved Question of “the People” and Noncitizens

Because the court again avoids deciding whether unlawfully present aliens are part of “the people,” the status of noncitizens under the Second Amendment remains unsettled:

Advocates for noncitizens can still invoke Verdugo‑Urquidez and the “significant voluntary connection” test to claim Second Amendment coverage.
The government can still press a “political community / citizen” understanding rooted in Heller, early state constitutions, and civic‑rights scholarship.

Duque‑Ramirez indicates the Tenth Circuit’s reluctance to resolve this issue without Supreme Court guidance, suggesting that the question will likely percolate further across circuits.

D. Individualized Dangerousness: A Deferred but Critical Issue

The court’s waiver holding leaves open, but pointedly highlights, an important doctrinal fault line: whether § 922(g) can constitutionally disarm individuals without any individualized judicial finding that they pose a current danger.

While Rahimi upheld § 922(g)(8) on the basis that its criteria effectively required such a finding (a credible threat), the Court did not address whether that principle extends to other subsections. Circuits are now splitting on this issue for felons, and Duque‑Ramirez signals that a similar debate may arise for unlawful‑alien disarmament in a properly preserved case.

E. Normative and Policy Considerations

Although the decision is framed entirely in doctrinal terms, it has substantial normative ramifications:

It upholds a regime where individuals like Duque‑Ramirez—brought to the United States as children, deeply integrated into American communities, and with no serious criminal history—are treated as outside the class of people whom the government may trust with firearms, solely due to their immigration status and failure to complete a highly complex and onerous legalization process.
The court expresses sympathy for the complexity of immigration law but treats such policy considerations as beyond the judicial role under Bruen’s strict text‑and‑history methodology.
It relies on historical practices (such as discriminatory loyalty tests and harsh penalties for dissenters) that would be unconstitutional today, raising broader questions about how to integrate morally troubling history into constitutional interpretation.

IX. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Facial vs. As‑Applied Challenges

A facial challenge argues that a law is unconstitutional in all (or virtually all) of its applications—i.e., that it cannot be validly applied to anyone.
An as‑applied challenge concedes that the law may be valid in many situations but claims it is unconstitutional as applied to the particular person or circumstances in the case.

In Duque‑Ramirez, the defendant first brought a facial challenge (rejected by the district court) and then, after Rahimi, brought an as‑applied challenge, which is the subject of the appeal.

B. “The People” in the Second Amendment

The Constitution uses the phrase “the people” in several places (Preamble, First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments). There is ongoing debate whether:

It means all persons with “sufficient connection” to the national community (the Verdugo‑Urquidez view), or
It is limited to members of the “political community” (citizens with full civic rights), especially for rights closely tied to republican self‑government, like arms‑bearing.

Duque‑Ramirez does not resolve this debate, but it underscores that the answer has major consequences for noncitizens’ constitutional rights.

C. The Bruen–Rahimi “Analogical Reasoning” Test

Rather than asking whether a modern law is “reasonable” or “narrowly tailored” (interest‑balancing), Bruen and Rahimi require courts to:

Identify relevant historical regulations from the founding era.
Extract the principles underlying those regulations.
Ask whether the modern law imposes a comparable burden for a comparable justification (“how” and “why”).

In Duque‑Ramirez, the relevant principle is that allegiance—as evidenced by an oath or similar act—was historically a precondition for arms‑bearing; those who lacked or refused allegiance could be disarmed.

D. Allegiance and Naturalization

Historically, allegiance was formalized through an oath to the sovereign; failure or refusal to take the oath could trigger disarmament and other severe penalties. Today, allegiance to the United States is typically manifested through the naturalization process, which culminates in an oath (8 U.S.C. § 1448).

Section 922(g)(5)(A) effectively treats the absence of lawful status and the absence of this formal commitment as grounds for presuming insufficient allegiance for firearms purposes.

E. Individualized Dangerousness Assessments

An “individualized dangerousness assessment” is a case‑specific determination, typically by a court, that a particular person poses a threat to public safety. Rahimi upheld § 922(g)(8) because it applied only where a court had found the person represents a “credible threat” to another’s physical safety.

Whether such individualized findings are (or should be) required for other firearm disabilities, like § 922(g)(1) (felons) or § 922(g)(5)(A) (unlawful aliens), is an unsettled and controversial question. Duque‑Ramirez leaves that question open due to waiver.

X. Conclusion

United States v. Duque‑Ramirez is a consequential application of the Supreme Court’s post‑Bruen Second Amendment jurisprudence to immigration‑related gun restrictions. The Tenth Circuit:

Avoids resolving whether unlawfully present noncitizens are within “the people,” but assumes they are for purposes of analysis.
Identifies and endorses an allegiance‑based historical principle: those who have not manifested allegiance to the sovereign in the manner prescribed by law may be categorically disarmed.
Applies that principle to uphold § 922(g)(5)(A) as applied to a deeply rooted, but unlawfully present, noncitizen who has not completed the naturalization process.
Flags but does not answer the critical question whether individualized dangerousness assessments are required for § 922(g) disabilities beyond domestic‑violence cases.

In the broader legal landscape, the decision solidifies the constitutionality of § 922(g)(5)(A) in the Tenth Circuit under the Bruen–Rahimi framework and contributes to a developing doctrinal structure in which allegiance operates alongside dangerousness and civic membership as key historical justifications for firearm regulation. It also underscores that many of the hardest questions at the intersection of immigration status and constitutional rights—including who counts as part of “the people”—remain for future courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, to resolve.