United States v. Dukes: The Seventh Circuit Re-draws the Line Between Direct Evidence and Rule 404(b) Other-Act Evidence

Introduction

United States v. Kashif Dukes, No. 24-1928 (7th Cir. Aug. 5, 2025), presented the Court of Appeals with two classic criminal-procedure flashpoints:

whether evidence of an uncharged shooting could be admitted at Dukes’s trial for carjacking and unlawful firearm possession;
whether the overall proof—anchored by a disputed eyewitness identification—was sufficient to sustain multiple guilty verdicts.

The Seventh Circuit not only affirmed the district court on both points, it also issued a significant doctrinal clarification: trial courts must look first to the language of the indictment itself to decide whether contested conduct is “part and parcel” of a charged offense (and hence direct evidence) or an “other act” governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). This opinion tightens the analytic framework for distinguishing direct evidence from propensity-laden Rule 404(b) material, particularly in continuing-offense prosecutions such as felon-in-possession cases.

Summary of the Judgment

Chief Judge Sykes and Judge Scudder joined Judge Kirsch’s opinion affirming in toto:

Admission of Shooting Evidence. The ballistics-linked park shooting, though uncharged, was (i) direct evidence of the § 922(g) firearm possession count because the indictment alleged possession “on or about July 21, 2018,” and (ii) alternatively admissible under Rule 404(b)(2) to show motive for the carjacking. The Rule 403 balance favored admission given limiting instructions and redaction of the shooting’s most inflammatory details.
Sufficiency of the Evidence. Viewing the record in the government’s favor, a rational jury could find Dukes guilty beyond a reasonable doubt notwithstanding attacks on the eyewitness lineup procedure; circumstantial corroboration (DNA, phones, Facebook posts, ballistics) powerfully supported the verdict.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The panel wove together a line of Seventh Circuit cases on character evidence and continuing offenses:

United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc): set the modern Seventh Circuit template for Rule 404(b), requiring a “propensity-free chain of reasoning.” Dukes employs Gomez’s two-step structure.
United States v. Gorman, 613 F.3d 711 (2010); United States v. Thomas, 986 F.3d 723 (2021): established that evidence intrinsically tied to the charged offense avoids 404(b). Dukes extends this insight by emphasizing the textual scope of the indictment.
United States v. Canady (2009); United States v. Miller (2012); United States v. Lowe (2021): prior “felon-with-a-gun” cases admitting earlier same-day firearm conduct. Dukes acknowledges, reconciles, and systematizes them.
United States v. Ellis, 622 F.3d 784 (2010): confirmed that § 922(g) possession is a continuing offense, supporting the panel’s “same-day” rationale.
Rule 403 precedent—United States v. Boros (2012) and United States v. Moore (2011)—supplied deferential review standards for balancing probative value and unfair prejudice.
Eyewitness identification cases—United States v. Gonzalez (2017) and United States v. Williams (2008)—guided the court’s treatment of lineup reliability and sufficiency.

2. Legal Reasoning

2.1 Direct vs. Other-Act Evidence

The court framed a crisp test: “Look to the indictment.” If the narrative scope and date span of the indictment embrace the disputed conduct, that conduct is direct evidence. Because § 922(g) possession endures so long as the firearm remains under the defendant’s dominion, firing the same gun later that day at the park was within “on or about July 21” and thus directly proved the charged possession. By contrast, using the stolen Equinox as a getaway car for an uncharged shooting was not alleged in the carjacking counts; ergo, that portion of the narrative triggered Rule 404(b). The panel thereby created a two-track admissibility analysis in a single evidentiary package.

2.2 Rule 404(b) Application

For the carjacking counts, the shooting evidence traveled a permissible, non-propensity chain—demonstrating motive (need for a disposable vehicle for a retaliatory shooting). Gomez’s caution against character inferences was satisfied because the jury could infer the need for a getaway car without concluding “Dukes is a violent man, therefore he must be guilty.”

2.3 Rule 403 Balancing

Key to upholding the district court’s discretion were (i) excision of gang references and casualty numbers; (ii) two targeted limiting instructions; and (iii) the central probative linkage between the same Ruger pistol, Dukes’s DNA, and the disputed shooting—evidence “critical, not cumulative.”

2.4 Sufficiency of the Evidence

The panel reiterated the “nearly insurmountable hurdle” standard. It catalogued corroborating facts—physical, digital, testimonial—and found the jury was entitled to credit them despite recognized weaknesses in Angelica Rodriguez’s identification. Importantly, the court emphasized that circumstantial evidence can be “even more reliable” than direct testimony, pre-empting common defense arguments that eyewitness problems automatically doom a conviction.

3. Impact of the Decision

Clarified Evidentiary Taxonomy. Litigants in the Seventh Circuit must now root the direct/other-act distinction in the four corners of the indictment. Expect more motion practice aimed at amending or narrowly drafting indictments to influence admissibility.
Continuing-Offense Doctrine Strengthened. Prosecutors may safely introduce same-day (or same-period) firearm use as direct proof of § 922(g) possession, provided the indictment uses “on or about” language and the firearm is demonstrably the same.
Structured Hybrid Analysis. Trial courts confronted with multi-purpose evidence can, and should, bifurcate their reasoning: first direct-evidence admission, then supplementary 404(b) analysis for any overflow relevance. Dukes models how to draft dual limiting instructions accordingly.
Eyewitness Challenges. The decision underscores that identification-procedure criticism usually goes to weight, not admissibility, unless the procedure is so suggestive that cross-examination and argument cannot cure the risk.
Strategic Use of Social-Media Evidence. Facebook posts—modern admissions by a party opponent—played a starring role. Practitioners should anticipate similar digital breadcrumbs to become centerpieces in motive and identity disputes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 404(b). A rule barring evidence offered solely to prove a person’s character (“once a criminal, always a criminal”) but allowing the same evidence for other logical purposes such as motive or identity.
Rule 403. The “common-sense brake” allowing judges to exclude otherwise relevant evidence if its unfair prejudice (or confusion) substantially outweighs probative value.
Continuing Offense. Certain crimes, like unlawful firearm possession, last as long as the illegal condition persists; proof can therefore include conduct throughout the period.
Propensity Inference. The forbidden leap: that a defendant committed the charged act because he has a bad character or behaved similarly before.
Limiting Instruction. A judge’s admonition telling jurors the particular purpose for which they may (and may not) consider a piece of evidence.
Sufficiency Review. On appeal, the court asks only whether any rational jury could convict—not whether the judges themselves would have voted to convict.

Conclusion

United States v. Dukes is more than an affirmation of a carjacking conviction; it is a blueprint for handling multi-faceted evidence in complex trials. By anchoring the direct-evidence inquiry to the indictment’s scope and articulating a disciplined, two-step analysis when evidence serves dual roles, the Seventh Circuit has given prosecutors, defense counsel, and district judges clearer navigation tools. Future litigants should heed the opinion’s twin lessons: draft indictments thoughtfully, and prepare to defend—or attack—contested evidence under both direct-evidence and Rule 404(b)/403 frameworks. In doing so, Dukes enhances predictability and transparency in an area of evidence law long criticized for inconsistency.