United States v. Duane Berry: Affirming Continued § 4241 Custody Post-Dismissal to Facilitate § 4246 Civil Commitment

Introduction

United States v. Duane Berry, No. 24-6385 (4th Cir. June 24 2025), presented the Fourth Circuit with an intricate question at the intersection of two federal civil-commitment statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (competency proceedings) and 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (post-sentence—or post-dismissal—commitment of dangerous persons). The appellant, Duane Letroy Berry, faced federal criminal charges stemming from a bomb-hoax incident but was repeatedly found mentally incompetent to stand trial. After years of proceedings, the underlying charges were dismissed. The government then sought civil commitment under § 4246 on the ground that Berry’s release would endanger the public. Berry argued that, once his charges were dismissed, he no longer fell within any of § 4246(a)’s three jurisdictional categories and therefore could not be committed. The Fourth Circuit squarely rejected that contention, holding that Berry remained “committed to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to § 4241(d)” even after dismissal of charges, thereby qualifying him for § 4246 proceedings. This decision clarifies—indeed cements—the principle that federal custodial authority under § 4241 continues for a reasonable period after charges are dismissed, allowing the government to pursue § 4246 certification without violating statutory limits or constitutional constraints.

Summary of the Judgment

Holding. A defendant whose charges have been dismissed after being found incompetent remains “committed to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to § 4241(d)” for a reasonable period, thereby satisfying § 4246(a)’s jurisdictional prerequisite. The district court therefore possessed authority to commit Berry under § 4246.
Reasonableness of Delay. The five-month interval between the unrestorability finding and the filing of the § 4246 certificate was reasonable in light of administrative, logistical, and COVID-19-related hurdles. The court adopted and extended its reasoning in United States v. Wayda.
Statutory Construction. The panel rejected Berry’s interpretation that dismissal of charges automatically terminates § 4241 custody, emphasizing statutory text, structure, and purpose, and avoiding an outcome that would jeopardize public safety.
Constitutional Issue Avoided. Because Berry squarely fit the § 4241(d) category, the court declined to decide whether § 4246’s “dismissed-charges” category is unconstitutional under United States v. Comstock.
Disposition. Judgment of the Eastern District of North Carolina affirmed.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010)
- Upheld § 4248 under congressional authority implied by the Necessary and Proper Clause.
- Berry invoked Comstock to challenge the “dismissed-charges” clause; the Fourth Circuit sidestepped the constitutional question by resting its decision on the § 4241(d) category.
United States v. Wayda, 966 F.3d 294 (4th Cir. 2020)
- Addressed reasonable delay for filing a § 4248 certificate; standard applied by analogy to § 4246.
- Established that delay must be “limited to a reasonable period” with adequate explanation; adopted verbatim here.
United States v. Curbow, 16 F.4th 92 (4th Cir. 2021)
- Reiterated that the government must act with “reasonable speed,” but not the “quickest possible manner.”
- Cited to show compliance with that standard despite pandemic delays.
Sixth Circuit medication decision: United States v. Berry, 911 F.3d 354 (6th Cir. 2018)
- Vacated involuntary-medication order; prompted renewed § 4241 evaluation and commitment order.
- Demonstrated shifting procedural posture yet continuity of § 4241 custody.

2. Legal Reasoning of the Court

Judge Wilkinson’s opinion undertakes a textual, structural, and purposive analysis of §§ 4241 & 4246. Key strands of reasoning include:

Textual Reading of § 4241(d). The clause “defendant is subject to the provisions of § 4246” indicates congressional intent that custody persist long enough to assess dangerousness.
Statutory Harmony. §§ 4241 and 4246 are “designed to work in tandem”—one dealing with competency, the other with public safety. Reading § 4241 to terminate custody instantaneously upon dismissal would thwart § 4246’s function and negate Congress’s design.
Reasonableness Limitation. Borrowing Wayda’s rubric, the court imposes a “reasonable period” cap on continued custody, thereby preserving individual liberty interests without sacrificing public protection.
Focus on Actual Custody. Emphasized that Berry was physically and legally in federal custody at FMC Butner when the § 4246 certificate was filed; earlier procedural lapses or speculative expiration arguments were immaterial.
Avoidance Canon. By grounding the decision in the undisputed § 4241(d) category, the panel avoided a potentially thorny constitutional holding on the dismissed-charges clause.

3. Likely Impact of the Judgment

Clarity for District Courts. Provides authoritative guidance on the permissible temporal overlap between § 4241 and § 4246, reducing litigation over statutory “gaps” in custody status.
Administrative Practices. Validates the Bureau of Prisons’ and FMCs’ practice of holding unrestorable defendants pending § 4246 evaluations, especially amid systemic delays (e.g., pandemics, staffing shortages).
Constitutional Landscape. Leaves unresolved the broader Comstock challenge to the dismissed-charges category, but narrows its practical reach; more defendants will fit the § 4241(d) category after this opinion.
Circuit Persuasive Authority. The decision is poised to influence other circuits confronting similar custody-gap arguments; the reasoning is equally transferrable to § 4248 (sexually dangerous persons) because of structural symmetry.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Civil Commitment (§ 4241 vs. § 4246): § 4241 – Temporarily hospitalizes a criminal defendant found incompetent to determine if competency can be restored for trial.
§ 4246 – Allows indefinite hospitalization of a person (post-sentence, post-dismissal, or mid-§ 4241) whose release would endanger the public.
Competency to Stand Trial: A defendant must understand proceedings and assist counsel. If not, trial pauses until restored or charges are dismissed.
Unrestorability Finding: Judicial determination—often after medical reports—that no “substantial probability” exists to restore competency in the foreseeable future.
“Qualified Person” under § 4246(a): One who fits any of three statutory categories; Berry fits the second (continuing § 4241 custody).
Reasonable-Delay Doctrine (Wayda): The government has a flexible window—bounded by reasonableness—to initiate civil-commitment certification, justified by administrative realities.

Conclusion

United States v. Berry enunciates a critical precedent: federal custody under § 4241 does not evaporate the instant criminal charges are dismissed; it endures for a reasonable period to permit § 4246 certification when public safety is at stake. By harmonizing statutory text with congressional purpose and practical exigencies, the Fourth Circuit ensures that dangerous, incompetent individuals cannot exploit procedural lacunae to secure immediate release. Equally important, the court cabined this custodial extension within the “reasonable delay” doctrine, preserving the balance between individual liberty and collective security. Future courts confronting similar “custody-gap” disputes will likely rely on Berry as the leading exposition of how §§ 4241 and 4246 interlock—a decision that fortifies the federal civil-commitment architecture while respecting constitutional boundaries.