United States v. Dobbin: Third Circuit Authorizes Use of Non-Shepard Records to Prove the Fact—Though Not the Nature—of Prior Convictions in Career-Offender Sentencing

Introduction

United States v. Torey Dobbin, No. 17-3664 (3d Cir. Aug. 11, 2025), is a precedential decision that addresses two recurrent sentencing-law flashpoints:

• How—and with what evidentiary limits—courts may establish the fact of a defendant’s prior convictions when applying U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1’s career-offender enhancement.
• Whether particular subsections of Pennsylvania’s robbery statute, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3701(a)(1), categorically qualify as “crimes of violence” after the Supreme Court’s evolving ACCA/Guidelines jurisprudence.

Torey “Truck” Dobbin pled guilty to Hobbs Act robbery and a 924(c) firearms count stemming from the armed robbery of a Cracker Barrel in Harrisburg, PA. Probation designated him a career offender based on two earlier Pennsylvania robbery convictions (Dauphin County and Cumberland County). Dobbin challenged the designation via 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). The district court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing; the Third Circuit affirmed.

While the panel (Chief Judge Chagares, joined by Judges Bibas and Fisher) rejected Dobbin’s IAC claims, its reasoning breaks new ground: it expressly holds that non-Shepard documents—such as Pennsylvania sentencing commitment forms (DC-300B) and Administrative Office “JCP” docket sheets—may be consulted to prove that a defendant was convicted of a particular offense, even though Shepard v. United States limits the documents a court may rely upon to characterize the nature of that offense.

Summary of the Judgment

1. The court applies a dual evidentiary framework:

• Fact of conviction: May be established with any records bearing “sufficient indicia of reliability,” including non-Shepard material (joining the 1st, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th and 10th Circuits).
• Character of conviction (crime-of-violence analysis): Remains bounded by Shepard’s “charging document, plea agreement, transcript, or comparable judicial record” limitation.

2. Applying that framework, the panel concludes:

• Dauphin County predicate – Non-Shepard records conclusively show Dobbin pled guilty to robbery under § 3701(a)(1)(ii), a crime of violence. Therefore, counsel was not ineffective for failing to contest that predicate.
• Cumberland County predicate – The Shepard-qualified charging instrument and information cite § 3701(a)(1)(ii). Mens rea language referencing “recklessly” is a drafting slip that cannot alter the statutory citation and first-degree-felony labeling. The subsection requires “threatening” or intentionally placing another in fear of “immediate serious bodily injury,” thereby satisfying the Guidelines’ elements clause.

Because both prior robberies stand as crimes of violence, Dobbin’s career-offender status is sound, defeating the Strickland prejudice prong; no evidentiary hearing was warranted.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) – Limits look-through documents for characterizing a prior conviction under the modified categorical approach. Dobbin extends, clarifies, and partly confines Shepard.
• Johnson v. United States (2010 & 2015) – 2010 clarified “physical force”; 2015 invalidated ACCA’s residual clause. Key backdrop for determining which Pennsylvania robberies survive under the elements clause.
• Henderson, 80 F.4th 207 (3d Cir. 2023) – Earlier Third Circuit case holding § 3701(a)(1)(ii) robbery is a crime of violence; relied on heavily to dispose of Dobbin’s merits arguments.
• Cornish, 103 F.3d 302 (3d Cir. 1997) – Overbroad pre-Johnson precedent implying all Pennsylvania robberies are violent; partially abrogated but still cited by the district court. The panel effectively cabins Cornish to subsection (v).
• Out-of-circuit cases upholding non-Shepard documents for fact of conviction: Zuniga-Chavez (10th), Bryant (1st), Felix (9th), etc. These authorities collectively pave the way for the Third Circuit’s express adoption.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Dual inquiry under Strickland
   • Deficiency: Counsel’s failure to challenge the predicates would be deficient only if an argument had “reasonable probability” of success.
   • Prejudice: Even assuming deficiency, no prejudice exists if robbery convictions inevitably qualify.
2. Evidentiary bifurcation
   • Shepard governs only the nature (violent or not) of a prior conviction, not the historical fact.
   • District courts may therefore consult state docket sheets, sentencing forms, and other administrative records to establish that a defendant was convicted of offense X on date Y.
   • Rationale: avoiding “mini-trials” about offense conduct, honoring judicial efficiency while respecting Sixth Amendment concerns.
3. Application to Dauphin County
   • Even though defendant produced a plea colloquy mentioning only burglary, other reliable records revealed two contemporaneous pleas—burglary and robbery.
   • The robbery was under § 3701(a)(1)(ii); Henderson compels violent-crime status.
4. Application to Cumberland County
   • Charging information expressly cites § 3701(a)(1)(ii) and first-degree-felony penalty (20-year max).
   • A stray “recklessly” phrase cannot override the statutory citation; Pennsylvania law makes reckless mens rea doctrinally impossible for subsection (ii) threats.
   • Consequently, the predicate is violent under the elements clause; alternative subsections suggested by Dobbin (i) or (iv) mismatch penalties and allegations.
5. Enumerated-offense backstop (dicta)
   The panel notes that, even if subsection (ii) could be committed recklessly, robbery is enumerated in Application Note 1, so the conviction would still count under § 4B1.2(a)’s enumerated clause. Because Dobbin did not press this angle, the court treats it as forfeited.

C. Impact of the Decision

• Clarifies evidentiary standards in the Third Circuit. Henceforth, sentencing courts in PA, NJ, and DE may use prison commitment forms, electronic docket sheets, parole board records, and similar materials to prove the fact of a conviction without violating Shepard.
• Streamlines § 2255 litigation. Petitioners urging IAC based on allegedly invalid predicates will now face a steeper hurdle where administrative records plainly show the convictions.
• Stabilises Pennsylvania robbery jurisprudence. By reaffirming subsection (ii) as categorically violent, the decision narrows uncertainty created when Cornish was partially abrogated.
• Potential ripple into ACCA cases. Though Dobbin addresses the Guidelines, its evidentiary holding is textually tethered to § 2255 and § 3559, making the logic transferrable to ACCA “violent felony” litigation.
• Creates alignment with majority circuits. Third Circuit now stands with six others; a circuit split remains only with circuits that have not yet spoken or that quietly apply Shepard more rigidly. Reduces likelihood of Supreme Court review absent a conflicting decision elsewhere.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Career Offender (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1) – A status enhancing the sentencing range when a defendant (1) is at least 18 at instant offense, (2) the instant offense is a felony crime of violence or drug offense, and (3) the defendant has two prior felony crimes of violence or drug offenses.
• Elements Clause – Part of the crime-of-violence definition covering offenses that “have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” Requires “violent force” (Johnson 2010).
• Enumerated Offenses Clause – Lists specific crimes (burglary, arson, extortion, etc.) deemed violent even if they lack the force element; Application Note 1 adds robbery, aggravated assault, etc.
• Residual Clause – Catch-all for crimes that “otherwise involve” serious potential risk; declared unconstitutionally vague in ACCA but not in the Guidelines (Beckles), though rarely relied on after 2016.
• Shepard Documents – Restricted record set (indictment, plea agreement, plea colloquy, jury instructions) permitted for determining the statutory basis of a conviction under the modified categorical approach.
• Modified Categorical Approach – Two-step method: (1) use Shepard documents to pin down which alternative statutory element the defendant was convicted of; (2) compare that element to the relevant Guidelines clause.

Conclusion

United States v. Dobbin is significant for two reasons. Substantively, it cements the post-Johnson view that Pennsylvania first-degree robbery (§ 3701(a)(1)(ii)) is a paradigmatic “crime of violence.” Procedurally—and more consequentially for future litigation—it delineates an evidentiary boundary: Shepard restricts courts only when they characterize a conviction, not when they merely confirm its existence. By formally adopting the majority-circuit position on non-Shepard documents, the Third Circuit equips district courts with flexible (yet reliable) tools to resolve sentencing and collateral-review disputes without unnecessary evidentiary hearings.

Practitioners should adjust sentencing strategy accordingly: defendants contesting predicate convictions must confront administrative records head-on, and counsel must recognize that creative parsing of plea colloquies will not suffice where parallel docket materials speak plainly. Conversely, the government must still respect Shepard’s limits when arguing that a conviction is violent; over-reliance on non-Shepard records for that characterization would invite reversible error.

In sum, Dobbin tightens the screws on collateral attacks premised on documentary ambiguities while preserving the constitutional guardrails established by Shepard and its progeny. Its twin holdings—on evidentiary scope and on Pennsylvania robbery—will reverberate across the Third Circuit’s criminal docket for years to come.