United States v. Day: Count-Specific Limits on Substantial-Assistance Departures Below Mandatory Minimums

I. Introduction

In United States v. Erika Kelley Day, No. 24-13312 (11th Cir. Dec. 23, 2025), the Eleventh Circuit addressed a recurring but previously under-explored question in federal sentencing: whether a government motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 for substantial assistance that explicitly targets one count authorizes a district court to depart below the statutory mandatory minimum on a separate count that also carries its own mandatory minimum.

The case arose from a common factual pattern—methamphetamine distribution coupled with possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime—yet presented an important legal issue at the intersection of:

mandatory minimum sentencing statutes (21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c));
the substantial-assistance regime (18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, and Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)); and
plea agreement interpretation and prosecutorial discretion in charging and sentencing.

The district court, persuaded by the defendant’s extensive cooperation and profound rehabilitation, used the government’s substantial-assistance motion referencing only the drug count to impose a sentence below the statutory minimum on both the drug and gun counts. The government appealed, arguing that this resulted in an “illegal sentence” on the § 924(c) count because it fell below the unwaived mandatory minimum.

The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the government, vacating the sentence on the firearm count and remanding for resentencing. In doing so, it announced a clear rule: a § 3553(e) motion is count-specific. A motion that authorizes departure below the statutory minimum for one count does not permit a district court to go below the mandatory minimum on another count unless the government’s motion expressly extends to that separate count.

Judge Kidd’s concurrence, while agreeing with the legal holding, highlights the profound human and policy implications of this highly asymmetric system, in which federal prosecutors possess decisive power to unlock relief from mandatory minimums even when a district court believes a lower sentence is more just.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

Erika Kelley Day was arrested after officers from the Mobile County Sheriff’s Office, acting on a tip about a fugitive at an RV park, stopped her vehicle for a traffic violation. During the stop, deputies observed crystal methamphetamine in the front seat and, upon arresting and patting her down, found a handgun on her person.

A federal grand jury indicted Day on two counts:

Count One: Possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, carrying a 5-year mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B); and
Count Two: Use or carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), which carries a mandatory minimum 5-year sentence consecutive to any other term of imprisonment.

Day entered into a written plea agreement and pled guilty to both counts. The plea agreement contained a standard substantial-assistance provision: if Day’s cooperation “result[ed] in substantial assistance,” the government agreed to “move for a downward departure in accordance with Section 5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines or Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,” while reserving:

sole discretion to determine whether Day’s cooperation amounted to substantial assistance; and
control over “the extent of any such departure request.”

Importantly, the plea agreement:

said nothing about 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) by name; and
did not promise a government motion to depart below any statutory mandatory minimum for any particular count.

The district court accepted the plea after advising Day that:

it could impose a sentence “more severe or less severe” than the advisory Guidelines; and
she faced two separate statutory minimum sentences.

Sentencing was delayed multiple times while Day completed extensive cooperation with the government. Ultimately, the government filed a motion citing U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), but the motion was expressly limited to Count One (the drug charge). There was no request to reduce the mandatory minimum sentence on the § 924(c) firearm count.

The district court characterized this as a “5K motion” that allowed it to “move below statutory minimum sentencing” and imposed:

a sentence of time served on Count One; and
one day on Count Two, consecutive to Count One.

Given that § 924(c) requires a 5-year consecutive minimum, the government objected that this constituted an illegal sentence on Count Two because its motion was directed only to Count One. The district court overruled the objection, and the government appealed.

B. Holding

The Eleventh Circuit held that:

A government motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 that authorizes departure below the statutory minimum for one count does not authorize a district court to depart below the statutory minimum on a separate count unless the government expressly so moves as to that separate count.

Because the government’s substantial-assistance motion was limited to Count One, the district court lacked authority to impose a sentence below the statutory minimum on Count Two. The sentence on Count Two was therefore illegal and had to be vacated.

The court also rejected Day’s contention that the government had breached the plea agreement by limiting its substantial-assistance motion to Count One. The plea agreement:

did not mention § 3553(e);
did not promise relief from statutory minimums on any specific count; and
explicitly reserved to the government sole discretion both as to whether to file a motion and as to the extent of any departure.

Accordingly, there was no breach, and—even if there had been—breach could not expand the district court’s statutory authority to impose a sentence below a mandatory minimum absent a proper government motion.

The court:

vacated the sentence as to Count Two; and
remanded for resentencing “in accordance with this opinion.”

C. The Concurrence

Judge Kidd concurred in the judgment and joined the majority’s legal analysis, but wrote separately to underscore:

the exceptional nature of Day’s rehabilitation and assistance to the government over two years while on pretrial release;
the district court’s reasoned belief that further incarceration would be counterproductive for both Day and the community; and
the “asymmetry” in federal sentencing law, under which district courts enjoy broad discretion to increase sentences but are tightly constrained from going below mandatory minimums absent a prosecutor’s motion.

He emphasized that in cases like Day’s, “only one person’s opinion” truly controls whether the district court can impose what it believes to be the most just sentence: the federal prosecutor. Citing a similar concern expressed in United States v. Perez (11th Cir. 2025) (Abudu, J., concurring), he urged prosecutors to use their “nearly unbounded discretion” with care and expressed hope that on remand the government would exercise that discretion to permit a just outcome in Day’s case.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory and Guidelines Framework

1. The Relevant Mandatory Minimums

Day’s case involves two distinct mandatory-minimum provisions:

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (Count One): imposes a 5-year minimum term of imprisonment for possession with intent to distribute certain quantities of controlled substances, including methamphetamine.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count Two): imposes a 5-year minimum sentence, consecutive to any other term of imprisonment, for using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime or possessing a firearm in furtherance of such a crime.

These statutory minimums supersede the otherwise applicable advisory Sentencing Guidelines ranges whenever the guideline range dips below the statutory floor. While the Guidelines can sometimes recommend longer sentences, they cannot authorize sentences below a mandatory minimum unless a statutory mechanism (such as § 3553(e) or the “safety valve” in § 3553(f)) applies.

2. The Substantial-Assistance Mechanisms

Three interlocking provisions govern sentencing reductions for a defendant’s “substantial assistance” to the government:

U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 – permits a downward departure from the advisory Guidelines range upon a motion by the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance. Standing alone, § 5K1.1 does not authorize relief from statutory mandatory minimums.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) – expressly empowers a court, “upon motion of the Government,” to impose a sentence below “a level established by statute as a minimum sentence” in recognition of substantial assistance. This is the statutory gateway to going below a mandatory minimum at the initial sentencing.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b) – allows post-sentencing reductions for substantial assistance upon a government motion. Courts have generally interpreted Rule 35(b) and § 3553(e) in parallel, both requiring a government motion and limiting reductions to assistance-related factors.

3. Multiple Sentences and Aggregation

When a defendant is sentenced on multiple counts, 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c) states that multiple terms of imprisonment ordered to run consecutively or concurrently “shall be treated for administrative purposes as a single, aggregate term of imprisonment.” The Eleventh Circuit emphasizes that this aggregation:

is only for administrative purposes (e.g., prison administration and computation); and
does not erase the legal reality that each count carries its own independent sentence and statutory minimum.

This distinction is crucial: even if the Bureau of Prisons treats the sentences as a single block of time, each count’s mandatory minimum remains separate and must independently be respected unless validly waived via a § 3553(e) motion or other statutory mechanism.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

1. Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120 (1996)

Melendez is the Supreme Court’s foundational decision on the relationship between § 5K1.1 and § 3553(e). The Court held:

a government motion under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 does not by itself authorize a sentence below a statutory mandatory minimum; and
a separate, explicit motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) is required for the court to go below the statutory floor.

The Eleventh Circuit relies on Melendez for the proposition that:

District courts have no authority to depart below a statutory minimum without “a Government motion requesting or authorizing the district court to … impose such a sentence.”

In Day, this principle is extended to a multi-count context: even if a § 3553(e) motion exists, the court may reduce a statutory minimum only to the extent—and only as to the specific count(s)—that the government’s motion actually encompasses.

2. United States v. Mangaroo, 504 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2007)

In Mangaroo, the Eleventh Circuit held that any departure under § 3553(e) must be based “only [on] substantial assistance factors.” In other words, once a § 3553(e) motion is filed, the court may consider only factors directly tied to the defendant’s assistance (e.g., usefulness, timeliness, risk, extent of cooperation) in deciding how far to go below the statutory minimum.

Mangaroo serves two roles in Day:

It emphasizes that the nature of the reduction under § 3553(e) is constrained to assistance-related considerations.
In light of those limits, it underscores why courts must adhere strictly to the scope of the government’s motion—because the authority to fall below the minimum, and the factors that can justify doing so, are both strictly cabined.

3. United States v. Aponte, 36 F.3d 1050 (11th Cir. 1994)

In Aponte, the Eleventh Circuit “accorded § 3553(e) and Rule 35(b) the same interpretation,” recognizing that both:

require a government motion; and
target sentencing reductions based on substantial assistance.

Aponte lays the groundwork for importing principles developed under Rule 35(b) into the interpretation of § 3553(e). In Day, the panel explicitly relies on this equivalence to borrow a key holding from a Rule 35(b) case, McNeese, and apply it in the § 3553(e) context.

4. United States v. McNeese, 547 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2008)

McNeese addressed whether the government could direct a Rule 35(b) motion to a specific count. The court held that the government may do so; its motion can target particular counts for reduction rather than automatically applying to all counts.

In Day, the panel uses McNeese—together with Aponte’s recognition of the parallel between Rule 35(b) and § 3553(e)—to support the following logic:

because the government may limit a Rule 35(b) substantial-assistance motion to specific counts;
and because § 3553(e) is interpreted in the same manner;
the government may likewise limit a § 3553(e) motion to particular counts, and such a motion does not automatically authorize reductions on other counts.

5. United States v. Melton, 861 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2017)

Melton is a key case on the interpretation of plea agreements. The Eleventh Circuit there emphasized:

“Silence is not ambiguity.”
Courts cannot conjure a government promise out of mere silence; any alleged promise (e.g., to file a § 3553(e) motion) must be grounded in the text of the agreement.

In Day, the plea agreement:

referred only to § 5K1.1 and Rule 35(b); and
said nothing about § 3553(e) or relief from statutory minimums on any particular count.

The panel, citing Melton, concludes:

Because “[s]ilence is not ambiguity” and “no promise was made about filing a [section] 3553(e) motion,” we cannot construe the agreement to require the prosecution to file a motion to depart on count two.

This directly defeats Day’s argument that the plea agreement, construed against the government as drafter, obligated it to seek relief on Count Two.

6. United States v. Hall, 64 F.4th 1200 (11th Cir. 2023)

Hall is cited for the standard of review: “We review de novo the legality of a sentence.” This underpins the court’s role in deciding, without deference, whether the sentence on Count Two complied with § 924(c) and § 3553(e).

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Textual Interpretation of § 3553(e)

Section 3553(e) provides in relevant part:

Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance …

The Eleventh Circuit focuses on two key textual features:

The use of the singular: “a level” and “a minimum sentence” – The court reads this as referring to a particular statutory minimum applicable to a particular offense. In a multi-count case, each count with a mandatory minimum has its own “minimum sentence,” and § 3553(e) operates individually on each such sentence, not on the aggregate whole.
The requirement of a government motion – The statute makes the court’s authority to go below a mandatory minimum contingent on a government motion. Without such a motion explicitly addressing a specific “minimum sentence,” the court has no power to impose a sentence below that statutory floor.

Combined with § 3584(c), the court’s reasoning is:

Even though multiple sentences can be pronounced as an aggregate for administrative purposes, each remains a separate legal sentence tied to its own mandatory minimum.
Section 3553(e) speaks to a specific statutory “minimum sentence,” not the defendant’s aggregated time in prison.
Therefore, a motion referencing one count does not automatically unlock authority to go below the minimum on other counts.

2. Application to Day’s Sentencing

On the facts:

Count One (drug) – a § 3553(e)/§ 5K1.1 motion was filed. The district court could therefore go below the 5-year mandatory minimum for this count, and it did so by imposing time served.
Count Two (firearm, § 924(c)) – the government’s motion did not mention this count. There was no § 3553(e) motion directed to this separate 5-year consecutive mandatory minimum.

Because the government did not move to reduce the Count Two mandatory minimum:

the district court lacked statutory authority to impose less than 5 years on Count Two; and
its one-day sentence on Count Two was therefore illegal.

3. Rejection of the “Global Effect” Theory

Day argued that § 3553(e) “says nothing about sentence relief when multiple counts in an indictment carry minimum mandatory sentences” and thus should be read flexibly to permit a global departure once the government triggers § 3553(e) at all.

The panel rejects that reading, stressing that:

a “plain reading” of § 3553(e) resolves the question;
its use of the singular subject—“a minimum sentence”—counsels against a global approach; and
the court’s precedents, especially McNeese, confirm that the government may direct substantial-assistance reductions to specific counts only.

In other words, once § 3553(e) is triggered for one count, the court does not gain free-floating authority to relieve the defendant of unrelated mandatory minimums on other counts. Each count’s mandatory minimum is a separate barrier that can only be lowered by a count-specific government motion.

4. Plea Agreement and Alleged Breach

Day alternatively argued that the government breached the plea agreement by limiting its substantial-assistance motion to Count One. She claimed:

the plea agreement did not say the government could “unilaterally limit its departure obligation to a single count”; and
any ambiguity should be construed against the government as drafter.

The Eleventh Circuit responds in two steps:

a. Breach Cannot Expand Statutory Authority

First, as a conceptual matter, the court expresses “doubt that breach of a plea agreement could grant the district court authority to bypass the statutory text” or “cure a breach by affirming an illegal sentence.” In other words, even if there had been a breach, the court:

could provide remedies such as specific performance or allowing withdrawal of the plea; but
could not lawfully sustain a sentence that contravenes mandatory statutory minimums.

However, the panel ultimately does not resolve this issue because it finds no breach occurred.

b. No Breach in Light of the Agreement’s Text

Second, the court examines the plea agreement and finds:

The agreement only promised a potential motion under § 5K1.1 and Rule 35(b), not under § 3553(e).
It made no guarantee about seeking reductions below statutory minimums at all, let alone on specific counts.
It expressly reserved to the government sole discretion to decide whether Day’s cooperation amounted to “substantial assistance” and “the extent of any such departure request.”

On this record, and invoking Melton’s maxim that “silence is not ambiguity,” the court concludes that Day cannot transform the government’s silence about § 3553(e) into an enforceable promise to seek relief as to Count Two.

c. Rejection of Two Auxiliary Breach Arguments

Day advanced two subsidiary arguments that the court rejects:

The plea colloquy “less severe” comment – Day argued that when the district court told her she might receive a “less severe” sentence than the Guidelines, and the government did not object, this implicitly signaled a promise that the government would permit a sentence lower than the § 924(c) mandatory minimum.
- The Eleventh Circuit characterizes the judge’s remark as a “formulaic question” about the advisory nature of the Guidelines, not a promise about statutory minimums.
- Indeed, the district court immediately thereafter reminded Day that she faced multiple mandatory minimum sentences.
- The government’s silence during this standard advisement did not create a new obligation.
The district court’s construction of the motion – Day contended that the district court implicitly read the government’s motion broadly to avoid a breach.
- The panel notes that neither party nor the district court suggested a plea breach at the sentencing hearing.
- The district court stated only that it “disagree[d]” with the government’s legal interpretation of § 3553(e).
- Thus, the broad reading of the motion cannot be justified as an attempt to cure—or avoid finding—a breach, because no breach theory was actually advanced at the time.

D. Impact and Implications

1. Practical Effect in Multi-Count Cases with Mandatory Minimums

United States v. Day announces a clear and administrable rule for the Eleventh Circuit:

A § 3553(e) substantial-assistance motion must be understood as count-specific.
If the government wishes to permit a departure below statutory minimums on multiple counts (for example, both a drug count and a § 924(c) count), it must either:
- file a motion explicitly identifying each count; or
- make clear in its language that the motion applies to “all counts carrying mandatory minimums” or similar phrasing.
If the government names only one count—or otherwise limits the motion—district courts may not independently extend the departure to other counts.

This has several direct consequences:

Prosecutorial leverage increases: In multi-count cases, especially those involving § 924(c), the government can calibrate cooperation rewards by choosing whether to extend § 3553(e) relief to the firearm count or to leave that mandatory minimum intact.
Defense negotiation strategy must adjust: Defense counsel must pay close attention not only to whether the government is willing to file a substantial-assistance motion, but also:
- whether the motion will include § 3553(e) (not just § 5K1.1/Rule 35); and
- which counts the motion will explicitly cover.
District courts are constrained: Even when a judge believes that further incarceration is unjust or counterproductive—as in Day’s case—he or she may not go below the unwaived mandatory minimum on a given count absent an express government motion covering that count.

2. Reinforcement of Prosecutorial Control Over Mandatory Minimums

The concurrence underscores, and the majority implicitly affirms, that federal prosecutors possess decisive power in three critical areas:

Charging decisions – whether to charge offenses that carry mandatory minimums, such as § 924(c).
Plea bargaining – whether to dismiss or reduce mandatory-minimum counts as part of a plea agreement.
Substantial-assistance motions – whether, and to what extent, to file § 3553(e) and/or Rule 35(b) motions and to which counts those motions apply.

Day confirms that once a mandatory-minimum count remains in the case at sentencing, the district court’s ability to go below that minimum turns entirely on the prosecutor’s decision to file a count-specific § 3553(e) motion. Without such a motion, even extraordinary rehabilitation and cooperation cannot empower the court to impose what it considers the most just sentence.

3. Sentencing “Asymmetry” and Calls for Reform

Judge Kidd’s concurrence echoes a broader concern that has been gaining traction: the asymmetry of federal sentencing discretion. He notes that:

District courts have “nearly unbounded discretion to impose higher sentences” above the Guidelines and even above minimums (subject to reasonableness review); but
They lack comparable discretion to impose lower sentences when mandatory minimums apply, except to the extent the government chooses to unlock § 3553(e) (or the “safety valve” applies).

Day’s case vividly illustrates this asymmetry:

She turned her life around while on pretrial release, completing a year-long treatment program, remaining drug-free, maintaining employment, and rebuilding her relationship with her children.
She undertook extraordinary risks to aid law enforcement—wearing a wire, returning to drug environments, traveling repeatedly to meet with agents—which led to multiple additional indictments and guilty pleas.
The district judge concluded that further imprisonment would harm, rather than help, Day and her community.
Yet, despite all of this, the law required the judge to impose at least a 5-year consecutive sentence on the § 924(c) count unless the prosecutor consented via a § 3553(e) motion specifically directed to that count.

The concurrence suggests that this system:

places immense and largely unreviewable power in the hands of prosecutors; and
may merit legislative or policy reconsideration, particularly for defendants who demonstrate the kind of transformation evidenced by Day.

While the majority opinion does not engage in policy analysis, by strictly enforcing the statutory scheme it accentuates the importance of nonjudicial actors—Congress and the Department of Justice—in addressing any perceived inequities arising from mandatory minimums and prosecutorial control over substantial-assistance departures.

4. Guidance for Plea Drafting and Litigation Strategy

For practitioners, Day provides several concrete lessons:

Drafting plea agreements:
- Defense counsel should, where the facts permit, negotiate for explicit language that the government will file (or consider filing) a § 3553(e) motion “as to all counts carrying mandatory minimums” or by naming particular counts, including § 924(c) counts, where present.
- Vague promises to file a § 5K1.1 or Rule 35 motion are insufficient to guarantee relief from statutory minimums.
Litigating alleged breaches:
- Counsel must ground any breach claim in the text of the plea agreement, not in expectations based on typical practice or judicial comments at plea colloquies.
- Silence about § 3553(e) or about specific counts cannot be transformed into a promise under Eleventh Circuit precedent.
Sentencing record:
- At sentencing, courts and counsel should ensure the scope of any § 3553(e)/§ 5K1.1 motion is clearly delineated on the record—identifying exactly which counts are covered.
- Any reliance on a supposed “global” effect of such motions is inconsistent with Day and is likely to be reversed on appeal.

5. Possible Avenues on Remand and Beyond

The opinion vacates the sentence on Count Two and remands “with instructions to resentence Day in accordance with this opinion.” That means, absent further action:

Count One may still be sentenced below the mandatory minimum pursuant to the existing § 3553(e) motion.
Count Two must carry at least the 5-year consecutive sentence required by § 924(c) unless the government now chooses to file a new § 3553(e) motion covering that count (or employs Rule 35(b) post-sentencing).

Judge Kidd’s concurrence pointedly notes that the prosecutor (or successor) remains free to exercise that discretion on remand and expresses hope that she will do so to reach a result the district court views as just. More broadly, the case may prompt:

internal DOJ discussions about how and when to extend § 3553(e) relief to § 924(c) counts in extraordinary cases; and
renewed calls for legislative reforms to mandatory minimum statutes and/or expansion of judicial discretion in cases of exceptional rehabilitation and cooperation.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Statutory Minimum vs. Guideline Range

A statutory minimum is a floor set by Congress in a statute (e.g., “not less than 5 years”). A judge cannot go below this minimum unless a statute like § 3553(e) or § 3553(f) specifically allows it.

The Sentencing Guidelines range is an advisory range computed by the court based on the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (e.g., “57–71 months”). Judges must consider this range but are not bound to sentence within it, so long as they respect any applicable statutory minimums and maximums.

2. Substantial Assistance

“Substantial assistance” refers to meaningful cooperation with law enforcement or prosecutors, such as:

providing truthful information about others’ criminal activity;
participating in controlled buys or sting operations;
wearing a wire or testifying against co-conspirators; and
helping recover assets or locate fugitives.

When the government believes a defendant’s assistance has been valuable enough, it may file a motion under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, Rule 35(b), and/or § 3553(e) to reduce the defendant’s sentence.

3. Downward “Departure” vs. “Variance”

A departure is a sentence that falls outside the Guidelines range based on a specific provision in the Guidelines themselves (such as § 5K1.1) or a statute (such as § 3553(e)).

A variance is a sentence outside the Guidelines range based on the judge’s independent consideration of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors (e.g., the defendant’s history, need for deterrence, protection of the public), once any applicable departures and mandatory minimums are accounted for.

Critically:

a variance cannot override a statutory minimum; but
a § 3553(e) departure, if properly triggered by a government motion, can permit a sentence below that minimum, albeit only based on assistance-related factors.

4. “Illegal Sentence” in This Context

An “illegal sentence” here does not refer to constitutional violations or procedural mistakes. It simply means:

a sentence that is not authorized by statute—in this case, a sentence on Count Two below the 5-year mandatory minimum of § 924(c) without a valid § 3553(e) motion covering that count.

Such a sentence must be corrected on appeal regardless of how equitable or reasonable it may appear to the sentencing judge.

5. Plea Agreements as Contracts

Federal courts treat plea agreements like contracts:

They interpret the written terms according to ordinary principles of contract interpretation.
Ambiguities are generally construed against the drafter (usually the government).
But “silence is not ambiguity”; courts will not find a promise where the agreement says nothing on the point.

In Day, because the plea agreement was silent about § 3553(e) and about the specific counts to which any substantial-assistance motion would apply, the court refused to read into the agreement a government obligation to seek relief from the § 924(c) mandatory minimum.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Day establishes an important clarification in Eleventh Circuit law: a government motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) that authorizes departure below a statutory mandatory minimum is count-specific. It does not automatically permit a district court to reduce other statutory minimums in the same case. Unless the government explicitly moves to reduce the mandatory minimum on a given count, that statutory floor remains binding.

The decision reinforces a rigid but clear structure:

Courts cannot circumvent mandatory minimums on their own initiative; they require a statutory trigger, most often a § 3553(e) motion from the government.
Prosecutors can strategically limit the scope of their substantial-assistance motions to preserve mandatory minimums on certain counts, such as § 924(c) firearm charges.
Plea agreements promising § 5K1.1 or Rule 35 consideration do not, without more, obligate the government to seek relief from statutory minimums.

Judge Kidd’s concurrence powerfully illustrates the human consequences of this framework, showing how even extraordinary rehabilitation and cooperation may not suffice to overcome a mandatory minimum absent prosecutorial consent. While the Eleventh Circuit correctly applies the statutory scheme as written, Day highlights the central role of prosecutors—and ultimately Congress—in shaping the real-world impact of mandatory minimum sentencing and substantial-assistance regimes.