United States v. Davis: Record-of-Conviction Requirement for Predicate Felonies Under § 922(g)(1)

Introduction

United States v. Davis, 23-1367 (10th Cir. May 21, 2025), addresses whether a defendant’s state‐court conviction qualifies as a predicate “felony” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) when that state conviction carried a presumptive maximum sentence of one year.

Parties:

Plaintiff-Appellee: United States of America
Defendant-Appellant: Omari Davis

Background: In 2019, Davis pleaded guilty in Colorado state court to distributing an imitation controlled substance—baking soda—under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-18-422(1)(a), a level-4 felony punishable by six months to one year (unless aggravated). He received two years’ probation without the court’s making any aggravating‐circumstance findings. In federal district court, Davis was charged under § 922(g)(1) with unlawful firearm possession as a felon; he moved to dismiss on the ground that his state conviction was not punishable by more than one year and thus was not a qualifying predicate. The district court denied the motion; Davis pleaded guilty, reserving appeal.

Summary of the Judgment

The Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated Davis’s federal conviction. It held:

The relevant inquiry under § 922(g)(1) is whether the particular defendant’s prior state conviction was “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” based on facts in the record of conviction.
Under Colorado law and the constitutional constraints of Apprendi/Blakely, an aggravated‐range sentence requires a judge to make specific findings of aggravating circumstances beyond the elements of the offense, either admitted by the defendant, found by a jury, or based on stipulated judicial fact‐finding.
Davis’s plea and sentencing contained no such findings; the record did not reflect any aggravating fact that would have exposed him to more than one year in prison.
Federal courts may not supplement the state record with their own recidivist or aggravating findings ex post (Carachuri-Rosendo). Hence Davis’s prior conviction did not qualify as a § 922(g)(1) predicate.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000): Facts other than a prior conviction that increase the maximum authorized sentence must be admitted by the defendant or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Blakely v. Washington (2004): Applied Apprendi to state sentencing guidelines, reinforcing that judicial fact‐finding cannot raise the statutory maximum.
Lopez v. People (Colo. 2005): Under Colorado’s general felony sentencing statute, an aggravated sentence requires an “additional aggravating fact beyond the bare elements of the offense” and that fact must be admitted or found consistent with Apprendi/Blakely.
Mountjoy v. People (Colo. 2018): Confirmed that absent constitutional fact‐finding, the maximum sentence a particular defendant faces is the top of the presumptive range.
Shepard v. United States (2005): For recidivism enhancements, courts may look only to the record of conviction (judgment, plea agreement, colloquy transcripts) to identify qualifying prior convictions.
Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder (2010): Held that an immigration court cannot apply a recidivist enhancement based on facts outside the record of conviction; it must rely on what the defendant was actually convicted of and sentenced upon in state court.
Brooks and Hisey (10th Cir.): Extended Carachuri-Rosendo’s record-of-conviction requirement to sentencing‐guideline and § 922(g)(1) predicate analyses in the Tenth Circuit.

Legal Reasoning

1. Textual and statutory analysis: Colorado’s drug‐sentencing statute prescribes a presumptive range (6–12 months for level-4 felonies) and an aggravated range (1–2 years) only if the court “makes specific findings on the record” of aggravating circumstances based on evidence or admissions.

2. Constitutional constraints (Apprendi/Blakely): Any fact that would permit a judge to exceed the presumptive maximum must be admitted by the defendant or found by a jury (or pursuant to stipulated judicial fact‐finding). Colorado’s Supreme Court in Lopez and Mountjoy applied those decisions to limit aggravated sentences to cases with additional admitted or adjudicated facts.

3. Record-of-conviction limitation: Under Shepard and Carachuri-Rosendo, a federal court assessing whether a prior state conviction qualifies as a predicate must confine itself to documents in the record of conviction—judgment, charging documents, plea agreement, colloquy transcripts—not to facts known to the federal judge but not reflected in that record.

4. Application to Davis: His plea agreement crossed out all boilerplate aggravation language; no additional facts were admitted beyond the statutory elements; the state judge made no aggravating findings. Nothing in the record exposed Davis to more than one year. Thus his conviction did not satisfy the predicate requirement of § 922(g)(1).

Impact

This decision tightens the definition of “felony” under § 922(g)(1), requiring that the record of conviction establish punishability of more than one year.
It reinforces the Apprendi/Shepard/Carachuri-Rosendo framework in firearm‐possession cases, ensuring that federal courts do not rely on post-conviction judicial fact‐finding to elevate state sentences.
State defendants and federal prosecutors will need to pay careful attention to plea colloquies and record entries regarding sentence ranges and aggravating circumstances when § 922(g)(1) exposure is at stake.
Potentially, many defendants whose state pleas involved presumptive‐range sentences without recorded aggravating findings will successfully challenge § 922(g)(1) predicates.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Presumptive vs. aggravated range: A state statute often sets a “default” sentence range (presumptive). To exceed that range, a judge must identify facts (aggravators) that justify a harsher term and formally record them.
Apprendi rule: Any fact that increases a defendant’s maximum possible sentence must be admitted by the defendant or found by a jury—courts can’t invent or rely on judicial intuition alone.
Record‐of‐conviction requirement: When classifying a prior state offense for federal purposes, only what appears in the official conviction documents—even plea transcripts—counts. Unspoken or background facts don’t matter.
Predicate felony under § 922(g)(1): To be a disqualifying “felon,” one’s prior conviction must be punishable by over one year in prison as shown by the record. If the record caps the sentence at one year, it cannot serve as a basis for federal felony prosecution under the statute.

Conclusion

United States v. Davis establishes that a state‐court conviction carried to its presumptive maximum of one year—with no recorded aggravating findings—does not qualify as a predicate “felony” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed the cross-cutting requirement that federal courts rely exclusively on the record of conviction to determine punishability and honored the constitutional boundaries set by Apprendi and its progeny. Going forward, practitioners must ensure that plea agreements and sentencing colloquies accurately reflect any admitted facts or judicial findings that could elevate a state sentence beyond one year, lest a conviction fail to support a § 922(g)(1) charge.