United States v. Davis and the Limits of Attempt Reductions and Consecutive Sentencing under the Hobbs Act

I. Introduction

United States v. Davis, No. 24-989 (2d Cir. Dec. 19, 2025) (summary order), arises from a resentencing of a defendant originally convicted in 2010 for violent, drug-related Hobbs Act robbery offenses and a marijuana conspiracy. After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022), four firearm-related counts were vacated, triggering a new sentencing proceeding in the Southern District of New York, followed by this appeal.

Although the Second Circuit’s disposition is explicitly a “summary order” without precedential effect under the Court’s own rules, it addresses, in a concise but legally significant way, several recurring sentencing issues:

How U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b)’s three-level reduction for attempts and conspiracies applies when the defendant has essentially completed all acts necessary for the substantive offense.
Whether 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) bars consecutive sentences for Hobbs Act conspiracy and Hobbs Act attempted robberies.
How courts treat the advisory nature of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d) when imposing sentences for multiple counts.
What is required to show that the sentencing court adequately considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities under § 3553(a)(6).
When and how a district court must explain a life term of supervised release.

The defendant-appellant, Alton Davis, proceeded pro se on appeal. The Court of Appeals (Judges Leval, Lynch, and Sullivan) affirmed the district court’s 60-year prison sentence and lifetime term of supervised release. While the order is non-precedential, it synthesizes and applies several important doctrines concerning federal sentencing, especially in the context of Hobbs Act offenses and post‑Taylor resentencings.

II. Background of the Case

A. Underlying Offense Conduct

Davis was part of a conspiracy that targeted drug dealers—specifically marijuana dealers—for robbery. The crew planned and carried out armed robberies (or attempted robberies) of these dealers, seeking drugs and drug money. The opinion highlights two episodes where the attempted robberies ended in homicide:

First attempted robbery: Davis forced his way into a marijuana dealer’s home to steal drugs or proceeds. There were, in fact, no drugs or money present. In the course of the invasion, Davis shot the dealer’s girlfriend in the head and chest, killing her.
Second attempted robbery: Davis entered another marijuana dealer’s residence when the dealer was not at home, tied up another occupant, interrogated that person about money in the house, and searched for valuables. When the dealer ultimately returned, Davis struggled with him and shot him dead. Again, no drugs or money were successfully taken.

The only reason Davis “walked away without property in hand” in these incidents was that there was nothing to take—not because he failed to carry out his intended criminal acts.

B. Charges, Original Sentence, and Post‑Taylor Resentencing

Following a 2010 jury trial, Davis was convicted of:

One count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery.
Two counts of attempted Hobbs Act robbery.
Two counts of using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence.
Two counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence resulting in death.
One count of conspiracy to distribute marijuana.

The district court initially imposed an aggregate life sentence. After the Supreme Court decided United States v. Taylor, holding that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), Davis’s four firearm convictions were vacated.

On resentencing in 2024, the district court:

Imposed 20 years’ imprisonment on each of the three Hobbs Act counts, to run consecutively (total 60 years).
Imposed 5 years for the marijuana conspiracy, to run concurrently with those 60 years.
Imposed a life term of supervised release.

Davis appealed the new sentence, challenging both the guideline calculations and the procedural reasonableness of the sentence.

C. Issues Raised on Appeal

Davis, acting without counsel, raised five principal arguments:

The district court erred by not reducing his offense level by three levels under U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b)(1)–(2) for attempts and conspiracies.
The court improperly imposed consecutive sentences for the Hobbs Act conspiracy and attempted robbery counts, allegedly in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a).
The court treated U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d) as mandatory, rather than advisory.
The court failed to consider properly the § 3553(a) factors, including the need to avoid unwarranted disparities under § 3553(a)(6).
The court inadequately explained the imposition of a lifetime term of supervised release.

III. Summary of the Court’s Decision

Applying a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard to the overall sentence and a mix of de novo, clearly frivolous, and plain-error review to specific challenges, the Second Circuit affirmed in all respects.

§ 2X1.1 attempt/conspiracy reduction: No three-level reduction was warranted because the record showed that Davis had completed all the acts he believed necessary to accomplish the robberies; his failure to obtain drugs or money was due only to the absence of contraband, not any deficiency in his conduct. This is squarely within the framework of U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b) and United States v. Medina.
Consecutive sentences under § 3584(a): Consecutive terms for Hobbs Act conspiracy and attempted robberies were lawful. Section 3584(a) prohibits consecutive sentences only for an attempt and the completed substantive offense that was the sole objective of that attempt; it does not bar consecutive sentencing for conspiracy and attempt, even when they have the same object.
Advisory nature of § 5G1.2(d): The record showed that the district court understood § 5G1.2(d) to be advisory, not mandatory, as evidenced by its decision to run the marijuana-conspiracy term concurrently. No procedural error was found.
Consideration of § 3553(a) factors: The district court explicitly addressed several key § 3553(a) considerations—including seriousness, deterrence, and respect for law—and is presumed to have considered the remaining factors, including § 3553(a)(6). The appellate court rejected any suggestion that the district court failed in its duty merely because it did not specifically mention each factor on the record.
Lifetime supervised release: The life term was upheld. The panel held that no separate, detailed discussion of the § 3553(a) factors was required specifically for supervised release, so long as the court’s overall rationale for the sentence was clear and those reasons naturally extended to the supervised-release component. Given that Davis killed two victims in separate attempted robberies, the record made the life term “self-evidently” reasonable.

Having found no reversible error—plain or otherwise—the Court of Appeals affirmed the April 11, 2024 judgment in full.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Sentencing Review Framework

United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) Cited for the proposition that sentencing is reviewed under a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Cavera also stands for the view that district courts have broad latitude to weigh § 3553(a) factors, and appellate review is limited to determining procedural and substantive reasonableness.
United States v. Hunt, 82 F.4th 129 (2d Cir. 2023) Quoted for defining procedural reasonableness: a sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the court incorrectly calculates the Guideline range, bases its decision on clearly erroneous facts, or fails adequately to explain the sentence.
United States v. Cramer, 777 F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 2015) Cited for dual standards: de novo review for guideline application, and clear-error review for factual findings underlying the guideline calculation.
United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2007) Establishes that properly preserved sentencing errors are reviewed for harmless error; unpreserved issues are reviewed for plain error. The Davis panel applies plain error to multiple claims because Davis did not timely raise them below.

2. Attempt and Conspiracy Reduction – U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1

U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b)(1) and (2) These provisions authorize a three-level reduction in offense level for attempts and conspiracies unless:
- the defendant (for attempts) or a co‑conspirator (for conspiracies) has completed all the acts believed necessary to complete the offense, or
- the defendant was “about to complete” all such acts but for apprehension or similar interruption.
United States v. Medina, 74 F.3d 413 (2d Cir. 1996) The key precedent explaining that § 2X1.1 focuses on the conduct actually undertaken, not on the probability of success. Medina emphasizes that many conspiracies fail for reasons unrelated to conduct, but the defendants remain fully culpable if they had carried out all intended steps. The Davis court quotes Medina’s distinction between being “about to complete” a crime and being “about to succeed” in achieving the intended outcome.

3. Consecutive Sentences – 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a)

18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) Provides that when multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed at the same time, they may run concurrently or consecutively, with a specific limitation: “the terms may not run consecutively for an attempt and for another offense that was the sole objective of the attempt.”
United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999) Clarifies that § 3584(a) prohibits consecutive sentences for an attempt and the completed offense that was the sole aim of that attempt; it does not broadly bar all combinations of consecutive sentences. The Davis panel relies on Rahman’s reading of § 3584(a).
United States v. Kapaev, 199 F.3d 596 (2d Cir. 1999) Interprets the legislative history of § 3584(a), concluding that Congress deliberately rejected a blanket ban on consecutive sentences where one count is a conspiracy to commit the same offense charged in another count.

4. Conspiracy vs. Substantive Offenses

Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961) Recognizes conspiracy as a distinct offense targeting “collective criminal agreement,” a form of “socially reprehensible conduct” separate from the completed crime.
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) Reaffirms that conspiracy and the underlying substantive offense are “separate and distinct offenses.” This supports separate punishment—potentially consecutive—for each.
United States v. Gunn, No. 24-2430 (2d Cir. 2025) The Davis order cites Gunn for the proposition that participation in a Hobbs Act conspiracy and a separate attempted Hobbs Act robbery are two distinct violations for which consecutive sentences are appropriate.
United States v. Collymore, No. 23-7333, 2024 WL 4707184 (2d Cir. Nov. 7, 2024) A recent case affirming consecutive sentences for Hobbs Act conspiracy and attempted robbery, consistent with the reasoning applied in Davis.

5. § 3553(a) Factors and Appellate Presumptions

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) Sets forth the factors courts must consider in imposing a sentence, including the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need for deterrence, public protection, respect for the law, and—most relevant here—§ 3553(a)(6), the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among similarly situated defendants.
United States v. Rosa, 957 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2020) Establishes that a sentencing judge is presumed to have considered all relevant § 3553(a) factors unless the record indicates otherwise.
United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2008) Holds that a sentencing court is not required to recite or discuss each § 3553(a) factor individually on the record.
United States v. Bleau, 930 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2019) Emphasizes that the weight assigned to any particular sentencing factor is committed to the sentencing judge’s discretion and generally unreviewable so long as the resulting sentence is reasonable.

6. Supervised Release and Explanation Requirements

United States v. Thompson, 143 F.4th 169 (2d Cir. 2025) Stands for the proposition that a district court typically need not separately articulate its reasons for imposing a term of supervised release if it has already explained its reasoning for the term of imprisonment; the same rationale generally carries over.
United States v. Zhong, 26 F.4th 536 (2d Cir. 2022) Reiterates that appellate courts presume a sentencing judge has considered the statutory factors and do not demand “robotic incantations” of each § 3553(a) factor.
United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2018) Permits affirmance of sentencing conditions “in the absence of” a detailed explanation if the district court’s reasoning is “self-evident from the record.”

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning, Issue by Issue

1. Denial of the § 2X1.1(b) Three-Level Reduction

Davis argued that because his Hobbs Act robberies were charged as attempts, he was entitled to a three-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b)(1) and (2). The Second Circuit rejected this argument, applying § 2X1.1 in line with Medina.

Section 2X1.1(b)(1) grants a three-level reduction “unless the defendant completed all the acts the defendant believed necessary for successful completion of the substantive offense or the circumstances demonstrate that the defendant was about to complete all such acts but for apprehension or interruption by some similar event beyond the defendant’s control.” The same logic governs conspiracies under § 2X1.1(b)(2).

The key factual findings here were:

Davis forcibly entered both residences with the intent to rob drug dealers of drugs and money.
He subdued and restrained occupants, interrogated them about the location of money and valuables, and searched the premises.
He used a firearm and, in both incidents, killed a victim during the course of the attempted robbery.
He left empty‑handed solely because there were no drugs or proceeds present, not because any step in his plan was thwarted.

On these facts, the court concluded that Davis had performed all the acts he believed necessary to complete the robberies. The “failure” of the robberies was due only to “pre-existing circumstances”—the absence of contraband— which, under Medina, does not reduce culpability for guideline purposes.

Indeed, the Davis panel underscores Medina’s insight:

“[T]his section determines punishment based on the conduct of the defendant, not on the probability that a conspiracy would have achieved success. Many pre-existing circumstances may doom a conspiracy, without rendering the conspirators any less culpable for their acts.”

Thus, even though the robberies were legally “attempts,” the completed nature of Davis’s conduct foreclosed the § 2X1.1(b) reduction. The district court did not err—let alone plainly err—in refusing to reduce his offense level.

2. Consecutive Sentences for Hobbs Act Conspiracy and Attempts under § 3584(a)

Davis next argued that 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) barred the district court from stacking his sentences for Hobbs Act conspiracy and attempted Hobbs Act robberies. He claimed that the court failed to consider § 3584(a), or misapplied it.

Section 3584(a) provides, in relevant part:

“If multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the same time… the terms may run concurrently or consecutively, except that the terms may not run consecutively for an attempt and for another offense that was the sole objective of the attempt.”

Relying on Rahman and Kapaev, the panel emphasized that the “sole objective” limitation applies to attempt and the completed substantive offense, not to combinations of attempt and conspiracy. Moreover, Callanan and Pinkerton firmly establish that conspiracy is a distinct offense, targeting the social harm of collective criminal agreement.

The panel reasoned:

Conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery punishes the agreement to engage in criminal conduct.
Attempted Hobbs Act robbery punishes the substantial step taken toward carrying out the planned robbery.
These are separate violations that implicate distinct harms and can therefore justifiably be punished consecutively.

The panel further cited its own recent decisions, including Gunn and Collymore, which explicitly approved consecutive sentences for Hobbs Act conspiracy and attempted Hobbs Act robbery.

Accordingly, the imposition of three consecutive 20‑year terms (for the conspiracy and the two attempts) did not violate § 3584(a).

3. Advisory Nature of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d)

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d) provides guidance when a defendant is convicted of multiple counts, directing courts to impose sentences consecutively “to the extent necessary to achieve the total punishment” determined by the Guidelines.

Davis claimed that the district court treated § 5G1.2(d) as if it were mandatory, thereby committing a procedural error. Review was for plain error, as he did not preserve this objection below.

The Second Circuit rejected this argument by pointing to the sentencing structure: the district court ran the marijuana-conspiracy sentence concurrently with the Hobbs Act sentences, rather than consecutively. If the court had believed § 5G1.2(d) to be mandatory, it would have had no basis to do so; the fact that it imposed one concurrent term demonstrated an understanding that the Guidelines are advisory, not binding, consistent with post‑Booker jurisprudence.

Thus, there was no misapprehension of § 5G1.2(d)’s status, and no procedural error.

4. Consideration of § 3553(a) Factors, Including § 3553(a)(6)

Davis argued that the district court failed adequately to consider all the § 3553(a) factors, especially § 3553(a)(6), which addresses the need to avoid unwarranted disparities among similarly situated defendants.

The Second Circuit invoked a pair of key principles:

Per Rosa, sentencing courts are presumed to have considered all relevant § 3553(a) factors unless something in the record suggests otherwise.
Per Verkhoglyad, courts do not need to “enumerate or discuss each § 3553(a) factor individually” on the record.

The sentencing record in Davis showed that the district court explicitly discussed a number of statutory objectives, including:

Promoting respect for the law.
Deterrence (general and/or specific).
The seriousness of the offense conduct—particularly that Davis killed two people during separate attempted robberies.

While § 3553(a)(6) was not mentioned by number, nothing in the transcript or judgment suggested that the court ignored considerations of parity or disparity. The appellate court therefore declined to infer a failure of consideration.

To the extent Davis was really arguing that the sentencing judge gave too little weight to § 3553(a)(6), Bleau forecloses appellate re-weighing of factors: the relative weight assigned is “firmly committed” to the district court’s discretion, reviewable only for overall reasonableness.

5. Lifetime Term of Supervised Release and the Duty to Explain

Finally, Davis challenged the procedural reasonableness of his lifetime supervised release, contending that the court failed to articulate why a life term was necessary.

Because this argument was raised for the first time on appeal, the Second Circuit applied plain-error review. It then relied on Thompson, Zhong, and Betts to set the standards:

A district court generally need not repeat a full § 3553(a) analysis when imposing supervised release, if the reasons supplied for the term of imprisonment logically support the supervised-release term as well.
Appellate courts presume that judges considered the statutory factors and do not require “robotic incantations” for each.
Even without a detailed explanation, a supervised-release term can be affirmed where the record makes the reasoning “self-evident.”

Applying these principles, the panel noted that the district court had:

Already provided a thorough discussion of the § 3553(a) factors when imposing the 60‑year incarceration term.
Grounded the sentence in the extraordinarily serious nature of the conduct: two separate killings during armed home invasions.

Those same considerations—deterrence, public safety, seriousness, and respect for law—plainly justified a long, even lifetime, period of supervision after release (if Davis lives long enough to reach supervised release).

Accordingly, the panel held that the district court did not plainly err in imposing a life term of supervised release without a separate, detailed, factor-by-factor explanation.

C. Impact and Significance

Although United States v. Davis is a summary order without precedential effect under Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1, it reinforces and illustrates several important principles likely to influence future litigation, both as persuasive authority and as a practical guide for district courts:

Restrictive Application of the § 2X1.1 Reduction: The case underscores that defendants charged with attempt or conspiracy should not assume they will automatically benefit from the three-level reduction. Where the record shows they carried out all acts they believed necessary to complete the offense—especially in “impossible” or “frustrated” attempts (e.g., no drugs in the house)—the reduction properly does not apply.
Consecutive Sentencing for Conspiracy and Attempt: By synthesizing Rahman, Kapaev, Callanan, and Pinkerton, and referencing newer cases like Gunn and Collymore, the order clarifies that § 3584(a) allows consecutive sentences for Hobbs Act conspiracy and attempted Hobbs Act robbery. This is particularly significant in violent robbery and gang cases where defendants are commonly charged with both conspiracy and attempt.
Advisory Nature of Multi-Count Sentencing Guidelines: The order confirms that § 5G1.2(d), like other Guidelines provisions, is advisory. Evidence that a court chose some concurrent terms is strong proof that it understood its discretion, an important point for appellate review.
Limited Appellate Review of § 3553(a) Weighting: Davis reaffirms that appellate courts will not micro‑manage how sentencing judges balance § 3553(a) factors. Absent a clear sign that some factor was ignored, arguments that a factor should have been weighed differently will fail, especially under deferential review.
Supervised Release Explanation Requirements: The order illustrates the practical rule that a district court’s general explanation of a sentence—if adequate for the imprisonment term—usually suffices for supervised release as well. Particularly in extreme-violence cases, life terms of supervised release may be sustained without separate, extensive justification.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Plain Error vs. Harmless Error vs. Abuse of Discretion

Abuse of discretion: The basic standard for reviewing a sentence. The appellate court asks whether the sentencing judge committed significant procedural errors or imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.
Harmless error: Applied when the defendant raised the issue in the district court. If an error occurred, the question is whether it likely affected the outcome. If not, the sentence stands.
Plain error: Applied when the issue was not raised below. The defendant must show (1) an error, (2) that is clear or obvious, (3) that affected his substantial rights (usually outcome‑determinative), and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. This is a high bar.

B. Attempt vs. Conspiracy vs. Completed Offense

Attempt: Requires intent to commit a crime plus a “substantial step” toward its completion. If the crime fails due to outside circumstances (e.g., no drugs in the location), it is still punishable as an attempt.
Conspiracy: An agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime, often requiring an overt act in furtherance of that agreement. The crime can be complete even if the planned offense is never attempted.
Completed offense: All required elements of the crime are fully realized (e.g., a successful robbery in which property is taken).

Callanan and Pinkerton teach that conspiracy is distinct from the substantive offense, and Davis reinforces that each can be punished separately and consecutively.

C. U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b) Three-Level Reduction

Section 2X1.1(b) can be confusing because it seems to promise a discount for inchoate crimes (attempts and conspiracies), but it is limited:

If the defendant or co-conspirators stopped short of completing all the acts they believed necessary, a 3-level reduction usually applies.
If they completed all planned acts, even if the crime failed due to circumstances (e.g., target had no money), the reduction is denied.

Davis illustrates that point: his plan was fully executed (armed home invasion, restraint of occupants, search for drugs and money, use of lethal force). The fact that there were no drugs did not make him less culpable.

D. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) and Consecutive Sentences

Section 3584(a) gives judges discretion to decide whether multiple sentences run at the same time (concurrent) or back‑to‑back (consecutive), but it includes one important limit:

A judge cannot impose consecutive sentences for:

an attempt and the completed offense that was the sole objective of that attempt.

Davis shows that this rule does not extend to:

Conspiracy + attempt, even if they target the same underlying robbery.

E. § 3553(a) Factors and the “Presumption of Consideration”

Judges must consider all § 3553(a) factors, but they do not have to list them all on the record. Appellate courts presume the judge did so unless something obvious suggests otherwise. For a defendant to win on appeal, it is not enough to argue that the court did not say a particular factor aloud.

F. Supervised Release

Supervised release is a period following imprisonment during which the defendant must comply with conditions and may be returned to prison for violations. In serious cases—especially those involving violence—lifetime supervised release is often deemed appropriate. Courts are not required to repeat their entire rationale a second time just for supervised release if it is clear that the same considerations apply.

VI. Conclusion

United States v. Davis is formally a non-precedential summary order, but it provides a clear, integrated application of several important sentencing principles in the context of violent Hobbs Act offenses and post‑Taylor resentencings.

The decision confirms that:

The § 2X1.1(b) attempt and conspiracy reduction hinges on whether the defendant stopped short of carrying out all intended acts, not on whether the crime “succeeded.”
§ 3584(a) allows consecutive sentences for Hobbs Act conspiracy and attempted Hobbs Act robbery, reflecting the distinct harms of agreement and action.
The Guidelines, including § 5G1.2(d), remain advisory; district courts retain discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive terms as justified by § 3553(a).
Appellate courts will presume that sentencing judges have properly considered all § 3553(a) factors, including disparity concerns, absent clear contrary indication.
A life term of supervised release in an extraordinary violence case can be sustained even without a separate, detailed explanation, so long as the reasons for the custodial term make the need for supervision self-evident.

For practitioners and courts, Davis serves as a practical guide on how to structure, justify, and defend serious sentences in violent robbery and drug cases, particularly where attempted offenses, conspiracy counts, and multiple terms of imprisonment and supervised release are at issue.