Introduction

In this unpublished per curiam opinion, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction and 120‑month sentence of Jacqueline Tatiana Cuellar for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846. The appeal proceeded under Anders v. California, with counsel identifying potential issues yet asserting no meritorious grounds, and Cuellar filing a pro se supplemental brief arguing she should not be held responsible for any drug quantity because she did not personally possess or distribute controlled substances.

The opinion addresses three principal issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conspiracy conviction (and thus whether the district court erred in denying a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal); (2) whether the district court plainly erred in calculating drug quantity attributable to Cuellar under the Sentencing Guidelines’ relevant‑conduct rules; and (3) whether the 120‑month sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. The court also conducted the required independent record review under Anders.

Two themes dominate the court’s reasoning: first, that circumstantial evidence of continuing relationships and repeated transactions can establish a narcotics conspiracy; and second, that a defendant may be held accountable at sentencing for reasonably foreseeable drug quantities within the scope of her jointly undertaken criminal activity—even absent personal handling of the drugs. The court further applies a presumption of substantive reasonableness to a below‑Guidelines sentence (citing United States v. Henderson).

Summary of the Opinion

• Sufficiency of the Evidence: The court held that substantial evidence supported the conspiracy conviction. Intercepted packages contained at least 872.53 grams of methamphetamine, and trial proof established ongoing relationships, repeated transactions, and Cuellar’s role arranging deals and collecting money for a coconspirator (Carlos Bariola). Denial of the Rule 29 motion was proper.
• Drug Quantity Attribution: Reviewing for plain error (no sentencing objection below), the court affirmed attribution to Cuellar of quantities supplied by Bariola—1,757.7 grams of methamphetamine mixture and 439.9 grams of actual methamphetamine—because they were within the scope of her jointly undertaken criminal activity and reasonably foreseeable to her. No error occurred in the converted drug weight calculation under the Guidelines.
• Reasonableness of Sentence: The district court properly calculated the Guidelines range, engaged with the parties’ arguments, allowed allocution, and explained the sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The below‑Guidelines sentence is presumptively substantively reasonable, and the record does not rebut that presumption.
• Anders Review: The court identified no potentially meritorious issues upon independent review and affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967): Establishes that appointed counsel who finds no meritorious grounds must file a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal, allowing the court to conduct an independent review. Here, counsel filed an Anders brief; the Fourth Circuit completed its independent review and found no meritorious issues.
• United States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 2018): Provides the standard for reviewing denial of a Rule 29 motion de novo and articulates the “substantial evidence” framework. The court quoted Savage’s reminder that sufficiency challenges face a “heavy burden,” as appellate reversal for insufficient evidence is rare and limited to clear failures of proof.
• United States v. Rodriguez‑Soriano, 931 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2019): Defines “substantial evidence” as that which a reasonable factfinder could accept as adequate to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, supporting the court’s deferential approach to the jury’s verdict.
• United States v. Ath, 951 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2020), and United States v. Tillmon, 954 F.3d 628 (4th Cir. 2019): Set out the elements of a drug distribution conspiracy—agreement, knowledge, and voluntary participation—which framed the sufficiency inquiry.
• United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519 (4th Cir. 2014): Clarifies that while a mere buyer‑seller relationship is not enough to prove conspiracy, it is probative, especially when paired with continuing relationships, repeated transactions, and substantial quantities. The court relied on this to conclude that the Government’s circumstantial evidence sufficed.
• United States v. Kobito, 994 F.3d 696 (4th Cir. 2021), and United States v. Green, 996 F.3d 176 (4th Cir. 2021): Supply the plain‑error framework for unpreserved sentencing objections. Cuellar’s failure to object to drug quantity at sentencing triggered this standard.
• United States v. Flores‑Alvarado, 779 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2015): Governs attribution of co‑conspirators’ acts for sentencing under U.S.S.G. §1B1.3: acts must be within the scope of the defendant’s jointly undertaken criminal activity and reasonably foreseeable. The panel applied this two‑part test to uphold attribution of Bariola’s drug quantities to Cuellar.
• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), and United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2019): Establish procedural and substantive reasonableness review. The court followed Gall’s two‑step analysis, finding no procedural error and, under the totality of circumstances, a substantively reasonable sentence.
• United States v. Henderson, 107 F.4th 287 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 578 (2024): Recognizes a presumption of substantive reasonableness for sentences within or below the Guidelines range. The panel invoked Henderson to support the presumption attached to Cuellar’s below‑Guidelines sentence.

Legal Reasoning

1) Sufficiency of the Evidence and Rule 29

Applying Savage and Rodriguez‑Soriano, the court reviewed the denial of the Rule 29 motion de novo but with deference to the jury’s determinations and no reweighing of credibility. For conspiracy under Ath and Tillmon, the Government proved:

• Agreement: Evidence of continuing relationships and frequent transactions among coconspirators; interception of 11 packages totaling at least 872.53 grams of methamphetamine, described as only part of the shipments during the conspiracy period.
• Knowledge and Participation: Witness testimony and corroborative evidence showed Cuellar arranged transactions, directed shipments on behalf of coconspirator Carlos Bariola, collected drug proceeds, and maintained transaction records referencing coconspirators. She admitted collecting payments from several coconspirators.

Relying on Howard, the panel emphasized that a conspiracy may be proven circumstantially, that the buyer‑seller doctrine does not preclude conviction where ongoing dealings and significant quantities are shown, and that the intercepted quantities alone sufficed to support the charged (b)(1)(A) threshold (500g mixture or 50g actual). The Rule 29 denial stood.

2) Sentencing: Drug Quantity Attribution and Converted Drug Weight

Because Cuellar did not object at sentencing, Kobito and Green required plain‑error review. The panel found no error, much less a plain one. Under Flores‑Alvarado, the relevant‑conduct analysis asked whether the acts of others (here, Bariola’s supplies to a coconspirator—1,757.7g of mixture and 439.9g of actual methamphetamine) were:

• Within the scope of Cuellar’s jointly undertaken criminal activity: The court concluded yes, citing her liaison role for Bariola—arranging shipments, directing others to send methamphetamine on his behalf, and handling proceeds.
• Reasonably foreseeable to Cuellar: Again yes, given her embedded role in the distribution chain and money flow for the same supplier.

The panel also rejected any challenge to the Guidelines calculation of “converted drug weight,” noting there was no error in combining quantities of “actual” and “mixture” methamphetamine pursuant to the Guidelines’ conversion methodology.

3) Procedural and Substantive Reasonableness

Under Gall, the court first found no procedural error: the district court properly calculated the Guidelines range, considered § 3553(a) factors, allowed allocution, and explained the sentence with reference to the statutory factors. For substantive reasonableness, the panel applied the presumption recognized in Henderson for within‑ or below‑Guidelines sentences; Cuellar’s 120‑month term fell below her advisory range. Nothing in the record rebutted the presumption. On this record, the sentence was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, consistent with Provance.

Impact and Significance

• Conspiracy Proof Through Circumstantial Evidence: The opinion underscores the sufficiency of circumstantial proof—continuing relationships, repeated transactions, and significant drug quantities—to establish both the existence of a conspiracy and a defendant’s knowing participation, even absent direct evidence of drug handling.
• Attribution Without Personal Possession: The reaffirmation of Flores‑Alvarado’s scope‑and‑foreseeability test is notable for defendants who serve as “liaisons,” couriers, or money collectors. The decision confirms that such roles can support attribution of a supplier’s drug quantities when integrated into the jointly undertaken activity.
• Preservation Matters: The plain‑error posture—triggered by the lack of a sentencing objection—was outcome‑determinative. The opinion illustrates how difficult it is to upset a drug quantity finding on appeal when the defendant did not object in the district court.
• Substantive Reasonableness Presumption: Citing Henderson, the panel applies a presumption of reasonableness to a below‑Guidelines sentence. This reinforces the uphill battle for appellants challenging sentences at or beneath the Guidelines range.
• Practice Tip—Particularized Scope Findings: Although the panel did not fault the district court’s approach here, defense counsel should press for individualized findings at sentencing on the “scope” of jointly undertaken activity and foreseeability, and should object to any disputed paragraphs in the PSR to preserve claims.
• Unpublished, Yet Instructive: While not binding precedent in the Fourth Circuit, the opinion provides a clear, practitioner‑friendly application of sufficiency standards, relevant‑conduct attribution, and reasonableness review.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Conspiracy vs. Buyer‑Seller: A simple buy‑sell transaction does not, by itself, prove a conspiracy. But repeated dealings, credit terms, coordination, or distribution‑level quantities can transform a buyer‑seller relationship into a conspiratorial agreement to distribute drugs.
• Rule 29 Motion (Judgment of Acquittal): A request to set aside a jury’s verdict for insufficient evidence. On appeal, courts ask whether any rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing evidence favorably to the Government.
• Jointly Undertaken Criminal Activity (Relevant Conduct): For sentencing, a defendant is accountable not only for her own acts, but also for others’ acts if (a) they were within the scope of the joint criminal plan the defendant agreed to, and (b) were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. This is narrower than the full scope of the conspiracy and requires a defendant‑specific inquiry.
• “Actual” vs. “Mixture” Methamphetamine: “Actual” refers to the pure methamphetamine content; “mixture” refers to any substance containing methamphetamine. Statutes and Guidelines treat “actual” meth more harshly due to its potency, and the Guidelines convert amounts of each into a single “converted drug weight” for uniform sentencing.
• Converted Drug Weight: The Sentencing Guidelines translate various controlled substances into a common metric to determine the base offense level. For methamphetamine, different conversion rates apply to “actual” and “mixture” quantities; the converted amounts are then summed to determine the base offense level.
• Plain Error Review: Applied when a party fails to object in the district court. The appellant must show (1) error, (2) that is clear or obvious, and (3) that affects substantial rights. Even then, the appellate court corrects the error only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
• Procedural vs. Substantive Reasonableness: Procedural reasonableness examines whether the district court correctly calculated the Guidelines, considered § 3553(a) factors, and explained the sentence. Substantive reasonableness asks whether, under the totality of circumstances, the length of the sentence is justified. In the Fourth Circuit, within‑ and below‑Guidelines sentences are presumptively substantively reasonable.
• Anders Procedure: When counsel believes an appeal lacks merit, they may file an Anders brief. The appellate court then independently reviews the record to ensure no non‑frivolous issues exist. Counsel must advise the client of the right to petition the Supreme Court and may seek to withdraw if further review would be frivolous.

Illustration: Without providing case‑specific calculations, consider how conversion works under the Guidelines: actual methamphetamine carries a significantly higher conversion rate than methamphetamine mixture. If a defendant is responsible for both forms, the court converts each to the common metric and adds them together. The combined amount determines the base offense level. This is why the identity of the substance (“actual” vs. “mixture”) and the total converted amount matter so much at sentencing.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s unpublished decision in United States v. Cuellar offers a clear application of core principles in federal narcotics prosecutions:

• Conspiracy can be proven through circumstantial evidence showing continuing relationships, repeated transactions, and substantial drug quantities;
• At sentencing, defendants may be held responsible for co‑conspirators’ quantities if those acts were within the scope of the jointly undertaken activity and reasonably foreseeable, even if the defendant never personally handled the drugs;
• Unpreserved sentencing challenges face the steep climb imposed by plain‑error review;
• A below‑Guidelines sentence is presumptively substantively reasonable in the Fourth Circuit.

Although non‑precedential, Cuellar consolidates and reaffirms settled law. For practitioners, the opinion emphasizes the importance of record‑building on the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, timely objections to drug quantity and conversion methodology, and the reality that liaison and money‑handling roles can carry full sentencing exposure when the conspiracy’s scope and foreseeability prongs are satisfied.