United States v. Crystal Orr: Written Plea Agreements as a Cure for Rule 11 Omissions under Plain-Error Review

Introduction

In United States v. Crystal Hali Orr, No. 24-13983 (11th Cir. July 28, 2025) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit confronted a familiar but perennially litigated question: when a defendant does not object in the district court, to what extent can alleged defects in a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 guilty-plea colloquy be remedied—or cured—by the contents of a thoroughly drafted written plea agreement?

Crystal Orr, one of sixteen defendants in a wide-ranging methamphetamine conspiracy, appealed her convictions for (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances and (2) possession of 447.1 grams of actual methamphetamine with intent to distribute, both in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841. She claimed the district judge committed six discrete Rule 11 errors that rendered her plea unknowing and involuntary. Because she never raised those objections below, the appellate court reviewed for plain error and affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The per curiam panel (Rosenbaum, Lagoa, and Wilson, JJ.) held that:

The district court adequately addressed the three “core concerns” of Rule 11: (i) voluntariness, (ii) understanding of the nature of the charges, and (iii) knowledge of the consequences of the plea.
Even if the colloquy did not explicitly cover each Rule 11 sub-requirement, the written plea agreement—read and acknowledged by the defendant under oath—supplied the missing information.
Orr could not show a “reasonable probability” that, but for the alleged omissions, she would have insisted on trial; therefore, any error did not affect her substantial rights and could not constitute reversible plain error under United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004).
Accordingly, her convictions were AFFIRMED.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004) – Supplies the controlling plain-error standard: reversal requires a reasonable probability that, absent the error, the defendant would have pleaded not guilty.
United States v. Monroe, 353 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2003) – Emphasizes that unpreserved Rule 11 defects are reviewed for plain error and reversible only if they undermine the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185 (11th Cir. 1994) – Establishes a “strong presumption” that a defendant’s sworn answers during a plea colloquy are truthful.
United States v. Presendieu, 880 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2018) – Explains that no rigid formula compels district courts to recite each element if the factual proffer effectively includes them.
United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 2005) & United States v. Clark, 274 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2001) – Recognize that omissions in the oral colloquy can be harmless when the plea agreement covers the same ground and the defendant admits understanding it.

Together, these cases craft a forgiving framework: once a defendant fails to object, only core–rather than formal–errors matter, and written materials acknowledged in open court may compensate for minor oral oversights.

Legal Reasoning of the Court

Plain-Error Framework.
- Error
- Plain (i.e., obvious at the time of appellate review)
- Affecting substantial rights
- Seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings
The panel assumed arguendo that some omissions occurred but focused on prongs 3 and 4.
Three Core Concerns Satisfied.
- Voluntariness – Judge asked whether Orr had been forced or promised anything outside the agreement; she said “No.”
- Nature of the Charges – The 17-page factual recitation and the prosecutor’s in-court summary supplied the elements.
- Consequences – Mandatory minimums, guideline applicability, appeal waiver, forfeiture of trial rights, and possible perjury liability were either orally explained or appear verbatim in the plea agreement.
Written Plea Agreement as a “Cure.” The court relied heavily on Dominguez Benitez and Clark: if the defendant acknowledged reading and understanding a detailed agreement, the contents count toward Rule 11 compliance.
No Substantial-Rights Prejudice. Orr accepted a 120-month sentence—a full year below the government’s own § 5K1.1 recommendation—after extensive negotiations. Nothing in the record suggested she would have risked a trial with a potential life sentence had the judge read a few more words aloud.

Impact on Future Litigation

Although unpublished, the decision wields persuasive authority, particularly in the South-Eastern federal districts. Its practical consequences include:

Elevated Significance of Written Plea Agreements. Defense counsel and prosecutors may craft ever-more exhaustive agreements, expecting appellate courts to treat them as surrogate Rule 11 advisements.
Narrow Path for Post-Plea Attacks. Defendants hoping to undo guilty pleas on technical Rule 11 grounds now face an additional barrier: showing not only an oral defect but also that the written agreement omitted the same information.
Judicial Economy. The case discourages unnecessary reversals for harmless colloquy imperfections, conserving judicial resources and fostering finality.
Strategic Considerations for Defense Counsel. Lawyers must object contemporaneously if they perceive any Rule 11 error; silence likely forfeits the issue under the stringent plain-error test.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 11 Plea Colloquy: The scripted conversation between judge and defendant ensuring the plea is voluntary, informed, and supported by facts.
Plain-Error Review: A tough appellate standard applied when no objection was raised below; reversal requires an obvious error that probably affected the outcome and seriously tarnishes judicial proceedings.
§ 5K1.1 Motion: A prosecution motion asking the court to reduce a sentence because the defendant provided “substantial assistance” (e.g., information or testimony against others).
Mandatory Minimum: A floor imposed by Congress below which the sentencing judge cannot ordinarily go, unless statutory safety-valve relief or a government substantial-assistance motion applies.
Appeal Waiver: A clause in many plea agreements that limits a defendant’s right to appeal, except for specified circumstances such as an illegal sentence or ineffective assistance of counsel.

Conclusion

United States v. Crystal Orr stands for a straightforward but powerful rule: where a defendant has signed and affirmed a detailed plea agreement, minor imperfections in the oral Rule 11 colloquy will almost never constitute reversible plain error. The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning fortifies the synergy between written plea agreements and oral admonitions, promotes finality of convictions, and underscores the critical importance of contemporaneous objections. For practitioners, the decision is a reminder that the safest path to preserving Rule 11 issues is to raise them before the district court—after the fact, the written plea agreement may prove an insurmountable hurdle.