United States v. Cornelius: Erlinger’s Jury-Fact-Finding Rule Does Not Apply to Advisory Sentencing Guidelines

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Case: United States v. Leontis Cornelius, No. 25‑1411
Date: November 21, 2025
Disposition: Conviction and sentence affirmed (nonprecedential disposition)

I. Introduction

This nonprecedential order from the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Cornelius sits at the intersection of two active areas of federal criminal law:

The scope of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment jury-trial right after the Supreme Court’s decision in Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), and
The use of uncharged (or not jury‑found) conduct to increase a defendant’s advisory Sentencing Guidelines range—here through the four‑level enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possessing a firearm “in connection with another felony offense.”

The defendant, Leontis Cornelius, was convicted by a jury of two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). At sentencing, the district court increased his offense level based on its own finding that, during a 2020 shooting incident, Cornelius committed the Indiana felony of criminal recklessness when he continued firing at fleeing assailants. Cornelius argued that:

Under Erlinger, a jury—not the judge—had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed that additional felony, and
Even if judicial fact-finding is permissible, the government failed to disprove his claim of self‑defense.

The Seventh Circuit rejected both arguments. The panel held that Erlinger and the broader Apprendi/Alleyne line of cases require a jury finding only for facts that change the statutory minimum or maximum sentence—not for facts that merely adjust the advisory Guidelines range. The court also upheld the district court’s conclusion, under Indiana law, that Cornelius’s self‑defense justification ceased once the shooters retreated, making his continued gunfire criminally reckless.

Although labeled a “nonprecedential disposition,” the order is a clear and tightly reasoned reaffirmation of several important principles:

The constitutional jury right does not extend to advisory Guidelines enhancements.
Federal courts may rely on judge-found conduct proved by a preponderance of the evidence—even conduct that could itself constitute a felony—to increase a defendant’s advisory Guidelines range.
Under Indiana self-defense law, force justified in self-defense becomes criminal when the threat has ended, and the government may negate self-defense at sentencing under a preponderance standard.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

1. The May 2020 shooting

In May 2020, South Bend police responded to reports of gunfire near Cornelius’s residence. Cornelius reported that:

Unknown assailants drove by his house, exited their vehicle, and opened fire.
He returned fire using his sister‑in‑law’s .45 caliber handgun.
As the assailants reentered their vehicle and drove away, he continued firing, shattering the vehicle’s windows.

Physical evidence—damage to nearby cars and a bullet hole in the house, along with shell casings—corroborated his account. A detective later recovered the .45 caliber handgun used by Cornelius and, upon running a criminal-history check, discovered that Cornelius was a convicted felon.

2. The later domestic disturbance

About a year later, different officers responded to a domestic disturbance. They observed Cornelius in possession of a loaded rifle. This second incident, combined with his status as a felon, led to the federal charges.

B. Procedural History

A federal grand jury indicted Cornelius on two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
A superseding indictment alleged three prior convictions sufficient to trigger the enhanced penalties under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
At trial in May 2023, Cornelius testified that he possessed the firearms solely for self-defense. The jury rejected his explanations and convicted him on both § 922(g) counts.
The jury was not asked to determine whether his prior convictions were “committed on occasions different from one another,” a key factual predicate for an ACCA enhancement under § 924(e)(1).

Because Cornelius’s offenses predated the 2022 amendments to § 924, his default statutory maximum was 10 years per count, former 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2021). Although the government had alleged ACCA status under § 924(e), the Supreme Court’s later decision in Erlinger required a jury finding on the “separate occasions” issue. Since no such finding was made, both sides agreed that ACCA could not apply and that the statutory maximum remained 10 years per count.

The Probation Office’s Presentence Investigation Report recommended a four‑level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), concluding that Cornelius used the handgun in connection with the Indiana felony of criminal recklessness during the 2020 shooting.

Cornelius objected, arguing:

He acted at all times in lawful self-defense, so his conduct could not amount to criminal recklessness under Indiana law.
After Erlinger, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments required the jury to find—beyond a reasonable doubt—that he committed criminal recklessness before the judge could use that conduct to increase his Guidelines range.

The district court (Judge Jon E. DeGuilio) rejected both arguments:

Accepting Cornelius’s factual narrative as generally true, the court found that his use of force was initially defensive but became criminally reckless once the assailants fled in their vehicle and he continued shooting.
The court held that Erlinger does not apply to advisory Guidelines enhancements. Because the enhancement did not alter the statutory maximum or impose a mandatory minimum, a judge could find the necessary facts by a preponderance of the evidence.

The district court calculated an enhanced Guidelines range (not fully specified in the order) and imposed concurrent 97‑month sentences—at the bottom of the resulting range.

C. The Seventh Circuit’s Holding

On appeal, Cornelius renewed his challenges to the four‑level enhancement. The Seventh Circuit:

Affirmed that Erlinger does not extend the jury‑fact‑finding requirement to facts used only to calculate advisory Sentencing Guidelines, and
Affirmed the district court’s factual finding that Cornelius’s continued shooting after the assailants’ retreat constituted criminal recklessness under Indiana law and was not justified by self-defense.

The panel therefore upheld the 97‑month sentence.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Standards of Review

The court began by clarifying its standards of review:

Factual findings at sentencing—including whether the defendant engaged in conduct constituting “another felony offense” or whether self-defense applies—are reviewed for clear error. See United States v. Barker, 80 F.4th 827, 834 (7th Cir. 2023).
Whether those facts legally support application of a Guidelines enhancement is reviewed de novo. Id. (citing United States v. Brown, 843 F.3d 738, 742 (7th Cir. 2016)).

This division is important: appellate courts give substantial deference to a district court’s view of what actually happened (clear error is a demanding standard), but they strictly supervise how those facts are translated into Guidelines calculations.

B. Precedents and Doctrinal Framework

1. The Apprendi–Alleyne–Booker line and Erlinger

Cornelius’s constitutional argument sits within a well-known line of Supreme Court decisions:

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000): Any fact (other than a prior conviction) that increases the statutory maximum punishment must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013): Extends Apprendi to facts that increase a statutory mandatory minimum sentence.
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005): To avoid Apprendi problems, the federal Sentencing Guidelines were rendered advisory rather than mandatory. Judges must still calculate the Guidelines range but may vary from it in light of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024): As described by the Seventh Circuit, Erlinger holds that, in ACCA cases, whether a defendant’s prior convictions were “committed on occasions different from one another” is a fact that must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt because it determines eligibility for ACCA’s 15‑year minimum and life maximum, § 924(e)(1).

In the wake of Erlinger, defendants have argued—much as Cornelius did—that any fact increasing a Guidelines range should also be subject to a jury finding. The Seventh Circuit has consistently rejected that position.

2. Advisory Guidelines and judicial fact-finding: Miedzianowski, Holton, Watts, Sandidge

The panel leaned heavily on pre‑existing circuit and Supreme Court authority confirming that:

United States v. Miedzianowski, 60 F.4th 1051 (7th Cir. 2023): The jury-trial right does not encompass all facts that influence sentencing outcomes. It applies only to facts that change the sentencing range authorized by statute, not to those that adjust the advisory Guidelines recommendation.
United States v. Holton, 873 F.3d 589 (7th Cir. 2017): A judge may apply Guidelines enhancements based on conduct not charged or not proved to a jury, so long as the conduct is found by a preponderance of the evidence and the sentence stays within the statutory range set by the jury’s verdict.
United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997): A sentencing court may consider conduct underlying acquitted charges, so long as it finds that conduct by a preponderance of the evidence, without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.
United States v. Sandidge, 784 F.3d 1055 (7th Cir. 2015): Reaffirms that factual findings at sentencing need only meet the preponderance of the evidence standard.

Together, these cases form a consistent doctrinal line: once the statutory range is established by the jury’s verdict (and any admitted prior convictions), the judge may resolve additional facts relevant to the advisory Guidelines calculation—even if those facts involve serious uncharged or untried conduct—under a preponderance standard.

3. Indiana self-defense law and criminal recklessness: Wilson v. State

Because the “other felony offense” for § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) purposes was a state crime—Indiana criminal recklessness—the court turned to Indiana substantive law:

Indiana criminal recklessness (Ind. Code § 35‑42‑2‑2(b)) generally covers conduct in which a person, at least recklessly, engages in an act that creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person. Firing a gun into an occupied area, or otherwise discharging a firearm in a dangerous manner, is a classic example.
Self-defense in Indiana is codified at Ind. Code § 35‑41‑3‑2. As summarized in Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800 (Ind. 2002), a defendant claiming self-defense must show:
- (1) He was in a place where he had a right to be;
- (2) He did not provoke, instigate, or willingly participate in the violence; and
- (3) He had a reasonable fear of death or serious bodily harm.

If the defendant produces evidence of these elements, the State must disprove at least one element beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. Wilson is particularly significant because the Indiana Supreme Court upheld a conviction where the defendant continued shooting after the immediate threat had subsided, concluding that any reasonable fear had ended at that point. The Seventh Circuit invokes Wilson directly to explain why Cornelius’s continued firing at retreating assailants falls outside the scope of lawful self-defense.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. No constitutional requirement for a jury finding on Guideline enhancements after Erlinger

Cornelius argued that his four‑level § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) increase was unconstitutional because the district court—not the jury—found he had committed “another felony offense” (Indiana criminal recklessness). He contended that Erlinger, which requires a jury finding that prior ACCA predicates occurred on different “occasions,” should be read more broadly to require jury findings on any facts that significantly increase a defendant’s sentencing exposure.

The Seventh Circuit called this a “fundamental[] misunderst[anding]” of the jury right. Synthesizing Apprendi, Alleyne, Booker, and Erlinger, the panel drew a sharp doctrinal line:

The Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt any fact that changes the statutory maximum or mandatory minimum.
Once that statutory range is fixed by the jury’s verdict, all other fact-finding relevant to the advisory Guidelines remains within the judge’s domain, using only a preponderance standard, provided the final sentence stays inside the authorized range.

The key points in the court’s reasoning:

Statutory range was unaffected by the enhancement. Cornelius’s maximum sentence under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a)(2) (2021) was 10 years per count because:
- The jury convicted him of being a felon in possession of a firearm.
- ACCA’s enhanced 15‑to‑life range under § 924(e) could not apply absent a jury finding (as required by Erlinger) that his prior convictions were committed on “occasions different from one another.” No such finding was made, and both parties agreed ACCA was off the table.
The four‑level Guidelines enhancement did not increase the statutory maximum above 10 years, nor did it impose a new statutory minimum. It simply raised the advisory Guidelines recommendation within the same 0–10 year window.
Advisory Guidelines are not “law” that trigger Apprendi concerns. Ever since Booker, the Guidelines do not bind the sentencing judge as a matter of law; they inform the judge’s discretion. Because the Guidelines no longer fix a binding sentencing range, changes to the Guidelines calculation—no matter how dramatic—do not alter the maximum or minimum authorized by statute.
Erlinger is limited to statutory-penalty-altering facts. Erlinger fits cleanly into the existing Apprendi/Alleyne framework: the “occasions different from one another” determination is a necessary factual predicate for ACCA’s enhanced statutory minimum (15 years) and maximum (life). By contrast, whether Cornelius’s conduct amounted to state-law criminal recklessness was relevant only to § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), which is part of an advisory system. As a result, Erlinger did not extend the jury-trial right to this context.

Thus, the panel concluded that the district court acted constitutionally in finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Cornelius had committed criminal recklessness and using that finding to enhance his advisory Guidelines range.

2. Application of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B): “In connection with another felony offense”

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (2024) provides a four‑level increase if the defendant:

used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense.

Two components are critical:

“Another felony offense”: This includes any federal, state, or local offense, punishable by more than one year, “regardless of whether a criminal charge was brought, or a conviction obtained.” (This understanding comes from the guideline’s commentary, consistently applied by federal courts.) Here, the asserted “other felony” was Indiana criminal recklessness based on Cornelius’s continued firing at the vehicle as it fled.
“In connection with”: Normally requires that the firearm facilitated, or had the potential to facilitate, the other felony. In a case like this, where the firearm is the means of committing the felony (reckless shooting), the nexus is straightforward: the conduct that makes possession criminally reckless is the very conduct enhancing the sentence.

The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that:

Cornelius’s continued shooting at the fleeing assailants was conduct satisfying Indiana’s criminal recklessness statute, and
This conduct was sufficiently related to his firearm possession to qualify as “another felony offense” for purposes of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).

Because the factual basis (continued firing at a fleeing vehicle) was undisputed—Cornelius himself admitted it—the primary legal question was whether this conduct could be justified as self-defense.

3. Self-defense at sentencing: burden of proof and reasonableness of fear

Cornelius argued that he acted in self-defense throughout the entire incident, including while firing at the retreating vehicle. The court addressed this in two steps: allocation of the burden of proof and evaluation of the evidence.

(a) Burden of proof and standard

The panel confirmed the proper burden allocation under Indiana law and federal sentencing standards:

Under Indiana law, a defendant claiming self-defense must introduce evidence that:
1. He was lawfully present.
2. He did not provoke or participate in the violence.
3. He had a reasonable fear of death or serious bodily harm.
(Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 800, citing Ind. Code § 35‑41‑3‑2.)
Once this initial showing is made, the government bears the burden of negating at least one of these elements to defeat the self-defense claim. In the sentencing context, however, because the issue is not guilt or innocence but the appropriate sentence, the government need only meet a preponderance of the evidence standard rather than beyond a reasonable doubt. See Watts, 519 U.S. at 157; Sandidge, 784 F.3d at 1062.

Cornelius claimed the district court had improperly shifted the burden to him. The Seventh Circuit rejected this, noting that the district court explicitly recognized the government’s burden to negate at least one element of self-defense and applied the correct preponderance standard.

(b) Reasonableness of fear once the threat receded

The panel emphasized one “dispositive” fact: Cornelius admitted he continued firing at the assailants as they drove away. Relying on Wilson, the court reasoned:

In Wilson, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld a conviction where the defendant continued shooting after the immediate threat had passed, concluding that any reasonable fear of death or serious harm had ended at that point.
Similarly, once Cornelius’s attackers retreated and were driving away, the immediate threat subsided, and his continued use of deadly force was no longer justified by self-defense.

Thus, even granting that Cornelius was lawfully present and had not instigated the conflict, the government successfully negated the crucial third element—continuing reasonable fear of death or serious injury—by a preponderance of the evidence.

Given the deferential clear-error standard and Cornelius’s own admissions, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the district court’s finding—that Cornelius’s continued gunfire constituted criminal recklessness and not self-defense—was not clearly erroneous.

IV. Impact and Significance

A. Constitutional boundary: Advisory Guidelines vs. statutory penalties

Although this disposition is nonprecedential, it clearly reinforces a key constitutional boundary:

Jury fact-finding is required for facts that alter the statutory sentencing range. This includes:
- Elements of the offense,
- Aggravating facts that raise the statutory maximum (Apprendi),
- Facts that trigger or raise statutory mandatory minimums (Alleyne), and
- Facts like the “occasions different from one another” under ACCA (Erlinger), which condition the applicability of enhanced statutory ranges.
Judicial fact-finding remains permissible for advisory Guidelines calculations. So long as:
- The sentence imposed remains within the statutory minimum and maximum authorized by the jury’s verdict and any admitted prior convictions, and
- The judge finds the relevant conduct by at least a preponderance of the evidence,
the Constitution does not require jury resolution of those additional facts.

In practical terms, Cornelius curbs attempts to leverage Erlinger into a broader constitutional attack on traditional guideline fact-finding. District judges in the Seventh Circuit can continue to:

Apply enhancements for “another felony offense” under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B),
Rely on uncharged or even acquitted conduct (subject to Watts and due process limits), and
Use a preponderance standard at sentencing,

without convening additional jury proceedings, so long as statutory ranges are respected.

B. Federal–state interaction: Using state offenses as “another felony offense”

The case also underscores how state criminal law can play a pivotal role in federal sentencing:

“Another felony offense” under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) can be any state offense punishable by more than one year, including conduct for which the defendant has not been charged or convicted.
To determine whether state conduct qualifies, federal courts must interpret and apply state substantive criminal law, here Indiana criminal recklessness and self-defense.

This sort of federal–state interplay is common in firearms cases, where underlying state-law violence or threats (e.g., aggravated assault, reckless endangerment) can substantially increase a federal defendant’s Guidelines range even in the absence of formal state charges.

C. Practical lessons for self-defense claims in firearm cases

The opinion has concrete implications for defendants asserting self-defense in cases involving firearms:

Self-defense is temporally limited. Even if a defendant is initially justified in using deadly force, that justification can evaporate once the threat ends. Continued use of force—especially deadly force—after attackers retreat can itself be criminal.
At sentencing, the bar for the government is lower than at trial. To defeat self-defense as a justification for an enhancement, the government need only negate an element of self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendants’ admissions matter. Cornelius’s own admission that he continued firing as the attackers drove away was “dispositive.” Similar statements can make it very difficult to sustain a self-defense claim, at least for sentencing purposes.

In effect, Cornelius sends a clear message: in self-defense scenarios involving firearms, once the aggressors are in flight and no longer pose an immediate threat, continued shooting is likely to be treated as criminal conduct that can enhance a federal sentence.

D. Nonprecedential but persuasive

The order is marked as a “NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION” subject to Fed. R. App. P. 32.1. That means:

It is not binding precedent in the Seventh Circuit.
It may nonetheless be cited for its persuasive value, particularly within the Seventh Circuit, and may guide district courts dealing with similar issues.

Given how closely it tracks established Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit authority, it functions more as a reaffirmation and clarification than as a source of new doctrine. But for litigants exploring the reach of Erlinger, the order signals that efforts to extend jury fact-finding into the Guidelines realm are unlikely to succeed in this circuit.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Advisory” Sentencing Guidelines vs. statutory ranges

In plain terms:

Statutory range: The minimum and maximum prison time set by Congress in the U.S. Code for a given offense. For Cornelius, the statute allowed 0 to 10 years per count, because ACCA did not apply.
Sentencing Guidelines: A set of rules and tables that recommend a narrower range (e.g., 87–108 months) based on offense level and criminal history. After Booker, judges must consider the Guidelines but are not required to sentence within that range.

Constitutionally, only changes to the statutory range trigger the need for a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt. Changes in the advisory Guidelines range—however impactful they may be in practice—do not.

B. “Preponderance of the evidence” vs. “beyond a reasonable doubt”

Two different standards of proof are at play:

Beyond a reasonable doubt: The highest standard, used to prove guilt at trial. The evidence must be so convincing that a rational person would have no reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt.
Preponderance of the evidence: A lower standard, used at sentencing. It means “more likely than not”—just over 50% likelihood. If the judge believes that it is more probable than not that a fact is true, that is sufficient.

At Cornelius’s sentencing, the judge needed only to conclude that it was more likely than not that his continued firing was not self-defense and constituted criminal recklessness.

C. “Clear error” review

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error. This standard means:

The appellate court will not disturb the district judge’s finding unless it is left with a “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake has been made.
Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the trial court’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.

Because Cornelius admitted that he kept shooting as the attackers drove away, the appellate court had no difficulty upholding the district court’s finding that he was no longer acting in self-defense.

D. Self-defense and “reasonable fear”

Self-defense is not an unlimited license to use force. Under Indiana law (and many others), key limits include:

The defender must reasonably believe that force is necessary to prevent imminent death or serious bodily harm.
Once the threat is no longer imminent—for example, attackers retreat, are disarmed, or are otherwise neutralized—continued use of deadly force cannot be justified as self-defense.

Cornelius’s case is a textbook example: the court accepted that his initial shots might have been defensive but concluded that shooting at fleeing assailants in a departing vehicle could not be justified by a continuing reasonable fear.

VI. Conclusion

United States v. Cornelius, while nonprecedential, offers a clear exposition of current federal sentencing law and its interaction with evolving jury-trial jurisprudence. The Seventh Circuit firmly maintains the line drawn in Apprendi, Alleyne, and Booker—as refined by Erlinger—by holding that:

The Fifth and Sixth Amendments require jury findings for facts that alter statutory minimums or maximums, but
They do not require jury involvement for facts used solely to adjust the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range, including findings that the defendant committed “another felony offense” under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).

The decision also illustrates how federal courts may:

Apply state criminal-law concepts (here, Indiana criminal recklessness and self-defense) to determine whether a Guidelines enhancement is warranted,
Rely on judge-found facts under a preponderance standard, and
Treat continued use of deadly force after a threat has ended as criminal conduct that can significantly increase a defendant’s advisory sentencing range.

In the broader legal context, Cornelius serves as a practical guidepost: Erlinger is an important development for ACCA and other statutory-enhancement cases, but it does not constitutionalize the entire realm of guideline fact-finding. Sentencing judges in the Seventh Circuit remain empowered—indeed obligated—to make factual determinations relevant to the advisory Guidelines, constrained by the statutory range fixed by the jury’s verdict and the modest requirements of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.