United States v. Cook: Successive Compassionate Release Motions, the 14‑Day Reconsideration Limit, and the “Only Available Caregiver” Standard

I. Introduction

The Tenth Circuit’s order in United States v. Cook, No. 25‑2080 (10th Cir. Dec. 3, 2025), though designated nonprecedential, offers significant guidance on two increasingly important aspects of federal compassionate release practice:

How courts should treat successive motions for compassionate release that rest on essentially the same factual basis as earlier motions; and
How the 2023 amendment to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, recognizing the incapacitation of a defendant’s parent as an “extraordinary and compelling reason,” operates—particularly its requirement that the defendant be the “only available caregiver.”

Defendant Sandra Cook, a federal prisoner serving a 324‑month sentence for methamphetamine trafficking as an organizer/leader in a cartel-linked drug trafficking organization, sought compassionate release to care for her incapacitated mother. After her first compassionate release motion was denied and not appealed, she filed a second motion, again grounded on her mother’s condition, this time invoking the 2023 Sentencing Commission amendment to § 1B1.13. The district court construed this second motion as an untimely motion to reconsider the prior denial and, in the alternative, rejected it under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit—reviewing for abuse of discretion—affirmed. While the order is formally nonbinding, it can be cited for persuasive value and meaningfully clarifies:

That a second compassionate release motion relying on the same caregiving facts as a prior motion can properly be treated as a motion to reconsider, subject to the 14‑day deadline that governs criminal appeals;
That the new § 1B1.13(b)(3)(C) “parental incapacitation” provision does not assist a defendant whose parent already has a guardian and facility care, because the defendant is not the “only available caregiver”; and
That serious drug trafficking conduct—especially where the defendant is an organizer/leader in a cartel-related operation—can independently defeat compassionate release under the § 3553(a) factors, even if other considerations like rehabilitation are present.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Background

Ms. Cook was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and sentenced to 324 months.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed her conviction on direct appeal. She later pursued a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, and the Tenth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability.
During her post‑conviction proceedings:
- She filed a first motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), seeking release to care for her mother. The district court denied the motion, finding (1) no “extraordinary and compelling reasons” and (2) that the § 3553(a) factors weighed against release. She did not appeal.
- On April 7, 2025, she filed a second compassionate release motion, again seeking release to care for her mother, this time citing the 2023 amendment to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 recognizing certain parental-caregiver situations as extraordinary and compelling.
The district court treated the second motion as:
- a motion to reconsider its prior § 3582(c)(1)(A) denial and dismissed it as untimely under Fed. R. App. P. 4(b); and
- alternatively, denied the motion on the merits after reconsidering the § 3553(a) factors.

B. Issues on Appeal

Appearing pro se, Ms. Cook raised several arguments, including:

The motion should have been placed on the civil calendar rather than treated as part of the criminal case.
The district court erred in treating her second motion as a motion for reconsideration and dismissing it as untimely.
The district court failed to reach or properly consider the merits.
She was subjected to a sentencing disparity for exercising her right to trial.
The district court overstated the seriousness and nature of her offense when weighing the § 3553(a) factors.

C. Holding

The Tenth Circuit, applying abuse-of-discretion review (United States v. Bradley, 97 F.4th 1214 (10th Cir. 2024)), affirmed the district court’s order. It held:

The district court correctly treated the second compassionate release motion as an untimely motion to reconsider, under United States v. Warren, 22 F.4th 917 (10th Cir. 2022), because:
- Both motions sought the same relief—release to care for her mother—based on essentially the same factual circumstances; and
- A motion to reconsider a compassionate release denial must be filed within the 14‑day appeal window of Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i), which Ms. Cook missed by almost three years.
Even assuming the second motion could be considered anew, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the § 3553(a) factors weighed against release—independently justifying denial.
The “civil calendar” argument lacked merit, because § 3582 motions must be filed in the underlying criminal case.
The “sentencing disparity for exercising the right to trial” argument was waived under United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2019), as it was not raised below and she did not argue plain error on appeal.
Her challenge to the district court’s characterization of the offense was inadequately developed, lacking record citations as required by Fed. R. App. P. 28.

The panel emphasized that either basis—untimeliness or the § 3553(a) analysis—would independently support affirmance.

III. Legal Framework and Reasoning

A. Compassionate Release Under § 3582(c)(1)(A)

The court began by rehearsing the now-familiar three-part framework for compassionate release post‑First Step Act, drawn from United States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821 (10th Cir. 2021), and United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035 (10th Cir. 2021):

Extraordinary and compelling reasons must warrant a sentence reduction.
The reduction must be consistent with applicable policy statements of the Sentencing Commission.
The court must consider the § 3553(a) sentencing factors and find they support a reduction.

Consistent with Maumau and McGee, the panel reiterated that the district court may deny a compassionate release motion if any one of these prerequisites is lacking; the court need not find all three unsatisfied.

B. Successive Motions vs. Motions to Reconsider

1. Characterization of the Second Motion

A central issue was whether Ms. Cook’s second § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion—filed years after the first denial and invoking a 2023 Guideline amendment—was:

a new and distinct motion based on a materially changed legal landscape, or
in substance, a motion to reconsider the earlier denial, subject to strict time limits.

The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court’s choice to construe the filing as a motion to reconsider. The core reasoning:

Both motions sought the same relief: release to care for her mother.
The factual basis of the motions was substantively identical: her mother’s health and caregiving needs.
The only “change” Ms. Cook invoked was a legal development—the 2023 amendment to § 1B1.13, which expressly lists incapacitation of a parent as a potentially extraordinary and compelling reason when the defendant is the only available caregiver.
The panel concluded that this amendment did not transform her motion into a genuinely new motion, because—even under the amended guideline—she still could not satisfy the “only available caregiver” requirement.

In other words, the court treated a repetitive motion based on unchanged facts, even if recast under new legal authority, as a reconsideration request, not as a new § 3582 motion.

2. Timeliness Under Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)

Having agreed that the second motion functioned as a motion for reconsideration, the panel turned to United States v. Warren, 22 F.4th 917 (10th Cir. 2022). Warren holds that:

A defendant’s motion to reconsider an order denying a motion for compassionate release “must be brought within the time granted to appeal that order.”

The time to appeal a criminal order is set by Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i): a notice of appeal must be filed within 14 days after entry of the order. The Tenth Circuit applied this same 14‑day window to motions for reconsideration of a compassionate release denial.

Applying this to Ms. Cook:

The district court denied her first compassionate release motion on May 20, 2022.
Under Rule 4(b), she had until 14 days later to either file a notice of appeal or move for reconsideration.
She filed her second motion on April 7, 2025—almost three years after the order.

The panel concluded the motion was plainly untimely as a request for reconsideration and that the district court “appropriately dismissed it on this ground.”

This reinforces a bright-line principle in the Tenth Circuit: reconsideration of a compassionate release denial must be sought within 14 days, absent some new, materially different factual basis that would justify treating the filing as a genuinely new § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion.

C. The 2023 Guideline Amendment and the “Only Available Caregiver” Requirement

1. The New Guideline Provision

Ms. Cook’s principal argument distinguishing her second motion was grounded in the 2023 amendment to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. As amended (effective Nov. 1, 2023), § 1B1.13(b)(3)(C) provides that one “extraordinary and compelling” reason for compassionate release is:

“Incapacitation of the defendant’s parent when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the parent.”

She argued that this amendment newly recognized parental caregiving as an explicit ground for compassionate release, thereby changing the legal landscape and rendering her second motion something other than a motion for reconsideration.

2. The Court’s Application to Ms. Cook

The Tenth Circuit found that the new guideline provision did not help Ms. Cook for a simple factual reason: she was not, in fact, the “only available caregiver” for her mother. As the panel explained:

Both Ms. Cook and the government submitted documentation showing that Ms. Cook’s mother had an appointed guardian and was receiving care at a facility.
These facts were before the district court and undisputed in the record.
Given this, the panel concluded that she could not satisfy the “only available caregiver” prong of § 1B1.13(b)(3)(C).

Because her factual circumstances fell outside the newly codified category, the amendment did not create a new, qualifying extraordinary and compelling reason distinct from what she had already argued. Accordingly, the district court was within its discretion to treat the second motion as seeking reconsideration of the prior denial.

3. Doctrinal Implications

Although the panel did not squarely address the broader question—how binding the new § 1B1.13 is post‑First Step Act—the opinion strongly suggests:

The Tenth Circuit is prepared to take the amended § 1B1.13 seriously as an “applicable policy statement,” particularly in the caregiver context.
Court and litigants should expect a fact‑intensive inquiry into whether a defendant is indeed the “only available caregiver”—a standard not satisfied simply because the defendant wishes to provide care, but only when others are unavailable or inadequate.
Where existing guardians and institutional care are already in place, the defendant will likely fail to meet this standard.

In practical terms, caregiver‑based compassionate release claims must be supported by concrete, well‑documented showings that:

the parent is incapacitated; and
no one other than the defendant is realistically available to provide adequate care.

D. The § 3553(a) Factors as an Independent Ground for Denial

1. The District Court’s § 3553(a) Analysis

Even after concluding the second motion was untimely as a motion to reconsider, the district court elected to address the merits. It revisited the § 3553(a) factors and again found that they weighed against release.

The Tenth Circuit summarized the district court’s reasoning, which focused heavily on:

The seriousness of the offense: a “huge quantity of methamphetamine” was attributable to Ms. Cook.
Her leadership role: she was found to be an organizer or leader in the drug trafficking organization.
The organization’s cartel ties, as detailed in the Presentence Report and sentencing transcript.
The need to:
- promote respect for the law,
- provide just punishment, and
- achieve general and specific deterrence.

Although Ms. Cook pointed to rehabilitative efforts and educational achievements in prison, the district court gave these factors less weight than the severity of the underlying crime and the need for deterrence.

2. Appellate Review: Abuse of Discretion

The Tenth Circuit, citing United States v. Bradley, 97 F.4th 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2024), reviewed the compassionate release denial for abuse of discretion. Under this standard, the appellate court asks whether the district court:

relied on an incorrect legal standard,
made a clearly erroneous factual finding, or
rendered a decision that is arbitrary, capricious, or lacks a rational basis.

Applying that deferential standard, the panel found:

The district court’s heavy emphasis on offense seriousness, leadership role, and cartel connection was well within its discretion.
The court was not required to discuss every piece of favorable mitigation evidence (e.g., rehabilitation efforts) as long as it considered the key statutory factors in a reasoned way.
There was no sign that the district court ignored relevant factors or misunderstood the record.

The panel thus concluded there was no abuse of discretion in the § 3553(a) analysis, making the merits ruling an independent and sufficient ground for denial.

E. Procedural and Argumentation Issues

1. Criminal vs. Civil Docket

Ms. Cook argued that the district court erred in not placing her motion “on the civil calendar.” The panel swiftly rejected this contention, relying on:

United States v. Wesley, 60 F.4th 1277 (10th Cir. 2023), and
United States v. Saldana, 807 F. App’x 816 (10th Cir. 2020).

Those cases confirm that a motion under § 3582(c)(1)(A) is a motion directed to the sentencing court in the original criminal case. It is not a separate civil action. Thus, there was no error in treating the filing as part of the criminal docket.

2. Sentencing Disparity Argument and Waiver

Ms. Cook also alleged a “[s]entencing disparity for exercising the right to trial,” suggesting that she received a harsher sentence by going to trial rather than pleading guilty. However:

She did not raise this argument in the district court in connection with her compassionate release motion.
On appeal, she did not argue plain error, the standard required to obtain review of issues not preserved below.

Relying on United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2019), the panel held that she had waived this argument. Under Leffler, when a party fails to raise a claim in the district court and then fails to argue plain error on appeal, the claim is deemed waived and is not considered.

3. Challenge to Factual Characterization and Briefing Deficiencies

Ms. Cook further asserted that the district court “overstated the facts” regarding her offense in recounting the nature and circumstances under § 3553(a)(1). The panel quoted the district court’s summary, which:

Relied on the sentencing transcript and presentence report,
Described her as responsible for a “huge quantity” of meth,
Identified her as an organizer or leader, and
Noted the cartel connection.

In response, Ms. Cook offered six factual assertions in her appellate brief, but provided no citations to the record. The panel invoked Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(6) and 28(a)(8)(A), which require:

a statement of facts “with appropriate references to the record,” and
arguments supported by “citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies.”

Her failure to ground her factual claims in the record rendered the challenge insufficiently developed. The panel therefore saw no basis to disturb the district court’s understanding of the offense or its § 3553(a) findings.

4. Pro Se Status and Its Limits

The panel noted that Ms. Cook proceeded pro se and reiterated the Tenth Circuit’s standard for pro se litigants:

“Because Ms. Cook appears pro se, ‘we liberally construe [her] filings, but we will not act as [her] advocate.’” (quoting James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013)).

Citing United States v. Green, 886 F.3d 1300 (10th Cir. 2018), the court emphasized she remained **subject to the same procedural rules** as other litigants—deadlines, briefing standards, and record-citation requirements. Her pro se status did not excuse:

the untimeliness of her motion;
her failure to preserve certain arguments below; or
her failure to properly cite the record on appeal.

IV. Precedents and Authorities in Context

1. United States v. Maumau & United States v. McGee

Maumau and McGee are foundational Tenth Circuit decisions on compassionate release post‑First Step Act. They:

Articulate the three-part structure of § 3582(c)(1)(A) analysis (extraordinary and compelling reasons, guideline consistency, and § 3553(a) factors).
Hold that district courts may deny relief when any one of these prerequisites is not met.
Originally recognized broad district court discretion when the Sentencing Commission’s pre‑2023 § 1B1.13 did not apply to defendant‑filed motions.

In Cook, the panel continues to rely on Maumau and McGee for structure and the “any‑one‑prerequisite-suffices-to-deny” principle, but implicitly acknowledges the new post‑2023 reality in which § 1B1.13 now explicitly covers defendant‑filed motions.

2. United States v. Wesley & United States v. Saldana

These cases confirm that:

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) motions are properly filed in the criminal case as a request that the sentencing court modify the sentence; and
They are not independent civil actions.

The panel uses them to dispose of Ms. Cook’s “civil calendar” argument, reinforcing that compassionate release is a mechanism for sentence modification within the criminal case.

3. United States v. Warren & United States v. Randall

Warren is the key authority on the timeliness of motions to reconsider denials of sentence‑modification motions, including § 3582 motions. It holds such motions must be brought within the time allowed for filing a notice of appeal, which Randall identifies as 14 days under Fed. R. App. P. 4(b).

In Cook, the panel straightforwardly applies this rule:

First denial: May 20, 2022.
Deadline for reconsideration (like appeal): 14 days later.
Second motion filed: April 7, 2025.

The nearly three-year gap was fatal to her reconsideration effort.

4. United States v. Bradley

Bradley, 97 F.4th 1214 (10th Cir. 2024), confirms that compassionate release decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Cook applies that standard to evaluate:

the characterization of the second motion as a reconsideration request;
the untimeliness determination; and
the district court’s weighing of the § 3553(a) factors.

5. Pro Se and Briefing Cases: James v. Wadas, United States v. Green, United States v. Leffler

James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir. 2013), sets the standard for construing pro se filings liberally but not acting as a litigant’s advocate.
United States v. Green, 886 F.3d 1300 (10th Cir. 2018), reminds that pro se parties remain bound by procedural rules.
United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2019), establishes that issues not raised in the district court and not presented under plain error review on appeal are waived.

The panel uses these cases to:

justify a liberal, but not indulgent, reading of Ms. Cook’s briefs; and
decline review of her sentencing disparity claim and her fact‑based challenge to the district court’s offense description.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. Compassionate Release (§ 3582(c)(1)(A))

Compassionate release allows a federal court to reduce a prisoner’s sentence for extraordinary and compelling reasons, after considering the § 3553(a) factors and the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. After the First Step Act, prisoners can file these motions directly, rather than relying solely on the Bureau of Prisons.

2. “Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons”

This phrase refers to reasons that are:

unusual and significant (not routine); and
so compelling that they can justify reducing a lawfully imposed sentence.

The 2023 amendments to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 list several examples, including certain serious medical conditions, advanced age, and, as relevant here, incapacitation of a parent when the defendant is the only available caregiver.

3. The “Only Available Caregiver” Standard

Under § 1B1.13(b)(3)(C), a defendant seeking release to care for an incapacitated parent must show:

The parent is incapacitated (unable to care for themselves); and
The defendant is the only available caregiver—meaning there is no other reasonably available person or adequate arrangement (e.g., another family member or professional guardian and facility care) to provide necessary care.

In Cook, the existence of a guardian and facility care meant Ms. Cook did not satisfy this requirement.

4. § 3553(a) Sentencing Factors

Section 3553(a) lists the considerations that must guide federal sentencing—and any later sentence reductions. They include:

The nature and circumstances of the offense, and the history and characteristics of the defendant;
The need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, and protect the public;
The need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities;
The kinds of sentences and ranges established by the Sentencing Guidelines; and more.

A court may deny compassionate release solely because these factors continue to favor the original sentence, regardless of any “extraordinary and compelling” reasons.

5. Abuse-of-Discretion Review

On appeal, compassionate release decisions are reviewed for “abuse of discretion.” This is a deferential standard. The appellate court does not reweigh evidence; it asks whether:

the district court applied the correct legal standards;
relied on facts supported by the record; and
reached a decision that is within the range of reasonable outcomes.

If those conditions are met, the appellate court must affirm, even if it might have decided differently in the first instance.

6. Waiver, Forfeiture, and Plain Error

Forfeiture occurs when a party fails to timely assert a right or argument.
Waiver occurs when a party intentionally relinquishes a known right; in practice, arguments not raised in the district court and not presented under plain error review on appeal are treated as waived.
Plain error review allows an appellate court to correct an unpreserved error that is clear, affects substantial rights, and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Because Ms. Cook neither raised the sentencing disparity issue below nor argued plain error on appeal, the Tenth Circuit treated that claim as waived and did not consider it.

VI. Broader Impact and Practical Implications

A. Successive Compassionate Release Motions

Cook sends a clear message to practitioners and defendants:

A second § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion that simply reasserts the same facts (e.g., same medical condition, same caregiving need) is likely to be treated as a motion to reconsider.
Such a motion must be filed within the 14‑day window for appealing the original denial.
Outside that window, the only viable path is to show a truly new factual basis—for example, a newly arisen condition, a dramatic worsening, or a newly documented circumstance that materially alters the assessment of “extraordinary and compelling reasons.”

Simply pointing to new legal authority, such as a guideline amendment that does not change the core facts, will generally be insufficient to transform a reconsideration request into a fresh compassionate release motion.

B. Application of § 1B1.13(b)(3)(C) Caregiver Provisions

The decision underscores that the 2023 caregiver amendments are not automatic relief:

Courts will demand clear proof that the defendant is truly the only available caregiver for the incapacitated parent.
The existence of alternative caregivers—whether family, appointed guardians, or professional facility care—will normally defeat such a claim.
Lawyers and pro se litigants should therefore gather comprehensive documentation (affidavits, medical records, guardianship orders, social service assessments) to demonstrate both incapacitation and lack of alternative caregivers.

C. Continued Centrality of § 3553(a)

Cook also serves as a reminder that even where compassionate release might otherwise be justified:

Serious, large‑scale, or leadership‑role criminal conduct can independently bar relief.
Courts may justifiably place significant weight on:
- the scale of drug trafficking,
- organizational leadership, and
- connections to cartel activity,
in concluding that early release would undermine respect for the law and deterrence.

For defendants in such cases, strong evidence of rehabilitation, remorse, and low risk of recidivism will be especially important but may still be insufficient.

D. Pro Se Litigants and Appellate Practice

Finally, Cook highlights several practical lessons for pro se litigants:

Deadlines matter: Missing the 14‑day window for reconsideration may close the door to repeating the same arguments later.
Record citations are essential: Assertions about what happened at trial, sentencing, or in the PSR must be backed by pin‑point references to the record.
Issue preservation: Arguments not presented to the district court (e.g., trial penalty or sentencing disparity claims) will be extremely difficult to resurrect on appeal.

VII. Conclusion

Although formally nonprecedential, United States v. Cook crystallizes several important, practical rules in the Tenth Circuit’s compassionate release jurisprudence:

A second compassionate release motion reasserting the same factual grounds is properly treated as a motion to reconsider, subject to the strict 14‑day Rule 4(b) deadline articulated in Warren and Randall.
The 2023 amendment to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(C) does not aid a defendant who cannot show she is the only available caregiver for an incapacitated parent—where a guardian and facility care exist, that showing fails.
The § 3553(a) factors remain a robust, independent basis to deny compassionate release, especially in severe drug trafficking cases involving leadership roles and cartel links.
Pro se status does not relax procedural obligations: timeliness, issue preservation, and compliance with appellate briefing rules remain critical.

In the broader legal context, Cook reinforces the message that compassionate release is a narrow, carefully controlled exception to the finality of criminal sentences. It clarifies that while evolving guidelines and humanitarian considerations matter, they must be squarely grounded in the facts and filtered through the statutory sentencing factors and procedural rules that govern all federal criminal litigation.