United States v. Collins: Limits on Post‑Investigation Tax Compliance and Hearsay‑Based Expert Testimony in Proving Willfulness

I. Introduction

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Annazette Collins, No. 24‑2161 (7th Cir. Dec. 18, 2025), affirms the conviction and sentence of a former Illinois state legislator for federal tax crimes. The opinion is doctrinally important in several respects:

It reaffirms how prosecutors may prove “willfulness” in tax prosecutions under 26 U.S.C. §§ 7203 and 7206(1) largely through circumstantial evidence, including prior filing history, business sophistication, and legislative experience with tax laws.
It confirms the narrow role that post‑investigation remedial conduct (amended returns and payment plans) plays in negating willfulness, especially after the defendant is on notice of IRS scrutiny, and approves exclusion of such evidence under Rule 403.
It applies the Luce waiver principle to a pretrial ruling under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b): a defendant who elects not to testify cannot appeal a conditional ruling that would have allowed impeachment by specific dishonest acts.
It reinforces limits on defense expert testimony in tax cases where the expert’s key opinions rest almost entirely on the defendant’s own out‑of‑court statements, treating such opinions as unreliable and properly excludable.
It underscores the strictly jurisdictional nature of Rule 35(a) sentencing corrections and the impossibility of “fixing” a one‑year sentence to a “year and a day” months later to obtain federal good‑time credits.

The case thus sits at the intersection of criminal tax law, evidentiary doctrine, and sentencing procedure, and will be particularly relevant to white‑collar defense lawyers, prosecutors, and trial judges managing tax‑related jury trials.

II. Case Overview

A. Parties and Roles

Plaintiff–Appellee: United States of America
Defendant–Appellant: Annazette Collins, former member of the Illinois General Assembly, later owner and president of a lobbying/consulting firm (Kourtnie Nicole Corp., “KNC”) and a producer for American Income Life Insurance Company (“AIL”).

B. Core Factual Background

After more than a decade in the Illinois legislature, Collins formed KNC in 2013 and also sold life insurance for AIL. For years before 2014 she had properly filed individual income tax returns; for 2013 she reported about $33,000 in income from KNC, and KNC filed its own corporate return reflecting that payment.

The government’s case focused on later years:

2014: Collins earned about $118,000 (approximately $96,000 from AIL and $40,000 from KNC) but reported only about $11,500 in total income and no AIL income on her return. She signed under penalty of perjury that the return was “true, correct, and complete.” AIL terminated her that year for fraudulent policy submissions.
2015: Collins reported only about $10,000 of income, despite actual income approaching $84,000 (about $75,000 transferred from KNC, plus more than $11,000 in KNC funds spent on personal expenses such as her daughter’s tuition and a SeaWorld camp). KNC had about $188,000 in gross receipts.
2016: Collins filed no individual return and KNC filed no corporate return, notwithstanding KNC’s $162,000 in gross receipts and Collins’s access to roughly $70,000 in income (via $50,000 in transfers and $18,000+ in personal expenditures from KNC funds, including mortgage and camp costs).

In 2016, the IRS sent a notice identifying more than $96,000 in unreported AIL income (related to 2014) and about $25,000 in tax owed. Only after receiving this notice did Collins amend her 2015 return, adding the previously unreported AIL income but pairing it with roughly $50,000 in new deductions (including about $8,000 for “work clothes” and a near ten‑fold increase in mileage), substantially reducing her liability. In 2017 she entered a payment plan but stopped paying in 2019; by 2023 she owed more than the original amount once interest and penalties were included.

C. Charges, Trial, and Convictions

A superseding indictment charged Collins with six counts:

Three felony counts under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) for willfully making and subscribing false individual income tax returns for 2014, 2015, and 2018.
Three misdemeanor counts under 26 U.S.C. § 7203 for willfully failing to file returns: the 2016 individual return and KNC’s corporate returns for 2015 and 2016.

Before trial, the district court:

Granted the government’s motion to exclude evidence of Collins’s amended 2015 return and her 2017 IRS payment plan.
Denied the government’s motion to introduce in its case‑in‑chief that Collins was fired from AIL for cause.
Conditionally limited defense expert Craig Greene’s testimony to the extent it would merely channel Collins’s own out‑of‑court statements.

At trial, the government introduced evidence of Collins’s actual income, the much lower amounts reported on returns, third‑party reporting, and her prior sponsorship of a 2008 state bill to raise Illinois’s income tax rate. Her tax preparer, Robert Burch, testified about his interactions with her and the preparation of her returns.

When Collins indicated she would testify, the government sought to cross‑examine her about the fraudulent conduct at AIL that led to her termination, under Rule 608(b) (specific acts of dishonesty as impeachment). The district court ruled that such cross‑examination would be permitted. Collins then chose not to testify, and instead presented only Greene, who attacked the government’s tax calculations and attributed her failure to file to Burch’s “negligence.”

The jury convicted Collins on four counts:

False returns for 2014 and 2015 (26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)).
Failure to file her 2016 individual return and KNC’s 2016 corporate return (26 U.S.C. § 7203).

She was acquitted on the remaining counts. Post‑trial, the court denied her motion for judgment of acquittal and sentenced her to one year of imprisonment and one year of supervised release.

Five months later, Collins moved to “correct” her sentence from 12 months to 12 months and 1 day, to qualify for federal good‑time credits. The district court denied the motion.

III. Summary of the Seventh Circuit’s Decision

Judge St. Eve, writing for a unanimous panel (Judges St. Eve, Lee, and Kolar), affirmed across the board.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The court held there was ample evidence from which a rational jury could find that Collins acted willfully, as required for both:

Willfully making false returns (26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)), and
Willfully failing to file returns (26 U.S.C. § 7203).

Drawing on circumstantial evidence of Collins’s income, prior tax‑filing history, business sophistication, role as KNC’s owner and president, and sponsorship of tax legislation, the court concluded that she knew her legal duties and intentionally violated them.

B. Evidentiary Rulings

Collins raised three evidentiary challenges, all rejected:

Excluding post‑offense remedial conduct. The court upheld exclusion of evidence about Collins’s amended 2015 return and her IRS payment plan under Rule 403. Given that these events occurred after she was on notice of her unreported income and after the crimes were complete, their minimal probative value on willfulness was substantially outweighed by the risk of confusing the jury and turning the trial to uncharged conduct.
Potential impeachment via AIL fraud (Rule 608(b)). The court held that Collins waived appellate review of the trial court’s conditional ruling allowing cross‑examination about her fraudulent AIL conduct by choosing not to testify, applying the Luce principle beyond Rule 609 to Rule 608(b). Even if reviewed, the impeachment ruling would have been proper and consistent with Rule 608(b) and Rule 404(b).
Limiting expert testimony grounded in hearsay. The court approved the district court’s exclusion of portions of expert Craig Greene’s testimony that rested solely on Collins’s out‑of‑court statements, relying on United States v. Beavers. It rejected Collins’s contention that this limitation infringed her constitutional right to present a defense.

C. Motion to Correct Sentence (Rule 35(a))

The Seventh Circuit held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to alter Collins’s sentence because her Rule 35(a) motion was filed long after the rule’s 14‑day deadline for correcting “arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.” The court also expressed doubt that the claim was moot, because completion of imprisonment does not moot a challenge that could affect the term of supervised release.

IV. Precedents and Doctrinal Foundations

A. Willfulness in Tax Crimes

Two Supreme Court decisions frame the willfulness analysis:

United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976) – Defines “willfulness” in federal tax crimes as a “voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.”
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991) – Refines Pomponio by holding that willfulness requires that the defendant knew of the legal duty; a subjective good‑faith misunderstanding of the law (even if unreasonable) can negate willfulness, but mere disagreement with the law cannot.

The Seventh Circuit applied these principles through its own precedents:

United States v. Murphy, 469 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 2006) – Cited for the definition of willfulness as a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.
United States v. Perez, 612 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2010) – Emphasizes that willfulness can be proven by circumstantial evidence, including large discrepancies between actual and reported income and inconsistent statements to tax authorities versus third parties.
United States v. Powell, 576 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2009) and United States v. Presbitero, 569 F.3d 691 (7th Cir. 2009) – Clarify that § 7206(1) requires proof the defendant signed the return knowing it was false and did so willfully.
United States v. Hassebrock, 663 F.3d 906 (7th Cir. 2011) – Holds that § 7203 (failure to file) is complete as soon as the filing deadline passes; willfulness focuses on the defendant’s state of mind at that time.
United States v. Falk, 605 F.2d 1005 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Briscoe, 65 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Bressler, 772 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1985) – Cases where defendants’ sophistication, prior filing history, or work advising others on taxes supported inferences that they knew their filing obligations.
United States v. Tishberg, 854 F.2d 1070 (7th Cir. 1988) – Recognizes that the presence of substantial income together with a failure to file may support an inference of willful non‑filing to avoid tax liability.

In Collins, the court integrates these authorities to conclude that: (1) Collins knew of her duty, given her prior filing, business experience, and legislative familiarity with tax laws, and (2) she intentionally violated that duty, as evidenced by large understatements, non‑filing in a year with substantial income, and inconsistent reporting.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence Standard

The court restates familiar Seventh Circuit formulations:

Standard of review: de novo, but highly deferential to the jury’s verdict.
Core test: whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt (Leal, Faulkner).
Evidence is viewed “in the light most favorable to the Government,” with deference to the jury’s credibility determinations (Perez, Huddleston).
The defendant carries a “nearly insurmountable” burden in challenging sufficiency (Beechler, building on Maldonado).

The court also reiterates two important corollaries:

Appellate courts do not second‑guess the jury’s credibility findings (Perez, Olofson).
Circumstantial evidence alone can support a conviction (Hills).

C. Post‑Offense Remedial Conduct and Rule 403

The opinion’s discussion of Collins’s amended return and payment plan is grounded in several earlier decisions:

United States v. Powell, 576 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2009) – The relevant time for willfulness in a § 7206(1) case is when the defendant signed the return, not years later; post‑filing conduct has limited relevance.
United States v. McClain, 934 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1991) & United States v. Radtke, 415 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2005) – Similarly emphasize that willfulness is assessed at the time of filing.
United States v. Hassebrock, 663 F.3d 906 (7th Cir. 2011) – For § 7203, the offense is complete “at 12:00:01 on April 16,” making post‑deadline conduct generally irrelevant to whether failure to file was willful.
United States v. Sawyer, 607 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1979), quoting United States v. Ming, 466 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1972) – Holds that late tax payment is immaterial to willfulness in a § 7203 prosecution.
United States v. Beavers, 756 F.3d 1044 (7th Cir. 2014) – Adopts a nuanced, case‑by‑case approach to remedial conduct: the probative value depends on how closely later corrections are tied to the defendant’s earlier state of mind, especially when they occur after the defendant learns of an investigation.
United States v. Curtis, 781 F.3d 904 (7th Cir. 2015) – Recognizes that if a defendant opens the door by asserting good‑faith remedial conduct, the government may introduce rebuttal evidence, potentially complicating the trial.

Applying these cases, the court in Collins agrees that while remedial acts can be relevant in some circumstances, they were minimally probative here and properly excluded under Rule 403 because they occurred after IRS notice and risked confusing and expanding the issues.

D. Constitutional Right to Present a Defense vs. Evidentiary Rules

Collins framed her evidentiary arguments as constitutional claims, arguing that excluding evidence of her remedial conduct and limiting expert testimony deprived her of the right to present a meaningful defense.

The court’s response draws on:

United States v. Cox, 54 F.4th 502 (7th Cir. 2022) – Constitutional challenges to evidentiary rulings are reviewed de novo and require reversal unless harmless (Bowling, Chapman).
Hinkle v. Neal, 51 F.4th 234 (7th Cir. 2022), relying on Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006) and Kubsch v. Neal, 838 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc) – The right to present a defense does not override the normal application of evidentiary rules like Rule 403.
United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095 (7th Cir. 1999) – Upholds exclusion of defense evidence that is unreliable or otherwise inadmissible, even when offered to support a core defense theory.

The panel in Collins reiterates that constitutional rights coexist with neutral, generally applicable evidentiary rules. A defendant cannot insist on presenting evidence that is misleading, unduly confusing, or unreliable under the guise of constitutional necessity.

E. The Luce Principle and Conditional Impeachment Rulings

The court’s disposition of Collins’s challenge to the Rule 608(b) ruling is anchored in:

Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984) – A defendant who does not testify cannot challenge on appeal a pretrial ruling that would have allowed impeachment by a prior conviction under Rule 609; the ruling is conditional and its impact impossible to assess in the abstract.
Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc) – Generalizes Luce to other conditional rulings: when a judge says, “If you testify, then X will be allowed,” the party must testify to preserve the claim.
United States v. Wilson, 307 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2002) – Applies the Luce principle in the criminal context, holding that a defendant who elects not to testify cannot later complain about potential impeachment.

The Collins opinion notes that other circuits have similarly extended Luce to Rule 608(b) specific‑act impeachment and cites examples from the First, Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits. The Seventh Circuit thus firmly aligns its practice with this broader consensus: if a defendant wants to challenge a conditional impeachment ruling, she must actually testify.

Substantively, the court also references:

Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) – Allows inquiry on cross‑examination into specific instances of conduct that are probative of the witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness (with no extrinsic proof), subject to Rule 403.
United States v. Chevalier, 1 F.3d 581 (7th Cir. 1993) – Confirms that a defendant who testifies puts her credibility squarely at issue and may be impeached via prior dishonesty under Rule 608(b).
Young v. James Green Mgmt., Inc., 327 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2003) – Distinguishes between Rule 608(b) impeachment (character for truthfulness) and Rule 404(b) propensity evidence; the former is permitted in limited fashion, the latter is more restricted.
Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753 (2000) & McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) – Emphasize that the right to testify does not free a defendant from the normal burdens of cross‑examination and impeachment; weighing the pros and cons of testifying is part of the adversarial system.

Against this backdrop, the court concludes that Collins’s right to testify (and against self‑incrimination) is not violated simply because taking the stand would expose her to probing cross‑examination about prior fraud at AIL.

F. Expert Testimony, Hearsay, and Reliability

The limitation on Greene’s testimony rests primarily on:

United States v. Beavers, 756 F.3d 1044 (7th Cir. 2014) – Where a defense expert’s crucial opinions are derived almost entirely from private conversations with the defendant, those opinions may lack meaningful support once stripped of hearsay. Courts have “wide latitude” to exclude such unreliable expert testimony.
Bielskis v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., 663 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2011) – Elaborates on the trial court’s gatekeeping role under Rule 702 and Daubert and the broad discretion to determine reliability.
United States v. Brown, 871 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 2017) – Affirms exclusion of expert testimony deemed unreliable.

In Collins, the panel holds that when a proposed expert will simply transmit the defendant’s self‑serving narrative in the guise of professional opinion, exclusion is permissible and does not violate the right to present a defense, especially where the expert is still allowed to testify in other respects (as Greene did).

G. Rule 35(a), Jurisdiction, and Mootness

On the sentencing issue, the court relies on:

Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) – A district court “may correct a sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error” within 14 days after sentencing. The Seventh Circuit treats this time limit as jurisdictional.
United States v. Wisch, 275 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2001) and United States v. Bania, 787 F.3d 1168 (7th Cir. 2015) – Confirm that after 14 days, the court has no authority to alter a sentence under Rule 35(a).
United States v. Heon Seok Lee, 937 F.3d 797 (7th Cir. 2019) – Describes Rule 35(a) as a narrow mechanism for correcting clear sentencing errors, not for rebalancing sentencing factors.

On mootness, the court cites:

United States v. Sanchez‑Gomez, 584 U.S. 381 (2018) – A case is moot if there is no longer a live controversy and no relief the court can meaningfully grant.
Pope v. Perdue, 889 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 2018) – Holds that a challenge to the length of imprisonment is not moot while the defendant remains on supervised release, because a shorter term could be relevant to a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) to reduce supervised release.
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) – The party asserting mootness bears a “heavy burden” to demonstrate it.

Using this framework, the panel concludes that Collins’s sentencing challenge is not moot (because of potential effects on supervised release), but fails on the merits for lack of Rule 35(a) jurisdiction.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning by Issue

A. Willfulness and Sufficiency of the Evidence

Collins’s central argument was that the government failed to prove she acted “willfully” — that is, that she knowingly and intentionally violated a known legal duty — both in under‑reporting income and in failing to file returns.

1. Knowledge of Legal Duty

The court identifies several strands of evidence from which a rational jury could infer knowledge of the duty to file and to report income accurately:

Prior filing history: For at least four years before 2014, Collins regularly filed individual returns and, for 2013, a corporate return for KNC. This record demonstrated she knew that individuals and corporations with income must file returns.
Business sophistication: As sole owner and president of a lucrative consulting firm, Collins was not a naive taxpayer. Citing Briscoe and Bressler, the court notes that a sophisticated businessperson (especially one who advises others on tax matters) is more likely to understand tax obligations.
Legislative experience with tax law: The government introduced evidence that Collins had sponsored tax legislation in 2008 to raise the Illinois income tax rate. The panel holds that it is reasonable to infer from this experience some familiarity with how income taxation and filing obligations work, at least at a basic level.

Taken together, these facts support the conclusion that Collins knew she was required to file returns and report her income truthfully.

2. Intentional Violation of Duty

The court then turns to whether Collins intentionally violated that duty. Here, multiple factors reinforce one another:

Magnitude of underreporting: The discrepancies between Collins’s true income and what she reported were very large — reporting about $11,500 instead of roughly $118,000 in 2014, and $10,000 instead of close to $84,000 in 2015. Under Perez, such stark differences permit an inference that misstatements were intentional, not accidental.
Pattern and repetition: The underreporting did not occur once, but in multiple consecutive years, followed by a complete failure to file any returns for 2016 despite substantial income. This pattern suggests deliberate behavior rather than an isolated oversight.
Tax preparer’s testimony: Collins’s preparer, Burch, testified that Collins supplied the income figures, that he prepared returns based on her representations, and that she reviewed and authorized the returns before filing. This undercuts any suggestion that Burch’s negligence (rather than Collins’s willfulness) caused the underreporting.
Higher income reported to others than to the IRS: Evidence showed that Collins reported higher income to third parties than she did on her tax returns. That inconsistency supports an inference she knew the true figures and selectively underreported them to the IRS.
Non‑filing in 2016 despite significant income: In 2016, Collins and KNC had substantial receipts and income, but no returns were filed. Combined with her history of filing in prior years, this allowed the jury to infer purposeful non‑filing to avoid tax (Briscoe, Tishberg).

On this record, the panel concludes that Collins’s sufficiency challenge fails to clear the “nearly insurmountable” bar. Importantly, the court emphasizes:

The government may rely entirely on circumstantial evidence.
Any gaps or weaknesses in Burch’s testimony or inferential leaps about her legislative experience were matters for cross‑examination and jury deliberation, not basis for overturning the verdict.

B. Exclusion of Amended Return and IRS Payment Plan

Collins argued that her later behavior — amending her 2015 return and entering a payment plan — showed she did not act willfully when she filed false returns or failed to file at all. The district court excluded this evidence under Rule 403, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

1. Limited Relevance

The panel begins from the premise that tax crimes under §§ 7203 and 7206(1) are complete at:

the moment the filing deadline passes without filing (Hassebrock, Sawyer, Ming), or
the moment the false return is signed and filed (Powell, McClain, Radtke).

Events that occur years later, especially after the IRS has explicitly put the taxpayer on notice of unreported income, are at best weak indicators of the taxpayer’s earlier state of mind. As the court notes (relying on Beavers), post‑investigation “corrections” may just as plausibly reflect an effort to cover up earlier intentional wrongdoing as a desire to remedy an innocent mistake.

2. Rule 403 Balancing

Even assuming some minimal relevance, the district court reasonably found that:

The probative value of Collins’s amended filing and payment plan on the question of her earlier willfulness was slight, given their timing after IRS notice.
Admitting them would likely:
- Shift the jury’s focus to collateral, uncharged conduct (the accuracy and good faith of the amended return and payment plan).
- Require rebuttal evidence and mini‑trials on new issues.
- Risk confusing or misleading the jury about the elements and timing of the charged offenses.

Under Rule 403, courts may exclude evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risks of confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or waste of time. The panel finds the district court’s Rule 403 determination “well within its discretion.”

3. No Constitutional Violation

Collins argued that excluding this evidence effectively pressured her to testify and infringed her right to present a defense. The court rejects this on two grounds:

The Constitution does not guarantee a defendant the ability to introduce every piece of evidence she believes helps her case, especially where that evidence violates ordinary evidentiary rules (Hinkle, Holmes, Kubsch).
Any “pressure” to testify arising from evidentiary constraints is part of the normal operation of the rules of evidence and does not itself infringe the Fifth Amendment or the right to present a defense (Beavers).

C. Conditional Rule 608(b) Ruling and the Luce Waiver

Collins also sought review of the ruling that, if she testified, the government could cross‑examine her about fraudulent acts at AIL to attack her character for truthfulness under Rule 608(b). She argued that this ruling chilled her right to testify.

1. Waiver Under Luce

The court holds that this claim is not reviewable because Collins never took the stand. Citing Luce, Wilson v. Williams, and United States v. Wilson, the panel explains:

A ruling that “if you testify, then X impeachment will be allowed” is inherently conditional.
Without actual testimony, the appellate court cannot know:
- What Collins would have said.
- Whether the government would in fact have pursued the line of impeachment.
- Exactly how the trial court would have applied its preliminary ruling in light of the context.
Thus, “a thorough review is impossible,” and the issue is waived when the defendant chooses not to testify.

The Seventh Circuit emphasizes that this principle is not confined to Rule 609 convictions; it reaches Rule 608(b) impeachment and other conditional rulings as well, aligning with decisions from other circuits.

2. Merits (Hypothetical)

The panel further notes that even if it reached the merits, the ruling was likely correct:

By testifying, Collins would have placed her credibility at issue.
Fraudulent conduct at AIL is directly probative of her character for truthfulness, making it suitable for inquiry under Rule 608(b).
This use of the prior conduct for impeachment is distinct from and not barred by Rule 404(b)’s limits on propensity evidence. As Chevalier and Young clarify, Rule 608(b) allows specific acts of dishonesty to impeach a witness’s credibility.

3. No Violation of Right to Testify or Fifth Amendment

Lastly, the court holds that Collins’s constitutional rights were not violated:

The right to testify does not immunize a defendant from ordinary impeachment; defendants routinely must weigh the risk of damaging cross‑examination (Ohler, McGautha).
Her decision not to testify, while influenced by the trial court’s ruling, does not transform a lawful evidentiary ruling into a constitutional violation.

D. Limitation of Defense Expert Testimony

Collins challenged the pretrial order foreclosing parts of expert Craig Greene’s testimony that were based solely on her own out‑of‑court statements.

1. Application of Beavers

The court finds the situation materially indistinguishable from Beavers:

In Beavers, the defense tax expert’s most important opinions depended on the defendant’s verbal explanations of his finances.
Once those conversations were set aside as inadmissible hearsay, the expert’s opinions lacked a sufficient factual foundation and were deemed unreliable.
The Seventh Circuit upheld their exclusion, emphasizing the district court’s “wide latitude” in evaluating the reliability of expert testimony.

In Collins, Greene’s excluded opinions likewise hinged entirely on Collins’s own self‑serving accounts, without independent corroboration. The court thus holds that, under Beavers, the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting such testimony.

2. No Constitutional Right to Hearsay‑Based Expert Testimony

The panel also rejects Collins’s argument that the ruling violated her right to present a defense. It notes:

There is no constitutional right to put before the jury an expert opinion that is unreliable or lacks a proper foundation (Hall).
Greene was not fully excluded; he was allowed to testify to his criticisms of the government’s calculations and even conveyed some of Collins’s narrative. This undercuts the claim that she was deprived of a “meaningful defense.”

E. Denial of Motion to Correct Sentence Under Rule 35(a)

Finally, Collins sought to convert her 12‑month sentence to 12 months and 1 day, which would make her eligible for up to 54 days of federal good‑time credits. The timing and nature of the motion doomed it.

1. Jurisdictional Time Limit

Rule 35(a) allows a district court to correct a sentence for clear error “within 14 days after sentencing.” The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly said this deadline is jurisdictional – after it passes, the court lacks authority to alter the sentence at all (Wisch, Bania).

Because Collins filed her motion “far more than fourteen days” after sentencing (about five months later), the district court correctly denied it for lack of jurisdiction. The panel underscores that this would be the outcome even if the court had wanted to grant the requested adjustment.

2. Not Moot Despite Completion of Imprisonment

The government argued the issue was moot because Collins had already served her term of imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, citing Pope v. Perdue:

A challenge to the length of imprisonment remains live while the defendant is on supervised release, because a shorter term could support a motion to reduce supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).
The government did not show that Collins had completed her supervised release or carry its “heavy burden” to prove mootness (Laidlaw).

The court therefore reached the merits and resolved the claim on jurisdictional grounds.

VI. Impact and Implications

A. Criminal Tax Prosecutions and Willfulness

Collins reinforces several themes in criminal tax enforcement:

Circumstantial proof of willfulness is often decisive. Prosecutors rarely have direct admissions of intent. The opinion underscores that large, consistent understatements of income, non‑filing during high‑income years, and inconsistent reporting to different recipients can be enough to support a willfulness finding.
Professional and legislative background can be turned against the defendant. The court’s willingness to consider Collins’s sponsorship of tax legislation and business experience as evidence of knowledge of legal duty is particularly notable. Public officials and sophisticated businesspeople can expect their roles to be used as proof they understood their tax obligations.
Blaming the preparer is a weak defense when the defendant controls the inputs. Collins’s attempt to shift responsibility to Burch foundered because the preparer credibly denied directing her not to file and described Collins as the source of key numbers. The decision underscores the importance of contemporaneous documentation if a taxpayer intends to argue reliance on professional advice.

B. Use (and Limits) of Post‑Investigation Compliance

The exclusion of Collins’s amended return and payment plan sends a clear signal to defense counsel:

Corrective filings after IRS notice are risky as trial evidence. While they may be necessary to reduce civil liability or penalties, such filings are unlikely to help at a criminal trial and may be excluded under Rule 403.
Timing matters critically. The opinion leaves open that remedial conduct before any hint of investigation might have probative value on willfulness. But once a taxpayer is plainly “on notice” that the IRS has discovered unreported income, remedial acts may look like strategic damage control rather than evidence of original good faith.
Introducing remedial conduct can open the door. If a defendant chooses to present such evidence, the government may respond with fuller context, including potentially prejudicial details of the investigation and any deficiencies in the amended filings (Curtis). This increases the risk of a trial within a trial on uncharged conduct.

C. Strategic Choices About Testifying and Impeachment

The extension and reinforcement of the Luce principle to Rule 608(b) have practical consequences:

Defendants cannot “test the waters” on appeal. If they choose not to testify, they forfeit any challenge to conditional impeachment rulings. Counsel must build this into their trial strategy.
Rule 608(b) impeachment is potent but narrow. The government may cross‑examine about specific dishonest acts relevant to credibility (like fraudulent insurance policies) but cannot introduce extrinsic evidence of them if the witness denies the conduct. Both sides must be prepared with careful offers of proof and objections.
The right to testify is real but not cost‑free. Collins illustrates the real‑world pressure defendants face when prior dishonest conduct exists. The ruling confirms that such pressure does not amount to a constitutional violation: defendants must weigh the benefits of telling their story against the risk of damaging impeachment.

D. Designing Defense Expert Testimony in Tax Cases

Collins, following Beavers, offers a warning for defense teams relying heavily on tax experts:

Experts need independent data. Opinions that simply repeat the defendant’s own statements are vulnerable to exclusion as unreliable or hearsay‑based.
Build the factual record through admissible evidence. If key factual assumptions are important to an expert’s opinion, they should be established via documents or other witnesses, not just the defendant’s self‑serving statements.
Anticipate Rule 702 and 703 challenges. Prosecutors can and will argue that an expert’s methodology is flawed if it rests entirely on untested assertions from the accused. Defense counsel should structure expert reports to minimize this vulnerability.

E. Sentencing Practice and “Year and a Day” Tactics

Finally, the Rule 35(a) portion of the opinion carries a practical lesson:

Good‑time eligibility must be addressed at sentencing, not later. Defense counsel often seek a sentence of “a year and a day” instead of exactly 12 months, because federal good‑time credits under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) are available only for sentences > 1 year. Collins makes clear that if the court imposes a 12‑month sentence, it cannot later “correct” it to a year and a day outside Rule 35(a)’s narrow 14‑day window.
Post‑sentencing rebalancing is not “clear error.” Even if the judge later wishes he or she had imposed a different length to allow good‑time, that regret does not constitute “arithmetical, technical, or other clear error” cognizable under Rule 35(a).
Supervised release keeps sentencing issues alive. Because the length of imprisonment may affect the appropriate length of supervised release, sentencing challenges are not necessarily mooted by release from prison, as Pope and Collins recognize.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Willfulness” in Criminal Tax Cases

In plain terms, to act “willfully” in a tax case means:

You had a legal duty (for example, to file a return or report all income).
You knew about that duty.
You chose, on purpose, to violate it.

It is not enough for the government to show that:

You made a mistake because you misunderstood a complicated rule (even if your misunderstanding was unreasonable, it can still be a defense under Cheek if it was genuine), or
You disagree with the law or think it is unfair (that is not a defense).

B. Federal Rules of Evidence 403, 404(b), and 608(b)

Rule 403 – Balancing test: A judge can keep out relevant evidence if its value is substantially outweighed by the risk of confusing the issues, misleading the jury, causing delay, or wasting time. In Collins, this rule justified excluding the amended return and payment plan.
Rule 404(b) – Prior bad acts: Generally, the prosecution cannot use evidence of a person’s past wrongs to prove they have a bad character and therefore probably committed the charged crime. Such evidence can sometimes be used for other purposes (like proving motive or intent), but with caution.
Rule 608(b) – Specific acts of dishonesty for impeachment: If a witness testifies, the opposing lawyer may ask about specific past acts that show the witness is dishonest (for example, cheating clients or submitting false documents), to attack the witness’s credibility. But:
- No other evidence (like documents or other witnesses) can be introduced to prove those acts if the witness denies them.
- The judge can still block such questions if they are unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403.

C. Hearsay and Expert Testimony

“Hearsay” is an out‑of‑court statement offered to prove the truth of what it says. Generally, hearsay is not allowed unless an exception applies.

Experts are allowed to rely on some information that is not itself admissible, but:

If an expert’s entire opinion is built only on what the defendant privately told them, without documents or other evidence, courts may find that opinion unreliable.
In that case, the court can keep the expert from testifying to those opinions, as happened with Greene in Collins (following Beavers).

D. The Luce Principle and Conditional Rulings

A “conditional ruling” is one that says: “If X happens, then Y will be allowed.” For example:

“If the defendant testifies, then the prosecutor may ask about her prior fraudulent acts.”

The Luce rule means:

If the defendant does not testify, she usually cannot appeal that conditional ruling.
Courts won’t decide in the abstract how the ruling might have played out if she had taken the stand.

E. Rule 35(a) and “Good‑Time” Credits

Federal prisoners with sentences longer than one year can earn up to 54 days per year of “good‑time” credit for good behavior in prison, which reduces actual time served.

A sentence of exactly 12 months is not eligible for these credits.
A sentence of 12 months and 1 day is eligible.

Rule 35(a) lets a court fix a sentencing error (for example, a math mistake in calculating the guideline range) within 14 days. It does not allow a court to later change a sentence simply to make the defendant eligible for good‑time credits once that 14‑day window has passed.

F. Mootness and Collateral Consequences

A case is “moot” if a court can no longer do anything meaningful to help the party bringing the case. In criminal sentencing:

Even if a defendant has finished their prison term, their case is usually not moot while they remain on supervised release.
A shorter prison term can influence whether a judge later decides to cut short supervised release.

That is why the Seventh Circuit considered Collins’s sentencing argument even though she had left prison.

VIII. Conclusion

United States v. Collins consolidates and extends several important strands of Seventh Circuit law:

It confirms that willfulness in tax prosecutions can be proven through circumstantial evidence, especially where sophisticated taxpayers dramatically under‑report income or stop filing altogether while continuing to earn significant sums.
It tightly cabins the role of post‑offense, post‑investigation remedial conduct as evidence of good faith, endorsing Rule 403 exclusions where such evidence risks confusing the jury or expanding the trial to uncharged matters.
It firmly applies the Luce principle to Rule 608(b) impeachment, requiring defendants to testify if they wish to preserve challenges to conditional impeachment rulings.
It reinforces limits on defense expert testimony that rests chiefly on the defendant’s own hearsay, highlighting the trial court’s broad discretion to exclude such opinions as unreliable.
It underscores that Rule 35(a)’s 14‑day limit is jurisdictional and cannot be used to retroactively convert a one‑year sentence into a “year and a day” for good‑time purposes.

Beyond Collins herself, the opinion will influence how tax prosecutions are tried and defended in the Seventh Circuit, shaping strategies regarding remedial filings, expert witnesses, decisions about testifying, and sentencing advocacy. It confirms a demanding evidentiary and procedural environment for defendants seeking to negate willfulness or adjust sentences after the fact, while providing clear guidance to trial courts on the proper application of long‑standing doctrines in this area.