United States v. Coleman: Anders Review of ACCA Enhancements, Consecutive Revocation Sentences, and Rehabilitation Comments at Sentencing

I. Introduction

In United States v. Coleman, Nos. 24-6253 & 24-6258 (10th Cir. Dec. 4, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed consolidated appeals arising from:

a new federal conviction for being a felon in possession of ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and
a revocation of supervised release stemming from an earlier federal case.

The defendant, Jacoby Coleman, received:

a 15-year (180-month) prison term and 5 years of supervised release for the felon-in-possession offense, enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); and
a consecutive 18-month sentence following revocation of supervised release.

Coleman’s appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief, concluding that any potential appellate issues would be frivolous, and sought leave to withdraw. The Tenth Circuit, applying the Anders v. California framework, independently reviewed the record. It focused on two potential issues:

whether the ACCA enhancement was properly applied; and
whether the overall sentence—including the decision to make the revocation term consecutive—was substantively reasonable.

The panel (Judges Hartz, Eid, and Carson) held that no nonfrivolous issues existed, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and dismissed both appeals. Although issued as a nonprecedential “Order and Judgment,” the decision provides useful guidance on:

how the Tenth Circuit conducts Anders review in sentencing appeals;
application of ACCA to multiple federal drug convictions occurring on “separate occasions”; and
the proper treatment of rehabilitation-related remarks at sentencing under Tapia v. United States.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court’s core holdings can be summarized as follows:

Valid guilty plea: The district court complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. Coleman’s guilty plea was voluntary, informed, and supported by a factual basis. No nonfrivolous challenge to the plea itself existed.
Proper ACCA enhancement: Coleman had at least three prior “serious drug offenses” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(i) because he had multiple convictions under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)) for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. Critically, he admitted those offenses occurred on “separate occasions.” Thus, the ACCA’s 15-year mandatory minimum properly applied.
Guidelines correctly calculated:
- For the § 922(g) conviction, because the ACCA mandatory minimum (15 years) exceeded the otherwise-applicable Guidelines range, U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) made 180 months the guideline sentence.
- The supervised release term (5 years) for the firearm conviction was within the advisory guideline range (2–5 years).
- The revocation term of 18 months and associated supervised release exposure were within the advisory Chapter 7 policy statement ranges (18–24 months’ imprisonment and up to life of supervised release).
Substantive reasonableness and consecutive term: Applying the standard described in United States v. Chavez, the court held that:
- the 15-year ACCA sentence and 5-year supervised release term were substantively reasonable; and
- the additional 18-month revocation sentence, imposed consecutively under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f), was likewise reasonable.
Because the sentences were within the Guideline (and policy statement) ranges, they were entitled to a presumption of reasonableness that the record did not rebut.
No Tapia error: The district court’s references to correctional treatment and programming did not constitute an impermissible attempt to lengthen Coleman’s prison term for rehabilitative purposes under Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011). The judge framed programming considerations only as potential mitigation or as factual background, not as a basis to increase the sentence.
Anders disposition: After an independent review of the record, pursuant to Anders and United States v. Calderon, the panel agreed that any potential appellate issues would be frivolous. It therefore:
- granted counsel’s motion to withdraw; and
- dismissed both the conviction and revocation appeals.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Procedural Posture and Issues on Appeal

Coleman’s case involved two related district court proceedings in the Western District of Oklahoma:

New felony conviction (No. 5:23-CR-00390-F-1): In January 2024, Coleman pleaded guilty to a superseding indictment charging him with being a felon in possession of ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The indictment alleged seven prior felony convictions, including six for possession with intent to distribute cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).
Supervised release revocation (No. 5:10-CR-00058-F-1): At the time of the ammunition offense, Coleman was on supervised release from an earlier federal case. The new offense triggered revocation proceedings, resulting in an 18-month revocation sentence.

The government sought ACCA enhancement for the § 922(g) offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), over Coleman’s objection. The probation office concluded that Coleman qualified as an armed career criminal and determined:

ACCA-enhanced advisory guideline sentence: 15 years’ imprisonment (the statutory minimum), and 2–5 years of supervised release.
Revocation advisory policy statement range: 18–24 months’ imprisonment and up to life on supervised release.

Coleman asked the district court to run the new ACCA sentence concurrently with the revocation sentence. The court declined and imposed consecutive terms.

On appeal, appointed counsel, believing there were no nonfrivolous grounds for relief, filed an Anders brief. That brief specifically examined:

whether ACCA was properly applied, and
whether the combined sentence was substantively reasonable, including the decision to impose consecutive terms.

The government did not file a brief, and Coleman did not respond to counsel’s Anders submission. Under Anders, however, the Tenth Circuit was obligated to independently examine the entire record to ensure that no meritorious appellate issues had been overlooked.

B. Precedents and Authorities Relied Upon

1. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)

Anders establishes the procedure for an appointed attorney who believes an appeal is wholly frivolous:

Counsel must conduct a “conscientious examination” of the case.
If counsel finds the appeal frivolous, counsel may move to withdraw but must file a brief “referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.”
The defendant must be notified and given an opportunity to file a pro se response.
The appellate court must then conduct its own “full examination of all the proceedings” to decide whether the case is indeed wholly frivolous.

The Tenth Circuit scrupulously followed this framework: it reviewed the Anders brief, gave Coleman the chance to respond, and independently analyzed the record before concluding that no nonfrivolous arguments existed.

2. United States v. Calderon, 428 F.3d 928 (10th Cir. 2005)

Calderon is the Tenth Circuit’s key articulation of its responsibilities under Anders. The court quoted it to emphasize that:

the appellate court must conduct a “full examination of the record” to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous; and
if the claims are frivolous, the court may grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal.

Coleman thus applies Calderon as the circuit-specific reinforcement of the Anders standard.

3. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)

Rule 11(b) governs the acceptance of guilty pleas. It obliges the district court to:

advise the defendant of key rights (e.g., right to trial, right to counsel, right to confront witnesses);
inform the defendant of the nature of the charge and the possible penalties;
ensure that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force, threats, or promises apart from a plea agreement; and
determine that a factual basis supports the plea.

The panel reviewed the plea colloquy and found full compliance with Rule 11, eliminating any nonfrivolous basis to challenge the validity of the guilty plea.

4. United States v. Sanchez-Leon, 764 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2014)

Sanchez-Leon is cited for the basic framework of procedural reasonableness review at sentencing. It confirms that a sentencing court must:

correctly calculate the Sentencing Guidelines range;
consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors;
rely on accurate factual findings; and
adequately explain the chosen sentence.

In Coleman, the Tenth Circuit invoked Sanchez-Leon to conclude that the district court committed no procedural error: the ACCA enhancement and all sentencing ranges were correctly calculated, the § 3553(a) factors were considered, and the sentencing explanation was sufficient.

5. United States v. Chavez, 723 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2013)

Chavez provides the Tenth Circuit’s approach to substantive reasonableness review. It instructs courts of appeal to:

examine whether the length of the sentence is reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors and the totality of the circumstances; and
apply the same substantive reasonableness standard when reviewing the decision to run sentences concurrently or consecutively.

Chavez also affirms that a sentence within the properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable on appeal.

Coleman applies Chavez directly:

It presumes reasonableness for the 180-month ACCA sentence and the 5-year supervised release term, both within the advisory range.
It treats the decision to impose the 18-month revocation sentence consecutively—also within the relevant policy statement—as subject to the same substantive test and presumption.

6. Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011)

Tapia holds that a sentencing court may not “lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to complete a treatment program or otherwise to promote rehabilitation.” The court may discuss rehabilitation and recommend programs, but those considerations cannot be the basis for imposing or extending imprisonment.

In Coleman, the panel addressed an Anders-flagged concern that the district court’s comments about “programming” and “correctional treatment” might constitute a Tapia violation. The Tenth Circuit concluded that:

the district court recognized it could only consider treatment needs as a potential mitigating factor or as a factual acknowledgment that certain programs might shorten Coleman’s effective time in custody;
there was no indication that the court extended the sentence length to facilitate rehabilitation.

Accordingly, no nonfrivolous Tapia-based argument existed.

7. Statutory and Guideline Provisions

18 U.S.C. § 922(g): Prohibits certain categories of individuals, including convicted felons, from possessing firearms or ammunition.
18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (ACCA): Provides a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence for a § 922(g) offender who has three prior convictions for a “violent felony” or “serious drug offense,” committed on different occasions.
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(i): Defines “serious drug offense” to include an offense under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.) for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed.
21 U.S.C. § 841(a): Criminalizes possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, including cocaine base (“crack”). Convictions under this section for serious quantities generally qualify as serious drug offenses for ACCA purposes.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a): Lists the factors a sentencing court must consider, including:
- the nature and circumstances of the offense;
- the history and characteristics of the defendant;
- the need for the sentence to reflect just punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation; and
- the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.
28 U.S.C. § 1291: Provides the court of appeals with jurisdiction over final decisions of the district courts, including final criminal judgments and supervised release revocations.
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b): States that if a statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable Guideline range, the statutorily required minimum becomes the Guideline sentence.
U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f): The Chapter 7 policy statement that recommends (and is often described as directing) that any term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation of supervised release shall be imposed consecutively to any sentence currently being served.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Validity of the Guilty Plea

The panel first examined whether Coleman’s guilty plea was valid under Rule 11(b). The record showed:

the district court advised Coleman of his trial rights and the consequences of pleading guilty;
the court ensured he understood the nature of the § 922(g) charge and the potential penalties, including enhanced exposure;
the plea was voluntary, not coerced; and
a factual basis supported the plea, including Coleman’s status as a felon and his possession of ammunition.

Because the plea colloquy was sound, any challenge to the plea’s validity would be frivolous. In the Anders context, this is crucial: often the only colorable appellate issues in guilty-plea cases concern compliance with Rule 11 or the voluntariness of the plea. Here, the court eliminated that entire category of issues.

2. ACCA Enhancement: “Serious Drug Offenses” and “Separate Occasions”

The central potential sentencing issue was whether Coleman properly qualified for ACCA’s 15-year mandatory minimum. ACCA requires:

a § 922(g) conviction; and
three prior convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense (or both) that were “committed on occasions different from one another.”

In Coleman’s case:

He had multiple prior federal convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base.
Because § 841(a) is part of the Controlled Substances Act, and these convictions carried significant penalties, they fit squarely within the statutory definition of a “serious drug offense” (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(i)).
Crucially, Coleman acknowledged that the six prior drug convictions specified in the superseding indictment “occurred on separate occasions.”

That admission resolved a frequently litigated ACCA issue—whether offenses occurred on different occasions. Without that dispute, the only remaining questions were:

Do at least three of these prior convictions qualify as “serious drug offenses”? (Yes.)
Did the district court properly rely on them? (Yes.)

The panel therefore found:

no nonfrivolous basis to challenge Coleman’s armed career criminal designation; and
no error in the district court’s ACCA enhancement.

Importantly, the Tenth Circuit did not need to reach whether any other prior convictions (beyond the six § 841(a) offenses) could support ACCA; it sufficed that the district court relied on valid, qualifying convictions that Coleman himself conceded occurred on separate occasions.

3. Operation of the Mandatory Minimum under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b)

Once ACCA applied, its 15-year mandatory minimum controlled. The panel noted that the otherwise-applicable Guideline range (absent ACCA) would have been lower, but under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b):

when the statutory minimum exceeds the top of the Guideline range, the mandatory minimum becomes the Guideline sentence.

This meant:

the advisory Guidelines “range” for imprisonment on the § 922(g) count was effectively fixed at 180 months; and
any sentence below 180 months would have been legally impermissible, not merely disfavored.

The district court sentenced Coleman to exactly 180 months—no more than required, but also no less. The panel found no error in this calculation or in the court’s recognition that it was bound by the statutory minimum.

4. Guideline Ranges for Supervised Release and Revocation

The probation office calculated, and the district court accepted:

a supervised release advisory range of 2–5 years for the new ACCA-enhanced conviction; and
a Chapter 7 policy statement range of 18–24 months for the supervised release revocation, plus up to life on supervised release.

The district court imposed:

5 years of supervised release on the firearm conviction (top of the 2–5 year range but still within it); and
18 months’ imprisonment upon revocation (the bottom of the 18–24 month range).

The panel found no analytical or arithmetic error in these calculations. That conclusion was significant because:

a correctly calculated Guideline or policy statement range is the starting point for reasonableness review; and
a within-range sentence carries a presumption of substantive reasonableness on appeal.

5. Substantive Reasonableness and the Consecutive Revocation Sentence

Applying Chavez, the Tenth Circuit examined substantive reasonableness by looking at:

“all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)” for the length of the sentence; and
the same factors and standard for the decision to make sentences concurrent or consecutive.

Key points in the court’s reasoning:

Within-Guidelines sentences: The 180-month ACCA sentence and 5-year supervised release term, as well as the 18-month revocation sentence, fell within their respective advisory ranges. They therefore enjoyed a presumption of reasonableness.
Consideration of § 3553(a) factors: The district court explicitly considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors. This likely included:
- the seriousness of the offense (a felon in possession while on supervised release after multiple drug trafficking convictions);
- the need for deterrence and protection of the public; and
- the history and characteristics of the defendant, including his repeated drug-trafficking history.
Consecutive revocation sentence under § 7B1.3(f): The Guidelines recommend that revocation imprisonment terms be imposed consecutively to any sentence already being served. The district court followed that guidance and imposed the 18-month term consecutive to the 180-month ACCA sentence.

The Anders brief did not identify any extraordinary circumstances that might rebut the presumption of reasonableness—for example, a gross disparity with similarly situated defendants, or a failure to consider a key mitigating factor. Nor did the panel’s independent review uncover any such grounds. Accordingly, the substantive reasonableness challenge was deemed frivolous.

6. Rehabilitation and Programming under Tapia

The Anders brief suggested that one potential issue was whether the district court’s references to “programming” and “correctional treatment” at sentencing ran afoul of the Supreme Court’s decision in Tapia.

Under Tapia:

courts may not impose or lengthen a term of imprisonment to promote a defendant’s rehabilitation; but
courts may discuss rehabilitation, recommend treatment programs, or consider such matters as a mitigating factor when choosing a sentence already supported by other § 3553(a) considerations.

The panel carefully examined the district court’s sentencing remarks. It concluded that:

the district court “took into account the possible need to provide correctional treatment” only as a “potential mitigating circumstance” or as an acknowledgment that certain programming might reduce Coleman’s effective time in prison;
the court did not increase Coleman’s sentence to ensure he would qualify for or complete such programming.

Thus, the comments did not constitute a Tapia error, and no nonfrivolous appellate argument could be made on this basis.

7. The Anders Determination

After addressing these potential issues, the Tenth Circuit returned to its overarching Anders inquiry:

Was there any nonfrivolous argument that could be made on Coleman’s behalf?

The court answered no, based on:

a valid, unassailable guilty plea;
a correctly applied ACCA enhancement supported by Coleman’s own admissions;
accurately calculated sentencing ranges for imprisonment and supervised release;
within-range sentences presumptively reasonable under Chavez and not rebutted by any unusual facts; and
no error under Tapia or any other identified doctrine.

The panel therefore:

granted counsel’s motion to withdraw; and
dismissed both appeals as wholly frivolous.

D. Impact and Practical Implications

1. For Defense Counsel Handling Anders Appeals

Coleman reinforces several practical points:

Thoroughness in Anders briefs: The panel commended (implicitly, by engaging with) counsel’s identification of potential ACCA, reasonableness, and Tapia issues. Even when counsel expects the appeal to be frivolous, all arguably supportive points must be flagged.
Limits when statutory minimums apply: Where a mandatory minimum like ACCA’s 15-year term controls, the scope for appellate sentencing relief shrinks dramatically. Defense counsel must realistically assess the value of arguing guideline-level errors that could not reduce the sentence below the statutory floor.
Client participation: Coleman did not respond to the Anders brief. Defendants who want to preserve issues or urge the court toward a different view should consider filing a pro se response in this posture.

2. For ACCA Litigation

Although nonprecedential, Coleman is a clear illustration of how straightforward ACCA cases look on appeal when:

the prior convictions are clearly “serious drug offenses” under the Controlled Substances Act; and
the defendant has explicitly admitted that the offenses occurred on “separate occasions.”

In such circumstances, appellate courts are unlikely to entertain challenges to ACCA enhancements absent some unusual legal wrinkle (e.g., a categorical-approach issue about the scope of the underlying drug offense or a mischaracterization of state law).

3. For Revocation and Consecutive Sentences

Coleman also confirms the Tenth Circuit’s deference to district courts that:

adhere to Chapter 7 policy statements, particularly § 7B1.3(f)’s preference for consecutive revocation sentences; and
impose revocation terms within the recommended range.

District judges in the Tenth Circuit can take from this that a revocation sentence at the bottom of the advisory range, imposed consecutively and accompanied by an express consideration of § 3553(a) factors, will almost always be substantively reasonable absent unusual circumstances.

4. On Rehabilitation and Sentencing Remarks

The panel’s handling of the Tapia issue offers a practical boundary:

Judges may discuss rehabilitation and programming at sentencing and may view the availability of such programs as mitigating or beneficial, so long as these considerations do not drive the length of the prison term.
Defense counsel considering a Tapia argument should focus on whether the sentencing judge tied the term of imprisonment explicitly to the need to complete programming, or whether rehabilitation was merely an ancillary concern.

5. Nonprecedential but Persuasive

Finally, the order expressly notes that:

it is “not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel”; but
it “may be cited for its persuasive value” consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

Thus, while Coleman does not create new binding law, it can be cited by practitioners in the Tenth Circuit as a persuasive example of how the court:

applies ACCA to multiple federal drug convictions;
applies the presumption of reasonableness to within-range and consecutive sentences; and
analyzes alleged Tapia violations.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. What Is an Anders Brief?

An Anders brief is filed by appointed counsel who, after thoroughly reviewing the case, believes that:

there are no nonfrivolous grounds for appeal, but
counsel is ethically obligated not to file a frivolous brief.

The brief must:

identify anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal; and
be served on the defendant, who may then file a pro se response.

The court of appeals independently reviews the entire record. Only if it agrees that the appeal is wholly frivolous will it grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal.

2. What Is the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)?

ACCA is a federal sentencing enhancement statute:

It applies only to defendants convicted of felon-in-possession crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
If such a defendant has three or more prior convictions for “violent felonies” or “serious drug offenses,” committed on different occasions, ACCA imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years (180 months).

A “serious drug offense” includes certain drug trafficking crimes under the federal Controlled Substances Act, such as possession with intent to distribute cocaine base under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).

3. What Are “Separate Occasions” Under ACCA?

ACCA requires that the prior qualifying offenses be “committed on occasions different from one another.” This generally means that each offense:

occurred at a different time or place; and
is not part of a single criminal episode.

Defendants sometimes argue that multiple convictions arose from a single “occasion” (for example, one arrest involving multiple counts). In Coleman, this issue was simplified because the defendant explicitly admitted that his prior § 841(a) convictions “occurred on separate occasions,” removing any factual or legal dispute on this point.

4. Statutory Minimums vs. Guidelines

In federal sentencing:

The Guidelines provide an advisory range (e.g., 100–125 months) based on offense characteristics and criminal history.
Statutory minimums (like ACCA’s 15-year minimum) are imposed by Congress and are binding on the court.

When the statutory minimum is higher than the top of the Guideline range, U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) makes the mandatory minimum the effective guideline sentence. The court generally cannot go below the statutory minimum absent a statutory exception (such as substantial assistance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), which is not at issue here).

5. What Is Substantive Reasonableness?

Substantive reasonableness asks whether the length of the sentence, in light of all circumstances and § 3553(a) factors, is:

too harsh, or
too lenient.

A within-Guidelines sentence is presumed substantively reasonable on appeal. To overcome this presumption, a defendant must show that the sentence is disproportionate or unreasonable in light of the case’s specifics.

6. What Is Supervised Release and Revocation?

Supervised release is a period of community supervision following a prison sentence. When on supervised release, a defendant must follow certain conditions (e.g., no new crimes, reporting to a probation officer).

If the defendant violates those conditions—especially by committing a new crime—the court can:

revoke supervised release; and
impose an additional prison term, often referred to as a “revocation sentence.”

Under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f), revocation terms are generally expected to run consecutively to any other sentence, meaning they are added on top of the underlying term, rather than overlapping with it.

7. What Did Tapia Prohibit?

Tapia v. United States held that:

judges may not impose or increase a prison sentence in order to make a defendant eligible for a specific rehabilitative program, or to ensure the defendant completes such a program; but
judges may recommend programs and acknowledge their potential benefits, as long as they do not use rehabilitation as a justification for lengthening imprisonment.

In Coleman, the district court’s consideration of correctional treatment as a mitigating factor and its acknowledgment that programming could reduce actual time served stayed on the permissible side of Tapia.

8. Nonprecedential Decisions and Persuasive Authority

A nonprecedential decision (often labeled “Order and Judgment” in the Tenth Circuit):

does not bind future panels or district courts as a matter of stare decisis; but
may still be cited for its persuasive reasoning, especially post–Fed. R. App. P. 32.1.

In Coleman, the panel underscored that its order is not binding except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel in the same litigation, but may be cited for persuasive value under Rule 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Coleman is a concise but instructive illustration of the Tenth Circuit’s approach to:

Anders review: The court rigorously satisfied its duty to independently review the record, especially focusing on sentencing and ACCA issues flagged by counsel.
ACCA application: When a defendant has multiple qualifying federal drug trafficking convictions under the Controlled Substances Act and admits they occurred on separate occasions, the ACCA enhancement becomes extremely difficult to challenge on appeal.
Mandatory minimums and Guidelines: ACCA’s 15-year minimum trumped any lower Guideline range, with U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) rendering that statutory minimum the guideline sentence.
Consecutive revocation sentences: The imposition of an 18-month revocation term consecutive to a 15-year ACCA sentence, both within their respective advisory ranges, exemplifies the Tenth Circuit’s deference to district courts that follow § 7B1.3(f) and adequately consider § 3553(a).
Tapia compliance: The panel clarified that references to correctional programming as potential mitigation or factual context are permissible, so long as they do not drive the sentence length.

Although nonprecedential, Coleman provides practitioners with a clear roadmap for understanding how the Tenth Circuit evaluates ACCA-enhanced sentences, supervised release revocations, and Anders submissions in cases with overwhelming evidence of recidivism and correctly applied mandatory minimums. It underscores the narrow range of viable appellate issues when statutory floors and properly calculated advisory ranges align, and when trial courts document consideration of the § 3553(a) factors and remain within the boundaries set by Tapia.