United States v. Cohen: False Statements About Another’s Sex‑Offender Registration “Relate To” Sex Offenses for Sentencing Purposes

I. Introduction

In United States v. James A. Cohen, No. 25‑1746 (7th Cir. Nov. 24, 2025), the Seventh Circuit confronted a recurring but under‑litigated problem at the intersection of false‑statement prosecutions, sex‑offender registration, and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: when does a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 “relate to” sex offenses such that the harsher obstruction‑of‑justice guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2, applies rather than the more lenient fraud guideline, § 2B1.1?

James Cohen accepted monthly payments to help a registered sex offender (“Individual A”) evade sex‑offender registration requirements by falsely listing Cohen’s address as his residence. When U.S. marshals investigated Individual A’s compliance, Cohen lied, confirming the sham address. He pleaded guilty to making a materially false statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of the executive branch, in violation of § 1001(a)(2).

The district court applied § 2J1.2, including a four‑level enhancement under § 2J1.2(b)(1)(A) because Cohen’s false statement related to a sex offense under chapter 109B of Title 18. This yielded a guideline range of 21–27 months, and the court imposed 21 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Cohen sought to recharacterize his conduct as more akin to “ordinary” fraud, arguing that:

Failure to register under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (the only statute in chapter 109B) is not itself a “sex offense,” so § 2J1.2 should not apply; instead § 2B1.1 should govern.
Even if § 2J1.2 may apply in some § 2250 contexts, it should apply only when the false statement relates to the defendant’s own sex offense or registration, not someone else’s.
Under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the eight‑year statutory maximum in § 1001(a) (for matters relating to offenses under chapter 109B) creates an additional element requiring mens rea that the information failed to allege.

Judge St. Eve, writing for a unanimous panel, rejected these arguments and affirmed. The decision is significant for three principal reasons:

It adopts a robust textual reading of the phrase “relates to sex offenses under … chapter[] … 109B” in the Sentencing Guidelines, effectively ensuring that false statements tied to SORNA registration noncompliance will typically be sentenced under § 2J1.2.
It clarifies the standards of waiver and forfeiture for guideline‑interpretation issues in plea agreements and at sentencing.
It underscores that certain Apprendi-based challenges can be knowingly waived both through counsel’s explicit withdrawal and through a guilty plea.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court’s holding can be summarized as follows:

Application of § 2J1.2 to false statements about SORNA registration. The panel held that where a defendant violates § 1001(a)(2) by lying to federal officials in an investigation concerning a failure to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), that offense “relates to” sex offenses under chapter 109B, as contemplated by U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2 and its Appendix A cross‑reference. It therefore affirmed the use of § 2J1.2 and the associated enhancement.
No requirement that the statement relate to the defendant’s own sex offense. Cohen’s argument that § 2J1.2 must be limited to statements relating to his own sex offense (rather than another’s) was reviewed only for plain error, because it was not raised below. The court found no error that was “clear under current law” and rejected the claim.
Apprendi challenge waived. Cohen argued on appeal that the information failed to allege the requisite mens rea needed to expose him to the enhanced eight‑year statutory maximum in § 1001(a) (for matters relating to chapter 109B offenses). The court held he waived this argument twice over: he expressly withdrew it at sentencing, and by pleading guilty he relinquished the right to attack the sufficiency of the information.

The court also addressed several procedural points:

Cohen’s plea agreement, which contained guideline calculations treating § 2J1.2 as applicable, did not waive his right to later contest the interpretation of the Guidelines, because the agreement characterized the calculations as “preliminary,” “non‑binding predictions” and expressly allowed either party to correct guideline errors.
The rule of lenity does not apply where the Guidelines language is not ambiguous; the court found no such ambiguity here.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Guideline‑interpretation and textualist authorities

United States v. Feeney, 100 F.4th 841 (7th Cir. 2024): Cited both for the standard of review (guideline calculations reviewed de novo when preserved) and for the “cardinal principle” of textual interpretation: courts must give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a text, quoting Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 358 (2014). This principle drives the panel’s refusal to render the Guidelines’ reference to chapter 109B meaningless.
United States v. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762 (2023), and Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110 (2023): The Supreme Court in Hansen noted that a word capable of many meanings is refined by its neighbors—context determines meaning. The Cohen panel invokes this to emphasize that “sex offenses” must be read in the context of the specific statutory cross‑references (e.g., chapter 109B) cited by § 2J1.2.
Coventry Health Care of Mo., Inc. v. Nevils, 581 U.S. 87 (2017) and Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992): These decisions discuss the breadth of the phrase “relate to,” which reaches any subject having “a connection with, or reference to” the enumerated topics. The Cohen court uses these cases to justify a broad understanding of “relates to” in the Guidelines, making it easier for Chapter 109B matters to trigger § 2J1.2.
Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 584 U.S. 709 (2018) and United States v. Kraemer, 933 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2019): Further support for context‑driven interpretation and the expansive scope of “relates to.”

2. Waiver, forfeiture, and preservation of Sentencing Guideline arguments

United States v. Castaneda, 77 F.4th 611 (7th Cir. 2023): Forfeited guideline claims are reviewed for plain error; forfeiture occurs when a party “accidentally or negligently” fails to raise an objection.
United States v. Pankow, 884 F.3d 785 (7th Cir. 2018): Waiver, by contrast, is the intentional relinquishment of a known right and precludes appellate review. The court uses this waiver/forfeiture distinction throughout.
United States v. Scott, 657 F.3d 639 (7th Cir. 2011): A plea agreement can waive a defendant’s right to contest facts that justify application of particular guidelines.
United States v. Issa, 21 F.4th 504 (7th Cir. 2021): Observes that the distinction between factual admissions and legal characterizations in plea agreements can be “illusory” at times. The Cohen court distinguishes that situation from the pure interpretive question raised here.
United States v. Martinez, 122 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 1997), and United States v. Chagoya‑Morales, 859 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2017): Both recognize that an “error in interpretation” of the Guidelines, as opposed to a quarrel with facts, can be preserved when timely raised at sentencing.
United States v. Fuentes, 858 F.3d 1119 (7th Cir. 2017): Further confirms that a defendant can preserve guideline‑interpretation arguments by raising them in a timely objection.
United States v. Young, 908 F.3d 241 (7th Cir. 2018): Explicit withdrawal of an argument at sentencing constitutes knowing waiver.

3. Plain error framework

United States v. Page, 123 F.4th 851 (7th Cir. 2024) (en banc): Lays out the four‑part plain‑error test:
1. There must be an error;
2. The error must be plain (clear or obvious under current law);
3. The error must affect substantial rights (reasonable probability of a different outcome absent the error); and
4. Even then, relief is discretionary and granted only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings (quoting Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503 (2021)).
United States v. McClellan, 794 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2015): On plain‑error review, relief is unavailable unless the error is “clear under current law,” quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993). This standard dooms Cohen’s novel theory that § 2J1.2 must involve a defendant’s own sex offense.

4. Rule of lenity and the Guidelines

United States v. Tinsley, 62 F.4th 376 (7th Cir. 2023): The rule of lenity applies only when there is a “grievous ambiguity” after employing all traditional tools of interpretation. The Cohen court cites Tinsley in a footnote to reject Cohen’s lenity claim; it finds no genuine ambiguity in § 2J1.2 as applied.

5. Guilty pleas and challenges to charging documents

Grzegorczyk v. United States, 997 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2021), and United States v. Grayson Enterprises, Inc., 950 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 2020): A valid guilty plea typically waives nonjurisdictional challenges to the indictment or information, including alleged failures to state an offense. The panel relies on this line of authority to hold that Cohen cannot, after pleading guilty, attack the sufficiency of the information under Apprendi.

6. Apprendi

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000): Any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the statutory maximum punishment must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Cohen invoked Apprendi to argue that the “chapter 109B” fact, and an associated mens rea, were elements never alleged. The court does not reach the merits because it finds the issue waived.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Whether failure to register can trigger § 2J1.2 as a “sex offense” matter

a. The guideline and statutory framework

Two Guidelines provisions potentially govern false statement offenses under § 1001:

U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 (Fraud and Deceit): The default guideline for many economic and false‑statement offenses.
U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2 (Obstruction of Justice): Applies when the § 1001 violation involves obstruction‑related contexts and, as relevant here, where “the matter relates … to sex offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1591 or chapters 109A, 109B, 110, 117 of Title 18.”

The Commission’s Appendix A (Statutory Index) directs that § 1001 offenses be sentenced under § 2B1.1 unless one of the specific relationships in § 2J1.2’s commentary applies (including the “sex offenses” clause). Chapter 109B of Title 18 contains only a single statute: 18 U.S.C. § 2250, “Failure to register,” the federal SORNA implementation offense.

Cohen conceded that his false statement occurred in the course of a federal investigation into Individual A’s SORNA compliance. That is, the “matter” being investigated was a potential § 2250 violation. Nonetheless, he argued that failure to register is not itself a “sex offense” and that § 2J1.2 therefore should not apply.

b. Giving effect to the reference to chapter 109B

The panel’s first move is a straightforward textual argument. The guideline commentary and Appendix A explicitly reference chapter 109B as a category of “sex offenses” to which § 2J1.2 applies. If failure to register under § 2250 were categorically excluded as a “sex offense,” the reference to chapter 109B in § 2J1.2 would be empty because chapter 109B contains only § 2250.

Drawing on Feeney and Loughrin, the court emphasizes the “cardinal principle” that courts must avoid readings that render text superfluous:

“The only statute within chapter 109B is 18 U.S.C. § 2250, ‘[f]ailure to register,’ the offense to which Cohen admits the matter underlying his false statement relates. If, as Cohen suggests, failure to register is not a sex offense, then the Guidelines’ reference to chapter 109B is empty.”

Thus, the mere presence of chapter 109B among the enumerated provisions strongly supports including § 2250‑related matters within the ambit of § 2J1.2.

c. Responding to Cohen’s § 2250(d) argument

Cohen tried to salvage his position by pointing to § 2250(d), which enhances penalties for those who commit a “crime of violence” after failing to register. He reasoned:

Perhaps the Sentencing Commission had in mind such post‑failure “crimes of violence” as the “sex offenses” under chapter 109B;
Therefore, one must evaluate each conviction under § 2250 to determine whether the underlying conduct qualifies as a sex offense or not.

The panel found this unpersuasive for at least two reasons:

Cohen offered no workable standard to distinguish sex offenses from non‑sex offenses for this purpose.
He was not himself charged under § 2250(d), but rather lied in the course of an investigation into a straightforward failure to register under § 2250(a).

More fundamentally, the court stresses that Cohen’s attempt conflicts with the structural signal sent by the Guidelines themselves: when § 2J1.2 lists “chapters 109A, 109B, 110, 117,” it is using entire chapter classifications as shorthand for the categories of conduct the Commission deems “sex offenses” for purposes of that guideline.

In footnote 1, the court notes that Cohen’s argument “assumes that the descriptor ‘sex offenses’ applies to chapter 109B” but declines to resolve that semantic issue directly because it can reject Cohen’s claim on other grounds. In effect, the opinion leaves open whether a failure‑to‑register offense is itself a “sex offense” in some abstract sense, but holds that, in the context of § 2J1.2, chapter 109B’s inclusion brings such matters within the guideline’s scope.

d. The significance of “relates to”

Even if one were to debate whether failure to register is itself a sex offense, the text of § 2J1.2 only requires that the § 1001 matter “relates to sex offenses” under the specified statutes and chapters; it does not require that the false‑statement offense itself qualify as a sex offense.

Citing Coventry and Morales, the court underscores that “relates to” is an “expansive” phrase, reaching any matter that has a “connection with, or reference to” the enumerated topics. Given that:

Only sex offenders are obligated to register under SORNA;
The entire purpose of chapter 109B is to monitor those convicted of sex offenses;
A failure to register directly undermines that monitoring regime;

the court concludes:

“Failure to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act readily bears a connection to sex offenses, and Cohen does not persuade us otherwise.”

Thus, even on Cohen’s own narrower understanding of “sex offense,” his false statement “relates to” sex offenses because it concerns an offense whose existence presupposes an underlying sex‑offense conviction and frustrates the regulatory framework established to manage such offenders.

On this basis, the panel holds that the district court correctly applied § 2J1.2.

2. Whether the matter must relate to the defendant’s own sex offense

a. Forfeiture and plain‑error posture

Cohen’s second appellate argument was that § 2J1.2 should apply only where the false statement relates to the defendant’s own sex offense or registration status, not someone else’s. Crucially, he did not raise this argument in the district court. That failure amounted to forfeiture, triggering plain‑error review under Castaneda and Page.

Under that standard, Cohen had to show at least:

There was indeed an error; and
The error was “plain,” i.e., clear or obvious under current law.

He could not satisfy either requirement.

b. Absence of textual or precedential support

First, the panel notes that nothing in § 2J1.2’s language limits the scope to a defendant’s own sex offenses. The guideline speaks only of whether “the matter relates to” certain enumerated sex‑offense statutes and chapters; it says nothing about whether the defendant personally committed the underlying sex crime or registration violation.

Second, Cohen cited no case law (in the Seventh Circuit or elsewhere) endorsing his proposed limitation. On the contrary, given the broad interpretation of “relates to” in Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent, any such limitation would be difficult to square with current doctrine.

The court therefore held that even if it were inclined to consider such a narrowing construction on de novo review, the absence of textual and precedential support precludes characterizing the district court’s approach as “plain error” under McClellan and Olano.

The practical result is important: defendants who lie to federal authorities about another person’s SORNA compliance face the same § 2J1.2 guideline exposure as defendants lying about their own registration status.

3. The Apprendi argument and waiver

a. The enhancement and Cohen’s theory

Section 1001(a) sets a five‑year maximum term of imprisonment for most false‑statement offenses. However, the maximum increases to eight years “[i]f the matter relates to an offense under chapter … 109B” (among other chapters).

Cohen argued that under Apprendi:

The statutory fact that the matter “relates to” a chapter 109B offense (e.g., failure to register) is a fact that increases the statutory maximum from five to eight years; therefore, it must be charged in the information and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Additionally, he suggested there is an extra mens rea requirement: the government must prove he knew the matter being investigated related to a chapter 109B offense.
Because the information allegedly did not charge that mental state, he argued that he had not been validly charged with the eight‑year version of § 1001, rendering application of § 2J1.2 improper.

b. Explicit withdrawal at sentencing

The district court record made the panel’s job straightforward. Cohen had originally raised an Apprendi objection in his sentencing memorandum. But at the sentencing hearing, defense counsel told the court, in response to the judge’s inquiry, “No, your Honor. We withdraw that,” and confirmed that Cohen was “no longer disputing” the enhancement.

The panel treated this as a classic example of waiver, not mere forfeiture, under Young: it was an intentional and strategic abandonment of a known argument. Waiver bars appellate review altogether—there is no plain‑error backstop.

C. Effect of the guilty plea

The panel also relied on Cohen’s guilty plea as an independent basis for finding waiver. Under Grzegorczyk and Grayson Enterprises, a knowing and voluntary guilty plea generally waives “nonjurisdictional” attacks on the indictment or information, including the claim that it fails to allege all elements of the offense.

Because Cohen pleaded guilty to violating § 1001(a)(2) in a matter he agreed carried an eight‑year maximum, the court held that he could not now argue on appeal that the information failed to state an eight‑year‑maximum offense. The question whether Apprendi in fact requires the charging of an additional mens rea or “chapter 109B” element remains unresolved in the Seventh Circuit, but Cohen is not the vehicle to decide it.

C. Impact and Implications

1. Sentencing of § 1001 offenses tied to SORNA

The central doctrinal effect of Cohen is to solidify that false‑statement prosecutions arising from sex‑offender registration investigations will ordinarily be sentenced under the obstruction‑of‑justice guideline § 2J1.2 if:

The “matter” in which the false statement is made is an investigation or proceeding involving a potential violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250, i.e., failure to register under SORNA; and
There is at least a “connection with” that registration issue.

This has several practical consequences:

Defendants like Cohen—who facilitate another’s evasion of SORNA requirements by lying to federal officers—face more severe guideline ranges than those whose lies concern typical financial frauds or regulatory issues.
Prosecutors can now confidently argue, within the Seventh Circuit, that § 2J1.2 applies to § 1001 charges arising from SORNA compliance checks—whether the registration issue involves the defendant’s status or someone else’s.
Defense counsel in sex‑offense‑related investigations must advise clients that even “just a lie” about residency or registration details can carry guideline consequences approximating obstruction of justice rather than standard fraud.

2. Reading “relates to” in the Guidelines going forward

By importing the Supreme Court’s broad reading of “relates to” into the Sentencing Guidelines context, Cohen reinforces a trend: when the Guidelines use “relates to” in cross‑references or enhancements, the scope is likely expansive. Expect future litigants to cite Cohen to:

Defend application of crime‑specific enhancements where the conduct is one step removed (e.g., false statements about, or obstruction surrounding, the underlying listed offense).
Argue that guideline provisions referencing entire chapters or statutory groupings similarly capture related regulatory offenses (such as registration, reporting, or ancillary conduct) connected to the core offense type.

This approach disfavors narrow, defendant‑friendly constructions of “relates to” absent clear textual cues from the Commission to the contrary.

3. Plea agreements, guideline stipulations, and preservation

The court’s treatment of Cohen’s plea agreement offers important guidance:

Language in plea agreements that guideline calculations are “preliminary,” “non‑binding,” and subject to correction preserves the defendant’s ability to later challenge the interpretation of the Guidelines—even if the plea document itself recites a particular guideline as applicable.
However, factual admissions that necessarily trigger a particular guideline (e.g., “defendant admits the matter relates to a sex offense under chapter 109B”) may still be treated as waiving future factual disputes about guideline applicability under Scott and Issa. Cohen underscores that the key distinction is between facts and legal characterization.
Defense counsel should be cautious when withdrawing objections at sentencing; express withdrawal will almost always be treated as waiver, not forfeiture, and will bar appellate review even of otherwise substantial issues.

4. Apprendi issues left open

Cohen does not resolve, on the merits, whether:

The “matter relates to … chapter 109B” clause in § 1001(a) creates an additional element that must be alleged and proved beyond a reasonable doubt under Apprendi; or
The government must prove a particular mens rea (e.g., that the defendant knew the matter related to such an offense) to invoke the eight‑year maximum.

Because the panel disposed of the argument on waiver grounds, those questions remain unresolved in the Seventh Circuit and may surface in future cases where the defendant preserves the issue and does not plead guilty or explicitly withdraw the objection.

5. Rule of lenity and the Guidelines

Although addressed only briefly, the court’s rejection of the rule of lenity argument is noteworthy. Defendants sometimes invoke lenity to counter broad, prosecution‑friendly readings of guideline language. Cohen reinforces that:

Lenity is a last resort, available only after all interpretive tools (text, structure, context, purpose, precedent) fail to resolve genuine ambiguity.
Where the guideline cross‑reference is textually explicit (here, chapter 109B is named), and the phrase “relates to” is settled as broad, courts will be reluctant to find ambiguity warranting lenity.

This will make it more difficult for defendants to argue that ambiguities in guideline commentary or cross‑references should be resolved in their favor absent a clear split in case law or irreconcilable textual tension.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Matter within the jurisdiction” and “relates to”

Matter within the jurisdiction of the executive branch (18 U.S.C. § 1001): A “matter” is essentially any business, investigation, proceeding, or function that a federal executive agency (like the U.S. Marshals Service) has legal authority to conduct. Lying to a marshal during an investigation of SORNA compliance clearly qualifies.
“Relates to” a sex offense: For § 2J1.2 and § 1001(a), this does not mean the defendant must have committed a sex offense. It is enough that:
- The subject of the investigation or proceeding is a sex‑offense‑related crime (like failure to register under SORNA), and
- The false statement is made in that context or bears a connection to it.

2. Waiver vs. forfeiture

Forfeiture: You forget to assert a right or argument, usually by negligence or oversight. The court can still review the issue for “plain error,” but the standard is demanding.
Waiver: You intentionally give up a known right, often by explicitly telling the court you withdraw or abandon an objection. Once you waive, appellate courts treat the issue as extinguished; they will not review it, even for plain error.

In Cohen’s case:

He preserved his first guideline‑interpretation argument by raising it at sentencing despite the plea agreement; it was reviewed de novo.
He forfeited his “own sex offense” argument by never raising it below; it was reviewed only for plain error.
He waived his Apprendi argument by expressly withdrawing it at sentencing and by pleading guilty; it was not reviewed at all.

3. Plain error review

When an argument is forfeited (not properly objected to in the trial court), appellate courts employ “plain error” review. The defendant must show:

The trial court made a mistake;
The mistake is clear under existing law;
The mistake probably affected the outcome (e.g., the sentence); and
Correcting the mistake is necessary to preserve the fairness and integrity of the judicial system.

Because there was no existing authority or textual hook supporting Cohen’s novel “own sex offense” limitation, he could not demonstrate a “clear” error, and his plain‑error claim failed.

4. Apprendi in a nutshell

Apprendi holds that any fact (other than a prior conviction) that increases the statutory maximum punishment is effectively an element of the offense and must:

Be alleged in the charging document (indictment or information);
Be submitted to the jury; and
Be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Here, the statutory maximum for Cohen’s § 1001 offense was eight years (not five) only if the matter related to an offense under chapter 109B (§ 2250). Cohen argued that this “chapter 109B” relationship, and potentially his knowledge of it, were uncharged, Apprendi-critical facts. The Seventh Circuit did not decide whether he was right on the law because he had waived the argument.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Cohen is a significant addition to Seventh Circuit precedent on sentencing for false‑statement offenses intersecting with sex‑offender registration law. The court:

Affirmed that false statements made to federal officers in the context of a SORNA registration investigation “relate to” sex offenses under chapter 109B for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2, even when the defendant is lying about someone else’s registration status.
Reaffirmed a strongly textualist approach to the Sentencing Guidelines, giving concrete effect to explicit references to chapter 109B and adopting a broad understanding of “relates to.”
Clarified the contours of waiver and forfeiture in guideline litigation, particularly in the context of plea agreements that label calculations as “non‑binding predictions.”
Signaled that lenity will rarely apply to guideline provisions where textual and structural cues are clear, and confirmed that explicit withdrawals of arguments at sentencing function as unreviewable waivers.

For practitioners, Cohen underscores the sentencing risk inherent in lying to federal officers about sex‑offender registration matters and the importance of preserving legal arguments cleanly at sentencing. For scholars and courts, it offers a concrete example of how the “relates to” formulation and chapter‑based guideline cross‑references will be applied in practice, reinforcing a broad, context‑sensitive reading that gives full effect to the Guidelines’ structure and the statutes they incorporate.