United States v. Clark: Reinforcing Rule 32 Fact-Finding Duties When Disputed PSR Allegations Drive Supervised-Release Conditions

Introduction

The Tenth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Clark, No. 24-1215 (Aug. 1, 2025) delivers a meticulous reminder to sentencing judges that disputed facts appearing in a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) cannot influence sentencing unless the court either (a) resolves the dispute on an adequate evidentiary record or (b) explicitly declines to rely on the contested matter. The case arose in an unexpected context: a routine bank-robbery sentencing that spawned a sex-offender–treatment condition on supervised release. Defendant James Robert Clark, having pled guilty to attempted bank robbery, objected that the PSR reproduced unproven allegations from a decades-old warrant affidavit describing hands-on sexual assaults he has always denied. When the district court nevertheless cited those allegations to justify a sex-offense-specific special condition, the Tenth Circuit vacated the sentence.

The ruling cements a clear procedural directive: Rule 32(i)(3)(B) requires a court confronted with a “specific allegation of factual inaccuracy” to rule on the truth of the matter or to disregard it entirely, even when the dispute concerns information used only to fashion supervised-release conditions.

Summary of the Judgment

The panel (Matheson, Bacharach, McHugh, JJ.) held that Clark’s written objection to the veracity of the warrant affidavit triggered Rule 32(i)(3)(B).
The district court neither found the allegations true by a preponderance of the evidence nor disclaimed reliance on them; instead it remarked on “what’s been alleged, what may have happened.”
This speculation constituted legal error. Because the Government did not show the error harmless, the Tenth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The court wove a line of Tenth Circuit authority into its opinion:

United States v. Harrison, 743 F.3d 760 (10th Cir. 2014) – Restated the Rule 32 rule: government must prove disputed fact by a preponderance or the court must ignore it.
United States v. McDonald, 43 F.4th 1090 (10th Cir. 2022) – Distinguished here as dealing with challenges to source credibility rather than to factual truth.
United States v. Vazquez-Garcia, 130 F.4th 891 (10th Cir. 2025) – Recognized the due-process right to be sentenced on accurate information as implemented through Rule 32.
United States v. Pena-Hermosillo, 522 F.3d 1108 (10th Cir. 2008) – Explained what suffices for a “procedurally adequate” Rule 32 ruling.
Additional support came from Tindall, Kaufman, Henry, Lucero, and classic sentencing-due-process cases such as Jones (1981).

Collectively, these cases supplied three propositions:

A defendant’s specific denial of facts triggers Rule 32.
The burden then shifts to the Government to prove those facts or to accept their exclusion.
Error is reversible unless the Government carries the harmless-error burden.

2. Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning advanced in three steps:

Triggering of Rule 32. Clark’s objection – “the allegations are inaccurate and untrue” – squarely contested factual accuracy, unlike objections limited to source credibility. Hence the district court’s fact-finding duties were activated.
Breach of Duty. The district court did not resolve the dispute; instead it expressed that the allegations “may have happened” and relied on that possibility to impose the sex-offender condition. “Speculation,” the panel held, is neither a ruling nor a disclaimer.
Harmless-Error Analysis. The Government argued the condition could rest on the bare conviction and on professional risk assessments, but the panel noted those assessments themselves incorporated the disputed allegations. Because the appellate court could only speculate what sentence the district court would choose absent error, the Government failed to show harmlessness.

3. Impact of the Decision

Heightened Scrutiny of PSR Allegations. Probation officers frequently incorporate arrest-warrant narratives, police reports, or hearsay statements. After Clark, district courts in the Tenth Circuit must be prepared either to demand proof or to jettison the information whenever a defendant specifically denies it.
Special Conditions on Supervised Release. The opinion clarifies that Rule 32 applies not just to guideline calculations but to the entire sentencing package, including discretionary conditions. Courts must therefore build a cleaner record when imposing sex-offender evaluations, computer restrictions, mental-health treatment, or similar liberty deprivations.
Government’s Evidentiary Burden. Prosecutors who wish to rely on unadjudicated conduct must be ready, at the sentencing hearing, to meet a preponderance standard through witnesses, certified records, or stipulations. Failing that, the allegations are off-limits.
Probation Practice Adjustments. Presentence writers will likely limit verbatim reproduction of warrant affidavits or flag them as “unverified.” Treatment providers may also need clearer briefs describing the actual adjudicated conduct lest their risk evaluations collapse in court.
Potential Circuit Influence. Although issued as a non-precedential order, the reasoning is citable under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and may persuade other circuits, especially because it ties directly to constitutional due-process principles.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Presentence Investigation Report (PSR): A dossier prepared by the U.S. Probation Office after conviction, detailing the defendant’s background, offense conduct, criminal history, and sentencing recommendations.
Rule 32(i)(3)(B): A Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure requiring the sentencing judge to resolve any factual dispute about the PSR or to declare the disputed matter irrelevant to the sentence.
Special Condition of Supervised Release: An extra obligation beyond the standard conditions that a defendant must follow after imprisonment (e.g., mandatory sex-offender treatment, computer monitoring, geographic limits).
Preponderance of the Evidence: The civil-side standard applied at sentencing, meaning “more likely than not” rather than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Harmless-Error Doctrine: An appellate rule allowing affirmance of a conviction or sentence despite error if the reviewing court is convinced the mistake did not influence the outcome.

Conclusion

United States v. Clark reinforces a bright-line procedural safeguard: a sentencing court cannot hedge its bets when confronted with disputed allegations. Either it conducts a mini-trial to determine the truth by a preponderance of the evidence or it sentences as if the allegation never existed. The decision protects defendants from liberty-restrictive conditions built on rumor or speculation, forces the Government to substantiate unadjudicated conduct, and guides probation officers and treatment providers toward greater factual rigor. In a criminal-justice era increasingly attentive to accuracy at every stage, Clark serves as a concise yet potent reminder that due-process values do not end at the guilty plea; they permeate the entire sentencing process—right down to the fine print of supervised release.