Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Warren, 22 F.4th 917 (10th Cir. 2022): Warren establishes that motions to reconsider § 3582 orders are proper in criminal cases but must be constrained by the appellate timeframe; it also reiterates that a district court lacks jurisdiction to modify a sentence unless the motion fits within § 3582(c)’s limited exceptions. Warren is the backbone for the 14‑day timeliness rule here and for treating eligibility limits as jurisdictional.

United States v. Randall, 666 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2011): Randall squarely holds that a motion to reconsider a § 3582(c)(2) ruling must be filed within the 14‑day appeal period, warning that allowing reconsideration at any time would mean “criminal proceedings might never end.” The panel applies Randall’s timing rule directly to Chavez’s late motion.

United States v. Smartt, 129 F.3d 539 (10th Cir. 1997): Smartt articulates the Tenth Circuit’s jurisdictional approach to § 3582: unless a resentencing request falls within a § 3582(c) category, the court lacks jurisdiction. The panel invokes this jurisdictional framing in concluding that Chavez’s ineligibility under § 4C1.1(a)(7) deprives the court of authority to reduce his sentence.

United States v. Bernal Salazar, No. 24-6121, 2024 WL 4603965 (10th Cir. Oct. 29, 2024): In interpreting “in connection with” for § 4C1.1(a)(7), the panel looks to § 5C1.2(a)(2) (safety valve) jurisprudence and adopts the familiar standard: a firearm is possessed “in connection with” the offense if it facilitated or had the potential to facilitate the offense. That standard governs Chavez’s eligibility analysis.

United States v. Hargrove, 911 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 2019): Hargrove recognizes firearms as “tools of the trade” in drug trafficking, commonly used to protect drugs, proceeds, and dealers. The panel uses this reasoning to reject Chavez’s contention that unloaded or non‑proximate firearms were irrelevant to his drug crimes.

United States v. Barajas‑Chavez, 358 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 2004); Ysais v. Richardson, 603 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 2010): These cases set the abuse‑of‑discretion standard for reviewing denials of reconsideration, which the panel applies in affirming the district court.

Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005 (10th Cir. 2000); Barber ex rel. Barber v. Colorado Dep’t of Revenue, 562 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2009): They define the narrow grounds for reconsideration—misapprehension of facts, positions, or law—which Chavez failed to show.

United States v. Carrillo, 389 F. App’x 861 (10th Cir. 2010); Coronado v. Ward, 517 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir. 2008): These confirm there is no constitutional right to counsel in § 3582 proceedings; therefore, ineffective‑assistance arguments cannot excuse untimely filings.

United States v. Verners, 103 F.3d 108 (10th Cir. 1996): Places the burden on the defendant to show a sentence reduction is warranted. The panel relies on this in holding Chavez did not carry his burden to negate the firearm‑connection disqualifier.

United States v. Pompey, 264 F.3d 1176 (10th Cir. 2001): Chavez’s reliance on Pompey’s burden‑allocation for the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement is rejected as “apples to oranges.” The burden dynamics for an enhancement at original sentencing do not govern a defendant’s later effort to establish eligibility for a discretionary sentence reduction under § 4C1.1.

Pro se standards: Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836 (10th Cir. 2005); Nielsen v. Price, 17 F.3d 1276 (10th Cir. 1994); Bynum v. City of Oklahoma City, 204 F. App’x 767 (10th Cir. 2006) inform the panel’s approach: liberal construction of pro se filings does not permit deviation from procedural rules and deadlines.

Legal Reasoning

1) Timeliness of Reconsideration: The 14‑Day Rule Applies

The court reiterates a clear timing rule: a motion to reconsider an order granting or denying a sentence modification under § 3582(c)(2) must be filed within the 14‑day window for filing a notice of appeal (Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i)). Relying on Warren and Randall, the panel emphasizes that this constraint prevents endless relitigation—“criminal proceedings might never end” absent such a limit. Chavez’s motion was filed more than three months after the order denying his § 3582(c)(2) motion. That delay far exceeds even the additional 30 days a district court could grant upon a proper showing of excusable neglect or good cause under Rule 4(b)(4).

Chavez’s arguments for excusing the delay fail. He claimed ineffective assistance because counsel informed him of the denial after the 14‑day deadline had passed. But there is no constitutional right to counsel in § 3582 proceedings; thus, ineffective assistance cannot supply “excusable neglect.” He also did not seek a Rule 4(b)(4) extension, and even a granted extension could not have reached a reconsideration filing nearly three months after the order. The district court, therefore, acted well within its discretion in denying the motion as untimely.

2) Jurisdiction to Modify a Sentence Is Strictly Cabined by § 3582(c)

The Tenth Circuit adheres to its jurisdictional view: a district court lacks authority to modify a sentence unless the request fits one of § 3582(c)’s limited exceptions—(1) compassionate release, (1)(B) modifications permitted by statute or Rule 35, or (2) retroactive guideline reductions. Where a defendant is ineligible for relief under the invoked pathway—here, § 3582(c)(2) via § 4C1.1—the court lacks jurisdiction to grant relief. The panel affirms the district court’s alternative holding that Chavez’s ineligibility under § 4C1.1(a)(7) deprived it of jurisdiction even had the reconsideration motion been timely.

3) The § 4C1.1(a)(7) Firearm Disqualifier: “In Connection With” Is Broad

To qualify as a zero‑point offender, a defendant must satisfy all ten criteria in § 4C1.1(a), including subsection (a)(7): the defendant “did not possess … a firearm or other dangerous weapon … in connection with the [drug] offense.” The panel adopts and applies the “facilitated or had the potential to facilitate” standard (borrowing from § 5C1.2 safety‑valve cases) to determine whether the firearm was possessed “in connection with” the offense.

The record defeats Chavez’s claim of eligibility. In his Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea, Chavez admitted that his residence—used to store methamphetamine before distribution—contained approximately a pound of methamphetamine, four firearms, and cash, and that he lived in and operated that premises. He agreed to forfeit the firearms and ammunition as derived from or used in the commission of the offense. He did not object to the PSR’s account of seized firearms, ammunition, methamphetamine, and a digital scale. Citing Hargrove, the panel notes that firearms are commonly “tools of the trade” in drug trafficking. Against this backdrop, Chavez’s contention that the firearms were unloaded or not in the immediate proximity of the drugs is insufficient to show the firearms lacked the potential to facilitate the offense.

Two related points further undercut eligibility: (a) at original sentencing, Chavez received a two‑level enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1) for firearm possession; and (b) the facts that supported that enhancement are the same facts that defeat § 4C1.1(a)(7) eligibility. Although the panel does not say the enhancement automatically forecloses ZPO relief in every case, the overlap of facts is telling here.

4) Burden Allocation: Why Pompey Does Not Help

Chavez invoked Pompey to argue the government bore the initial burden to prove firearm possession “in connection with” the offense. The panel rejects this, explaining that Pompey addressed the government’s burden to justify a § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement at the original sentencing. In the § 3582(c)(2)/§ 4C1.1 posture, the defendant bears the burden to show he meets all eligibility criteria for a discretionary reduction (Verners). On this record, Chavez cannot meet that burden.

5) Second Amendment Argument: Irrelevant to § 4C1.1 Eligibility

Chavez’s Second Amendment assertions do not alter the eligibility inquiry. The question under § 4C1.1(a)(7) is whether firearms were possessed “in connection with” the drug offense, not whether firearm possession was constitutionally protected in the abstract. The panel, echoing the district court, finds this constitutional argument inapposite to the guideline criterion at issue.

Impact and Practical Implications

A. Timeliness of Reconsideration Motions After § 3582(c)(2) Rulings

• Firm 14‑day clock: Defense counsel and pro se litigants must calendar the 14‑day deadline immediately upon entry of a § 3582 order. Late notice from counsel does not create a due‑process or ineffective‑assistance exception.
• Limited extensions: Even if excusable neglect or good cause exists, a Rule 4(b)(4) extension cannot exceed 30 days; motions filed months later will almost always be untimely.
• Preservation strategy: If reconsideration is contemplated, promptly file within 14 days or seek a timely Rule 4(b)(4) extension, and consider protective notices of appeal.

B. The Firearm Disqualifier in § 4C1.1(a)(7)

• Broad “in connection with” standard: The Tenth Circuit applies safety‑valve jurisprudence to ZPO eligibility: firearms that facilitate or could facilitate drug trafficking will defeat eligibility. Firearms at a stash house, even unloaded or not adjacent to drugs, typically qualify.
• Overlap with § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement: A prior enhancement is not per se dispositive but is a substantial indicator the ZPO firearm criterion cannot be met on the same record.
• Admissions matter: Plea stipulations, PSR facts left unchallenged, and forfeiture agreements can be decisive evidence of possession “in connection with” the offense.

C. Jurisdictional Framing in the Tenth Circuit

• Gatekeeping through eligibility: In this circuit, a failure to fit within § 3582(c)’s enumerated pathways is jurisdictional. District courts may deny for lack of jurisdiction where the defendant cannot satisfy § 4C1.1’s criteria.
• Litigation posture: Parties should brief both jurisdiction and merits succinctly; when ineligibility is clear, courts may dismiss for lack of jurisdiction without resolving ancillary issues.

D. Zero‑Point Offender Litigation Going Forward

• Record development: Defendants seeking ZPO reductions must marshal affirmative evidence that any firearms were not possessed in connection with the offense (for example, credible separation in time, location, and purpose), though such showings will be rare in drug‑trafficking cases.
• Second Amendment defenses: Constitutional firearm rights are not a defense to the guideline’s “in connection with” inquiry; expect courts to continue to treat ZPO eligibility as a factual‑nexus question, not a constitutional one.
• Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreements: Although not addressed here, defendants should be mindful that even with a C plea, § 3582(c)(2) relief hinges on meeting the guideline’s eligibility criteria and any applicable retroactivity provisions.