United States v. Charley: Re-affirming Appellate Deference to a District Court’s Balancing of § 3553(a) Factors in Substantive-Reasonableness Review

Introduction

In United States v. Charley, No. 24-1265 (10th Cir. 2025), the Tenth Circuit yet again clarifies the proper scope of appellate review when a defendant challenges the “substantive reasonableness” of a sentence. Defendant Lionel Mario Charley—convicted of attempted carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury—argued that the district court over-emphasized certain statutory sentencing factors and ignored others when it imposed an upward variance to 120 months. The panel rejected that invitation, holding that so long as the district court remains within the “bounds of permissible choice” and gives a sufficiently detailed explanation, the court of appeals will not re-weigh the § 3553(a) factors.

Although the decision is a non-precedential Order & Judgment, it carries substantial persuasive force and, more importantly, synthesises prior Tenth Circuit doctrine into a succinct rule: an appellate court conducting substantive-reasonableness review must defer to a district court’s weighing of the § 3553(a) factors unless the result is “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.”

Summary of the Judgment

District Court Proceedings: Charley pleaded guilty to attempted carjacking causing serious bodily injury (18 U.S.C. § 2119(2)). After overruling two guideline objections, the court calculated a range of 87–108 months but imposed 120 months, citing community safety, deterrence, and the brutal nature of the assault.
Issues on Appeal: Charley claimed the sentence was substantively unreasonable because the court allegedly ignored his mitigating history—tragic childhood, cognitive deficits, and intoxication.
Holding: Applying abuse-of-discretion review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The panel found the district court had explicitly considered all § 3553(a) factors and adequately explained its upward variance. Arguments that the court “ignored” evidence were deemed either (i) waived procedural challenges or (ii) impermissible attempts to re-weigh factors.
Key Takeaway: The Tenth Circuit will not second-guess a district court’s allocation of weight among § 3553(a) factors so long as the court’s reasoning is coherent and within lawful bounds.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion is compact yet rich in citations that collectively paint a consistent doctrinal picture:

United States v. Valdez, 128 F.4th 1314 (10th Cir. 2025) – provides the newest articulation of “substantial deference” and defines the parameters of reviewing upward variances.
United States v. Pena, 963 F.3d 1016 (10th Cir. 2020) – source for the mandate that appellate courts “must consider the extent of deviation” but still “give due deference” to the district court’s overall judgment.
United States v. Sanchez-Leon, 764 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2014) – emphasizes that appellate review is limited to ensuring the sentence falls within “permissible” bounds; attempts to re-weigh factors are disallowed.
United States v. Chavez, 723 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800 (10th Cir. 2008) – foundational for the “arbitrary, capricious … manifestly unreasonable” test.
United States v. Lawless, 979 F.3d 849 (10th Cir. 2020); United States v. Barnes, 890 F.3d 910 (10th Cir. 2018) – reiterate that district courts “need not afford equal weight” to every factor.
United States v. Gross, 44 F.4th 1298 (10th Cir. 2022) – confirms that a district court may consider offense conduct even if guideline enhancements already capture similar facts.
United States v. McCrary, 43 F.4th 1239 (10th Cir. 2022); United States v. Haggerty, 731 F.3d 1094 (10th Cir. 2013) – help demarcate substantive versus procedural reasonableness.

Collectively, these precedents fortify the “high wall” that separates legitimate substantive review from impermissible appellate fact-finding or factor re-weighing.

Legal Reasoning of the Panel

Standard of Review – Abuse of Discretion: The panel reiterated that a sentence is substantively unreasonable only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” This language, borrowed from Chavez and its progeny, sets a steep hill for appellants.
Refusal to Re-Weigh Factors: Charley’s appeal hinged on convincing the court that the district judge over-valued deterrence and community safety while under-valuing rehabilitation and his traumatic background. But the panel stressed that such a claim asks the appellate court to re-balance factors—something it cannot do (Lawless).
Distinguishing Procedural from Substantive Claims: Portions of Charley’s brief arguably sounded in “procedural” error (failure to consider certain factors). The court deemed any such procedural challenges waived because Charley did not properly preserve or brief them, further narrowing the focus to substantive reasonableness.
Permissible Double-Counting: The opinion reiterated that a sentencing court may rely on offense specifics that already triggered guideline enhancements when imposing a variance—a practice sometimes criticized as “double-counting” but permitted under Gross and Barnes.
Deference to Credibility and Fact-Finding: Where Charley disputed whether he used a rock or whether the victim lost consciousness, the panel concluded those arguments attacked factual findings. Because Charley did not develop them and appealed only substantive reasonableness, any factual challenges were deemed waived (McCrary).

Impact on Future Sentencing Appeals and Criminal Law

The decision’s most salient practical effects include:

Re-affirmed High Deference: Defendants in the Tenth Circuit must recognize the high hurdle in overturning sentences on substantive-reasonableness grounds alone—particularly when the district court’s explanation is thorough.
Procedural vs. Substantive Clarity: Litigants must clearly label and preserve procedural arguments (e.g., failure to consider mitigation) at sentencing; otherwise, those arguments cannot be recast as “substantive” on appeal.
Guideline “Double-Counting” Tolerated: District courts may freely revisit offense conduct already embedded in guideline enhancements to justify variances, so long as the explanation shows independent judgment.
Upward Variances Given Cushion: By blessing a sentence 12 months above the high end of the guideline range (approx. 11% upward deviation), the panel signals continued tolerance for moderate variances rooted in community protection and deterrence.
Strategic Takeaway for Defense Counsel: Detailed objections and preservation of procedural claims are indispensable; failure to do so effectively forecloses many appellate avenues.

Complex Concepts Simplified

§ 3553(a) Factors: Statutory checklist guiding sentencing. Includes nature of the offense, defendant’s history, deterrence, public protection, need for rehabilitation, and avoiding unwarranted disparities.
Substantive vs. Procedural Reasonableness:
- Procedural – Was the process correct? Did the court calculate guidelines, treat them as advisory, consider all factors, explain itself?
- Substantive – Is the length of the sentence reasonable in light of the factors, regardless of procedure?
Abuse of Discretion Standard: The appellate court asks whether the district judge’s decision falls within a range of reasonable choices, not whether it is the “best” choice.
Upward Variance: A sentence imposed above the advisory guideline range. Requires justification tied to § 3553(a) factors.
“Double-Counting” Concern: Using the same fact once in the Guidelines and again in § 3553(a) analysis. Allowed so long as the court shows independent reasoning.

Conclusion

United States v. Charley crystallizes a central tenet of federal sentencing jurisprudence: appellate courts do not sit as “super-sentencers.” Once a district court meaningfully engages the § 3553(a) factors and articulates its reasoning, its decision to lean more heavily on certain factors than others is largely insulated from substantive-reasonableness attack. For practitioners, the case underscores the urgency of: (1) making detailed, on-the-record procedural objections; (2) marshaling all mitigation evidence directly to the sentencing judge; and (3) appreciating the formidable deference the Tenth Circuit accords to a thoughtfully explained sentence. In the broader legal landscape, Charley continues the trend of reinforcing district courts’ discretion, thereby promoting finality and predictability in federal sentencing.