United States v. Chandler and the Eleventh Circuit’s Post-Loper Bright Endorsement of Kisor Deference to Sentencing-Guidelines Commentary

Introduction

In United States v. Gregory Chandler, Jr., Nos. 21-14125 & 23-12836 (11th Cir. June 23 2025) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit addressed a bundle of issues arising from a child-pornography conviction: voir-dire management, application of the image-count enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D), oral pronouncement of standard conditions of supervised release, and the timeliness of an appeal challenging restitution. The most consequential portion of the decision cements—at least within the Eleventh Circuit—the continued vitality of Kisor v. Wilkie deference to Sentencing‐Commission commentary in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo.

The Court affirmed Gregory Chandler’s 120-month sentence, upheld the five-level enhancement that converts each video into seventy-five “images,” and dismissed as untimely his appeal from the $24,000 restitution order. In so doing, the panel tacitly adopted a new rule: until the Sentencing Commission (or Congress) speaks otherwise, district courts in the Eleventh Circuit must continue to apply Kisor when deciding whether to defer to commentary that interprets ambiguous guideline text—despite Loper Bright having constrained deference to agency interpretations of statutes.

Summary of the Judgment

Voir dire: No plain error in the district court’s handling of a biased prospective juror.
Sentencing enhancement (§ 2G2.2(b)(7)(D)): The guideline word “images” is ambiguous with respect to video files; the 75-to-1 commentary is a “reasonable” interpretation entitled to Kisor deference; no plain error.
Supervised release: Under United States v. Hayden, orally referencing “standard conditions” without listing them satisfied due-process concerns; no relief.
Restitution: Appeal dismissed for untimeliness under Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A).
Disposition: Conviction and sentence affirmed; restitution appeal dismissed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558 (2019)
Provides the modern framework for Auer-type deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation. The panel found the § 2G2.2 commentary “reasonable” and therefore deferred under Kisor.
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024)
Limiting Chevron deference for agency interpretations of statutes. Chandler argued that Loper Bright should undermine deference to Sentencing-Guidelines commentary. The panel rejected that argument, citing its own recent published decision in United States v. James, 135 F.4th 1329 (11th Cir. 2025), which held Loper Bright does not displace Kisor.
United States v. Phillips, 54 F.4th 374 (6th Cir. 2022)
Notably discussed because the Sixth Circuit had split internally on whether “images” is ambiguous. The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the split but aligned with Phillips’ majority approach in finding ambiguity.
United States v. Hayden, 119 F.4th 832 (11th Cir. 2024)
Controls oral pronouncement of standard conditions of supervised release. Because the district court referenced “standard conditions” and allowed objections, no plain error occurred.
Unpublished Eleventh-Circuit Cases (Carmody 2023; Vandyke 2024; Peralta 2024)
All upheld the 75-to-1 ratio, reflecting growing consensus within the circuit. Chandler is the first post-Loper Bright appellate decision to do so.

Legal Reasoning

1. Ambiguity of “Images”

The guideline, § 2G2.2(b)(7), enhances sentences based on the number of “images” of child pornography. Because the term is undefined, the panel assessed ordinary meaning, noting that reasonable readers could treat a video either as one file or as many constituent frames. Ambiguity being established, Kisor supplied the next step: determine whether the agency’s interpretation is “reasonable.”

2. Applicability of Kisor Post-Loper Bright

Chandler argued that Loper Bright, which curtailed Chevron deference, implied a broader retreat from deferential doctrines. The Eleventh Circuit, however, emphasized that Loper Bright dealt with statutory interpretation by agencies, whereas Sentencing‐Guidelines commentary interprets regulation—a scenario squarely governed by Kisor. Moreover, the Sentencing Commission functions uniquely as a quasi-judicial body under Article III supervision, adding weight to continued deference.

3. Reasonableness of 75-to-1 Conversion

The commentary’s ratio was “not plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the guideline text.” It reflects: (1) typical video length encompassing multiple acts; (2) a need to avoid sentencing disparities between defendants who store videos versus still images; and (3) congressional intent to punish volume trafficking severely. Because the commentary “sensibly conforms” to the guideline, Kisor deference was due.

4. Plain-Error Standard

Chandler had not preserved the statutory-interpretation argument below, so he had to show (a) error, (b) that was clear or obvious, (c) affecting substantial rights, and (d) undermining the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Even if the court were to question the 75-to-1 ratio, any error was far from “clear or obvious”; therefore prongs (a) and (b) failed, ending the inquiry.

Impact of the Judgment

Precedential Guidance: Although unpublished, Chandler reaffirms (and, by citing James, crystallizes) that the Eleventh Circuit will Kisor-defer to guideline commentary unless the commentary is plainly inconsistent with the guideline itself. Practitioners cannot rely on Loper Bright to undermine commentary within this circuit.
Child-Pornography Sentencing: The decision entrenches the 75-to-1 conversion, ensuring that possession of even a few dozen videos will catapult a defendant into the highest image band (>600 images), frequently resulting in five-level enhancements. Sentencing leverage thus remains substantial.
Supervised Release Protocol: Chandler, following Hayden, signals to district judges that blanket reference to “standard conditions” is procedurally sufficient; advocates must object contemporaneously if they wish to preserve arguments.
Restitution Appeals: The dismissal underscores that restitution orders embedded in amended judgments trigger a fresh, but still 14-day, clock. Defendants should file protective notices promptly, even when amendments appear ministerial.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Kisor Deference

A doctrine instructing courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation, but only if the text is genuinely ambiguous, the interpretation is reasonable, and other “traditional tools” of construction do not resolve the issue.

Chevron vs. Kisor vs. Loper Bright

Chevron: Deference to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute it administers.
Kisor: Deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation.
Loper Bright: Limited Chevron; it did not speak to Kisor. Chandler clarifies that distinction.

Plain-Error Review

When a defendant fails to preserve an objection in district court, appellate relief requires showing a clear or obvious error affecting substantial rights, and the error must seriously affect the fairness or integrity of judicial proceedings.

§ 2G2.2(b)(7)(D) Enhancement

Adds five offense-levels if the child-pornography offense involves 600 or more “images.” Because each video is treated as 75 images, only 8 videos are enough to reach 600.

Conclusion

United States v. Chandler is an unassuming unpublished opinion that nevertheless sets an important marker in federal-sentencing jurisprudence: in the Eleventh Circuit, Kisor remains the lodestar for interpreting Sentencing Guidelines, and Loper Bright offers no shortcut for defendants seeking to upend commentary-based enhancements. By affirming the 75-to-1 video-to-image conversion, the court preserves a powerful sentencing escalation mechanism, and by endorsing Hayden, it blesses streamlined sentencing colloquies concerning supervised release. The decision also serves as a cautionary tale on the rigor of filing deadlines for restitution appeals. For practitioners, Chandler underscores the twin imperatives of (1) raising precise objections at sentencing and (2) acting swiftly on amended judgments. For scholars, it highlights the judiciary’s ongoing effort to delineate the boundaries between statutory, regulatory, and agency-interpretive power in a post-Chevron world.