United States v. Castro (5th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025):
Stash Apartments for Drug Proceeds as “Premises for Distributing” Under § 2D1.1(b)(12)

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I. Introduction

In United States v. Castro, No. 24‑40621 (5th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025), the Fifth Circuit confronted a recurring but under-theorized question in federal drug sentencing: whether a stash location used primarily to store large drug proceeds—but where no drugs or paraphernalia are ever found—qualifies as a “premises for the purpose of … distributing a controlled substance” under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12).

The panel (Judge Richman writing; Judge Smith joining) affirmed two sentencing enhancements:

• a two-level firearm enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1); and
• a two-level premises enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12).

Judge Dennis concurred in the firearm ruling but dissented as to the premises enhancement, contending the majority breaks from the guideline’s text and prior Fifth Circuit practice by extending § 2D1.1(b)(12) to premises where only drug proceeds—and no controlled substances—are ever shown to have been kept.

The case accordingly sets an important Fifth Circuit precedent on three fronts:

1. Clarifying that proximity of a firearm to drug proceeds in a drug-premises setting suffices to support the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement, even without drugs physically present.
2. Holding that a premises used primarily to store drug proceeds can qualify as a premises maintained “for the purpose of … distributing” under § 2D1.1(b)(12).
3. Defining the role of a defendant’s plea admissions in supporting these enhancements, and limiting the reach of the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in United States v. Le.

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II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

Rodney Ignacio Castro was a cocaine supplier in a drug trafficking conspiracy spanning several cities in eastern Texas. Investigators tied him to:

• his primary residence on Briarcliff Drive;
• a “stash house” on Great Oaks Drive used for multi‑kilogram cocaine deliveries; and
• an apartment in downtown Houston (Texas Avenue) linked to Castro.

Executing a search warrant at the downtown apartment, officers found:

• a closet containing approximately $1,050,000 in U.S. currency;
• assorted jewelry worth roughly a quarter‑million dollars; and
• an unloaded gold‑plated handgun in a gun case on the closet’s top shelf.

In his plea factual basis, Castro admitted that:

• the cash and jewelry “were the proceeds of [his] cocaine trafficking enterprise”;
• he possessed the handgun; and
• he used the downtown apartment “in furtherance of his drug trafficking activities.”

The Presentence Report (PSR) attributed 39.05 kilograms of cocaine to Castro, yielding a base offense level of 32. It added:

• +2 levels under § 2D1.1(b)(1) (firearm possessed), and
• +2 levels under § 2D1.1(b)(12) (maintained a premises for manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance),

both based on the downtown apartment. After a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the total offense level was 33; with a criminal history category III, the advisory guideline range was 168–210 months.

Castro objected to both enhancements, emphasizing that:

• no drugs or paraphernalia were found in the apartment; and
• no observed drug transactions took place there.

The district court overruled the objections, imposed a 210‑month sentence (top of the range), and stated that it would impose the same sentence as a non‑guideline sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) if its guideline calculations were later found incorrect. Castro appealed.

B. Majority Holding

The majority:

• Applied clear‑error review to both enhancements as factual determinations.
• Affirmed the § 2D1.1(b)(1) firearm enhancement because the gun was possessed by Castro and found in the same closet as massive drug proceeds in an apartment he admitted using to further drug trafficking.
• Affirmed the § 2D1.1(b)(12) premises enhancement by holding:
  • storing drug proceeds can fall within “distributing a controlled substance”; and
  • on this record, storing drug proceeds was a primary (not merely incidental) use of the apartment.
• Distinguished United States v. Le and held Castro’s admission—combined with objective evidence (location, cash, gun, sparse habitation)—was sufficient to support the enhancement.
• Because no clear error was found, the panel did not reach harmless‑error analysis or the district court’s alternative § 3553(a) sentence.

C. Judge Dennis’s Partial Concurrence and Dissent

Judge Dennis agreed the firearm enhancement was proper but dissented on the premises enhancement. In his view:

• § 2D1.1(b)(12) is textually limited to premises maintained for manufacturing, distributing, or storing a controlled substance, not proceeds.
• The record contained no evidence that drugs, residue, paraphernalia, or drug transactions were ever present at the downtown apartment.
• The majority effectively rewrites the guideline by treating “storage of drug proceeds” as equivalent to “distribution of a controlled substance.”
• Under Le, Castro’s admission that he used the apartment “in furtherance” of trafficking is too ambiguous and conclusory—standing alone—to justify the enhancement.

He would have vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing without the § 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement.

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III. Detailed Analysis

A. Standard of Review and the Zapata–King Line

The panel first addresses the threshold question of standard of review. The general rule in the Fifth Circuit is:

• Interpretation or application of the Guidelines—de novo.
• Underlying factual determinations (including application of § 2D1.1(b)(1) and (b)(12))—clear error review.

The court cites:

• United States v. Sincleair, 16 F.4th 471 (5th Cir. 2021), and United States v. Trujillo, 502 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2007) (general standard);
• United States v. Le, 126 F.4th 373 (5th Cir. 2025) (premises enhancement = factual finding); and
• United States v. King, 773 F.3d 48 (5th Cir. 2014) (firearm enhancement = factual finding).

Castro argued for de novo review because the facts were undisputed, relying on United States v. Zapata‑Lara, 615 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2010), which held that when the issue is whether undisputed facts are legally sufficient to support an enhancement, review is de novo.

The majority distinguishes Zapata‑Lara and Sincleair on a narrow ground: those cases involved situations where the district court’s rationale for applying the enhancement was unclear or missing (e.g., whether the firearm was personally or jointly possessed). Here, by contrast, the district court clearly based the enhancement on Castro’s personal possession of the firearm found in the apartment. Thus, the panel treats the application of the guideline to these facts as a factual determination, not a purely legal sufficiency question, and applies the deferential clear‑error standard.

This framing significantly shapes the outcome: under clear‑error review, the appellate court reverses only if left with a “definite and firm conviction” that the district court erred, as reiterated via United States v. Galicia, 983 F.3d 842 (5th Cir. 2020).

B. Firearm Enhancement Under § 2D1.1(b)(1)

1. Governing Legal Framework

Guideline § 2D1.1(b)(1) provides a two‑level increase “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed.” The Fifth Circuit’s framework, synthesized from King, Ruiz, Cisneros‑Gutierrez, Cooper, and Eastland, operates as follows:

1. The government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant possessed the weapon.
2. Possession may be shown circumstantially by demonstrating a temporal and spatial relationship between:
   • the defendant,
   • the firearm, and
   • the drug trafficking activity (including drugs, drug paraphernalia, transactions, or proceeds).
3. Once the government meets this burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show it is “clearly improbable” that the weapon was connected to the offense. See United States v. Ruiz, 621 F.3d 390, 396 (5th Cir. 2010).

The panel reiterates the familiar formulation (quoting Cooper and Eastland) that the government can establish the requisite nexus by showing the weapon was found:

“in the same location where drugs or drug paraphernalia are stored or where part of the transaction occurred.”

What is more controversial here is whether proximity to drug proceeds alone, without drugs or paraphernalia, is enough.

2. Majority’s Reasoning

The majority relies heavily on:

• Castro’s admission that he used the apartment “in furtherance” of drug trafficking;
• the admission that the cash and jewelry were drug proceeds; and
• the physical co‑location of the handgun and proceeds in the same closet.

Under these facts, the panel holds the government established the necessary “temporal and spatial relation” between:

• Castro (who admitted possession of the gun);
• the weapon; and
• his drug trafficking activity (as reflected in the storage of proceeds in that apartment).

To respond to the defense argument that the guideline requires the weapon be found where drugs or paraphernalia are stored, the majority invokes Seventh Circuit authority:

• United States v. Noble, 246 F.3d 946, 954 (7th Cir. 2001), and
• United States v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 807 (7th Cir. 2000),

for the proposition that proximity to drug proceeds alone provides a sufficient nexus to support the enhancement. It analogizes to its own prior decision in United States v. Juluke, 426 F.3d 323, 328 (5th Cir. 2005), where loaded weapons in a residence were found in the same area as cash from drug trafficking.

Thus, the rule emerging is:

The firearm enhancement is proper if a gun is found with large drug proceeds in a premises the defendant admits using in furtherance of drug trafficking, even if no drugs or paraphernalia are actually seized there.

3. Defense Burden: “Clearly Improbable” Connection

Once that nexus is established, the defendant bears the burden to show it is “clearly improbable” the weapon was connected to the offense. The opinion does not detail any alternative explanation offered by Castro (e.g., a wholly lawful reason for the gun), but given:

• the high value of proceeds stored there,
• the admitted link of the apartment to trafficking, and
• the absence of normal residential use,

the majority concludes that Castro did not meet that burden, and the district court did not clearly err.

C. Premises Enhancement Under § 2D1.1(b)(12)

1. Text and Commentary

Guideline § 2D1.1(b)(12) provides:

“If the defendant maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance, increase by 2 levels.”

Application Note 17 elaborates:

• The enhancement applies if the defendant “knowingly maintains a premises … for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance, including storage of a controlled substance for the purpose of distribution.”
• Manufacturing or distributing need not be the sole purpose, but it must be one of the premises’ “primary or principal uses,” not merely “incidental or collateral.”

Prior Fifth Circuit cases have:

• Recognized that the evidentiary bar for “primary use” is “not high.” See United States v. Galicia, 983 F.3d 842, 844–45 (5th Cir. 2020).
• Emphasized that the residential character of premises does not insulate a defendant from the enhancement. See Galicia; United States v. Guzman‑Reyes, 853 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2017); United States v. Rico, 864 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2017); United States v. Romans, 823 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 2016).

However, those cases largely involved premises where controlled substances or paraphernalia were actually found or stored.

2. Majority: Storage of Drug Proceeds as “Distributing”

The central move in the majority’s opinion is to treat storage of drug proceeds as part and parcel of “distributing a controlled substance.” The district court explicitly “agree[d]” that “storing proceeds is part and parcel to distribution,” and the majority affirms that reasoning.

Key factual points:

• The apartment was not Castro’s residence; he lived elsewhere.
• The unit was rented in a woman’s name; only a few items of Castro’s clothing were found; it was sparsely furnished.
• Castro admitted he used the apartment “in furtherance of his drug trafficking activities.”
• More than $1 million in cash and high‑value jewelry—admittedly drug proceeds—were stored there, along with a handgun.
• Castro said he only “stayed there on occasion.”

On these facts, the majority reasons:

1. Distributing includes proceeds handling. The court adopts an “expansive” understanding of “distributing,” reasoning that the purpose of a drug distribution conspiracy is to obtain proceeds, and that transporting, collecting, and securing those proceeds are integral to the distribution enterprise:

   “The purpose of a conspiracy to distribute illegal drugs is to obtain proceeds. Storing drug proceeds is an integral part of ‘distributing a controlled substance.’”

2. “Including” in the commentary is illustrative, not exhaustive. Judge Dennis’s dissent argues that because the commentary gives “storage of a controlled substance” as an example, “storage of proceeds” is excluded by negative implication (expressio unius). The majority responds that:
   • the word “including” in the commentary is generally non‑exclusive, and
   • the force of any negative implication depends on context (citing NLRB v. Southwestern General, Inc., 580 U.S. 288 (2017); Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371 (2013); and Fifth Circuit precedent in United States v. Vargas, 74 F.4th 673 (5th Cir. 2023), and United States v. Cartagena‑Lopez, 979 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2020)).

   In short, “including storage of a controlled substance” is treated as a non‑limiting example, not a statement that only those premises where drugs are stored qualify.

3. Primary use test met. The court emphasizes that the evidentiary bar for “primary use” is low, and that:
   • Casting aside a strong residential use: the apartment was clearly not his main home.
   • The most salient and “primary” feature was the storage of enormous amounts of drug proceeds.

   The majority analogizes to Galicia, where the premises enhancement was upheld for a long‑term family home based on intermittent storage of drugs in a garage a few times over several years. Because that home’s obvious primary function was residential, yet the enhancement was upheld, the majority views Castro’s largely non‑residential apartment—with over $1 million in proceeds—as an easier case.

Thus, the majority holds that it was not clear error to find that:

• Castro maintained the apartment (though Castro did not contest this element); and
• one of the apartment’s primary uses was to advance cocaine distribution via secure storage of its proceeds.

3. Role of Castro’s Admission and the Le Distinction

Castro argued that his plea admission—that he used the apartment “in furtherance of his drug trafficking activities”—was a bare, legalistic conclusion, insufficient on its own to support the premises enhancement.

He relied on United States v. Le, 126 F.4th 373 (5th Cir. 2025), where the Fifth Circuit reversed a premises enhancement that rested essentially on a single admission that the defendant and a co‑conspirator “used and maintained” a motorcycle shop as a drug premises. In Le:

• The “used and maintained” phrasing was ambiguous—potentially admitting only that the co‑conspirator maintained the premises.
• The rest of the factual narrative and record indicated the defendant’s role involved use, not maintenance.
• The panel warned against relying “solely on a single, conclusory statement” in the factual basis when the broader narrative undercuts the enhancement.

The Castro majority distinguishes Le on two key grounds:

1. No ambiguity in the admission. Unlike the “use and maintain” joint phrasing in Le, Castro personally admitted that the apartment was used “in furtherance of his drug trafficking activities.” There was no “and/or” ambiguity or suggestion that only someone else maintained the premises.
2. Robust corroborating evidence. The admission is not operating in isolation. It is buttressed by:
   • the physical evidence of over $1 million in admitted drug proceeds and a firearm in that apartment;
   • the sparse residential character and Castro’s minimal use of the apartment as living space; and
   • evidence that his drug transactions and deliveries emanated from his residence and a separate stash house, supporting the inference that the downtown apartment’s distinct function was proceeds storage.

The majority also notes that Le itself recognized that no prior Fifth Circuit case had held it was error to rely solely on a defendant’s admissions to support an enhancement. Castro thus nudges the law back toward permitting enhancements based principally—even if not exclusively—on clear and specific admissions in the factual basis.

4. Judge Dennis’s Textual and Precedential Critique

Judge Dennis’s dissent is grounded in a stricter textual reading and a survey of Fifth Circuit practice:

• Textual limitation to “controlled substance.” The guideline and commentary repeatedly tie the enhancement to premises maintained “for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance,” “including storage of a controlled substance.” Proceeds are not controlled substances. To treat storage of proceeds as dispositive is, in his view, to:

  “rewrite the enhancement and elide the distinction drawn by our own precedent.”

• Prior Fifth Circuit cases involved drugs or paraphernalia at the premises. The dissent notes that in all prior cases upholding § 2D1.1(b)(12), there was direct evidence of:
  • drugs stored or processed at the site;
  • drug paraphernalia (cutting agents, masks, packaging equipment); or
  • drug transactions directly linked to the premises.

  Examples cited include:

  • United States v. Benitez, 809 F.3d 243 (5th Cir. 2015) (drugs plus paraphernalia at premises);
  • United States v. Rodney, 532 F. App’x 465 (5th Cir. 2013) (premises accessed immediately before crack sales);
  • United States v. Carrillo, 689 F. App’x 334 (5th Cir. 2017) (large quantity of methamphetamine and residue at premises, plus cash);
  • United States v. Fonseca, 834 F. App’x 75 (5th Cir. 2020) (nearly 10 kg of cocaine and substantial cash destined for a residence);
  • United States v. Pardo‑Oseguera, 844 F. App’x 739 (5th Cir. 2021) (400+ grams of meth, paraphernalia, and a firearm at the residence).
• Skepticism about inferring drug storage from cash and guns alone. The dissent underscores that Fifth Circuit unpublished opinions, such as United States v. Rodriguez, 707 F. App’x 224 (5th Cir. 2017), have expressed skepticism toward inferring drug storage from cash and weapons even when drugs were present, and have described some enhancements as “close factual question[s]” even with far more damning evidence (United States v. Lopez, 750 F. App’x 349 (5th Cir. 2018)).
• Application of Le to Castro’s “in furtherance” language. The dissent views Castro’s admission as more ambiguous than the “use and maintain” language in Le. “In furtherance of his drug trafficking activities” could refer to:
  • proceeds storage,
  • planning,
  • meetings,
  • communications, or other collateral functions.

  In the absence of any drugs, paraphernalia, or transactions tied to the apartment, construing that broad phrase to imply maintaining a controlled substance premises “requires overlooking much of the factual narrative itself,” which clearly links actual drug deliveries and stash activities to different locations (Briarcliff residence and Great Oaks stash house).

In sum, Judge Dennis would maintain a rule that:

§ 2D1.1(b)(12) applies only where there is evidence that the identified premises was used to manufacture, distribute, or store a controlled substance—and not where it is used solely to store money or other proceeds.

D. Defendant Admissions and Sentencing Enhancements

A recurring theme in modern guideline litigation is how far courts may rely on plea admissions—often drafted by the government—to sustain guideline enhancements.

Le briefly suggested a more constrained approach, insisting that a single, arguably legalistic admission could not override the balance of the record. Castro recalibrates this trajectory:

• It confirms that a defendant’s unambiguous factual admissions can be sufficient to support an enhancement, especially where the narrative and physical evidence align.
• It narrows Le to situations where the admission is truly ambiguous (e.g., “use and maintain” with multiple actors) or flatly contradicted by a fuller factual narrative.

Practically, prosecutors may:

• draft factual bases that explicitly tie premises to distribution or storage functions; and
• highlight statements that a defendant “maintained” or used a location in specific ways (e.g., receiving, cutting, packaging, storing drugs or proceeds).

Defense counsel, conversely, should:

• scrutinize and, where possible, narrow the language of plea factual bases;
• avoid conclusory phrasing like “used in furtherance of drug trafficking activities” if the facts are more limited; and
• build a record clarifying alternative primary uses of the premises (purely residential, legitimate business, etc.).

E. Harmless Error and the Alternative § 3553(a) Sentence

The district court stated that it would impose the same 210‑month sentence under § 3553(a) “without regard to the applicable guideline range,” essentially announcing an alternative, independent sentence.

Under Fifth Circuit law (e.g., United States v. Giglio, 126 F.4th 1039 (5th Cir. 2025)), a guideline calculation error may be deemed harmless if:

• the district court says it would impose the same sentence regardless of the guidelines; and
• the sentence is substantively reasonable under § 3553(a).

However, the panel explicitly declines to apply harmless‑error analysis because it finds no error at all. The harmless‑error backstop therefore remains in the background, but future litigants may still test such alternative sentences where an enhancement is successfully challenged.

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IV. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. “Clear Error” Review

“Clear error” is a highly deferential appellate standard. The court does not ask whether it would have reached the same conclusion in the first instance. Instead, it asks whether, in light of all the evidence, it has a definite and firm conviction that the district court made a mistake. If reasonable judges could disagree about what the evidence shows, the district court’s view stands.

B. Preponderance of the Evidence

Sentencing enhancements are usually proved by a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning:

more likely than not (51% likelihood), rather than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

This lower threshold, combined with the deferential “clear error” standard on appeal, gives the district court broad latitude in applying guideline enhancements.

C. “Maintained a Premises”

To “maintain” a premises generally involves:

• a degree of ownership, leasehold, or control (ability to exclude others, pay rent, direct use); and
• regular access and responsibility for its upkeep or function.

In Castro, this element was effectively conceded; the dispute centered on the purpose for which the premises was maintained.

D. “Primary or Principal Use” vs. “Incidental or Collateral Use”

The guideline requires that manufacturing or distributing controlled substances be one of the premises’ primary uses, not merely incidental. The Fifth Circuit has “not set [this bar] high,” meaning:

• the presence of even limited, periodic drug‑storage or processing can qualify, if intertwined with the premises’ overall function; and
• the fact that a location is residential does not immunize it if drugs are regularly brought there for storage, packaging, or sales.

Castro extends this concept to premises whose primary distinguishing feature is the storage of significant drug proceeds.

E. Expressio Unius and the Meaning of “Including”

The dissent invokes the interpretive canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius—the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others. The commentary says the enhancement applies to premises used for manufacturing or distributing, “including storage of a controlled substance.”

Under a strict expressio unius view, the express mention of “storage of a controlled substance” might imply that “storage of proceeds” is excluded. The majority, however, emphasizes that “including” ordinarily signals that the list is illustrative, not exhaustive. The canon’s force is context‑dependent; where the text does not clearly signal exclusivity, courts are hesitant to infer it.

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V. Likely Impact and Future Litigation

A. Impact on Drug Sentencing in the Fifth Circuit

Castro will likely be cited for several propositions:

1. Firearm–Proceeds Nexus. A firearm found with significant drug proceeds in a location used in furtherance of drug trafficking is enough to support § 2D1.1(b)(1), even when no drugs/paraphernalia are seized there.
2. Proceeds‑Premises as “Distribution” Premises. Premises used primarily as a “money stash” for a drug trafficking enterprise can qualify as maintained “for the purpose of … distributing a controlled substance” under § 2D1.1(b)(12).
3. Low Bar for “Primary Use.” The decision reinforces that the threshold for finding a “primary or principal” drug‑related use is low—especially when:
   • residential or legitimate uses are thin; and
   • illicit functions (e.g., proceeds storage) are obvious and significant.
4. Admissions as Powerful Evidence. Clear plea admissions about using a premises “in furtherance” of drug activity, coupled with objective evidence (cash, firearms, sparse habitation), will often suffice to support enhancements over defense objections.

B. Strategic Considerations for Practitioners

1. For the Government

• Emphasize large drug‑related cash and valuables stored at any premises, particularly when unaccompanied by typical residential indicia.
• Develop evidence showing that a location had a distinct function in the trafficking operation (e.g., money storage, planning, meeting co‑conspirators), even if no drugs were found there.
• Craft plea factual bases that:
  • expressly identify a premises and its role (e.g., “maintained as a stash location for proceeds of cocaine sales”); and
  • obtain defendant admissions linking the place to “in furtherance” use.

2. For the Defense

• Resist overbroad or conclusory plea admissions (e.g., “in furtherance of drug trafficking activities”) where the real facts are narrower.
• Develop a record showing legitimate primary uses for disputed premises (e.g., actual residence, legitimate business functions) and challenge the characterization of proceeds storage as “primary.”
• Preserve textual and commentary‑based arguments that § 2D1.1(b)(12) is limited to controlled‑substance premises; such arguments may attract future en banc or Supreme Court interest, especially given ongoing debates over the weight to be given guideline commentary.

C. Potential for Further Review and Circuit Tension

The majority’s holding pushes § 2D1.1(b)(12) toward a broader functional understanding of “distributing” that encompasses financial infrastructure (proceeds storage) as well as drug storage and transactions. The dissent’s textualist critique:

• highlights a plausible narrower reading tethered to “controlled substances” themselves; and
• grounds that view in the guideline’s text, commentary, and prior Fifth Circuit practice.

While no explicit circuit split is identified here, future cases in other circuits could adopt a stricter view, creating fertile ground for further appellate clarification. Additionally, in light of Supreme Court decisions such as Kisor v. Wilkie on deference to agency commentary (and analogous debates about guideline commentary), litigants may eventually test whether expansive readings of commentary‑driven enhancements like § 2D1.1(b)(12) remain tenable.

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VI. Conclusion

United States v. Castro marks a significant development in Fifth Circuit guideline jurisprudence. On the firearm front, the panel reiterates that a gun’s proximity to sizable drug proceeds at a premises tied to trafficking activity suffices for the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement, even in the absence of drugs onsite. More consequentially, the court holds that a premises primarily used to store drug proceeds may itself qualify as a premises maintained “for the purpose of … distributing a controlled substance” under § 2D1.1(b)(12).

In doing so, the majority:

• treats proceeds handling as an integral component of “distributing”;
• interprets the commentary’s “including storage of a controlled substance” language as illustrative rather than exhaustive; and
• reaffirms that the evidentiary threshold for “primary use” is low.

Judge Dennis’s partial dissent underscores the stakes of this interpretive choice, warning that extending § 2D1.1(b)(12) to “proceeds‑only” premises departs from the guideline’s text and from prior practice requiring some nexus to controlled substances themselves.

For now, the majority’s approach is controlling in the Fifth Circuit. Drug traffickers who maintain off‑site “money apartments” or similar stash locations face a heightened risk that those locations will trigger both firearm and premises enhancements, even when no drugs ever cross the threshold—and plea admissions will play a central role in that analysis.