United States v. Bustamante: Strengthening the Rule-11 Factual Basis Standard and Re-affirming the Breadth of Sentence-Appeal Waivers
Introduction
In United States v. Mark Anthony Rogue Bustamante, No. 24-11557 (11th Cir. May 8, 2025), the Eleventh Circuit confronted two recurring issues in federal criminal practice:
- What quantum and form of evidence is sufficient under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(3) to establish a factual basis for a guilty plea?
- When and how does a sentence-appeal waiver foreclose appellate review of a defendant’s sentence?
Defendant-Appellant Mark Anthony Roque Bustamante pleaded guilty to a large-scale fentanyl and methamphetamine conspiracy originating from contacts with the Sinaloa Cartel. After receiving a life sentence, he attempted to undo the plea by claiming an insufficient factual basis, and—failing that—contested the substantive reasonableness of his life sentence. The Court, in an unpublished but instructive per curiam opinion, affirmed the conviction and dismissed the sentence challenge, reinforcing key doctrinal points that will reverberate through future plea proceedings in the circuit.
Summary of the Judgment
The panel (Judges Jordan, Luck, and Wilson) held:
- Conviction affirmed: The written factual proffer—though it did not add up the drug quantities into one grand total—listed individual transactions whose combined weight plainly exceeded the 400-gram fentanyl threshold and the 50-gram methamphetamine threshold under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). That was sufficient for Rule 11(b)(3).
- Sentence appeal dismissed: Bustamante’s written plea agreement contained a broad sentence-appeal waiver. The magistrate judge personally questioned him about it, he confirmed understanding, and none of the carve-outs applied. Consequently, any challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his life sentence was contractually barred.
No new statutory interpretation was required; instead, the Court clarified and applied existing precedent in two discrete doctrinal areas.
Analysis
Precedents Cited and Their Influence
The panel relied heavily on a line of Eleventh Circuit decisions governing both Rule 11 factual bases and appeal waivers.
- United States v. Frye, 402 F.3d 1123 (11th Cir. 2005) – Confirmed that a district court may rely on written admissions (e.g., a factual proffer) to satisfy Rule 11(b)(3). The Bustamante panel echoed Frye’s standard: whether “the trial court was presented with evidence from which it could reasonably find that the defendant was guilty.”
- United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185 (11th Cir. 1994) – Established the “strong presumption of veracity” accorded to a defendant’s sworn statements during a plea colloquy. That presumption blunted Bustamante’s later attempt to distance himself from the drug quantities.
- United States v. Colston, 4 F.4th 1179 (11th Cir. 2021) – Reiterated that when the government seeks enhanced penalties under § 841(b), it must prove both the type and quantity of the controlled substance. The Bustamante court applied this framework but found the proffer satisfied it.
- United States v. Puentes-Hurtado, 794 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2015) – Allowed Rule 11 challenges despite an appeal waiver and set the plain-error rubric. Bustamante used Puentes-Hurtado to get in the courthouse door on the factual-basis issue.
- United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1993) – The seminal case on appeal waivers. If the court questions the defendant or the record is “manifestly clear,” the waiver stands. Bushert’s two-pronged test controlled the ultimate dismissal of Bustamante’s sentencing claim.
- United States v. Boyd, 975 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2020) & King v. United States, 41 F.4th 1363 (11th Cir. 2022) – Recent decisions fortifying the contractual nature of appeal waivers; cited to show that such waivers are broadly enforceable absent an explicit exception.
Legal Reasoning
1. Rule 11(b)(3) Factual Basis
The Court applied a straightforward syllogism:
(a) Rule 11 requires a factual basis.
(b) A factual proffer containing individual drug-shipment weights is competent evidence.
(c) Summation of those weights exceeds statutory thresholds.
∴ The factual basis exists.
Critically, the Court rejected the notion that the proffer must expressly total the sums or that later guideline objections negate the earlier Rule 11 finding. The existence of two separate shipments (1,085 g & 5,438.1 g) was independently sufficient even if earlier shipments were excluded.
2. Appeal Waiver Enforcement
Bustamante’s plea agreement contained standard waiver language barring “any sentence” appeal except (i) upward departures/variances, (ii) statutory-maximum exceedances, or (iii) a government appeal. None applied. The Court verified the waiver’s validity under Bushert:
- The magistrate judge explicitly explained the waiver and its exceptions in open court.
- Bustamante acknowledged understanding through a Spanish interpreter.
- He signed the agreement attesting to voluntary acceptance.
Hence, the substantive-reasonableness challenge fell squarely within the waiver’s scope and was dismissed.
Impact of the Decision
Although unpublished, the opinion crystallizes two practical teachings for district courts and practitioners in the Eleventh Circuit:
- Written Proffers Suffice Without Arithmetic Totals
Defense counsel often argue that the government must present a “spreadsheet” or oral testimony to tally drug weights. Bustamante holds that courts may do simple math themselves and still meet Rule 11(b)(3). Expect prosecutors to rely even more on concise written proffers, while defense attorneys will need to contest quantities before the plea is accepted, not at sentencing. - Comprehensive Appeal Waivers Will Be Enforced
The Court’s per curiam dismissal underscores that post-Booker substantive reasonableness claims are foreclosed when a defendant has broadly waived appeal rights. District judges are therefore encouraged to continue the now-familiar colloquy ensuring waiver validity; defendants must weigh carefully the cost of obtaining concessions through plea bargaining.
Down-stream, we can anticipate fewer appellant victories based on allegedly insufficient factual bases when similar proffers exist, and an even higher bar for challenging within-guideline sentences in the face of a waiver.
Complex Concepts Simplified
- Rule 11(b)(3) “Factual Basis” – Before accepting a guilty plea, a judge must be satisfied there is enough evidence to believe the defendant is guilty. It is not a full trial; the bar is low but real.
- Plain-Error Review – If a defendant did not object below, he must prove (1) error, (2) that is obvious, (3) affects substantial rights, and (4) undermines the integrity of the proceedings. A tough hurdle.
- Converted Drug Weight – The Sentencing Guidelines convert different drugs to a common marijuana-equivalent to set offense levels. In the PSI, fentanyl and methamphetamine were converted to 104,753.3 kg marijuana-equivalent, driving a guideline range of 360 months to life.
- Sentence-Appeal Waiver – A contractual clause in a plea agreement where the defendant gives up most rights to appeal the sentence, subject to limited exceptions (e.g., illegal sentence, upward variance, or government appeal).
Conclusion
United States v. Bustamante contributes incrementally but meaningfully to Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence. By endorsing the adequacy of itemized—but untallied—written proffers for Rule 11 purposes, the Court streamlines plea-taking procedures and signals deference to district courts doing basic arithmetic. Equally, the decision fortifies the already substantial wall erected by sentence-appeal waivers. Defendants and counsel must therefore:
- Challenge drug quantities (or other factual bases) before the plea is accepted, not after.
- Understand that a broadly written waiver, once validated in open court, will almost certainly bar future sentencing appeals.
Taken together, these holdings reinforce the finality of guilty pleas in federal court, promote judicial efficiency, and clarify defense counsel’s strategic obligations at the plea stage. While unpublished, the opinion’s logical clarity and reliance on entrenched precedent make it a persuasive authority for lower courts confronting similar Rule 11 or waiver disputes.
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