United States v. Bracken: Anders Review, Sovereign-Citizen Arguments, and True-Threat Prosecutions After Foreclosure Disputes

I. Introduction

In United States v. Bracken, No. 25‑4005 (10th Cir. Dec. 3, 2025), the Tenth Circuit issued a nonprecedential order and judgment dismissing an appeal as wholly frivolous under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The case arises from a series of violent threats made by Ryan Gregory Bracken against attorneys and county officials involved in the foreclosure of his home. Proceeding pro se at trial (with standby counsel), Bracken was convicted of one count of interstate communication of threats under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) and five counts of criminal stalking under 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2). He received a below‑Guidelines sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment.

On appeal, the Federal Public Defender (FPD) moved to withdraw under Anders, asserting that any issues Bracken might raise would be frivolous. Bracken filed his own pro se brief asserting, among other things, pseudo‑jurisdictional theories and a vague double jeopardy claim. The government elected not to respond. The panel (Tymkovich, Baldock, and Phillips, JJ.) decided the case on the briefs, without oral argument.

Although designated as nonbinding, the decision is important for several reasons:

• It illustrates how the Tenth Circuit conducts Anders review in a threat and stalking case.
• It reaffirms that “sovereign citizen”‑style arguments—here rebranded as “American State National Civilian” theories—are summarily rejected as frivolous.
• It applies the Supreme Court’s recent true‑threats jurisprudence in Counterman v. Colorado to threats arising from a foreclosure dispute.
• It approves district court management of a pro se criminal trial, including limiting irrelevant foreclosure evidence, giving a conditional‑threats instruction, and deviating from pattern reasonable‑doubt instructions.
• It upholds guideline enhancements for use of a dangerous weapon and targeting government officials, rejecting a double‑counting challenge.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Foreclosure and the Threatening Conduct

Bracken stopped paying his mortgage, and his lender initiated foreclosure. An auction of his house was scheduled for April 8, 2024. In the weeks leading up to that date, Bracken engaged in “many angry and profane phone calls” targeting:

• Attorneys involved in the foreclosure; and
• Officials and employees of the Salt Lake County Sheriff’s, Recorder’s, and Assessor’s Offices.

The voicemails, as paraphrased and quoted in the opinion and the Anders brief, were overtly violent:

• Reference to “a f***ing tall tree with a short rope with all of your barrister f**ing names on it.”
• Warning that anyone coming to serve an eviction “better come armed 'cause if not you're gonna get shot.”
• Threats to “spit red hot f***ing 7.62 by 39 millimeter lead” at the victims’ heads and “center mass.”
• Statement that if the auction proceeded, he would “open fire” on “anybody and all who step foot on this property” and would “shut you down there too.”
• Threats that the first sheriff to attempt an eviction would be met with gunfire.
• A statement that if the sheriff’s sale went forward, the sheriff would be “held responsible for treasonous acts” and would “swing from a rope.”

The threats were not merely abstract or hyperbolic. The evidence at trial established that Bracken owned a Kalashnikov rifle and ammunition consistent with the caliber referenced in his threats (7.62×39mm), underscoring their concreteness and credibility.

Bracken was arrested on April 5, 2024, and indicted less than two weeks later.

B. District Court Proceedings

After a Faretta hearing, the district court granted Bracken’s request to represent himself, with the Federal Public Defender appointed as standby counsel.

Pretrial, Bracken filed several unconventional motions and requests, arguing, among other things:

• The district court and/or the federal government lacked jurisdiction over him.
• The prosecution should be dismissed as a “sham.”
• He was entitled to discovery of items like the court’s “DUN & Bradstreet number.”
• Voir dire should include questions reflecting his personal and idiosyncratic view of the law.

The district court denied these requests, characterizing them as “indicative of the sovereign citizen movement or otherwise wholly unsupported or nonsensical,” and “completely without merit and patently frivolous.”

At trial, the jury convicted Bracken of:

• One count of interstate communication of threats, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c); and
• Five counts of criminal stalking under 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2), acquitting him on one additional stalking count.

The district court sentenced Bracken to 60 months’ imprisonment and 36 months of supervised release—substantially below the advisory Guidelines range of 108 to 135 months, which had been enhanced for, inter alia, use of a dangerous weapon, a pattern of threatening conduct, and targeting government officials.

Post‑conviction, Bracken filed a motion to vacate the judgment raising similar arguments to his pretrial filings; the district court again denied these as frivolous.

C. The Appeal and Anders Briefing

Bracken filed a notice of appeal. The FPD, now in a traditional appellate role, filed an Anders brief and moved to withdraw from representation, concluding that any issues that might be raised on appeal would be wholly frivolous. Bracken received a copy of the Anders brief and submitted a pro se opening brief in response, asserting:

• That the case had been brought “quasi in rem” and therefore lacked validity “in personam” as to him;
• That he had “never appeared in Court;”
• That the government never held “a prescribed title or paramount title to the property;” and
• That his convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, without explaining how.

The government declined to file a response brief. After examining the briefs and record, the panel unanimously concluded that oral argument would not materially assist and submitted the case without argument.

Pursuant to Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1, the court designated the order and judgment as non‑precedential, except under law‑of‑the‑case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel, but allowed citation for persuasive value.

III. Summary of the Tenth Circuit’s Decision

Applying Anders, the Tenth Circuit independently reviewed the entire record, including:

• The issues flagged in the FPD’s Anders brief; and
• The contentions in Bracken’s pro se filing.

The court held that:

• All potential claims were “wholly frivolous,” including those concerning jurisdiction, sovereign‑citizen‑style theory, and alleged First Amendment protection of the threats.
• The district court’s exclusion of detailed evidence regarding the legality of the foreclosure was within its discretion under the Federal Rules of Evidence; any contrary argument would be frivolous.
• The evidence was more than sufficient to support the § 875(c) and § 2261A(2) convictions; a sufficiency challenge would be frivolous.
• The reasonable‑doubt jury instruction, though differing from the pattern instruction, was not plainly erroneous, and any challenge would be frivolous.
• The district court properly gave a conditional‑threats instruction; any challenge based on timing or substance would fail.
• The sentencing enhancements under U.S.S.G. §§ 2A6.2(b)(1) and 3A1.2(a), (b) did not constitute impermissible double counting, and the below‑Guidelines sentence left no nonfrivolous basis for appeal.
• Bracken’s pro se jurisdictional and double‑jeopardy assertions were “plainly frivolous” and inadequately developed under Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A).

The court therefore:

• Granted counsel’s motion to withdraw; and
• Dismissed the appeal.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Anders Framework and the Court’s Role

Under Anders v. California, appointed counsel who concludes after a conscientious review that an appeal is wholly frivolous must:

1. Advise the court and request permission to withdraw; and
2. Submit a brief identifying any potential issues that might arguably support the appeal, even if counsel believes they lack merit.

The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Calderon, 428 F.3d 928 (10th Cir. 2005), reiterated that once an Anders brief is filed:

• The defendant may submit his own arguments to the court; and
• The court must conduct a “full examination of all the proceedings” to determine whether the appeal is in fact frivolous.

Here, the court explicitly invoked this framework. It:

• Reviewed both the FPD’s Anders brief and Bracken’s pro se brief.
• Independently analyzed potential issues across all phases of the case:
  • Pretrial motions and rulings;
  • Evidentiary rulings at trial;
  • Sufficiency of the evidence;
  • Jury instructions;
  • Sentencing; and
  • Post‑trial motions.

The resulting opinion provides a roadmap of what the Tenth Circuit deems frivolous in a threat‑and‑stalking case, and thus functions as practical guidance for criminal defense counsel contemplating an Anders filing in similar cases.

B. Sovereign‑Citizen‑Style Jurisdictional Arguments and Benabe

A core feature of Bracken’s litigation strategy was reliance on pseudo‑legal theories commonly associated with the “sovereign citizen” movement, although he self‑styled as an “American State National Civilian.” His filings asserted:

• Lack of jurisdiction over him personally;
• The federal prosecution was a “sham;”
• The court was obliged to produce its DUN & Bradstreet number; and
• Voir dire should test jurors on his personal alternative legal theories.

The district court summarily rejected these as frivolous, and the Tenth Circuit “agree[d.”] It relied on United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011), which has become a leading case on this point:

"[R]egardless of an individual's claimed status … as a 'sovereign citizen,' a 'secured‑party creditor,' or a 'flesh‑and‑blood human being,' that person is not beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. These theories should be rejected summarily, however they are presented."

Key points from the court’s treatment:

• Changing the label—from “sovereign citizen” to “American State National Civilian”—does not change the legal analysis; the arguments remain frivolous.
• These theories do not create legitimate jurisdictional defects or defenses in federal prosecutions.
• On appeal, re‑asserting similar arguments in pro se briefs does not preserve any nonfrivolous issue; instead, it invites summary rejection.

The opinion thus reinforces a cross‑circuit consensus: courts will not expend resources on pseudo‑legal theories that deny the legitimacy of the judicial system or misapply concepts like “quasi in rem” jurisdiction to a criminal prosecution. For trial and appellate courts, Bracken provides further support to:

• Identify such arguments as non‑starters; and
• Reject them without extensive discussion, even in criminal cases where liberty is at stake.

C. First Amendment and “True Threats” After Counterman

Bracken suggested that his statements were protected speech under the First Amendment. The district court, citing Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023), held that they were unprotected “true threats.” The Tenth Circuit “see[s] no non‑frivolous basis” for appealing that ruling.

In Counterman, the Supreme Court clarified that:

• “True threats of violence” are not protected speech; and
• The First Amendment requires the prosecution to establish, at minimum, a mental state of recklessness with respect to the threatening nature of the communication.

The threats at issue in Bracken—explicit threats to shoot, hang, or otherwise kill named officials and participants in a foreclosure process—are paradigmatic true threats:

• They were directed at specific identifiable individuals or groups (attorneys, county officials).
• They were delivered directly to those individuals via phone calls and voicemails.
• They referenced an actual firearm and specific ammunition that Bracken possessed.
• They were tied to an imminent, real‑world event (the scheduled foreclosure auction and anticipated eviction).

In this posture, any First Amendment challenge would not merely be weak but, in the court’s view, frivolous:

• On the “speech vs. threat” line: There was no plausible argument that these statements were political hyperbole, rhetorical exaggeration, or protected advocacy.
• On mens rea: The repeated, graphic, and context‑specific nature of the threats makes it virtually impossible to argue that Bracken did not at least recognize a substantial risk that his words would be perceived as threatening violence.

Bracken thus illustrates how post‑Counterman true‑threats doctrine applies to violent responses to foreclosure proceedings: an economic or property dispute does not confer any special First Amendment immunity for express threats of lethal force.

D. Exclusion of Evidence About the “Illegality” of the Foreclosure

Bracken attempted to transform his criminal trial into a forum for litigating the legality of the underlying foreclosure. The district court drew a careful line:

• It permitted Bracken to “make reference to the fact that [he] believe[d] the foreclosure … was done illegally.”
• It forbade a “mini trial over the merits of [the] foreclosure,” including:
  • Detailed testimony about the validity of his mortgage; or
  • Assertions that it was “not in arrears.”

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit applied abuse‑of‑discretion review, citing United States v. Rudolph, 152 F.4th 1197, 1229 (10th Cir. 2025), and the relevance rules (Fed. R. Evid. 401–403). It held:

• The legality of the foreclosure was not relevant to any element of the charged offenses:
  • Interstate communication of threats under § 875(c); or
  • Stalking under § 2261A(2).
• Allowing a mini‑trial on those civil issues would risk confusing the jury, wasting time, and diverting focus from whether the threats occurred and met statutory elements.

The court concluded that any appellate challenge to these evidentiary rulings would itself be frivolous.

The opinion thereby:

• Affirms district courts’ authority to preclude litigants from converting criminal threat prosecutions into collateral attacks on underlying civil or administrative disputes.
• Provides a model approach: allow the defendant to explain his subjective belief or emotional context, but bar detailed adjudication of civil legality that is not an element of the offense or recognized defense.

E. Sufficiency of the Evidence on § 875(c) and § 2261A(2) Counts

Bracken moved for a judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The district court rejected the motion, and the Tenth Circuit found that any appellate sufficiency challenge would be frivolous.

1. Elements of the Offenses

For the § 2261A(2) stalking counts, the court described the elements as:

1. Use of a facility of interstate commerce;
2. With intent to harass and intimidate; and
3. Conduct that caused, or would reasonably be expected to cause, the victims substantial emotional distress.

The opinion notes the district court’s reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) and Counterman in analyzing the mental‑state and harm elements.

For the § 875(c) interstate threat count, the district court identified these elements:

1. Knowing transmission of a communication in interstate commerce;
2. Containing a threat to cause physical injury;
3. With intent to make the threat, or knowledge that it would be viewed as such.

2. Evidence Supporting the Elements

The Tenth Circuit highlighted several key evidentiary points:

• Interstate commerce:
  • Bracken used a cellular telephone to make the calls.
  • The voicemail underlying the § 875(c) count was delivered by an out‑of‑state server, thereby satisfying the interstate nexus.
• Threatening content and intent:
  • Bracken expressly threatened “death” as the punishment for “treason” in a call to a County Recorder’s Office employee.
  • His messages consistently threatened to open fire with a specific caliber weapon at specific people performing specific functions (foreclosure sale, eviction).
  • The tone, frequency, and graphic detail of the threats strongly supported that he intended them to be perceived as threats, or at least knew they would be so viewed.
• Emotional distress:
  • The combination of numerous threats, their specificity, and the defendant’s possession of matching weaponry would reasonably be expected to cause, and did cause, substantial emotional distress to the victims.

The jury’s partial acquittal—one stalking count—also suggests it carefully parsed the evidence, undercutting any suggestion that the convictions were the product of generalized prejudice rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Given this record, the Tenth Circuit found no conceivable nonfrivolous argument that the evidence was insufficient, and therefore no arguable error in the denial of Bracken’s Rule 29 motion.

F. Jury Instructions: Reasonable Doubt and Conditional Threats

1. Reasonable Doubt and the Presumption of Innocence

The district court’s reasonable‑doubt instruction diverged from the circuit’s pattern instruction. Bracken did not object at trial, so the Tenth Circuit reviewed any potential error only for plain error, citing United States v. Fishman, 645 F.3d 1175, 1193 (10th Cir. 2011).

Under plain‑error review, a defendant must show:

1. An error;
2. That is clear or obvious (plain);
3. That affects substantial rights (usually meaning it affected the outcome); and
4. That seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

The court found:

• The instruction was neither a misstatement of the law nor misleading to the jury.
• District courts have “substantial latitude and discretion in tailoring and formulating jury instructions,” citing United States v. Sockey, 157 F.4th 1282, 1285 (10th Cir. 2025).
• Jury instructions “need not be perfect,” so long as, taken as a whole, they correctly convey the concept of reasonable doubt (Tillman v. Cook, 215 F.3d 1116, 1127 (10th Cir. 2000)).

Because the instruction here met that standard, any appeal challenging it would fail at the first or second plain‑error prong and is therefore frivolous in the Anders sense.

2. Conditional Threats Instruction

Bracken tried to recast his comments as “harsh conditional statements” rather than true threats, insisting that framing them as “if/then” propositions took them outside the statute. In response, the government requested a conditional‑threats instruction.

Bracken objected only that the request was untimely because it came after the court’s pretrial instruction‑submission deadline. He did not object to the legal accuracy of the instruction.

The Tenth Circuit disposed of both the timing and substance issues:

• Timing:
  • Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(a), parties must request instructions at the close of evidence or by any earlier deadline the court reasonably sets.
  • The government’s request was made after the pretrial deadline but before closing arguments, and in direct response to trial testimony.
  • District courts have “significant latitude over case management,” citing United States v. Teerlink, 141 F.4th 1126, 1133 (10th Cir. 2025); thus there was no abuse of discretion.
• Substantive law:
  • The instruction was consistent with Tenth Circuit precedent, notably United States v. Dillard, 795 F.3d 1191, 1200 (10th Cir. 2015), which holds that “[a] statement may constitute a true threat even if it is conditional.”
  • Given the absence of a contemporaneous objection to the content, any challenge would be reviewed only for plain error, and there was none.

As a result, the court deemed any attack on the conditional‑threats instruction frivolous. The opinion serves as a clear reminder that defendants cannot immunize violent communications by embedding them in conditional phrasing (“if you do X, I will kill you” remains a threat).

G. Sentencing, Guidelines Enhancements, and Double Counting

The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) calculated an advisory Guideline imprisonment range of 108 to 135 months. This range reflected:

• Application of U.S.S.G. § 2A6.2(b)(1) (stalking/threatening communications) enhancements because:
  • Bracken possessed a dangerous weapon; and
  • He engaged in “a pattern of activity involving stalking, threatening, harassing, or assaulting the same victim.”
• Application of U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(a), (b), which enhances sentences when the offense is motivated by the status of the victims as government officials.

The district court adopted the PSR’s calculations over Bracken’s objection that the § 2A6.2(b)(1) enhancement impermissibly double‑counted his conduct. It then imposed a significant downward variance to 60 months’ imprisonment.

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit relied on United States v. Campus, 147 F.4th 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2025), which defines impermissible double counting as occurring when “the same conduct … is used to support separate increases under separate enhancement provisions which necessarily overlap, are indistinct, and serve identical purposes.”

The court concluded:

• The enhancements under §§ 2A6.2(b)(1) and 3A1.2(a) did not “necessarily overlap” or serve “identical purposes.”
• Section 2A6.2(b)(1) focuses on increased dangerousness and culpability arising from:
  • Use or possession of a dangerous weapon; and
  • A pattern of threatening or stalking conduct toward the same victim.
• Section 3A1.2(a), (b) addresses a distinct societal harm: targeting government officials because of their official status or duties, which threatens institutional integrity and public service.

Because the enhancements address different aspects of the harm and risk (weapon/pattern vs. official victim), their cumulative application was proper. Given that Bracken also received a sentence substantially below the calculated range, any appellate challenge to the sentence would be doubly infirm: doctrinally unsound and practically unlikely to succeed.

H. Pro Se Claims: “Quasi in Rem” Jurisdiction and Double Jeopardy

Bracken’s pro se brief restated and repackaged his pseudo‑legalism in appellate terms:

• He described the case as brought “quasi in rem” and claimed it therefore could not bind him “in personam.”
• He asserted he had “never appeared in Court,” despite the record showing otherwise.
• He claimed the government lacked “prescribed title or paramount title” to his property.
• He alleged a Double Jeopardy Clause violation without explanation.

The Tenth Circuit:

• Affirmed that, even liberally construed, these contentions were “plainly frivolous.”
• Declined to “act as his advocate,” citing Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).
• Noted that Bracken cited no supporting authority, in violation of Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A), and therefore forfeited meaningful appellate review.

From a doctrinal standpoint:

• Quasi in rem vs. in personam: These are civil jurisdiction concepts relating to whether a court exercises authority over property (quasi in rem) or over a person (in personam). They do not meaningfully apply to a straightforward federal criminal prosecution for threats and stalking, where the federal court has subject‑matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and personal jurisdiction by virtue of the defendant’s physical presence before the court.
• Double jeopardy: The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against:
  • A second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal;
  • A second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and
  • Multiple punishments for the same offense.
  Bracken faced a single prosecution with multiple counts based on discrete statutory offenses (§ 875(c) and § 2261A(2)), and he pointed to no prior prosecution or multiple punishments for the same offense.

The court’s summary rejection of these claims underscores that merely invoking constitutional or jurisdictional vocabulary—without coherent argument or support—does not preserve an issue or prevent an appeal from being deemed wholly frivolous.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. What Is an Anders Appeal?

An Anders appeal is a special procedure used when appointed counsel believes there are no nonfrivolous issues to raise. Instead of filing a conventional merits brief, counsel:

• Files an Anders brief explaining why the appeal lacks merit and identifying any possible but weak issues;
• Serves the brief on the client, who may respond pro se; and
• Asks the appellate court to allow withdrawal.

The appellate court then independently reviews the record. If it agrees there are no nonfrivolous issues, it may grant withdrawal and dismiss or summarily affirm.

2. Faretta Hearing and Self‑Representation

Under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to represent himself, provided the waiver of counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. A Faretta hearing is an inquiry by the court to ensure the defendant understands:

• The dangers and disadvantages of self‑representation; and
• The nature of the charges, potential penalties, and the rules that will apply.

In Bracken, the district court held such a hearing before allowing him to proceed pro se with standby counsel.

3. “True Threats” vs. Protected Speech

The First Amendment does not protect “true threats”—statements that:

• Convey a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence; and
• Are made with at least recklessness as to whether they will be understood as threats (Counterman).

Conditional phrasing (e.g., “If you do X, I will kill you”) does not remove such statements from the “true threat” category; courts look to the context, specificity, and credibility of the threat.

4. “Facility of Interstate Commerce”

Federal threat and stalking statutes often require that the defendant use a “facility of interstate commerce.” Common examples include:

• Telephones (including cellular phones);
• Internet services (email, social media, messaging platforms);
• Mail; and
• Telecommunication networks that route communications across state lines, such as out‑of‑state voicemail servers.

In Bracken, proof that calls were made by cell phone and that a voicemail was delivered via an out‑of‑state server satisfied this element.

5. “Substantial Emotional Distress” in Stalking Law

Under § 2261A(2), the government must show that the defendant’s conduct:

• Caused substantial emotional distress to the victim; or
• Would be reasonably expected to cause such distress to a reasonable person in the victim’s circumstances.

Substantial emotional distress can be inferred from:

• The nature and frequency of the conduct;
• The specificity and gravity of threats; and
• Contextual factors like the defendant’s access to weapons or proximity to the victim.

6. Jury Instructions, Pattern Instructions, and Plain Error

Appellate courts review jury instructions by looking at the instructions “as a whole” to ensure they fairly and accurately state the law. Pattern instructions are recommended, but not mandatory. Deviating from them is permissible so long as the substance remains accurate and non‑misleading.

When a defendant fails to object at trial, any error is reviewed for “plain error,” a demanding standard that will rarely justify reversal unless the error is obvious, outcome‑determinative, and seriously undermines the fairness of the proceeding.

7. Double Counting under the Sentencing Guidelines

“Double counting” occurs when the same aspect of the defendant’s conduct is used to increase the sentence multiple times under Guideline provisions that overlap and serve identical purposes. But the Guidelines often intentionally punish different aspects of conduct separately, such as:

• The inherent seriousness of an offense (base offense level);
• Use of a dangerous weapon;
• Targeting official victims; and
• Pattern or repetition of conduct.

Using enhancements that reflect conceptually distinct harms or risks—like weapon use and official‑victim status—is generally permissible.

8. “Sovereign Citizen” and Related Theories

“Sovereign citizen”‑type arguments typically assert that:

• The government or courts lack jurisdiction over the individual;
• Only certain pseudo‑legal forms (e.g., special “contracts,” “secured party creditor” status) create obligations;
• Government actors are mere corporate entities identified by DUN & Bradstreet numbers.

Federal courts have uniformly rejected such theories as frivolous, as illustrated by Benabe and reaffirmed in Bracken. Rebranding these ideas under new labels—such as “American State National Civilian”—changes neither their nature nor their legal validity.

9. “Quasi in Rem” vs. “In Personam” Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases

In civil litigation:

• In personam jurisdiction is the court’s authority over a person.
• Quasi in rem jurisdiction is jurisdiction over a person’s interest in property within the court’s territorial reach.

Federal criminal prosecutions, by contrast, rest on:

• Subject‑matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (federal crimes); and
• Personal jurisdiction by virtue of the defendant’s presence before the court on the charged offenses.

Framing a criminal case as “quasi in rem” because it was triggered by a foreclosure is conceptually mistaken and, as the Tenth Circuit noted, frivolous.

VI. Broader Impact and Practical Implications

1. For Defense Counsel and Anders Practice

Bracken is notable as a comprehensive catalog of issues that the Tenth Circuit deems frivolous in a threat and stalking context. It should guide defense counsel deciding whether to:

• File an Anders brief where the record, as here, overwhelmingly supports guilt and there are no colorable procedural or constitutional claims;
• Omit pseudo‑jurisdictional or sovereign‑citizen‑style arguments from serious appellate advocacy; and
• Focus any potential challenges on realistically contestable issues (which were absent here).

2. For Trial Judges Managing Pro Se Defendants

The opinion validates several important trial‑management choices:

• Granting self‑representation after a proper Faretta hearing but keeping standby counsel in place;
• Firmly rejecting frivolous motions rooted in pseudo‑legal theories;
• Limiting irrelevant and confusing evidence about the underlying foreclosure while allowing the defendant to explain his perceived grievances;
• Deviating from pattern instructions where appropriate, so long as the law is correctly stated; and
• Adapting jury instructions mid‑trial in response to the evidence and defenses framed by the parties, including adding a conditional‑threats instruction.

In this way, Bracken offers persuasive support for robust yet balanced judicial control over the trial process when defendants seek to inject sovereign‑citizen or other fringe theories.

3. For Threat and Stalking Prosecutions

Substantively, Bracken reinforces several prosecutorial and doctrinal points:

• Classic, explicit threats of lethal violence to specific victims, even if framed conditionally, remain squarely within the ambit of § 875(c) and § 2261A(2).
• Use of modern communications infrastructure—such as cell phones and out‑of‑state servers—satisfies the “facility of interstate commerce” requirement.
• The emotional impact on victims can be established through the nature and volume of the threatening conduct, especially when accompanied by evidence of firepower.
• Guideline enhancements for dangerous weapons, patterns of conduct, and official victims can be combined without constituting impermissible double counting.

The case thus strengthens the hand of prosecutors (and reassures public officials) that violent threats tied to government functions, including foreclosure and eviction, can be vigorously prosecuted and punished.

4. Free‑Speech and Protest Context

The opinion implicitly draws a line between:

• Protected expression of anger, dissent, or criticism about governmental or corporate conduct, including foreclosures; and
• Unprotected threats of actual violence directed at specific individuals performing those functions.

While nonviolent protest against foreclosure practices remains constitutionally safeguarded, Bracken confirms that the First Amendment does not shield explicit threats to kill or harm judges, attorneys, sheriffs, or clerks, regardless of the defendant’s perceived grievances.

5. Persuasive but Nonprecedential Authority

Because the opinion is designated as nonprecedential, it does not bind later panels except under limited doctrines like law of the case or res judicata. Nonetheless, under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and Tenth Cir. R. 32.1, it may be cited for its persuasive value.

Given its:

• Clear application of Anders procedures;
• Summarization of sovereign‑citizen argument treatment;
• Integration of Counterman into true‑threat analysis; and
• Structured handling of jury instructions and sentencing enhancements;

Bracken is likely to be cited in future litigation involving:

• Frivolous appellate issues in threat and stalking cases;
• Courts’ authority to manage pro se litigants who espouse pseudo‑legal doctrines; and
• Disputes over conditional‑threats instructions and the First Amendment.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Bracken stands as a thorough illustration of the Tenth Circuit’s approach to an Anders appeal arising from a foreclosure‑related threat and stalking prosecution. The court:

• Confirmed that the defendant’s violent communications were unprotected true threats under the First Amendment;
• Upheld evidentiary rulings excluding attempts to relitigate the foreclosure within the criminal case;
• Found overwhelming evidence supporting the § 875(c) and § 2261A(2) convictions;
• Approved the district court’s flexibility in jury instruction drafting and timing, including on reasonable doubt and conditional threats; and
• Rejected challenges to sentencing enhancements as non‑meritorious and clarified that no impermissible double counting occurred.

Most significantly, the opinion reinforces that:

• Sovereign‑citizen and “American State National” theories are legally void and provide no shelter from jurisdiction or criminal liability;
• Pseudo‑jurisdictional and undeveloped constitutional claims will be summarily dismissed as frivolous; and
• Federal courts will protect public officials and others involved in legal processes from credible threats of violence, even when those threats are cloaked in rhetoric about property rights or anti‑foreclosure sentiment.

As a persuasive authority, Bracken will likely inform future handling of similar threat prosecutions and Anders appeals, reinforcing both the limits of the First Amendment and the judiciary’s unwillingness to entertain pseudo‑legal attacks on its jurisdiction and authority.