United States v. Benton, Jr.: Fourth Circuit Clarifies Sentencing-Remand Discretion Under the Mandate Rule

Introduction

In United States v. Robert Benton, Jr., Nos. 23-4009 & 23-6019 (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 2025) (unpublished), the Fourth Circuit confronted a frequently litigated—but rarely settled—question: when an appellate court vacates one part of a multi-count sentence and remands “for de novo resentencing,” must the district court revisit every conceivable sentencing issue, including arguments that the defendant long ago abandoned?

Robert Benton, once facing a life sentence for narcotics, firearms, and witness-tampering crimes, seized his latest resentencing opportunity to raise—for the first time since 1998—a technical challenge to the Government’s § 851 sentencing-enhancement filing. The district court declined to entertain the new claim, and Benton appealed again.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a general remand for de novo resentencing permits, but does not compel, a district court to consider new or previously waived arguments. In so ruling, the panel harmonised the mandate rule, the sentencing-package doctrine, and the district court’s discretionary authority, thereby creating an important guidepost for future resentencing litigation in the Fourth Circuit.

Summary of the Judgment

Issue on Appeal: Whether the district court erred in refusing to consider Benton’s untimeliness challenge to the 1998 21 U.S.C. § 851 enhancement when resentencing him after a partial appellate vacatur.
Holding: The district court acted within its discretion. Even assuming the appellate mandate authorised a de novo resentencing, it merely empowered—rather than required—the court to entertain new issues. The court’s decision not to revisit Benton’s belated § 851 argument therefore did not violate the mandate rule.
Key Reasoning: The sentencing-package doctrine allows holistic resentencing but does not abrogate the district court’s control over its proceedings. The mandate rule bars only (i) matters previously resolved and (ii) those that could have been but were not raised on earlier appeal. A general remand removes those bars but replaces them with discretion, not duty. No “blatant error” exception applied because no controlling precedent makes a post-jury-selection § 851 filing untimely.
Disposition: Judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Alston, 722 F.3d 603 (4th Cir. 2013) – Supplies the standard of de novo review for mandate-rule questions.
United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2012) – Establishes that general remands authorise, but do not oblige, district courts to entertain new matters.
Invention Submission Corp. v. Dudas, 413 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2005) – Describes the mandate rule as a “more powerful” law-of-the-case doctrine.
JTH Tax, Inc. v. Aime, 984 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2021) – Outlines the two dimensions of the mandate rule (issues conclusively decided and issues that could have been raised).
Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011) – Recognises full reconsideration power on resentencing when an entire sentence is vacated.
United States v. Ventura, 864 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2017) & United States v. Richardson, 96 F.4th 659 (4th Cir. 2024) – Explain the sentencing-package doctrine’s holistic view of multi-count sentencing.
United States v. Cannady, 63 F.4th 259 (4th Cir. 2023) – Demonstrates that counsel may still be ineffective at resentencing despite the court’s discretion.
United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64 (4th Cir. 1993) – Origin of the “three exceptions” framework for deviating from the mandate rule; specifically relevant to the “blatant error” exception.
United States v. Beasley, 495 F.3d 142 (4th Cir. 2007) – Declares absence of controlling precedent on when trial “begins” for § 851 timeliness, undercutting Benton’s claim of blatant error.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The panel proceeded in two steps:

Scope of the Remand. Even if the prior appellate decision (24 F.4th 309) implicitly authorised a de novo resentencing, such authorisation enlarges the district court’s power but not its obligation. Citing Susi, the panel stressed that district courts “may entertain new arguments as necessary … but [are] not obligated.”
Application to Benton’s § 851 Claim. The district court reasonably elected not to reopen the issue because (a) Benton had “many opportunities” to raise it over 25 years, (b) he conceded the fact of his prior convictions (no prejudice), and (c) no binding precedent rendered the information untimely. Therefore, refusing review did not violate the mandate rule, nor did the “blatant error” exception apply.

3. Likely Impact of the Decision

Clarified Boundaries. Litigants can no longer assume that de novo resentencing automatically re-opens every potential sentencing challenge. Strategic urgency now attaches to raising all viable arguments at the first possible opportunity.
District-Court Discretion Reinforced. The decision grants sentencing judges greater procedural control, reducing the risk of prolonged resentencing proceedings caused by late-blooming theories.
Guidance on § 851 Timeliness. Though not squarely deciding the merits, the panel’s reliance on the absence of precedent may dissuade similar challenges unless and until the Supreme Court or the Fourth Circuit issues a definitive ruling.
Appellate Litigation Strategy. Defense counsel must sharpen issue-preservation practices; prosecutors, conversely, gain an argument for finality where defendants attempt to revive long-dormant objections.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Mandate Rule: A doctrine requiring lower courts to follow the appellate court’s instructions on remand. It bars revisiting (i) matters already decided and (ii) matters that could have been, but were not, raised previously—unless an exception applies.
Sentencing-Package Doctrine: The idea that sentences on multiple counts form an interrelated “package.” If one count’s sentence is vacated, the entire package may be re-configured to maintain the original sentencing intent.
De Novo Resentencing: “From the beginning” resentencing. The prior sentence is treated as void, allowing the court to reconsider guidelines, variances, and evidence. Benton clarifies that de novo power does not equal obligation.
21 U.S.C. § 851 Information: A formal notice filed by the Government to invoke enhanced penalties for repeat drug offenders. Statute requires filing “before trial, or before entry of a guilty plea.” Timeliness disputes hinge on when “trial” starts.
Blatant-Error Exception: One of three narrow exceptions to the mandate rule: a lower court may correct an obvious error that would otherwise cause serious injustice, even if the issue was previously waived.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s unpublished but analytically robust decision in United States v. Benton, Jr. cements an important principle: a general remand for de novo resentencing is an invitation, not a command, for district courts to revisit every facet of a defendant’s sentence. By reinforcing the discretionary nature of resentencing and declining to stretch the mandate rule beyond its core, the Court promotes both judicial efficiency and respect for finality, while leaving the door open to redress true, demonstrable injustices under the mandate rule’s narrow exceptions. Future practitioners in the Fourth Circuit must treat initial sentencing and first-round appeals as their best—and perhaps only—chance to air all viable arguments, lest later attempts meet the same fate as Benton’s untimely § 851 challenge.