Federal Eminent-Domain Supremacy over State Trespass-Fixture Claims: A Commentary on United States v. Bennett (5th Cir. 2025)
Introduction
United States v. Bennett squarely addresses whether a landowner may demand compensation for government-built improvements that allegedly exceed the scope of a pre-existing easement when the federal government later institutes a formal condemnation action. Mary Francis Chupick Bennett owns a cotton farm abutting the U.S.–Mexico border. In 2008 federal agencies erected a segment of the now-familiar steel-bollard “border wall” atop a flood-control levee located on a 4.43-acre easement. In 2020 the United States filed a direct condemnation suit to broaden the easement and secure title to the affected tract.
Bennett argued that:
- the wall was outside the easement’s scope and thus a trespassory fixture,
- Texas’s common-law “trespass rule” (tracing back to Searl v. School District No. 2, 133 U.S. 553 (1890)) vests ownership of trespassory improvements in the fee owner, and
- she therefore deserves “just compensation” not only for the land but for the value of the wall itself.
The district court excluded Bennett’s expert valuation of the wall, concluding the fixture rule was inapplicable. On interlocutory review, a divided Fifth Circuit panel (Judge Hendrix writing, joined by Judges Jones and Oldham) affirmed, announcing a clear, broad rule: State-law trespass-fixture doctrines cannot divest the federal government of improvements constructed pursuant to its constitutional power of eminent domain.
Summary of the Judgment
Key rulings:
- The government was acting under its federal eminent-domain power when it built the wall, notwithstanding the absence of a contemporaneous condemnation judgment.
- When the sovereign exercises eminent domain, federal constitutional principles—and not conflicting state private-property doctrines—govern the measure of just compensation.
- Because the wall was not Bennett’s property at the moment of the original taking (2008), she cannot recover its value in the subsequent 2020 condemnation proceeding.
- Expert testimony valuing the wall is therefore irrelevant and was properly excluded.
- The case is remanded solely to determine compensation for the land (and any distinct, non-fixture damages) consistent with federal takings law.
Analysis
a. Precedents Cited and Their Influence
- Searl v. School District No. 2, 133 U.S. 553 (1890) – Recognized the “trespass rule”: fixtures erected by a trespasser generally pass to the landowner. The district court framed the dispute around Searl, but the Fifth Circuit ultimately treated it as inapposite because it interpreted state property law and involved a school district, not the Federal Government wielding its Article I eminent-domain power.
- United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17 (1958) – Established that government possession may itself constitute the “taking,” fixing the valuation date. The Fifth Circuit relied on Dow to underscore that improvements added after the taking (possession) are not compensable to the landowner.
- PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 594 U.S. 482 (2021) & Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1876) – Reaffirm the principle that states cannot “limit, enlarge, or prescribe the manner” of federal eminent-domain power. This doctrine supplied the analytical backbone for displacing Texas trespass law.
- Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139 (2021) – Cited for the proposition that the nature of property rights is defined by state law, but only “absent conflict with constitutional or federal supremacy.” The Bennett court used this tension to demarcate where state law ends and federal authority begins.
- Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470 (1973) & Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23 (2012) – Discuss valuation timing and types of takings. They informed the panel’s rule that compensation is measured at the moment of taking, not thereafter.
b. Legal Reasoning of the Court
The judgment proceeds in three analytical steps:
- Identify Source of Law. Though “property rights are creatures of state law,” this maxim yields where applying that law would “limit or subvert” federal eminent-domain power (PennEast). Hence, any direct clash triggers supremacy, and federal law controls.
- Characterize Government Action. By erecting the border wall for clearly public aims—border security and flood control—the United States was acting pursuant to eminent domain. The absence of a condemnation filing until 2020 is immaterial; under Dow, physical entry plus public purpose equals a constitutional taking.
- Apply Federal Valuation Principles. Because the “taking” occurred when possession began (2008) and the wall did not yet exist, the value of the wall is excluded from “just compensation.” Allowing Bennett to claim the wall’s value via a state trespass rule would (a) enlarge compensation beyond federal requirements and (b) effectively transfer federal property to a private party, contravening the Supremacy Clause.
c. Impact on Future Litigation and Doctrine
Potential consequences are considerable:
- Fixtures in Federal Projects. Landowners adjacent to federally initiated structures (pipelines, levees, military installations) face a higher bar in claiming ownership of government-built improvements—even when constructed before formal condemnation.
- Border Wall Litigation. Dozens of pending suits over segments of the wall (or other future border fortifications) will likely cite Bennett to foreclose fixture-value claims.
- Takings Clause Jurisprudence. The decision clarifies that the chronology of possession—not the date of title vesting—dictates compensability for later enhancements.
- Section 1292(b) Practice. The court reiterates that an interlocutory appeal concerns the order itself, not merely the certified “question.” Practitioners may rely on Linton and Bennett to argue for (or against) broader appellate scope during § 1292(b) reviews.
- Good-Faith Exception Debate Halted. The Fifth Circuit intentionally sidestepped the subjective/objective “good-faith builder” debate under Searl. This leaves that doctrinal issue for purely state-law contexts but renders it largely moot where the federal sovereign is involved.
Complex Concepts Simplified
- Eminent Domain – The Government’s constitutional power to take private property for public use, with payment of just compensation.
- Condemnation vs. Taking – “Condemnation” is the legal proceeding; a “taking” occurs when government intrudes on property with the intent to appropriate it, even before a lawsuit begins.
- Fixtures – Objects so attached to land that they are treated as part of the realty (e.g., walls, buildings). Ownership normally follows the land unless law dictates otherwise.
- State Trespass Rule – A doctrine (stemming from Searl) that a landowner gains title to fixtures erected by a trespasser, entitling the owner to their value if later condemned.
- Supremacy Clause – Article VI’s command that federal law preempts conflicting state laws.
- § 1292(b) Interlocutory Appeal – Allows appellate courts to review non-final orders presenting “controlling questions of law” where immediate review may speed resolution.
Conclusion
United States v. Bennett crystallizes a straightforward but powerful proposition: when the federal government acts under its eminent-domain authority, state-law doctrines that would shift ownership (or economic value) of federal improvements to private parties are nullified by the Supremacy Clause.
The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning harmonizes longstanding Supreme Court precedent (Dow, Kohl, PennEast) and rejects attempts to graft state trespass rules onto federal condemnation valuations. Practically, the case limits landowners’ recovery to the pre-taking fair market value of their interest, foreclosing windfalls tied to improvements fully funded and constructed by the United States.
Going forward, litigants should focus less on subjective good-faith considerations and more on the timing of government possession when assessing compensability. The decision solidifies federal primacy in border-wall cases and beyond, confirming that the Constitution’s Takings Clause sets both the floor and the ceiling for just compensation when the United States is the taker.
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