United States v. Andrews – Elevating the “Bona-Fide Doubt” Standard and Closing the Door on Extra-Record Evidence

1. Introduction

In United States v. Lonnise Andrews, No. 24-10334 (11th Cir. 2025) the Eleventh Circuit issued a non-precedential yet highly instructive opinion that crystallises three important procedural principles:

• It reiterates that a court of appeals will almost never enlarge the record with unsworn, unvetted communications such as client-attorney e-mails (Shahar v. Bowers and CSX Transportation followed).
• It heightens the functional “bona-fide doubt” threshold a trial court must cross before ordering a sua sponte competency hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a).
• It clarifies the limited survival of recusal challenges after an unconditional guilty plea, distinguishing waivable § 455(a) claims from non-waivable § 455(b) claims.

The defendant, Lonnise J. Andrews, pleaded guilty to multiple counts of tax fraud. On appeal she attacked her plea and sentence on three fronts: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) during plea negotiations; (2) judicial bias requiring recusal; and (3) the district court’s failure to conduct a competency hearing sua sponte. Additionally, she sought to supplement the appellate record with a cache of e-mails she exchanged with appointed counsel. The Eleventh Circuit rejected each contention and affirmed.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Motion to Supplement Record: Denied. The e-mails did not “establish beyond any doubt” the proper resolution of the issues – the standard under CSX Transportation.
• Ineffective Assistance Claim: Dismissed without prejudice; record undeveloped. The court signalled § 2255 as the proper vehicle.
• Recusal Claim: No plain error. Judge’s credibility findings and comments did not show pervasive personal bias under § 455(b)(1).
• Competency Hearing: No abuse of discretion. No bona-fide doubt existed; counsel withdrew earlier competency concerns and defendant displayed coherent, strategic engagement with the court.
• Result: Convictions and 51-month sentence AFFIRMED.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The panel’s reasoning weaves through a cluster of Supreme Court and Circuit authorities:

• Shahar v. Bowers, 120 F.3d 211 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc) & CSX Transp. v. City of Garden City, 235 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2000)
  – Provide the stringent standard for enlarging the record on appeal: supplementation is “rarely exercised” and only when the proffered material “establishes beyond any doubt” the correct resolution. These cases empowered the panel to deny Andrews’s e-mail submission.
• Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) & Martin v. United States, 949 F.3d 662 (11th Cir. 2020)
  – Supply the two-prong IAC test (deficient performance + prejudice). The panel quoted Martin for the plea-specific prejudice standard.
• United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2003)
  – Establishes that an unconditional guilty plea waives § 455(a) bias claims but not § 455(b) claims. The court relied on Patti to narrow the scope of Andrews’s recusal argument.
• Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994)
  – Distinguishes judicial rulings/remarks rooted in the proceedings from personal bias. The panel invoked Liteky to reject Andrews’s reliance on the judge’s “manipulative” comment.
• United States v. Wingo, 789 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2015) & Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975)
  – Frame the three-factor competency inquiry and define “bona-fide doubt.”

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Supplementing the Record
   The panel began with the threshold matter: should the appellate record be expanded? Applying CSX, it found three gaps: (a) the e-mails were unsworn; (b) no district-court fact-finding existed; (c) the communications, even if authentic, would not conclusively resolve the merits. Therefore, supplementation would undercut the adversarial process and the hierarchical structure of fact-finding.
2. Ineffective Assistance
   Because the record lacked sworn testimony, cross-examination, or district-court findings, the court declined to evaluate the Strickland prongs. Instead, it directed Andrews to § 2255 – consistent with Patterson and Bender.
3. Recusal / Bias
   Reviewing for plain error, the panel separated § 455(a) (appearance of bias) – waived by guilty plea – from § 455(b) (actual bias) – non-waivable. It then applied Liteky: adverse credibility determinations, even pointed ones, are not personal bias. No “pervasive” hostility appeared.
4. Competency Hearing
   Using the Wingo triad, the court concluded:
   • Irrational behaviour? Court labelled behaviour “manipulative,” not delusional.
   • Demeanour? Defendant spoke cogently, followed proceedings, negotiated counsel.
   • Medical opinion? None in the record; counsel withdrew concerns.
   Lacking these indicia, no bona-fide doubt arose, so § 4241(a) did not obligate a hearing.

3.3 Impact on Future Litigation

• Appellate Practice: Litigants now have an additional cautionary exemplar that unsworn e-mails or informal communications will almost never be accepted on appeal. Counsel must create a factual record in the district court or pursue collateral relief.
• Competency Challenges: The opinion nudges the standard upward, signalling that fleeting or strategic allegations will not trigger a sua sponte hearing – especially when counsel retreats from competency concerns.
• Recusal Strategy: Defense lawyers must timely file § 455 motions or obtain specific record evidence of personal bias. An unconditional plea will drastically narrow appellate remedies.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Non-Argument Calendar”: A docket category where the court decides the appeal without oral argument because the panel finds the issues clear from the briefs.
• Supplementing the Record: Adding documents not reviewed by the trial court. Appellate courts distrust this because appellate judges are fact-reviewers, not fact-finders.
• Bona-Fide Doubt: A genuine, reasonable concern that the defendant lacks mental capacity to understand proceedings or assist counsel. It is more than speculation but less than proven incompetence.
• Plain Error Review: The most deferential appellate standard. The appellant must show (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) affecting substantial rights, and (4) seriously affecting the fairness or integrity of judicial proceedings.
• § 455(a) vs § 455(b): § 455(a) addresses the appearance of impartiality and is waivable; § 455(b) addresses actual, personal bias or specific conflicts and is not waivable after conviction.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Andrews does not blaze new doctrinal trails, but it tightens existing ones. It underscores that:

1. Appellate courts are guardians of an intact trial record; unsworn e-mails will not fill evidentiary voids.
2. The duty to hold a competency hearing is triggered only by concrete evidence creating a real, not rhetorical, doubt of competence.
3. Judicial candour in making on-record credibility assessments, even harshly worded, is not personal bias.

For practitioners, the opinion is a cautionary tale: build your record below, litigate competency in real time, file timely recusal motions, and if you plead guilty without reservation, expect appellate doors to close. For courts, it reaffirms confidence in district judges’ frontline role in assessing competence and impartiality. Together, these insights reinforce procedural integrity and the finality of guilty pleas in the federal system.