United States v. Almonor: Rejecting a Foreseeability Requirement for Venue in Money Laundering Conspiracies

United States v. Almonor: Rejecting a Foreseeability Requirement for Venue in Money Laundering Conspiracies

I. Introduction

The Fourth Circuit’s unpublished decision in United States v. Pierre Yvelt Almonor, No. 24‑4022 (4th Cir. Dec. 16, 2025), arises from a multi‑state business‑email‑compromise (BEC) money laundering conspiracy. The case touches a wide array of criminal procedure and sentencing issues:

  • Race‑based jury selection (a Batson challenge);
  • Where a money‑laundering conspiracy may be prosecuted (venue);
  • Single versus multiple conspiracies, including the “rimless wheel” theory;
  • Alleged constructive amendment / fatal variance between indictment and proof;
  • Admissibility of pre‑conspiracy emails and the intrinsic evidence / Rule 404(b) divide;
  • Guidelines loss calculation and restitution under the MVRA;
  • The “in the business of money laundering” enhancement under USSG § 2S1.1(b)(2)(C);
  • Delegation of authority to probation officers regarding supervised release conditions.

Although the opinion is unpublished and therefore not binding precedent in the Fourth Circuit, it provides a clear and detailed application of existing doctrine and, notably, expressly rejects adding a “reasonable foreseeability” requirement to the venue statute for money‑laundering conspiracies. That doctrinal clarification—especially in the context of modern, geographically diffuse cyber‑fraud schemes—is the most significant contribution of the case.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Almonor was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), based on a BEC scheme that diverted funds from real‑estate transactions. He received a 51‑month prison term, two years of supervised release, and restitution of $542,640.92.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed on all grounds. In particular, the panel held:

  1. Batson challenge: The district court did not clearly err in overruling Almonor’s objection to the government’s peremptory strike of an African American juror.
  2. Venue: Venue for a § 1956(h) conspiracy was proper in the Western District of North Carolina based on acts of any co‑conspirator there. The court:
    • Rejected the defendant’s “rimless wheel” argument, finding one overarching conspiracy; and
    • Declined to adopt a Second Circuit‑style requirement that co‑conspirators’ actions in the venue district be reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.
  3. Jury instructions on venue and multiple conspiracies: The instructions adequately stated the law. Moreover, any complaint about the multiple‑conspiracies instruction was barred by the invited‑error doctrine because the court gave the instruction requested by the defense.
  4. Fatal variance / constructive amendment: There was no fatal variance. The proof at trial established the single conspiracy charged, and the jury was instructed it could convict only if it found involvement in that charged conspiracy.
  5. Admission of pre‑conspiracy emails: The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting emails predating the charged conspiracy, including one referencing a child‑support levy. The court treated them as intrinsic to the conspiracy; alternatively, they were admissible under Rule 404(b) to show motive, intent, knowledge, and lack of mistake.
  6. Loss and restitution: It was proper to include losses from the North Carolina transaction in both Guidelines loss and MVRA restitution because they were attributable to the conspiracy of which Almonor was a member and reasonably foreseeable to him.
  7. “In the business of money laundering” enhancement: The four‑level enhancement under USSG § 2S1.1(b)(2)(C) was properly applied based on multi‑year, repeated laundering and substantial revenue.
  8. Supervised release conditions: The standard conditions requiring substance‑abuse testing and transitional support services did not unconstitutionally delegate judicial power to probation officers, in light of the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in United States v. Williams. No plain error occurred.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

The government proved a business‑email‑compromise scheme targeting real‑estate transactions. In such schemes, fraudsters infiltrate or spoof email accounts involved in real‑estate closings, tricking victims into wiring funds to accounts controlled by conspirators rather than to the legitimate closing agent.

In this case, conspirators:

  • Sent fraudulent emails redirecting wire transfers related to real‑estate transactions;
  • Caused funds to be wired into accounts controlled by conspirators (including accounts in Almonor’s name); and
  • Then moved those funds through a network of domestic and foreign accounts in an effort to conceal the illicit origin and ownership of the funds.

At trial, the government focused on two exemplar scams:

  • North Carolina transaction: A BEC scheme targeting a business and property transaction in North Carolina. Funds were diverted and laundered as part of the larger conspiracy. Almonor did not personally receive these funds, but the government contended the scheme was part of the same overarching conspiracy.
  • Illinois transaction: A real‑estate transaction in Illinois, where diverted funds were wired directly into Almonor’s account. He then transferred those funds to several co‑conspirators’ accounts, including offshore accounts.

The jury convicted on a single count of conspiracy to commit money laundering (§ 1956(h)). The district court’s sentence incorporated:

  • Loss totals from both the Illinois and North Carolina transactions;
  • A four‑level enhancement for being “in the business of money laundering”; and
  • Supervised release conditions involving treatment and testing under probation‑officer supervision.

On appeal, Almonor raised eight main challenges. The Fourth Circuit addressed each but found no reversible error.

IV. Precedents and Doctrinal Framework

A. Jury Selection and Batson

The opinion relies on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and Fourth Circuit elaboration in United States v. Dennis, 19 F.4th 656 (4th Cir. 2021). Under this framework:

  1. The defendant must first make a prima facie showing that a peremptory strike was based on race.
  2. The burden then shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a clear, specific, race‑neutral reason for the strike.
  3. The trial court must decide whether the defendant has proved purposeful discrimination, considering all circumstances.

On appeal, the trial court’s resolution of that third step is reviewed for clear error—a highly deferential standard recognizing the trial judge’s superior vantage point in assessing demeanor and credibility.

B. Venue in Federal Criminal Cases and Conspiracies

Venue doctrine comes primarily from:

  • Constitutional text: Article III and the Sixth Amendment require trial in the state and district where the crime was committed.
  • Statutes: Congress can define venue more specifically, particularly for continuing offenses and conspiracies.

For money‑laundering conspiracies, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(i)(2) provides that venue is proper in any district where an act in furtherance of the attempt or conspiracy took place. The Fourth Circuit, citing United States v. Sterling, 860 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2017), applies a standard whereby:

  • Venue is a question of law reviewed de novo, but
  • The underlying factual finding is upheld if any rational juror, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, could find venue by a preponderance of the evidence.

In conspiracy cases, the Fourth Circuit has long held that:

  • A conspiracy exists wherever the agreement is formed or any overt act occurs, even if a given conspirator never sets foot there. See United States v. Ojedokun, 16 F.4th 1091, 1107 (4th Cir. 2021).
  • Acts of any co‑conspirator are imputed to all members. See United States v. Al‑Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 928 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Banks, 10 F.3d 1044, 1054 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 372–73 (4th Cir. 2010).

The defendant urged the Fourth Circuit to graft onto § 1956(i)(2) a reasonable‑foreseeability limitation on venue—a gloss the Second Circuit has adopted in United States v. Tang Yuk, 885 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2018). However, the Sixth Circuit has expressly declined to follow that path. See United States v. Guererro, 76 F.4th 519, 529 (6th Cir. 2023).

The Fourth Circuit relied on its own cases, particularly United States v. Johnson, 510 F.3d 521 (4th Cir. 2007) (securities fraud) and again Ojedokun, to emphasize that it will not read a foreseeability requirement into venue statutes that do not contain such language.

C. Single vs. Multiple Conspiracies and the “Rimless Wheel”

Whether the government has proved one conspiracy or multiple conspiracies is doctrinally important for both venue and variance issues. The court drew on:

  • Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), which introduced the “rimless wheel” metaphor—many separate conspiracies (spokes) connected only through a single central actor (hub) with no unifying “rim” connecting the spokes to each other.
  • United States v. Strickland, 245 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 2001), emphasizing overlap in key actors, methods, and goals.
  • United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1995), defining a single conspiracy as one with the same objective, nature, geographic spread, results, and product, and recognizing that a conspirator can be a member without knowing the full scope or all members.

This framework allows the government to prove a single, wide‑ranging conspiracy even where participants engage in different acts against different victims in different locations, so long as there is an overarching scheme with shared methods and goals.

D. Jury Instructions and Invited Error

The standards come principally from:

  • United States v. Ali, 735 F.3d 176 (4th Cir. 2013) (abuse‑of‑discretion review for choice of instructions);
  • United States v. Hassler, 992 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2021) (de novo review for legal correctness, but focus on whether instructions as a whole adequately conveyed the law);
  • United States v. Stockton, 349 F.3d 755 (4th Cir. 2003) and United States v. Nunez, 432 F.3d 573 (4th Cir. 2005) on when a multiple‑conspiracies instruction is required; and
  • United States v. Bartko, 728 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2013) (reversible error only if evidence of multiple conspiracies is so strong that a cautionary instruction probably would have led to acquittal).

Crucially, the panel invokes the invited‑error doctrine, citing:

  • United States v. Hickman, 626 F.3d 756 (4th Cir. 2010);
  • United States v. Herrera, 23 F.3d 74 (4th Cir. 1994).

Under that doctrine, a litigant generally cannot request a particular instruction or ruling at trial and then claim on appeal that giving that very instruction was error.

E. Variance, Constructive Amendment, and Intrinsic Evidence vs. Rule 404(b)

For the variance issue, the court applies:

  • United States v. Miltier, 882 F.3d 81 (4th Cir. 2018) (definition and standard for fatal variance);
  • United States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876 (4th Cir. 1994) (in conspiracy cases, multiple actual conspiracies proved when only one is charged can be a material variance).

On the evidentiary front, the key doctrines are:

  • Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), governing admission of “other acts” evidence;
  • United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991 (4th Cir. 1997) (four‑part test for admissibility under Rule 404(b));
  • United States v. Brizuela, 962 F.3d 784 (4th Cir. 2020), and Kennedy, 32 F.3d at 885, distinguishing intrinsic evidence (part of the same criminal episode or necessary to complete the story) from truly extrinsic “other acts” subject to Rule 404(b).

The panel also cites:

  • United States v. Ebert, 61 F.4th 394 (4th Cir. 2023), and
  • United States v. Dillard, 891 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 2018)

for the abuse‑of‑discretion standard governing evidentiary rulings.

F. Sentencing: Loss, Restitution, and the Money‑Laundering Business Enhancement

The opinion synthesizes several sentencing principles:

  • Loss under the Guidelines:
    • Guidelines interpretation from United States v. Freitekh, 114 F.4th 292 (4th Cir. 2024), and United States v. Lawson, 128 F.4th 243 (4th Cir. 2025);
    • USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1), cmt. n.3(A) (loss = greater of actual or intended loss);
    • United States v. Shephard, 892 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2018) (conspiracy loss includes reasonably foreseeable acts of co‑conspirators in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity).
  • Restitution under the MVRA:
    • United States v. Stone, 866 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2017) (abuse‑of‑discretion review of restitution);
    • United States v. Ritchie, 858 F.3d 201 (4th Cir. 2017) (case‑specific approach to restitution calculation);
    • United States v. Llamas, 599 F.3d 381 (4th Cir. 2010), holding that in conspiracy cases MVRA restitution is limited to losses caused by the particular conspiracy of conviction, but may include reasonably foreseeable losses caused by co‑conspirators within that conspiracy.
  • “Business of money laundering” enhancement:
    • USSG § 2S1.1(b)(2)(C) and commentary notes 4(A) and 4(B), listing factors such as regularity, duration, multiple sources, substantial revenue, prior convictions, and statements to undercover agents;
    • United States v. Mitchell, 613 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 2010), treating a 16‑ to 18‑month laundering period and a $42,000 gain as showing “extended” activity and substantial revenue.

G. Supervised Release and Delegation to Probation Officers

For the supervised‑release conditions, the court applies:

  • United States v. Combs, 36 F.4th 502 (4th Cir. 2022), on plain‑error review;
  • Rosales‑Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129 (2018), on when to correct plain error;
  • United States v. Williams, 130 F.4th 177 (4th Cir. 2025), which upheld a closely analogous condition requiring mental‑health treatment supervised by probation (with discretion over provider, location, modality, duration, intensity).

The key constitutional principle is that Article III forbids delegating “core judicial functions” (such as deciding whether a condition will exist at all) to non‑Article III actors, but permits probation officers to fill in administration details once a condition is imposed.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning Issue by Issue

A. The Batson Challenge

Almonor argued that the government’s peremptory strike of an African American juror violated Batson. The opinion does not recite the specific race‑neutral reasons offered by the prosecution, but it applies the Dennis framework and reiterates the deferential standard of review:

  • The government must offer a “clear and reasonably specific” race‑neutral explanation;
  • The district court then evaluates that explanation against all circumstances, a determination largely based on credibility and courtroom observation;
  • On appeal, the ruling is upheld unless clearly erroneous, a highly deferential standard.

The Fourth Circuit, after reviewing the record, found no clear error in the district court’s acceptance of the government’s explanation and rejection of the Batson challenge. The court effectively underscores how difficult it is, on appeal, to overturn a trial court’s Batson ruling absent glaring discrepancies or patterns in the strikes.

B. Venue, the Rimless Wheel Theory, and the Foreseeability Debate

1. Single conspiracy vs. rimless wheel

Almonor’s core attack on venue was structural: he contended that the government had proven not a single, unified conspiracy, but multiple “rimless wheel” conspiracies under Kotteakos:

  • The “hub” was the central figure or figures coordinating the BEC schemes.
  • The “spokes” were separate sets of conspirators involved in particular fraudulent transactions.
  • There was no “rim”—no interconnection among the spoke conspiracies; thus North Carolina activity, he argued, was part of a different conspiracy from his own Illinois‑based activities.

This framing matters because if there were multiple, distinct conspiracies, and if Almonor’s conspiracy did not involve any acts in North Carolina, the government could not rely on the North Carolina acts to establish venue in the Western District of North Carolina for the conspiracy in which Almonor participated.

The Fourth Circuit rejected this characterization. Applying Strickland and Johnson (1995), it held:

  • The schemes shared overlapping key actors;
  • They used the same modus operandi (business email compromise of real‑estate transactions, diversion of funds to conspirator‑controlled accounts, further transfers to conceal the money);
  • They had the same goal and nature (laundering criminal proceeds); and
  • They produced the same type of result (victim businesses losing funds, conspirators receiving laundered proceeds).

On those facts, the court held that the government had proved one large money‑laundering conspiracy, not separate “rimless wheel” conspiracies, even though:

  • Different sets of conspirators may have interacted in specific transactions; and
  • Almonor may not have known all participants or specific victims, consistent with Johnson’s statement that a conspirator need not know the full scope or all members.

2. Venue without foreseeability for money‑laundering conspiracies

Once the court accepted that there was a single conspiracy, venue analysis followed established conspiracy‑venue principles.

Under § 1956(i)(2), venue for a § 1956(h) conspiracy is proper in any district where an act in furtherance of the…conspiracy took place. Combined with conspiracy law:

  • Acts of any conspirator within a district render that district a proper venue for prosecution of all conspirators; and
  • This remains true even if a particular conspirator never enters that district and is unaware of the specific act, so long as it is in furtherance of the conspiracy of which he is a member.

Almonor, however, pressed a more ambitious argument: venue should additionally require that the acts in the district be reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. He pointed to the Second Circuit’s approach in Tang Yuk, which imposes a foreseeability limitation on conspiracy venue.

The Fourth Circuit rejected that invitation expressly and categorically:

  • It observed that “no other circuit” besides the Second has adopted such a requirement and cited the Sixth Circuit’s contrary position in Guererro.
  • It relied on its own precedents—Johnson (2007) and Ojedokun—that refused to read a foreseeability element into venue provisions that lack such text.
  • It emphasized the plain text of § 1956(i)(1), (2), which speaks only of “an act in furtherance” and not foreseeability.

The panel thus “decline[d] [Almonor’s] invitation to add a requirement to the money laundering conspiracy venue provision that does not appear in the plain text.” Having concluded that a co‑conspirator committed an act in furtherance of the conspiracy in North Carolina, it held venue proper in the Western District of North Carolina as to Almonor.

This is the key doctrinal point: in the Fourth Circuit, venue for a money‑laundering conspiracy under § 1956(h) requires only that some conspirator act in furtherance of that conspiracy in the district; it does not require that the defendant reasonably foresee that act or that district.

C. Jury Instructions on Venue and Multiple Conspiracies

Almonor argued that the jury instructions were inadequate because they did not explicitly explain the concept of a rimless‑wheel conspiracy or more fully distinguish single from multiple conspiracies.

Two aspects of the court’s response are important:

  1. Substantive correctness and adequacy. Construing the instructions “as a whole,” and in light of the entire record, the court concluded they adequately informed the jury of controlling legal principles and did not mislead or confuse. The law does not require that every nuanced doctrinal metaphor (like “rimless wheel”) be spelled out in jury instructions, only that the instructions convey the applicable legal standards.
  2. Invited error. More decisively, the court invoked invited error: after engaging with the parties, the district court gave the multiple‑conspiracies instruction requested by the defense. Having asked for and received that instruction, Almonor could not attack its adequacy on appeal. Under Hickman and Herrera, a party cannot “invite” a particular ruling and then complain that it was error.

Thus, even if some refinement might have been possible, the combination of doctrinal adequacy and invited error foreclosed relief.

D. Alleged Fatal Variance / Constructive Amendment

Almonor also argued that the indictment charged a single conspiracy, but the trial proof actually described multiple conspiracies, producing a fatal variance or constructive amendment.

The Fourth Circuit applied Miltier and Kennedy:

  • A fatal variance occurs when the indictment is effectively altered—either in form or through proof—so that the defendant is convicted of an offense different from the one charged.
  • In conspiracy cases, proving several unrelated conspiracies when the indictment alleges only one can be such a variance.

Having already held that the evidence established one overarching conspiracy, the court concluded there was no variance. It further emphasized that the jury instructions required the jury to find that Almonor joined the specific conspiracy charged in the indictment in order to convict. This alignment between the indictment, proof, and instructions defeated the variance argument.

E. Admission of Pre‑Conspiracy Emails: Intrinsic Evidence and Rule 404(b)

The contested emails included communications between Almonor and a co‑conspirator from before the charged conspiracy dates, concerning transactions not specified in the indictment. One email referred to a levy on Almonor’s assets for substantial unpaid child support—raising the risk of unfair character inferences.

The district court admitted the emails, and the Fourth Circuit upheld that decision on two complementary grounds:

  1. Intrinsic evidence. Drawing on Brizuela and Kennedy, the court held the emails were intrinsic to the charged conspiracy because they:
    • Arose from the same series of transactions as the charged offense; or
    • Were necessary to “complete the story” of the crime, by showing how the relationships, methods, and financial pressures underlying the conspiracy developed and operated.
    As intrinsic evidence, they fell outside Rule 404(b)’s specific limitations on “other acts” evidence.
  2. Alternative 404(b) justification. Even if treated as extrinsic “other acts,” the emails were admissible under Rule 404(b) as interpreted in Queen. The court accepted the district court’s conclusion that the emails were:
    • Relevant to non‑character issues—namely, motive (financial pressure from child‑support obligations), intent, knowledge, and lack of mistake;
    • Necessary to prove elements of the offense (knowledge and intent in a money‑laundering conspiracy);
    • Reliable; and
    • Not so unfairly prejudicial as to substantially outweigh their probative value under Rule 403, particularly given the context and the court’s ability to instruct the jury appropriately.

The abuse‑of‑discretion standard, coupled with the dual intrinsic/404(b) rationales, made reversal highly unlikely. The opinion illustrates how broadly intrinsic can be construed for communications that show the development, context, and functioning of a conspiracy.

F. Loss Calculation and Restitution

1. Loss under the Guidelines

Almonor argued that the loss associated with the North Carolina transaction should not be counted against him for Guideline purposes because he was not directly involved in that episode.

The Fourth Circuit, applying Shephard’s conspiracy‑loss principles, held:

  • Guidelines “loss” is the greater of actual or intended loss, USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A).
  • In a conspiracy, a defendant is responsible for losses resulting from conduct of others if:
    • The conduct was in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, and
    • The losses were reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.

Because the court had already determined that:

  • The North Carolina and Illinois schemes were part of one overarching BEC money‑laundering conspiracy; and
  • Almonor actively participated and even recruited others into that conspiracy,

the losses from the North Carolina transaction were deemed both in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity and reasonably foreseeable to him. Thus, including those losses in the Guidelines calculation was proper.

2. Restitution under the MVRA

The same reasoning carried over to restitution. Under the MVRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, restitution is mandatory for certain offenses involving fraud or deceit, including money‑laundering conspiracies whose underlying conduct involves such fraud.

Citing Llamas, the court reiterated:

  • In a conspiracy case, restitution is limited to losses caused by the specific conspiracy of conviction, but
  • Within that conspiracy, the defendant can be held responsible for losses reasonably foreseeable to him that were caused by the acts of co‑conspirators.

Because the North Carolina loss was part of the same conspiracy proved at trial and attributable to that conspiracy, it was properly included in the restitution amount.

G. The “Business of Money Laundering” Enhancement

USSG § 2S1.1(b)(2)(C) provides a four‑level enhancement if the defendant was “in the business of laundering funds.” The commentary instructs courts to consider a “totality of the circumstances,” including six specific non‑exclusive factors:

  1. Whether the defendant regularly engaged in laundering funds;
  2. The length of time the defendant engaged in such conduct;
  3. Whether the defendant laundered funds from multiple sources;
  4. Whether the defendant earned substantial revenue from laundering;
  5. Prior convictions for similar conduct; and
  6. Statements to undercover officers indicating such activity.

Here, the court found the enhancement supported because:

  • Evidence showed Almonor laundered funds over at least four years, with several transactions in that period—exceeding what the Eighth Circuit in Mitchell treated as an “extended” duration (16–18 months).
  • He obtained a “substantial amount of revenue” from the conspiracy—again, greater than the $42,000 identified as substantial in Mitchell.

The opinion does not detail every factor, but under the totality‑of‑the‑circumstances approach, these two—extended duration and substantial revenue—were sufficient to justify the enhancement. The reasoning conveys that this enhancement is aimed not only at professional launderers for organized crime, but at any defendant who, over time and across transactions, turns laundering into a regular, remunerative activity.

H. Supervised Release and Delegation to Probation

Finally, Almonor challenged two standard conditions of supervised release:

  • Mandatory participation in a substance‑abuse testing program;
  • Mandatory participation in transitional support services, including cognitive‑behavioral treatment programs.

Both conditions gave the probation officer authority to supervise the details: provider, location, modality, duration, and intensity. Almonor argued this was an unconstitutional delegation of Article III judicial power.

Because he failed to object in the district court, review was for plain error, requiring:

  1. An error;
  2. That is plain (clear or obvious);
  3. That affects substantial rights; and
  4. That warrants correction in light of the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings. See Combs, Rosales‑Mireles.

The Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in Williams was dispositive. In Williams, the court upheld a mental‑health‑treatment condition with nearly identical language delegating to probation officers the details of implementation. The court emphasized:

  • The district court must set the broad principle—that the defendant will undergo specified treatment or testing;
  • Probation may fill in practical details—where and how that treatment happens;
  • This does not transfer the core judicial function of deciding if the condition exists; it merely allows probation to administer the condition.

Given Williams, any claimed error here was neither error nor “plain,” and the panel therefore rejected the non‑delegation challenge.

VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. Conspiracy and the “rimless wheel”

A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more people to commit a crime, plus (in most federal statutes) at least one overt act in furtherance. A single conspiracy exists even where members perform different roles or join at different times, as long as they share a common objective and work as part of the same overall scheme.

A “rimless wheel” conspiracy exists when:

  • One central actor (the “hub”) deals separately with multiple others (the “spokes”);
  • The spokes are not connected to each other or to a unifying plan beyond the hub; and
  • In reality there are several independent conspiracies, not one overarching one.

That matters because:

  • For venue and sentencing, the government can attribute acts and losses only within the same conspiracy;
  • If the government charges one conspiracy but proves multiple, there may be a fatal variance.

2. Venue in conspiracies

Venue answers the question: In which federal district may this case be tried? For conspiracies:

  • Any district where any conspirator commits any act in furtherance of the conspiracy is a proper venue for all conspirators;
  • The Fourth Circuit does not require that the defendant have foreseen that the act would occur in that district;
  • The defendant need not be physically present in the district.

3. Intrinsic evidence vs. Rule 404(b)

Rule 404(b) governs evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts offered to show that someone has a bad character and acted in accordance with that character. Such evidence is generally barred for that purpose, but may be used for things like motive, intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake.

However, intrinsic evidence falls outside Rule 404(b) altogether. Evidence is intrinsic if it:

  • Is part of the same series of acts as the charged crime; or
  • Is necessary to give the factfinder a complete and accurate view of how the crime unfolded.

In conspiracy cases, emails or transactions that predate the formal conspiracy dates in the indictment can still be intrinsic if they help explain how relationships and methods developed or show a continuous pattern of conduct.

4. Loss and restitution in conspiracies

  • Guidelines loss (USSG § 2B1.1): Used to determine the offense level, it is the greater of actual or intended loss. For conspiracies, a defendant is responsible for losses caused by co‑conspirators’ acts that are:
    • In furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity; and
    • Reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.
  • MVRA restitution: A separate, typically mandatory order requiring the defendant to repay victims’ actual losses. In conspiracy cases, restitution can likewise include reasonably foreseeable losses caused by co‑conspirators within the same conspiracy.

5. “In the business of money laundering”

This enhancement targets defendants who are not occasional, one‑off launderers but whose conduct shows:

  • Repeated, regular laundering activity;
  • Over an extended period;
  • From multiple sources; and
  • Producing significant revenue.

It can apply even where the defendant launders for one overarching scheme, if that scheme runs long and pays substantially. The result—a four‑level increase—can materially increase the sentencing range.

6. Delegation to probation officers

Courts may not abdicate core judicial decisions—such as whether a defendant must undergo treatment— to probation officers. But once a court imposes the treatment condition, it may let probation decide:

  • Which provider is used;
  • Where and how often sessions occur;
  • How long the program lasts;
  • Other implementation details.

That is administrative, not judicial, and is generally permissible in the Fourth Circuit after Williams.

VII. Impact and Significance

A. Venue in Cyber‑Fraud and Multi‑District Schemes

The most consequential aspect of Almonor is its explicit rejection of a foreseeability requirement for conspiracy venue under § 1956(i). In practice:

  • Federal prosecutors in the Fourth Circuit may bring § 1956(h) conspiracy cases in any district where any conspirator took action to further the scheme, even if a particular defendant:
    • Never traveled to that district;
    • Did not send or receive communications there; and
    • Did not specifically know of transactions there, so long as they were part of the same overarching conspiracy.
  • This is particularly significant for business‑email‑compromise and other cyber‑fraud schemes, which:
    • Can victimise entities in many states; and
    • Often have laundering operations using victims’ accounts and mules scattered across districts and countries.

The opinion aligns the Fourth Circuit with the majority of circuits rejecting the Second Circuit’s foreseeability gloss (as the panel notes, no circuit other than the Second has adopted it). Defense counsel should therefore anticipate:

  • Difficulty contesting venue in the Fourth Circuit when any co‑conspirator acted in the district; and
  • Greater need to attack the existence of a single overarching conspiracy rather than the foreseeability of specific acts in particular districts.

B. The High Bar for Rimless‑Wheel and Multiple‑Conspiracy Arguments

Almonor reinforces a pragmatic, government‑friendly approach to conspiracy structure:

  • Even where different victims, accounts, and actors are involved, courts will readily find a single conspiracy if methods and goals are common and there is overlap among some actors.
  • The threshold to force a “multiple conspiracies” instruction—and to succeed on a fatal variance argument—is substantial: the defense must show both compelling evidence of separate conspiracies and prejudice.
  • Where defendants actively recruit others or serve as key transactional hubs, courts are likely to view them as part of a broad, unified conspiracy, making them liable for the acts of more distant co‑conspirators.

C. Evidence Strategy: Intrinsic vs. 404(b)

The treatment of the pre‑conspiracy emails, including sensitive references (like unpaid child support), illustrates that:

  • Courts may characterize wide swaths of relationship‑building and preparatory communications as intrinsic “background” to the conspiracy, circumventing 404(b) limits.
  • Even when judges hedge and analyze evidence under Rule 404(b) in the alternative, the Queen and Brizuela standards give them considerable leeway to admit material as probative of motive, intent, or knowledge.

Defense counsel must therefore:

  • Vigorously contest claims that pre‑indictment conduct is part of the “same series of transactions,” especially where the conduct is highly prejudicial and only loosely connected;
  • Request limiting instructions making clear the permitted use (e.g., only for motive or intent) and barring propensity reasoning.

D. Sentencing Exposure and Broad Attribution of Loss

The opinion shows how broad liability can be in conspiracy sentencing:

  • A defendant who personally handles only one transaction can nevertheless be accountable for losses from multiple other transactions, if they are part of the same conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable.
  • The Guidelines loss table and the MVRA both then amplify punishment and financial liability based on the total scheme loss, not merely the portion handled by the defendant’s account.
  • On top of that, the “business of money laundering” enhancement can significantly elevate the sentencing range for defendants whose involvement is sustained and profitable.

This combination strongly incentivizes early plea negotiations and careful consideration of factual stipulations regarding the scope of jointly undertaken activity and foreseeability.

E. Supervised Release Conditions and Nondelegation Challenges

With Williams and now Almonor, the Fourth Circuit has signaled that it will generally uphold conditions that:

  • Require treatment or testing as determined by the district court; and
  • Delegate to probation only the operational details, even where that delegated authority is described broadly (provider, modality, duration, intensity).

This narrows the room for non‑delegation challenges to standard treatment or testing conditions in supervised release, at least in the absence of a condition that truly leaves to probation whether a treatment obligation exists at all.

VIII. Conclusion

United States v. Almonor is formally unpublished, but it offers a compact, multi‑issue survey of modern federal criminal law in the Fourth Circuit as applied to a contemporary BEC money‑laundering conspiracy. Its most important doctrinal move is to explicitly reject adding a reasonable‑foreseeability requirement to venue for § 1956(h) conspiracies, aligning the Fourth Circuit with the majority of circuits and providing prosecutors broad flexibility in choosing venue for geographically diffuse laundering schemes.

Beyond venue, the opinion:

  • Reaffirms the difficulty of overturning Batson rulings on appeal;
  • Demonstrates the high threshold for successfully arguing rimless‑wheel or multiple‑conspiracy theories;
  • Shows the breadth of “intrinsic” evidence and alternative Rule 404(b) justifications for admitting contextual communications, even those predating the charged period;
  • Confirms that defendants in broad conspiracies may face exposure for the entire scheme’s reasonably foreseeable loss and restitution;
  • Illustrates when the “in the business of money laundering” enhancement applies based on duration and revenue; and
  • Clarifies that probation‑officer supervision of treatment and testing details does not violate Article III when the court itself imposes the condition.

Taken together, these holdings underscore the expansive reach of federal conspiracy and money‑laundering law in the Fourth Circuit, particularly in trans‑district cyber‑fraud contexts, and provide a detailed template for both prosecutors and defense counsel navigating similar cases in the future.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

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