United States v. Acosta: Post-Bruen Endorsement of Felon-in-Possession Prohibitions and Plain-Error Review of Gang-Association Conditions

Introduction

United States v. Acosta, No. 24-965 (2d Cir. July 8 2025) is a Second Circuit summary order that—while non-precedential in a formal sense—offers an important window into two post-New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen (2022) controversies:

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal felon-in-possession statute, survives constitutional scrutiny after Bruen and United States v. Rahimi (2024); and
How courts should evaluate vagueness challenges to supervised-release conditions that restrict a defendant’s association with gang members.

Defendant-appellant Raul Acosta, a previously convicted felon and reputed member of the Trinitarios gang, pled guilty to possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(1). On appeal he raised two principal claims:

§ 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him after Bruen’s “history & tradition” test;
The supervised-release condition barring him from associating with “any gang members or associates” is unconstitutionally vague.

The Second Circuit, applying plain-error review because neither argument was preserved below, affirmed the district court in all respects.

Summary of the Judgment

1. Constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) — The panel reaffirmed prior circuit authority (United States v. Bogle, 2013; Zherka v. Bondi, 2025) upholding § 922(g)(1). Because the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have not declared the statute unconstitutional, any potential error was not “plain.” The Court underscored that historical evidence supports legislative power to disarm categories of persons deemed dangerous, including felons.

2. Supervised-Release Condition — The panel rejected Acosta’s vagueness challenge to the prohibition on “associat[ing] or interact[ing] in any way…with any gang members or associates,” again under plain-error review. Relying on United States v. Green (2010) and subsequent unpublished decisions, the Court found no clear or obvious error and held that the condition was sufficiently clear when interpreted to reach only knowing association with gang members, excluding incidental contact.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Bogle, 717 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2013) — Upheld § 922(g)(1) against a facial Second-Amendment challenge pre-Bruen.
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) — Established the modern “history & tradition” test for firearms regulation.
United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) — Clarified that historical analogues need not be “dead ringers” for modern statutes.
Zherka v. Bondi, No. 22-1108, 2025 WL 1618440 (2d Cir. June 9 2025) — Post-Bruen decision affirming Congress’s power to disarm felons.
United States v. Napout, 963 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2020) — Explained the stringent “plain error” standard for unpreserved arguments.
United States v. Green, 618 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2010) — Approved a similar gang-association condition.
Other supervisory-release cases: MacMillen (2008), Marshall (2020), Rakhmatov (2022), illustrating gradual acceptance of anti-gang conditions.

B. Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Plain-Error Framework

Because Acosta did not raise his constitutional claims in the district court, the panel had to find a clear or obvious legal error to grant relief. In both issues, precedent cut decisively against a finding of “plain error”:

For § 922(g)(1), neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit has struck the statute post-Bruen; indeed,Zherka reaffirmed its validity.
For vagueness, the Circuit’s own decisions have repeatedly upheld nearly identical gang-association conditions.

2. Historical Analysis under Bruen

Even assuming Bruen applied squarely, the Court emphasized two points drawn from Rahimi:

Congress does not need a one-to-one historical analogue; rough similarity suffices;
There is a long Anglo-American tradition of disarming persons considered dangerous (Catholics in the 17th century, loyalists in the Revolutionary era, “dangerous lunatics,” etc.).

Thus Congress’s categorical ban on felon possession is “relevantly similar” to historical disarmament practices, making § 922(g)(1) constitutionally sound.

3. Vagueness Analysis

The Court interpreted the supervised-release condition through the lens of mens rea: the prohibition applies only to associations that Acosta knows involve gang members. That implied knowledge requirement, coupled with examples of the Trinitarios, cured potential vagueness. Courts need not define “gang” with “letters six feet high.”

C. Potential Impact of the Judgment

Second-Amendment Litigation — Acosta reinforces a growing consensus in the circuits that Bruen does not imperil felon-in-possession statutes. Litigants challenging § 922(g)(1) will face an uphill battle absent Supreme Court intervention.
Supervised-Release Jurisprudence — The opinion signals that plain-error review will almost always doom vagueness challenges to standard gang-association conditions, provided the district court references a specific gang or otherwise delimits the restriction.
Plea-Stage Strategy — Defense counsel must raise Bruen and vagueness objections in the district court or risk the near-insurmountable plain-error hurdle.

Complex Concepts Simplified

As-Applied vs. Facial Challenge — A facial challenge attacks a statute in all circumstances; an as-applied challenge targets its application to a specific defendant.
Plain-Error Review — A four-part test applied on appeal when an argument was not preserved below. Relief is granted only for unmistakable, outcome-determinative errors that undermine judicial integrity.
Supervised Release — A period of court-ordered monitoring following imprisonment. Violating its conditions can lead to re-incarceration.
Vagueness Doctrine — Due Process requires criminal prohibitions (and supervised-release conditions) to be clear enough that an ordinary person can understand what conduct is forbidden.
“History & Tradition” Test — After Bruen, gun regulations are valid if analogous to historical regulations circa the ratification of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.

Conclusion

Although issued as a non-precedential summary order, United States v. Acosta carries persuasive weight. It confirms two salient post-Bruen propositions: (1) § 922(g)(1)’s felon-disarmament regime remains intact, supported by historical analogues and recent Second Circuit authority; and (2) standard gang-association conditions will survive vagueness attacks, particularly when defendants fail to object below. The opinion thus fortifies the existing legal framework regulating firearms possession by felons and supervises released offenders, while highlighting the strategic imperative for litigants to preserve constitutional claims at the trial level.