United States v. Abercrombie: Constructive Possession of Vehicle Firearms Proven by a Circumstantial “Mosaic”

I. Introduction

In United States v. Abercrombie, Nos. 24‑1474 & 24‑1867 (1st Cir. Dec. 16, 2025), the First Circuit addressed when a felon sitting in the front passenger seat of a vehicle can be deemed to have “constructive possession” of a loaded pistol hidden under that seat. The decision affirms both a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition) and a revocation of supervised release based on the same conduct.

The opinion, authored by Judge Aframe and joined by Chief Judge Barron and Judge Rikelman, does not announce a brand‑new doctrinal test. Its significance lies in how it applies and synthesizes existing constructive‑possession caselaw to a common but difficult scenario: a shared vehicle with a hidden firearm and no direct evidence of the defendant ever touching the gun. The court treats a series of facts—exclusive control of the passenger seat, visibility and placement of the firearm, the defendant’s repeated movements toward the floorboard, his wearing of a single latex glove, and the absence of fingerprints—as an integrated circumstantial mosaic sufficient to uphold the jury’s verdict.

The opinion also:

Reiterates the very deferential sufficiency‑of‑the‑evidence standard under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29;
Clarifies the limited role of Rule 33 new‑trial motions based on “thin” circumstantial evidence;
Reaffirms that sufficiency review considers all evidence actually admitted, even if arguably prejudicial or improperly admitted;
Confirms that a criminal conviction, once upheld, easily sustains a supervised‑release revocation under the lower “preponderance of the evidence” standard.

A Second Amendment facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) was raised below but effectively waived on appeal for want of development, leaving broader constitutional questions untouched.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

Boston police were responding to a drive‑by shooting in Roxbury. Officers received a radio report that a navy‑blue Ford Fusion was the suspect vehicle. Within minutes, Officers Driscoll and O’Loughlin saw a black Ford Fusion leaving a nearby market and stopped it, believing it might be involved.

The driver was Dominick Douglas; Tevin Abercrombie sat in the front passenger seat; there were no back‑seat passengers.
Abercrombie wore dark clothing, a hood, glasses, a mask, and a blue surgical/latex glove on his right hand only.
Both men were removed and frisked (no contraband found). Douglas invited police to search the car.

Officer Driscoll quickly located a loaded pistol with an obliterated serial number a few inches from the floor mat under the very front of the passenger seat. The handle pointed toward the front of the car and the muzzle toward the passenger door. The gun was visible from the passenger‑door frame by slightly leaning in.

Later video evidence assembled by Detective Medina showed:

A drive‑by shooting from a Honda CR‑V aimed at three men.
Within about two minutes, the Fusion arrived near the scene and parked in the Fuentes Market lot.
Douglas (driver), Abercrombie (front passenger), and a third back‑seat passenger exited the vehicle.
Douglas spoke to two of the men who had just been shot at; Abercrombie talked on his phone.
Abercrombie then re‑entered the front passenger seat. Through the windshield, his masked head was seen “popping up” from the floor‑mat area.
Abercrombie exited again, entered the market, and kept his gloved right hand in his pocket while touching store items with his ungloved left hand.
No one entered the car while he was inside.
Upon returning, Douglas and Abercrombie talked; then each got back into their respective seats, and as the car backed out, Abercrombie again moved toward the floor‑mat area.

Forensics confirmed the pistol was operable and loaded, with no fingerprints on the gun, magazine, or ammunition.

B. Procedural History

A federal grand jury indicted Abercrombie under § 922(g)(1).
The parties stipulated to three elements:
- the firearm was operable and the ammunition was real;
- the firearm and ammunition traveled in interstate or foreign commerce;
- Abercrombie was a felon and knew his status.
The only contested issue at trial: whether Abercrombie possessed the firearm and ammunition.
The jury convicted.
The district court denied:
- a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal (sufficiency of the evidence); and
- a Rule 33 motion for a new trial (weight of the evidence and alleged prejudicial “drive‑by” narrative).
Because Abercrombie was on supervised release from a prior drug conviction, the same conduct led to revocation of that supervised release.

On appeal, Abercrombie contested:

The denial of his Rule 29 motion (arguing the evidence showed mere presence, not possession);
The denial of his Rule 33 motion (arguing the case was too thin and infected by confusing, prejudicial evidence linking him to the shooting);
The revocation of supervised release (arguing the evidence was inadequate).

He mentioned but did not meaningfully brief a facial Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1); the First Circuit treated that challenge as waived under United States v. Zannino.

C. Holdings

The First Circuit held:

Sufficiency of the evidence (Rule 29): The evidence—viewed in the light most favorable to the government—was sufficient for a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Abercrombie constructively possessed the pistol and ammunition. The Rule 29 motion was properly denied.
New trial (Rule 33): Although the case was “close” and based on circumstantial evidence, the verdict was not a “seriously erroneous result” and no miscarriage of justice loomed. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial.
Supervised release revocation: Evidence sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt necessarily sufficed to prove a violation of supervised release conditions by a preponderance of the evidence. The revocation was affirmed.
Second Amendment challenge: Any facial attack on § 922(g)(1) was waived on appeal.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Procedural Posture and Issues Framed

The case comes to the First Circuit in a conventional posture: a direct appeal from a federal criminal conviction and a related supervised release revocation. But the court is careful to distinguish between:

Rule 29 (sufficiency): a legal question reviewed de novo—could any rational juror, viewing the evidence favorably to the government, find each element proved beyond a reasonable doubt?
Rule 33 (new trial based on weight of the evidence): an equitable safety valve reviewed for abuse of discretion—did the jury’s verdict reflect a “seriously erroneous result” or “miscarriage of justice” given the whole record?

This dual framing matters: Abercrombie casts much of his dissatisfaction with the verdict as a sufficiency problem, but many of his points (prejudicial drive‑by evidence, “gang” implications, body‑cam failures) are actually complaints about how the government tried the case or the inferences the jurors might have drawn. The court repeatedly insists that such concerns, especially when not objected to below, do not translate into a successful sufficiency challenge.

B. Constructive Possession: The Governing Framework

The core legal issue is whether the evidence could support a finding of constructive possession of the gun and ammunition. The court carefully rehearses the applicable standards:

Actual possession exists when the defendant has “immediate, hands‑on physical possession” of the item. (United States v. Guzmán‑Montañez) No one saw Abercrombie holding the gun; the government did not rely on this theory.
Constructive possession exists when a person “knowingly has the power at a particular time to exercise dominion and control over” the object. (United States v. Sylvestre, quoting United States v. Nuñez) It does not require ownership but does require knowledge that the weapon is there. (United States v. Ridolfi)

The court emphasizes several recurring points from prior cases:

Constructive possession may be proven entirely by circumstantial evidence. (United States v. Burgos, relying on United States v. Fernández‑Jorge)
Evidence of an individual’s control over the area where the firearm is found is highly relevant—but mere proximity is not enough. (United States v. Weems)
There must be “some action, some word, or some conduct” linking the individual to the contraband and showing “some stake in it, some power over it.” (United States v. Tanco‑Baez, quoting United States v. McLean)
Constructive possession can be shown where a defendant knows, or has reason to know, a firearm is within easy reach so that actual possession is available “virtually at will.” (United States v. Maldonado‑García)

The First Circuit’s opinion functions as a worked example of how these principles operate when the evidence is entirely circumstantial and plausibly consistent with innocence if viewed piece by piece.

C. How the Court Assembles the Evidence “Mosaic”

Abercrombie’s main appellate theme was that the government essentially proved only that he was present in the passenger seat when police discovered a gun under that seat. On its face, that sounds like the “mere presence” cases that often result in reversals. The First Circuit disagreed, itemizing and integrating multiple lines of evidence:

1. Exclusive control of the front passenger seat

From the time the Fusion appears on video approaching Fuentes Market until the traffic stop, the only person occupying the front passenger seat is Abercrombie. The third person is seen exiting the back seat and does not re‑enter; no one else enters the passenger side. The court notes:

The gun was located several inches from the passenger floor mat, at the very front of the seat.
Given that location, it would be “not easy” for a back‑seat passenger to reach forward and place the weapon where it was found.

This gives the jury a reasonable basis to link the gun’s placement specifically to the front‑seat passenger and narrows the universe of potential possessors.

2. Visibility and orientation of the firearm

Officer O’Loughlin testified that by standing at the passenger‑door frame and leaning slightly right, he could see the gun. The jury saw video of Abercrombie coming and going from that exact spot. A reasonable juror could infer that Abercrombie, like the officer, saw the gun when the door was open.

Officer Driscoll further opined that the pistol was oriented in a way consistent with how a right‑handed person sitting in the passenger seat would slide a weapon under the seat. The court acknowledges defense counsel’s argument that such placement would require an “awkward twist,” but notes the officer demonstrated how it could be done and the jury was entitled to credit his testimony.

This testimony ties the physical orientation of the weapon to Abercrombie’s handedness and seat position, strengthening the inference that this passenger, rather than some unknown third party, placed or controlled the gun.

3. Latex glove plus absence of fingerprints

Perhaps the most consequential piece of evidence—and the aspect most likely to influence future cases—is Abercrombie’s wearing of a single blue latex glove on his right hand. The court leans heavily on its own prior probable‑cause decision in United States v. Jones:

“Latex gloves offer little if any protection against the weather. They most obviously would serve the function of preventing fingerprints from being left on items like [a] gun. … Wearing such gloves [is] thus a gesture suggesting an intention to exercise dominion and control over [a] gun.” (quoting Jones)

In Jones, latex gloves supported probable cause; in Abercrombie, the court effectively elevates similar reasoning into the sufficiency‑of‑the‑evidence context:

There were no fingerprints on the gun, magazine, or ammunition.
Abercrombie wore a glove on only one hand—the dominant (right) hand.
Inside the market, he concealed the gloved hand in his pocket and used only the ungloved hand to touch items.

The court treats these facts as powerfully corroborative:

The absence of fingerprints suggests someone took care not to leave them.
The single glove on the right hand, combined with how Abercrombie used (and concealed) that hand, suggests he was that person.
His behavior inside the store undermines the innocent explanation he advanced—that the glove was merely for COVID‑19 protection—since he comfortably touched items with his ungloved left hand.

A rational juror could therefore infer that the glove was worn for the specific purpose of handling contraband without leaving prints—a classic indicator of dominion and control.

4. Repeated movements toward the floor‑mat area

Video evidence, as interpreted by Detective Medina, showed Abercrombie’s head “popping up” from the area of the passenger floor mat, and his bending toward that area on multiple occasions:

After re‑entering the passenger seat at Fuentes Market, before going inside;
Again after returning to the car and as it backed out of the space.

Abercrombie argued that a Gatorade bottle on the floor provided an innocent explanation for his reaching down. The court treats this as a classic credibility and inference dispute:

It was “fair” for the defense to offer that alternative theory.
It was equally fair for Detective Medina to point out he did not see a blue Gatorade bottle appear through the windshield during these movements.
The jury’s role is to weigh these competing rationales.

On sufficiency review, the court holds it must respect the jury’s selection among “plausible, albeit competing, inferences.” The fact that the movements were repeated, focused on the area where the gun was later found, within minutes of a shooting, and combined with the glove/no‑print evidence, makes the inference of gun‑related activity reasonable.

5. Integration of the evidence and avoidance of “stacking inferences”

Abercrombie argued that upholding his conviction required the court to “stack inference upon inference” contrary to United States v. Valerio, which warns against convictions built on speculative chains of inference.

The First Circuit rejects this characterization. It views the evidence as multiple, independent indicia all pointing toward knowledge and control, not a single multi‑step chain. The court invokes its “prosecution‑friendly” description of sufficiency review from United States v. Lara and reiterates from Ridolfi that the question is whether the verdict finds support in “a plausible rendition of the record” including “reasonable, common sense inferences.”

Put differently, the court sees:

exclusive seat control;
the gun’s visible placement and orientation;
the glove/no‑print combination; and
repeated floor‑mat movements

as forming a mutually reinforcing mosaic. Each fact is ambiguous in isolation, but together they comfortably support an inference of constructive possession without speculative leaps.

D. Reconciling Other Circuits: Blue, Clark, and Liranzo

The court directly engages conflicting case law on guns under car seats.

United States v. Blue (4th Cir. 1992): The Fourth Circuit held that the discovery of a gun under a seat, plus an observation that the occupant had leaned forward toward that area, was insufficient to sustain a § 922(g) conviction, though “barely” so.
United States v. Clark (D.C. Cir. 1999): The D.C. Circuit found that actually reaching for a gun later discovered under a seat was sufficient to establish constructive possession.

The First Circuit does not reject Blue; instead, it interprets it narrowly and emphasizes that leaning movement is still relevant evidence even if not sufficient standing alone. It then points to its own prior decision in United States v. Liranzo (1st Cir. 2004), where:

Police found a gun under the front passenger seat.
The defendant was seen leaning toward that area.
The gun was propped up in a way suggesting it could not have been in that position while the car was moving.

In Liranzo, the First Circuit upheld the conviction and distinguished Blue because there was more than “gun plus lean.” In Abercrombie, the court invokes that same reasoning:

“Here, as in Liranzo, there is more than the discovery of a gun and Abercrombie leaning forward. As already discussed, the jury also heard that Abercrombie moved his head toward the area where the gun was located multiple times and wore a single latex glove on his right hand.”

Thus, the case clarifies and extends Liranzo by endorsing a multi‑factor approach in vehicle‑gun cases:

Leaning or reaching movements toward the weapon’s location;
Physical impossibility or implausibility of alternative placements;
Additional incriminating conduct (e.g., glove usage, lack of fingerprints, repeated attention to the area).

The practical upshot is clear: while “gun under seat + lean” may be insufficient in some circuits, “gun under seat + repeated focused movements + corroborating evidence of deliberate concealment or control” will likely suffice in the First Circuit.

E. Standards of Review: Rule 29 vs. Rule 33

1. Rule 29 – Sufficiency of the evidence

The court reiterates the familiar but highly important standard:

Review is de novo, but strongly constrained by a government‑friendly lens.
The court asks whether any rational factfinder could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and drawing all reasonable inferences in the government’s favor. (Mendoza‑Maisonet; Ridolfi; Rodríguez)
The reviewing court may reject only “unreasonable, insupportable, or overly speculative” interpretations of the evidence. (Spinney)

The First Circuit also underscores an important, sometimes overlooked point: in sufficiency analysis the court examines the adequacy of the evidence to support the verdict of a hypothetical reasonable jury, not whether this particular jury was actually influenced by improper considerations. It cites:

United States v. O’Donovan (1st Cir. 2025) for the proposition that sufficiency review considers all evidence admitted, even if erroneously admitted; and
United States v. Ballinger (6th Cir. 2025) to emphasize that the inquiry focuses on whether “a reasonable jury could convict,” not on the actual jury’s deliberations.

This has significant implications for appellate strategy: arguments that the government’s theory was confusing, inflammatory, or unduly prejudicial must be developed as evidentiary or trial‑management issues (with proper objections), not repackaged as sufficiency challenges.

2. Rule 33 – New trial based on weight of the evidence

Rule 33 permits a trial court to grant a new trial “if the interest of justice so requires.” When based on the weight of the evidence, the standard is deliberately stringent:

A new trial should not be granted “unless it is quite clear that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result.” (United States v. Simon, quoting United States v. Rothrock)
It is appropriate “only when the evidence preponderates heavily against the jury’s verdict or a miscarriage of justice otherwise looms.” (Simon)

The panel notes that the case against Abercrombie was circumstantial and “close,” but that is not enough. Citing United States v. Ruiz, it underscores that a trial judge “is not a thirteenth juror who may set aside a verdict merely because [the judge] would have reached a different result.” Because the evidence here did not “preponderate heavily” against the verdict, denying a new trial was not an abuse of discretion.

F. Handling of Allegedly Prejudicial Drive‑By Shooting Evidence

A significant feature of the case is the surrounding context: the Fusion’s presence near the scene of a drive‑by shooting and its occupants’ interactions with the apparent targets shortly thereafter. Abercrombie complained that:

The prosecution improperly suggested he had a gang affiliation or was otherwise involved in the shooting;
The government presented inconsistent theories about when he learned of the shooting (via phone call vs at the market); and
These themes unfairly “filled evidentiary gaps” in the constructive‑possession case.

The First Circuit’s responses are multi‑layered:

Not a sufficiency issue. The court characterizes these complaints as arguments about prejudicial evidence or argumentation, not about evidentiary adequacy. Since Abercrombie lodged no contemporaneous objections and did not argue plain error on appeal, the panel declines to treat them as trial‑error claims.
All admitted evidence counts in sufficiency review. Relying on O’Donovan, the court stresses that sufficiency analysis includes even evidence that might have been erroneously admitted. Whether the jury was “improperly influenced” by suggestive gang narratives is unknowable and off‑limits for review because of Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b).
Even without shooting‑related inferences, sufficiency stands. Crucially, the court explicitly states that the evidence was sufficient “without any inferences related to the drive‑by shooting.” This reinforces that the constructive‑possession finding rested on the glove, gun placement, seat control, and movements, not on guilt‑by‑association with a shooting.
For Rule 33, no miscarriage of justice. On the new‑trial question, the court notes that:
- The government introduced video footage of the shooting and surrounding events, and Detective Medina neutrally described what the videos showed.
- The prosecution’s narrative—that Abercrombie brought a gun to the market after his associates were shot at—was one possible explanation the jury could accept or reject based on the same evidence.
- Presenting such a narrative, where the jury can verify or disbelieve it by viewing the footage, does not amount to a “miscarriage of justice.”

Doctrinally, this portion of the opinion underscores a key principle: where the factual underpinnings of a narrative are in evidence, the government may argue a theory of motive or background—even one that edges toward prejudicial territory—so long as the jury can evaluate it itself. Absent timely objections and clear prejudice, appellate courts will not use such narratives as a basis to overturn a verdict.

G. Jury’s Role in Evaluating Competing Theories and Credibility

Throughout, the panel is emphatic that controversies about how to interpret ambiguous facts are for the jury:

Gatorade bottle vs gun as the reason for leaning: a classic factual dispute.
“Awkward” placement vs officer’s demonstration: a credibility contest where the jury decides which account is more plausible.
Calm demeanor during the stop: the defense argued this suggested ignorance of the gun; the government presumably argued otherwise. Again, a jury issue.

Citing United States v. Cruz‑Ramos and United States v. Nascimento, the court reiterates that “sifting through conflicting testimony and determining where the truth lies is … squarely within the jury’s province, not ours.”

The opinion also reaffirms, via United States v. Gobbi, that when the government presents multiple theories of guilt, a conviction may stand if the evidence supports any one of them; it is not necessary for the reviewing court to identify which specific theory the jury embraced.

H. Distinguishing Sufficiency from Jury‑Instruction or Trial‑Management Errors

Abercrombie referenced the lack of an adverse‑inference instruction based on an officer’s failure to activate his body camera and suggested that this contributed to an unfair trial. The panel responds in a way that underscores the categorical separation between:

Claims about jury instructions or trial management (e.g., failure to give an adverse‑inference instruction), which must be raised and preserved as such; and
Sufficiency claims, which ask whether, on the record as it exists, any rational juror could convict.

Citing United States v. Baldyga, the court notes that jury‑instruction challenges and sufficiency challenges “raise analytically distinct questions.” The body‑cam issue goes to the former, not the latter, and Abercrombie limited his appeal to sufficiency. This portion of the opinion serves as a reminder that appellate courts will not blend doctrinal categories simply because a defendant feels the process was unfair in some broader sense.

I. Revocation of Supervised Release

The supervised‑release piece of the opinion is brief but important. The standard for revocation is dramatically lower than for criminal conviction:

The government need prove a violation of release conditions only by a preponderance of the evidence—that it is more likely than not that the violation occurred. (United States v. Tanco‑Pizarro)
Here, the same conduct—constructive possession of the firearm—formed the basis for revocation.

Because the First Circuit already held the evidence sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it concludes that it “was therefore also sufficient” to support revocation under the more forgiving preponderance standard.

The opinion implicitly reinforces a practical reality: where a conviction is affirmed on direct appeal, a revocation predicated on the same facts will almost always stand, absent some distinct procedural flaw in the revocation proceeding.

J. Precedents Cited and Their Roles

The opinion relies on a network of First Circuit and other federal appellate decisions, each playing a specific role:

United States v. Norris – confirms the timeliness of a Rule 29 sufficiency challenge.
United States v. Torres‑Rosario – prior First Circuit decision upholding § 922(g)(1) against certain Second Amendment challenges; cited only to note that Abercrombie’s undeveloped facial challenge appears inconsistent with existing circuit law.
United States v. Zannino – establishes that issues raised in a perfunctory way on appeal are deemed waived.
United States v. Mendoza‑Maisonet, United States v. Ridolfi, United States v. Rodríguez, United States v. Santonastaso – articulate and confirm the de novo but prosecution‑friendly standard for Rule 29 sufficiency review.
United States v. Sylvestre, United States v. Nuñez, United States v. Maldonado‑García, United States v. Guzmán‑Montañez – define actual vs constructive possession and the “dominion and control” test.
United States v. Burgos, United States v. Fernández‑Jorge – emphasize that constructive possession may be shown by circumstantial evidence, including control of the area where contraband is found.
United States v. Weems, United States v. Tanco‑Baez, United States v. McLean – delineate the line between impermissible reliance on mere proximity and permissible inferences from conduct connecting the defendant to contraband.
United States v. Jones – foundational for treating latex glove use as circumstantial evidence of an intent to handle a gun without leaving fingerprints.
United States v. Blue (4th Cir.), United States v. Clark (D.C. Cir.), United States v. Liranzo – frame the specific issue of guns under vehicle seats and occupants’ movements; provide comparative guidance the First Circuit uses to situate its holding.
United States v. Lara – describes sufficiency review as “prosecution‑friendly.”
United States v. O’Donovan – holds that sufficiency analysis considers all evidence admitted at trial.
United States v. Ballinger (6th Cir.) – emphasizes that sufficiency is measured against a hypothetical reasonable jury, not the actual deliberations.
United States v. Spinney, United States v. Apicelli – clarify that the government need not disprove every hypothesis consistent with innocence; appellate courts reject only unreasonable or speculative readings.
United States v. Gobbi – supports the principle that a conviction stands if any one of multiple government theories is supported by sufficient evidence.
United States v. Baldyga – highlights the analytical distinction between sufficiency and jury‑instruction error.
United States v. Simon, United States v. Rothrock, United States v. Ruiz – establish the demanding standard for granting a Rule 33 new trial based on the weight of the evidence.
United States v. Rodríguez‑Vélez – cautions that when evidence can support different views, appellate courts must honor the jury’s choice among plausible inferences.
United States v. Cruz‑Ramos, United States v. Nascimento – reiterate that assessing credibility and resolving conflicting testimony are quintessential jury functions.
United States v. Tanco‑Pizarro – supplies the preponderance standard for supervised‑release revocation.
United States v. Valerio – warns against convictions based on impermissible “stacking” of inferential steps, a doctrine the court finds inapplicable here.

Collectively, these authorities show the court carefully working within existing doctrinal boundaries while extending their application to a nuanced factual pattern.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

The opinion assumes familiarity with several legal concepts; the following simplified explanations may help non‑specialists.

A. Actual vs. Constructive Possession

Actual possession: You have the object in your hand, in your pocket, or otherwise directly on your person. Think of someone holding a gun.
Constructive possession: You do not physically hold the item, but you know where it is and you have the power and ability to control it (for example, to pick it up whenever you want). Think of a gun in a drawer next to you that you know is there and can access at will.

In criminal law, constructive possession can be enough for conviction if the prosecution proves both knowledge and control.

B. Circumstantial vs. Direct Evidence

Direct evidence: If believed, it automatically proves a fact. An eyewitness saying “I saw him holding the gun” is direct evidence of actual possession.
Circumstantial evidence: It suggests a fact, and you infer the fact from the circumstances. For example, no fingerprints on a gun + the defendant wearing a glove can support an inference that he handled the gun with the glove.

Most criminal cases, including Abercrombie, rely heavily on circumstantial evidence. The law does not regard circumstantial evidence as inferior; jurors may convict on circumstantial evidence alone.

C. Rule 29: Judgment of Acquittal (Sufficiency of Evidence)

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, a defendant can ask the judge to enter a judgment of acquittal if the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain a conviction. On appeal, courts ask:

Assuming the jury believed the government’s witnesses;
With evidence viewed in the government’s favor;
Could a reasonable juror find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?

If the answer is yes—even if the case is close or the appellate judges might have voted to acquit themselves—the conviction stands.

D. Rule 33: New Trial (Weight of the Evidence)

Rule 33 allows a judge to grant a new trial “if the interest of justice so requires.” When the argument is that the verdict goes against the weight of the evidence, the standard is higher than mere disagreement:

The judge must believe the jury’s verdict was “seriously erroneous” or that a “miscarriage of justice” would occur if it stands.
The judge may not act as a “thirteenth juror” simply substituting a different view of the evidence.

Appeals from Rule 33 denials are hard to win because the standard is both deferential to the jury and deferential to the trial judge’s discretion.

E. Standards of Proof: Beyond a Reasonable Doubt vs. Preponderance

Beyond a reasonable doubt: The highest standard in law, used in criminal trials. The evidence must leave the jury firmly convinced of guilt; reasonable doubts (based on evidence or lack of evidence) require acquittal.
Preponderance of the evidence: A lower standard, often described as “more likely than not” or “51% vs. 49%.” Used, for example, in civil cases and supervised‑release revocation hearings.

Because “beyond a reasonable doubt” is stricter, evidence sufficient to meet that standard almost automatically satisfies a preponderance standard in related proceedings.

F. “Stacking Inferences”

Courts sometimes caution against “stacking inferences”: building a conclusion from a speculative chain where each link is only tenuously supported. That is improper when:

Inference A is weak or unsupported;
The court uses A to infer B, and then B to infer C; and
The final conclusion rests on multiple speculative steps.

In Abercrombie, the First Circuit concludes it is not stacking inferences; instead, multiple facts each independently support the central inference (knowledge and control), forming a robust, non‑speculative mosaic.

G. Facial Constitutional Challenge vs. As‑Applied Challenge

Facial challenge: Argues that a law is unconstitutional in all or nearly all of its applications.
As‑applied challenge: Argues that, even if the law is valid in general, it is unconstitutional as applied to this particular defendant or set of facts.

Abercrombie raised, but did not develop, a facial Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1); the First Circuit treated this as waived without reaching the merits.

H. Revocation of Supervised Release

Supervised release is a period of community supervision imposed after a defendant completes a prison term. If the defendant violates conditions (for example, by committing a new crime or possessing a firearm), the court may revoke supervised release and impose additional imprisonment.

At a revocation hearing:

The rules of evidence are relaxed compared to a criminal trial.
The government must prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt.

In Abercrombie, once the conviction for constructive possession was affirmed, the revocation naturally followed.

V. Impact and Significance

A. Constructive Possession in Vehicle Cases

United States v. Abercrombie will likely be cited in future cases involving:

Firearms found under car seats or in other shared spaces;
Absence of direct evidence that the defendant physically handled the gun;
Reliance on circumstantial evidence such as seat position, visibility, movements, and clothing/glove use.

The opinion provides a concrete template of the kind of circumstantial package that suffices:

Exclusive access/control to the space where the gun is found over the relevant time period;
Visibility/orientation supporting an inference that the defendant saw and/or positioned the gun;
Behavioral cues such as repeated focus on the area where the gun is hidden;
Forensic cues such as absence of fingerprints consistent with deliberate concealment;
Protective or evasive accessories (e.g., a single glove) consistent with efforts to avoid leaving forensic traces.

Defense counsel confronting similar fact patterns will need to carefully develop alternative, fact‑supported explanations for each of these elements and preserve trial objections to evidence they consider unduly prejudicial.

B. Elevation of “Latex Glove” Evidence

The court’s reliance on Jones and its extension of glove logic into sufficiency analysis is particularly notable. It signals that:

Wearing a single latex or surgical glove—especially on the dominant hand—in the context of firearm investigations will be treated as suspicious, not benign, absent persuasive contrary explanations.
When combined with an absence of fingerprints on contraband, glove evidence can be powerful circumstantial proof of possession and consciousness of guilt.

At the same time, the court’s use of Abercrombie’s own behavior (concealing the gloved hand, touching items only with the ungloved hand) to rebut his COVID‑protection explanation shows that such inferences are context‑dependent. Defendants and counsel should anticipate a need to explain glove use credibly and consistently with all other behavior on video.

C. Deference to Juries in Close Constructive‑Possession Cases

The court openly acknowledges that the case is “close” and “circumstantial,” yet affirms both under Rule 29 and Rule 33. This underscores a recurring lesson:

Appellate courts are reluctant to overturn jury verdicts in close cases where the record supports competing, plausible narratives.
If the prosecution’s interpretation is reasonable, even if not inevitable, the verdict is likely to be affirmed.

This places premium importance on trial‑level advocacy—cross‑examination of officers, alternative explanations for ambiguous behavior, and timely objections to prejudicial evidence. Once those issues are not preserved or the jury resolves factual disputes against the defendant, appellate review is highly constrained.

D. Constraining the Use of Sufficiency Appeals to Attack Prejudicial Narratives

By insisting that sufficiency review incorporates all admitted evidence and focuses on a hypothetical reasonable juror, the First Circuit cabins attempts to re‑litigate evidentiary admissibility and prosecutorial rhetoric under the guise of sufficiency. Defendants who seek to limit or exclude prejudicial narrative evidence—such as gang references or collateral shootings—must do so at trial and on direct evidentiary appeal, not by re‑branding the issue as an “insufficiency” problem.

E. Second Amendment Litigation

Although the opinion does not substantively address the Second Amendment, it is worth noting that:

Defendants increasingly raise constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1).
The First Circuit reiterates that undeveloped arguments are waived under Zannino.

The message to litigants is clear: constitutional challenges must be properly briefed, with engagement with existing circuit precedent (e.g., Torres‑Rosario), or they will not be considered.

F. Supervised Release: A Secondary but Automatic Casualty

The opinion illustrates the domino effect that a criminal conviction has on supervised‑release status. Practically speaking:

If a new felony conviction is upheld, a revocation based on the same conduct is almost inevitable.
Defendants on supervised release thus face compounded consequences from new criminal charges, reinforcing the importance of aggressive defense at the initial prosecution stage.

VI. Conclusion

United States v. Abercrombie does not rewrite the law of constructive possession, but it meaningfully refines how the First Circuit applies that law in a common—and often contentious—context: firearms hidden in vehicles shared by multiple people. The decision:

Confirms that a carefully assembled mosaic of circumstantial evidence—seat control, weapon placement and visibility, glove/no‑print forensics, and repeated floor‑mat movements—can be sufficient to prove constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt.
Clarifies that leaning or bending movements toward a weapon’s location, while not enough alone, are highly relevant when combined with other incriminating circumstances.
Elevates the evidentiary significance of single‑hand latex glove use in firearm cases.
Reaffirms strong appellate deference to jury verdicts under both Rule 29 and Rule 33, even in close, circumstantial cases.
Solidifies the principle that sufficiency review includes all admitted evidence and cannot be used as a backdoor challenge to unpreserved evidentiary or rhetorical issues.
Illustrates the near‑automatic relationship between affirmed convictions and supervised‑release revocations under the lower preponderance standard.

For prosecutors, Abercrombie offers a roadmap to building constructive‑possession cases in vehicle settings; for defense counsel, it underscores the need to contest each circumstantial link carefully at trial and to preserve distinct challenges to prejudicial evidence and jury instructions. In the broader landscape of federal firearm prosecutions, the case stands as a detailed, modern application of constructive‑possession principles to surveillance‑heavy, post‑shooting investigations—a likely touchstone for future First Circuit jurisprudence in this area.