United States v. Abbott: Sixth Circuit Broadens Prosecutorial Latitude on Joinder and 404(b) Intent Evidence in Civil-Rights Prosecutions

1. Introduction

In United States v. Tanner M. Abbott (6th Cir. Aug. 6, 2025), the Court of Appeals addressed three recurrent trial-management questions:

When may the Government join multiple excessive-force and falsification counts in a single indictment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a)?
What must a defendant do—and when—to preserve a severance request under Rule 14(a)?
Under what circumstances can prior bad-acts evidence be admitted to prove the “willfulness” element of 18 U.S.C. § 242?

Tanner Abbott, a former Kentucky sheriff’s deputy, was convicted on six of seven counts for willfully violating civil rights and obstructing justice. On appeal he challenged (1) joinder, (2) denial of severance, and (3) admission of three prior-act incidents under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). The Sixth Circuit affirmed in a published-but-not-for-publication opinion, but the analytical depth makes the decision an important practical precedent for civil-rights and white-collar prosecutions alike.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Joinder upheld (Rule 8(a)): All counts were “of the same or similar character” because they alleged a repeated pattern—excessive force and falsification—over a short 3½-month span. The Court stressed “logical relation” and “judicial efficiency.”
Severance denied (Rule 14): Abbott waived heightened review by not renewing his motion after the close of evidence. Even on abuse-of-discretion review, he failed to show “substantial prejudice,” particularly given targeted limiting instructions and a split verdict (one acquittal).
404(b) evidence affirmed: Three prior incidents—two involving actual force, one a threat—were sufficiently proven, admitted for a proper purpose (specific intent), and not unduly prejudicial after a Rule 403 balance.
Conviction and 110-month sentence affirmed.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The panel leaned heavily on a line of Sixth Circuit cases construing Rules 8, 14, and 404(b). Key citations and functions include:

United States v. Wirsing, 719 F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1983) – Articulated the “logical relation” test for joinder; quoted to favor broad joinder in service of efficiency.
United States v. Cody, 498 F.3d 582 (2007); United States v. Hang Le-Thy Tran, 433 F.3d 472 (2006) – Both upheld joinder of repeated similar crimes; relied on for the “same or similar character” prong and 18-month temporal window comparison.
United States v. Deitz, 577 F.3d 672 (2009); United States v. Chavis, 296 F.3d 450 (2002) – Confirmed de novo review for misjoinder and that the indictment alone controls the Rule 8 analysis.
United States v. Sherrill, 972 F.3d 752 (2020) – Reiterated the necessity to renew Rule 14 motions post-evidence; decisive in finding waiver here.
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) – Established that the jury must be able to reasonably find the other act occurred; adopted at Step 1 of the 404(b) test.
United States v. Bell, 516 F.3d 432 (2008); United States v. Hardy, 643 F.3d 143 (2011) – Provided the Sixth Circuit’s three-part 404(b) framework; thoroughly applied.
United States v. LaVictor, 848 F.3d 428 (2017); United States v. Asher, 910 F.3d 854 (2018) – Discussed similarity and temporal proximity of prior acts, underscoring the significance of specific-intent crimes.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Joinder under Rule 8(a)

The Court emphasized three pillars:

Same or Similar Character. Multiple § 242 violations plus falsifications targeted a single protected interest—freedom from unreasonable force and official cover-ups. The “pattern” and 3-month span satisfied the “same or similar” language.
Logical Relation. Overlapping proof would recur: departmental policy, willfulness, and the defendant’s state of mind. Trying the counts together conserved resources.
Indictment-Centric Inquiry. Echoing Chavis, the panel confined itself to the indictment’s face, avoiding a hindsight evidentiary dissection.

b) Severance under Rule 14(a)

Two separate rationales doomed Abbott’s request:

Procedural Waiver. Under Sherrill, failure to renew after the Government rested defaulted the issue or at least shifted to a plainer-error posture.
No Substantial Prejudice. The jury acquitted on Count 6, showing that it compartmentalised evidence. Limiting instructions after each 404(b) witness further insulated the defendant. The Court found no compromised trial right.

c) Admissibility of Rule 404(b) Evidence

Step 1 – Occurrence Proven. The district judge heard each witness outside the jury’s presence and found testimony credible enough for a reasonable jury, satisfying Huddleston.
Step 2 – Proper Purpose & Materiality. Because § 242 is a specific-intent crime, “willfulness” was squarely in issue. Prior incidents of gratuitous violence or threats during official duties were therefore classic intent evidence.
Step 3 – Rule 403 Balance. Probative value was “high”—directly illuminating willfulness—while prejudice was blunted via (i) similarity in kind/time (within a year), (ii) split verdict showing juror discipline, and (iii) repeated limiting instructions.

3.3 Potential Impact

Broader Joinder in Civil-Rights Cases. Prosecutors can package multiple unrelated victim incidents involving the same officer into one trial if they depict a common pattern over a limited period. This sharply reduces repetitive victim testimony and conserves judicial resources.
Heightened Preservation Requirements. Defense counsel must now be vigilant: failure to re-raise severance after the evidence can forfeit the claim in the Sixth Circuit.
Use of Prior Force Incidents. The opinion green-lights introduction of other episodes—violent or merely threatening—to prove willfulness against law-enforcement defendants, provided similarity and proximity are present. Expect more 404(b) motions in § 242 prosecutions.
Split-Verdict as Antidote to Prejudice. The Court again signals that an acquittal on any count is powerful evidence that jurors compartmentalised, a tool trial courts may cite to uphold joinder or Rule 404(b) rulings on appeal.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 8(a) Joinder: Allows the Government to charge several offenses in the same indictment when they (1) stem from the same act, (2) are part of a common plan, or (3) share a similar character. Think of it as “one trial for related misdeeds.”
Rule 14 Severance: Even if joinder is technically proper, the judge can order separate trials if joint trial would unfairly hurt a defendant—for example, confusing the jury or spilling prejudice from one count to another.
“Willfulness” under § 242: The Government must prove the officer specifically intended to violate a constitutional right, not merely that he used poor judgment. It is a demanding mental-state element.
Rule 404(b) Evidence: Bars propensity evidence—“once bad, always bad”—but allows prior acts to show permissible points like intent, motive, or knowledge. A three-step test (occurrence, proper purpose, Rule 403 balance) governs admissibility.
Rule 403 Balancing: Court must weigh the evidence’s importance against its risk of unfair prejudice. Evidence is excluded only when prejudice substantially outweighs probative value.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Abbott reinforces two practical guideposts for federal criminal litigation in the Sixth Circuit:

Counts that portray a consistent pattern of wrongdoing—especially in civil-rights cases—will typically satisfy Rule 8(a). Defendants seeking separate trials must both demand and preserve severance with precision.
Prior bad-act evidence remains a potent weapon for proving specific intent. When incidents are close in time and factually akin to the charged conduct, the Sixth Circuit is inclined to find them more probative than prejudicial, particularly with robust limiting instructions.

The decision therefore tilts procedural and evidentiary levers toward the prosecution in cases involving serial police misconduct—or any pattern-type offense—while providing a clear roadmap for district courts to insulate their rulings on appeal.