Unified Sufficiency Standard Reaffirmed:
State v. Roberts (Wash. 2025) and the Jackson-Green Test for Bench Trials

1. Introduction

Case: State v. Roberts, No. 103546-2, Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc (31 July 2025)

Parties: The State of Washington (Respondent) v. Mical Darion Roberts (Petitioner).

Background: In 2018 a deadly burglary in Tacoma left Ricardo Villaseñor dead. Evidence—blood traces, stolen firearm accessories, and rap lyrics—tied Mical D. Roberts and Sebastian Beltran to the scene. At a bench trial (trial without a jury) Roberts was convicted of first-degree felony murder predicated on burglary as an accomplice and sentenced to 384 months plus a firearm enhancement. On appeal, Roberts challenged (i) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction and (ii) the calculation of his offender score, especially the extra point added because the crime was committed while he was under Texas community supervision.

Key Issue for the Supreme Court: What is the correct standard for reviewing sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges arising from bench trials in Washington, and did the Court of Appeals properly apply it? An ancillary issue concerned offender-score calculation for crimes committed while on out-of-state community supervision.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court unanimously:

• Reaffirmed that the correct test for all sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges—jury or bench—is the Jackson v. Virginia / State v. Green II standard:
  “Whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
• Clarified that State v. Homan (2014) did not alter this rule; its reference to “substantial evidence” was a misstatement.
• Found the evidence against Roberts sufficient under the Jackson-Green test, even though the trial judge had not found him to be the actual shooter.
• Rejected Roberts’s late-raised claim that the felony-murder statutory affirmative defense was self-executing.
• Affirmed the extra offender-score point because Roberts committed felony murder while on community supervision transferred from Texas—qualifying as “community custody” under RCW 9.94A.525(19).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) – U.S. Supreme Court articulated constitutional sufficiency standard. Originated from a bench-trial conviction.
• State v. Green (Green II), 94 Wn.2d 216 (1980) – Washington rejected its prior “substantial evidence” test and adopted Jackson.
• State v. Homan, 181 Wn.2d 102 (2014) – Language appeared to limit appellate review in bench trials to findings of fact. The Roberts court clarified that Homan applied Jackson despite the imprecise wording.
• State v. Conaway, 199 Wn.2d 742 (2022) – Noted labels (“substantial” vs. “sufficient”) are immaterial; the due-process principle governs.
• In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) – Due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
• State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192 (1992) – Clarified that a defendant challenging sufficiency admits the truth of the State’s evidence.
• State v. Carter, 154 Wn.2d 71 (2005) – Defined “participant” for felony-murder/accomplice liability.
• Sentencing Precedent: State v. Buck (2024); State v. King (2011); State v. Hunt (2005) – Address definitions of community custody, supervision, and out-of-state supervision in offender scoring.

The Court threaded these authorities to conclude that Jackson remains controlling. Homan’s stray “substantial evidence” language could not overrule Jackson/Green because (1) the issue was not squarely before the Homan court and (2) Homan ultimately applied the Jackson burden-of-proof lens.

3.2 Legal Reasoning in Depth

1. Nature of Appellate Review – Appellate courts must examine “all the evidence” in the light most favorable to the prosecution, not merely the written findings. Written findings aid review but do not circumscribe it.
2. Preservation of Fact-Finder Role – Deference is owed to the trial judge’s credibility determinations; reviewing courts may not re-weigh evidence, but they must still test the legal sufficiency.
3. Application to Roberts – Blood evidence, eyewitness auditory testimony of multiple intruders, stolen items found in Beltran’s car, rap lyrics, and Roberts’s implausible explanation together allowed any rational fact-finder to find burglary with accomplice liability and resulting homicide.
4. Affirmative Defense Argument – Because Roberts never pleaded the statutory defense (lack of knowledge of weapons/intent), the trial court was not obliged to consider it sua sponte. Unlike lesser-included offenses, affirmative defenses are waived if not raised.
5. Offender Score Interpretation – The statute (RCW 9.94A.525(19)) explicitly broadens “community custody” to include “community placement or postrelease supervision” defined in ch. 9.94B RCW. Under the interstate compact, Roberts’s Texas community supervision administered by Washington DOC fits within that umbrella.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

a. Clarifies Appellate Framework Statewide.
Courts of Appeals had split after Homan (see Stewart, I.J.S.). Roberts resolves the ambiguity: the Jackson-Green test governs uniformly. Litigants can no longer argue for a different “substantial evidence” test in bench trials.

b. Predictability for Trial Judges.
Bench-trial judges know that their verdicts will be assessed against the same constitutional due-process standard applied to jury verdicts. Expect more detailed findings to aid appellate scrutiny but no artificial narrowing of the record.

c. Sentencing Consequences Across State Lines.
By treating out-of-state community supervision accepted under the interstate compact as “community custody,” the court reinforced that Washington sentencing courts may add an offender-score point when crimes are committed during such supervision—regardless of comparability of the underlying conviction. Defendants under transferred supervision now have clear notice of this exposure.

d. Affirmative Defenses.
The ruling underscores that statutory affirmative defenses in Washington remain waivable; courts are not compelled to conjure a defense unargued by the defendant, even in bench trials.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Sufficiency of the Evidence – A constitutional check ensuring the State has produced enough credible evidence so that any reasonable fact-finder could (not necessarily would) convict beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Bench Trial vs. Jury Trial – In a bench trial the judge acts as fact-finder. The constitutional sufficiency test does not change; appellate courts still ask what any rational fact-finder could decide.
• Felony Murder Rule – A participant in certain felonies (e.g., burglary) is guilty of murder if someone dies during the crime, even if the participant did not personally commit the killing.
• Accomplice Liability – One who aids or facilitates a crime, knowing that their conduct will promote it, is equally culpable for substantive offenses committed by any participant.
• Community Custody / Supervision / Placement / Postrelease Supervision – Different statutory labels for periods when an offender lives in the community under DOC controls. For scoring purposes, they are treated interchangeably.
• Offender Score – Numerical calculation under the Sentencing Reform Act that helps fix a defendant’s sentencing range. A point is added if the new crime was committed while on community custody.
• Interstate Compact (ICAOS) – Agreement allowing states to supervise each other’s probationers/parolees. Once supervision is transferred, the receiving state’s rules (including “community custody” status) apply.

5. Conclusion

State v. Roberts delivers two lasting lessons. First, the constitutional sufficiency standard—rooted in Jackson v. Virginia and adopted in Green II—applies identically to jury and bench trials. Any confusion sown by Homan is now dispelled. Second, Washington sentencing courts may add an offender-score point when crimes are committed during out-of-state community supervision that has been transferred under the interstate compact. Together, these holdings reinforce due-process rigor in appellate review and promote uniformity and transparency in sentencing. Practitioners should craft findings of fact with the full Jackson-Green lens in mind and advise clients that being supervised—regardless of the originating state—carries real sentencing consequences if new crimes are committed.