1. Introduction

This commentary examines the Sixth Circuit’s April 25, 2025 decision in United States v. Marcus Angelo Smith, which affirms a felon‐in‐possession conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The defendant, Marcus Smith, challenged his conviction on three grounds: ineffective assistance of counsel, erroneous jury instructions as to unanimity, and insufficiency of the interstate-commerce element. The Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s rulings in full. This case crystallizes two important principles: (1) strategic choices by defense counsel—even unconventional ones—will survive Strickland review absent prejudice; and (2) when a defendant possesses a loaded firearm in a single incident, a specific unanimity instruction distinguishing firearm from ammunition is not required because jurors necessarily agree on the single act.

2. Case Background and Key Issues

• Parties: United States (Plaintiff–Appellee) vs. Marcus Angelo Smith (Defendant–Appellant).
• Charge: One count of knowingly possessing a firearm and/or ammunition while a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
• Facts: On October 31, 2018, eyewitnesses saw Smith fire a handgun in the driveway of his then‐partner, Yolanda James. Police recovered a shell casing; forensic and ATF testimony established it likely came from a Glock or Smith & Wesson and traveled in interstate commerce.
• Procedural History: Smith was convicted by a jury. He then pursued a delayed motion for a new trial—alleging ineffective assistance, jury‐instruction error, and weight‐of‐evidence insufficiency—which the district court denied. After sentencing, Smith appealed.
• Key Issues on Appeal:
  1. Whether trial counsel’s strategic decisions (not calling certain witnesses or pursuing a “ghost‐gun” defense) constituted ineffective assistance.
  2. Whether the unanimity instruction given to the jury was legally flawed.
  3. Whether the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm/ammunition traveled in interstate commerce.

3. Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit affirmed in all respects:

• IAC Claim: Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), counsel’s performance is reviewed for reasonableness and prejudice. The court held that counsel’s strategic decisions—not calling certain impeachment witnesses, not presenting “ghost‐gun” experts, and not calling a potentially suspect lay witness—were within the wide range of professional norms and did not prejudice Smith’s defense.
• Jury Instruction: The instruction notifying jurors they need not unanimously agree on whether Smith possessed a firearm or ammunition was proper because the evidence showed a single act—firing a loaded weapon—which necessarily established possession of both items in one incident. No risk existed that some jurors would convict based on one item while others convicted based on the other.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, testimony and expert opinions supported a finding that the recovered shell casing traveled in interstate commerce. Even if the firearm nexus were in doubt, possession of ammunition alone would satisfy § 922(g)(1).

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1. Precedents Cited

• Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668, 1984): Established the two‐prong test for ineffective assistance—deficient performance and prejudice—and the presumption that strategic choices are reasonable.
• United States v. Foreman (323 F.3d 498, 6th Cir. 2003): Explains that direct‐appeal IAC claims are typically deferred but may be heard when the record is developed.
• United States v. Bass (460 F.3d 830, 6th Cir. 2006): Clarifies district courts’ discretion in holding evidentiary hearings on new‐trial motions.
• United States v. Ward (957 F.3d 691, 6th Cir. 2020): Articulates the four elements of a § 922(g)(1) offense, including the interstate‐commerce nexus.
• Richardson v. United States (526 U.S. 813, 1999): Jury unanimity principle and the “single‐act” exception for alternative means of satisfying an element.
• United States v. DeJohn (368 F.3d 533, 6th Cir. 2004) & United States v. Cook (290 F. App’x 874, 6th Cir. 2008): Applied the Richardson single‐act rule in felon‐in‐possession cases involving both firearm and ammunition.
• United States v. Pratt (704 F. App’x 420, 6th Cir. 2017): Reversible‐error standard when alternative acts create a “genuine risk” of non‐unanimous verdicts.

4.2. Legal Reasoning

The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning unfolded in three parts:

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (IAC):
   • All of defense counsel’s key choices—foregoing certain impeachment witnesses, not exploring a ghost‐gun theory with an expert, and not calling a potentially impeached lay witness—were reasonable strategic judgments. Counsel had investigated witnesses, weighed credibility risks, and chose a defense narrative that Smith never possessed a gun. Calling those witnesses or experts would have undermined that narrative or shifted jury focus to damaging facts.
   • Smith failed to demonstrate “a reasonable probability” that these choices altered the outcome. For example, lay testimony about after-hours Detroit gunshots merely duplicated the Devil’s Night context already before the jury. The ghost-gun theory could not overcome undisputed ATF testimony that the recovered casing traveled interstate.
2. Jury‐Instruction Claim:
   • Under Richardson, jurors need unanimity only on the crime’s elements, not on which alternative underlying act. The single‐act exception applies when “one continuous act” supplies all means of satisfying an element.
   • Here, Smith fired a loaded handgun in one incident, simultaneously possessing the firearm and its ammunition. No juror could find he possessed only one item without also finding possession of the other. Thus, no risk of non‐unanimous verdict existed, obviating a special unanimity instruction.
3. Sufficiency of Evidence:
   • Viewing the record “in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” testimony from eyewitnesses, the discovery of a shell casing in the driveway, forensic analysis linking the casing to a model manufactured out of state, and ATF confirmation of interstate manufacture suffice to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that either the firearm or ammunition traveled in interstate commerce.
   • Because possession of either item independently violates § 922(g)(1), the interstate nexus for the ammunition alone sustains the conviction.

4.3. Impact on Future Cases

This decision will guide both trial and appellate courts in felon‐in‐possession litigation:

• Counsel Strategy: Affirms wide latitude in strategic choices, especially in balancing impeachment value against collateral damage and in choosing between mutually exclusive defenses (e.g., no‐possession vs. ghost‐gun).
• Jury Instructions: Restricts demands for special unanimity instructions to scenarios where multiple, disconnected acts could support a single element. A single‐incident case involving firearm plus ammunition demands no additional instruction.
• Interstate Nexus Proof: Reinforces that proving either component—gun or ammunition—crossed state lines suffices for § 922(g)(1). Defendants cannot exploit dual‐item indictments to force the government to prove both beyond reasonable doubt.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Strickland Two-Prong Test: To prevail on ineffective assistance grounds, a defendant must show (1) counsel’s performance fell below professional norms and (2) a reasonable probability exists that, but for the errors, the outcome would differ. Strategic choices are presumed reasonable.
• Single-Act Exception (Richardson): When a crime’s element can be proved by multiple acts (e.g., possession of a gun or ammo), a jury need only unanimously find one act if all jurors agree on the same event. A special unanimity instruction is required only when distinct events occur.
• Ghost‐Gun Defense: Arguing that a homemade or 3D‐printed firearm was never in interstate commerce. Here, pursuit of that theory would conflict with claiming the defendant never possessed a weapon at all.
• Rule 29 Motion: A post‐trial motion for acquittal for insufficient evidence. Unspecified grounds are waived if not raised at the district‐court stage.
• Delayed New-Trial Motion: A mechanism for a defendant to raise new arguments—such as IAC—after conviction but before sentencing, sometimes requiring an evidentiary hearing.

6. Conclusion

United States v. Marcus Angelo Smith reaffirms critical principles in federal criminal procedure. First, the Sixth Amendment guarantees “reasonable competence” but does not demand perfect representation; trial counsel’s well‐considered strategic decisions enjoy a strong presumption of reasonableness absent clear prejudice. Second, in § 922(g)(1) prosecutions involving a single incident in which a defendant fires a loaded weapon, jurors need not unanimously specify whether the conviction is based on firearm or ammunition—possession of one necessarily entails possession of both. Finally, the government need prove only one interstate nexus—either the gun or the ammo—to satisfy the statute. Collectively, these holdings streamline felon‐in‐possession trials and limit post‐trial relief to genuinely defective representations or scenarios where truly distinct acts supply alternative elements.