Unforeseeable Chains of Events and Generalized Warnings Do Not Establish Proximate Cause: Long v. Fowler (N.C. 2025)

Introduction

In Long v. Fowler, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed summary judgment for university maintenance employees in a wrongful-death negligence suit arising from a catastrophic industrial chiller accident on North Carolina State University’s campus. The case centers on the proximate cause element of negligence and, in particular, the foreseeability requirement: when is an injury so improbable and unprecedented that no reasonable juror could find it reasonably foreseeable?

The decedent, an OSHA-certified pipefitter employed by a subcontractor, died after a thirteen-pound flange/cap explosively detached from a chiller unit that had become pressurized following an unusual sequence: incomplete draining and winterization, freezing temperatures, burst cooler tubes, and migration of high-pressure refrigerant into the water side of the chiller. The estate sued individual NCSU technicians, alleging negligent winterization practices. The superior court granted defendants’ summary judgment motion; a divided Court of Appeals affirmed on foreseeability and, in the alternative, contributory negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed on foreseeability alone, concluding that the accident, while tragic, was not legally foreseeable as a matter of law.

A forceful dissent would have sent the foreseeability question to a jury, invoking longstanding North Carolina doctrine that proximate cause and foreseeability are “ordinarily” jury questions and pointing to warnings and manual statements the dissent viewed as sufficient to create a triable issue. The decision thus marks a notable clarification in North Carolina negligence law on when courts may remove foreseeability from the jury at the summary judgment stage.

Procedural note: The appeal proceeded as of right based on the dissent in the Court of Appeals under former N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2). Although that statute has since been repealed, the appeal was properly before the Court because it was docketed before the repeal’s effective date.

Summary of the Opinion

Writing for the Court, Justice Berger affirmed the Court of Appeals. Applying de novo review of the summary judgment order, the Court held that:

The uncontradicted record evidence—including admissions from plaintiff’s own expert and testimony from all involved—established that the chain of events leading to pressurization and the flange’s projectile detachment was “improbable,” “unexpected,” and not reasonably foreseeable.
Foreseeability is an essential component of proximate cause. A defendant need not predict the precise manner of injury, but the law does not require anticipation of events that are merely possible rather than reasonably foreseeable. If the causal chain is “unnatural, unreasonable and improbable in the light of common experience,” any negligence is a remote, not proximate, cause.
General manual language and warning labels here did not warn that failing to winterize (e.g., add antifreeze) could lead to pressurization of the water side and personal injury. They primarily cautioned against equipment damage from freezing. Thus, even had defendants read the manual, it would not have made this injury reasonably foreseeable.
Post-incident reconstruction of causation—i.e., understanding how the accident happened after the fact—does not establish that the sequence was foreseeable beforehand.
Because the Court affirmed on proximate cause, it did not reach the Court of Appeals’ alternative ground that the decedent’s contributory negligence barred recovery.

Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, dissented. Emphasizing that proximate cause/foreseeability are typically jury issues, the dissent argued the estate had forecast evidence sufficient to reach a jury, including warnings in the manual and on the unit about system pressures and freezing, as well as testimony bearing on what trained HVAC technicians should foresee. The dissent viewed the majority’s approach as improperly resolving factual inferences at summary judgment and as incompatible with North Carolina precedents such as Hairston and Williams.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Use

Hairston v. Alexander Tank & Equipment Co., 310 N.C. 227 (1984).
Majority: Cited for the principle that foreseeability is a requisite of proximate cause and that defendants are not required to anticipate merely possible events. The majority leveraged Hairston’s formulations of foreseeability to underscore that only reasonably foreseeable injuries are actionable.
Dissent: Invoked Hairston for the countervailing rule that a defendant need not foresee the precise manner of injury; it is enough that “some injury” or injury “of a generally injurious nature” be foreseeable. Hairston itself allowed a jury to find proximate cause across a multi-actor chain of events.
Keith v. Health-Pro Home Care Servs., Inc., 381 N.C. 442 (2022).
Majority: Quoted for the “person of ordinary prudence could have reasonably foreseen that a similar injurious result was probable” standard—a framing the Court applies to determine that no reasonable juror could find foreseeability on this record.
McNair v. Boyette, 282 N.C. 230 (1972); White v. Dickerson, Inc., 248 N.C. 723 (1958); Byrd v. Southern Express Co., 139 N.C. 273 (1905).
Majority: These decisions reiterate that foreseeability is essential to proximate cause and that proof must do more than raise a mere conjecture that negligence caused the injury.
Phelps v. City of Winston-Salem, 272 N.C. 24 (1967); Bennett v. R.R., 245 N.C. 261 (1957).
Majority: Used to emphasize that the law does not charge defendants with all possible consequences; if the connection between negligence and injury is “unnatural” or “improbable” in common experience, any negligence is a remote cause.
DiOrio v. Penny, 331 N.C. 726 (1992).
Majority: Acknowledges the general principle that summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases, but not never. The Court proceeds because it finds the evidence one-sided on foreseeability.
Terry v. Public Service Co. of N.C., Inc., 385 N.C. 797 (2024); Shore v. Brown, 324 N.C. 427 (1989); N.C. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Herring, 385 N.C. 419 (2023).
Majority: Authorities on summary judgment standards and de novo review; the Court reiterates that summary judgment is proper when an essential element fails as a matter of law and may be affirmed on any ground supported by the record.

The dissent in turn cites a line of cases underscoring that proximate cause and foreseeability are ordinarily jury issues unless only one inference can be drawn:

Williams v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 296 N.C. 400 (1979). Whether electrocution by uninsulated lines was foreseeable was left to the jury.
Slaughter v. Slaughter, 264 N.C. 732 (1965). Injury need not be foreseeable in the precise manner; it suffices that some injury is reasonably foreseeable.
Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94 (1970). Foreseeability extends to injury to person or property that could reasonably occur; a jury question existed when livestock escaped through a chain of events initiated by defendants’ negligence.
McIntyre v. Monarch Elevator & Machine Co., 230 N.C. 539 (1949); Hall v. Coble Dairies, 234 N.C. 206 (1951); Conley v. Pearce-Young-Angel Co., 224 N.C. 211 (1944); Kidd v. Early, 289 N.C. 343 (1976). Reaffirm the general rule that proximate cause is typically for the jury and that, at summary judgment, courts must not weigh credibility or resolve factual inferences.
Draughon v. Evening Star Holiness Church of Dunn, 374 N.C. 479 (2020). Standard requiring inferences to be drawn for the non-movant at summary judgment.
Fussell v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 364 N.C. 222 (2010). Duty of care extends to reasonably foreseeable harms, not perfect prescience—used to emphasize the jury’s role in close foreseeability calls.

In essence, the majority reads the precedents to permit summary judgment when the only reasonable inference is lack of foreseeability; the dissent reads the same or related precedents to insist that the presence of warnings, industry context, and disputed expert testimony normally suffice to take foreseeability to a jury.

Legal Reasoning

The majority’s reasoning proceeds in three linked steps:

Foreseeability as a legal threshold for proximate cause. The Court starts from orthodox negligence elements: duty, breach, and proximate cause. Proximate cause requires injuries that a person of ordinary prudence could reasonably foresee. While exact consequences need not be predicted, foreseeability demands more than mere possibility.
The record demonstrates an unprecedented, improbable sequence. The accident followed a confluence of conditions: incomplete draining and no antifreeze; freezing temperatures; resulting fracture and bulging of copper cooler tubes; unexpected ingress of high-pressure refrigerant into the water side; and capping of the system, which allowed pressure to build. The Court emphasizes that defendants, their supervisors, the employer, and plaintiff’s expert uniformly testified that no one anticipated such a mechanism—indeed, no one had heard of a similar occurrence. The decedent and coworker checked gauges that read zero; no one checked relief valves; there were no sensory cues of pressure. These features combined, in the majority’s view, to make the injury mechanism “unexpected” and “improbable” in light of common experience.
Warnings and post-incident understanding do not bridge the foreseeability gap. General statements in the Carrier manual that installing and servicing the equipment can be “hazardous due to system pressures” did not, the Court concludes, warn that failing to add antifreeze could lead to pressurization of the water side and a projectile release injuring a person. The manual and on-unit labels focused on protecting equipment from freeze damage; plaintiff’s expert conceded the winterization warnings were framed as equipment damage, “not as a safety concern.” The Court also rejects the estate’s argument that because a defendant later “figured out” the mechanism, it was foreseeable beforehand—post-accident reconstruction is not proof of pre-accident foreseeability.

Building on these points, the Court applies the “remote cause” principle from Phelps: where the connection between negligence and injury appears “unnatural, unreasonable and improbable in the light of common experience,” any negligence is not a proximate cause. The Court therefore affirms summary judgment because the estate failed to forecast evidence on foreseeability sufficient to reach a jury. It expressly declines to reach contributory negligence.

The dissent’s legal reasoning departs at the threshold: because foreseeability/proximate cause are “ordinarily” jury questions, the dissent would treat warnings about system pressures and freezing, and industry knowledge about freezing and tube breakage, as sufficient to create a triable dispute. The dissent highlights record evidence it views as contradictory—e.g., whether defendants consulted manuals generally; whether trained HVAC technicians should know that freezing can lead to tube failure and pressure migration—arguing that credibility disputes and reasonable inferences must be left to the jury.

Impact and Practical Consequences

Long v. Fowler sets a consequential marker on foreseeability at summary judgment in North Carolina negligence law, especially in industrial and maintenance contexts:

Elevated bar for plaintiffs on foreseeability when the injury mechanism is unprecedented. Where the chain of causation involves a novel or unexpected sequence—particularly one acknowledged as such by both sides’ experts—the Court is willing to deem lack of foreseeability as a matter of law and remove the issue from the jury. This narrows the path to trial in some industrial-accident negligence suits.
General hazard warnings may not suffice to create a jury issue. The majority distinguishes between warnings that protect equipment (e.g., “add antifreeze to prevent freeze-up damage”) and warnings that inform the risk of human injury. Generic statements that “system pressures” can be hazardous, without more, may be insufficient to raise a triable foreseeability issue if the actual injury arose from an unusual chain not specifically warned against. Expect defense arguments to focus on the granularity and target of warnings—equipment versus personal safety.
Expert testimony can be dispositive—against the proponent. The Court relied on plaintiff’s expert’s concessions that the manual did not frame winterization failures as a safety hazard to people and that this mechanism was unexpected. Parties should be precise in expert framing: testimony that a mechanism was “unprecedented” or not previously known can undercut foreseeability.
After-the-fact causal reconstruction is not prior foreseeability. Accident investigation narratives will not, without more, establish that a reasonable person could foresee the mechanism beforehand. Plaintiffs will need to marshal pre-accident evidence: industry literature, prior incidents, known failure modes, or standards showing the risk was appreciated beforehand.
Jury’s traditional role in foreseeability remains—but is not absolute. The decision does not abandon the general rule that foreseeability is a jury issue; it identifies a class of “exceptional cases” where uncontradicted evidence points one way. The dissent’s critique signals that future litigants should expect close scrutiny of whether the record is truly “uncontradicted.”
Contributory negligence remains a potent but separate defense. North Carolina’s pure contributory negligence regime loomed in the background—the Court of Appeals had adopted it as an alternative ground, citing the decedent’s OSHA training and methods. Although the Supreme Court did not reach it, defendants will continue to press contributory negligence as an independent basis for summary judgment when proximate cause is not dispositive.
Compliance and warning practices may shift. Manufacturers and institutional owners may consider clarifying warning schemes to highlight potential personal injury risks associated with winterization failures or unusual pressure migration, and to specify safe cap-removal protocols (e.g., stand clear, venting steps, relief valve checks). While such warnings can improve safety, they also expand the evidentiary basis for foreseeability in future litigation.

Practice Pointers

For plaintiffs: Develop evidence (before discovery closes) that the mechanism was known or should have been known in the field: prior incidents, industry standards (e.g., ASHRAE guidance), manufacturer service bulletins, OSHA or NIOSH alerts, or training materials addressing pressure migration after freezing. Elicit expert opinions linking winterization failures to foreseeable personal injury, not just equipment damage. Preserve testimony on the adequacy and placement of warnings and safe work practices (including relief valve checks and safe positioning when loosening caps).
For defendants: Emphasize the absence of prior similar incidents, lack of industry literature on the mechanism, and any consensus among experts that the chain was unprecedented. Distinguish equipment-protection warnings from personal-injury warnings. Highlight steps taken and the decedent’s own training and choices (e.g., position relative to caps, failure to verify relief valves), while preserving contributory negligence as an alternative ground.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Negligence: A failure to use reasonable care, breaching a duty owed to someone, causing injury.
Proximate cause: A legal limit on liability requiring that the negligence be sufficiently connected to the injury in a way that a reasonable person could anticipate some injury as a likely outcome. It focuses on the foreseeability of harm, not mere possibility.
Foreseeability: Not exact prediction, but awareness that some injury or generally injurious outcome is likely under the circumstances. North Carolina law does not require defendants to anticipate highly unusual or unprecedented chains of events.
Remote cause: If the link between the negligent act and the injury is too unusual or improbable in common experience, the law treats the negligence as a remote cause, not a proximate one—no liability.
Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling that no material factual disputes require a jury; the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Courts must view evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, but may grant summary judgment when an essential element (here, foreseeability) cannot be established on the record.
Contributory negligence (not reached here): In North Carolina, if a plaintiff is even 1% negligent and that negligence proximately contributes to the injury, recovery is barred. The high bar amplifies the defense’s leverage at summary judgment.

Conclusion

Long v. Fowler clarifies that generalized hazard references and post hoc explanations do not, without more, create a triable issue on foreseeability when an injury stems from a highly unusual and unprecedented chain of events. The Court’s emphasis on “uncontradicted evidence” that the mechanism was unexpected—and on the distinction between equipment-protection warnings and personal-injury warnings—provides defendants with a roadmap to secure summary judgment in select negligence cases where causation hinges on unforeseeability.

At the same time, the sharp dissent underscores an enduring tension in North Carolina tort law: the strong presumption that proximate cause and foreseeability are for juries versus the judiciary’s gatekeeping role to remove claims that rest on mere possibility rather than reasonable foreseeability. The decision will likely prompt more rigorous development—in both pleadings and expert discovery—of industry knowledge, warning content, and safe work practices to meet or defeat summary judgment on the foreseeability element of proximate cause.