Unexplained VE Skill Labels Won’t Do: Tenth Circuit Requires Record Documentation of Transferable Skills Under SSR 82-41

Unexplained VE Skill Labels Won’t Do: Tenth Circuit Requires Record Documentation of Transferable Skills Under SSR 82-41

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Tenth Circuit’s unpublished order and judgment in Morgan v. Commissioner, SSA (No. 24-8085, Oct. 9, 2025). The case concerns a common Step Five issue in Social Security disability adjudications: whether the agency adequately documented the claimant’s transferable skills and their applicability to other jobs in the national economy, as required by Social Security Ruling (SSR) 82-41.

The claimant, Rose M. Morgan, worked for fourteen years as a buyer for the Wyoming Department of Transportation, performing procurement-related tasks such as soliciting bids, managing contracts, meeting with vendors, and training end-users. She sought disability benefits based on fibromyalgia, rheumatoid arthritis, degenerative disc disease, memory issues, and migraines. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found severe impairments and an ability to perform only sedentary work, concluded she could not return to her past work as a purchasing agent, but denied benefits at Step Five on the ground that skills she purportedly acquired—“verbal recording” and “recordkeeping”—would transfer to the semi-skilled jobs of receptionist, appointment clerk, and order clerk.

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reverses and remands, holding that while clerical skills like recordkeeping can qualify as transferable skills under SSR 82-41, the record lacked substantial evidence—specifically, the required documentation—to support that Morgan acquired the skill of “verbal recording,” and the agency did not show that recordkeeping alone would support the identified Step Five jobs. The opinion clarifies that a vocational expert’s (VE) bare assertion of transferable skills, without supporting documentation and record linkage, is insufficient.

Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit reviews the Commissioner’s decision for substantial evidence and application of correct legal standards. It holds:

  • Under SSR 82-41, clerical skills qualify as “skills” that can transfer. The court rejects Morgan’s narrow reading that would limit “skills” to highly technical tasks.
  • However, the ALJ’s finding that Morgan acquired the skill of “verbal recording” is not supported by substantial evidence. The record does not define what “verbal recording” is, nor does it document that Morgan actually acquired it through her prior work.
  • By contrast, the court can discern a reasonable path for concluding that Morgan acquired “recordkeeping,” given her 14-year procurement job involving bids, contracts, and related documentation.
  • Because the agency relied on both “verbal recording” and “recordkeeping” to support transferability to receptionist, appointment clerk, and order clerk, and because the record does not establish that recordkeeping alone suffices, the Step Five denial cannot stand.
  • Remand is required for further proceedings; an outright award of benefits is not warranted on the present record.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

  • Barnett v. Apfel, 231 F.3d 687 (10th Cir. 2000): Establishes the substantial-evidence standard—“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion”—and the requirement that correct legal standards be applied.
  • SSR 82-41 (1982): Governs “work skills” and their transferability at Step Five. It requires that findings “should be supported with appropriate documentation,” and recognizes that clerical abilities (e.g., typing, filing, tabulating, posting data) can be transferable skills.
  • Dikeman v. Halter, 245 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2001): Confirms that the Commissioner bears the burden at Step Five to show that the claimant can perform other work, including establishing transferable skills.
  • Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983): Provides the administrative-law principle that courts cannot supply a reason the agency did not give, but can uphold a decision if the agency’s path can be reasonably discerned.
  • Zzyym v. Pompeo, 958 F.3d 1014 (10th Cir. 2020): Notes the “independent reasons” doctrine—courts can uphold administrative action when an agency gives two independent reasons and one is valid—if the record shows the validity of the independent ground.
  • Revised Handbook for Analyzing Jobs (1991): The VE referenced “work field 231 – VERBAL RECORDING–RECORD KEEPING.” The court’s footnote acknowledges this taxonomy but proceeds on the same understanding used by the ALJ and parties, treating “verbal recording” and “recordkeeping” as discrete skills.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning moves in two stages: defining what can qualify as a “skill” under SSR 82-41 and determining whether there is substantial, documented evidence that the claimant actually acquired the specific skills on which the Step Five determination rests.

1) What counts as a “skill” under SSR 82-41?

Morgan argued that “verbal recording” and “recordkeeping” are too rudimentary to be “skills,” pointing to SSR 82-41’s examples of technical abilities like precise measurement and operating complex machinery. The court rejects that narrow interpretation. SSR 82-41’s own illustrations include clerical abilities—“typing, filing, tabulating and posting data in record books”—as transferable skills. On that basis, the court concludes that “recordkeeping” and similar clerical capabilities fall comfortably within the ambit of “skills.” This clarifies that transferable skills are not confined to highly technical or mechanical occupations; clerical competencies can suffice.

2) Is there substantial, documented evidence that Morgan actually acquired the identified skills?

Here, SSR 82-41’s documentation requirement looms large. The ALJ relied exclusively on the VE’s testimony that Morgan possessed “verbal recording” and “recordkeeping,” and that those skills would transfer to receptionist, appointment clerk, and order clerk. The Tenth Circuit emphasizes:

  • SSR 82-41 requires “appropriate documentation” supporting transferability findings.
  • The Commissioner bears the Step Five burden to produce evidence on transferable skills (Dikeman).
  • The government pointed to no authority—and the court knew of none—holding that an expert’s opinion alone, without supporting documentation, constitutes substantial evidence on transferable skills.

Applying these principles, the court bifurcates the analysis:

  • Recordkeeping: From Morgan’s 14-year procurement role—soliciting bids, managing contracts, training users—the court can “reasonably discern” (State Farm) that she acquired recordkeeping abilities. The agency’s path on this point is sufficiently supported by the work history in the record.
  • Verbal recording: The term is undefined in the record, and there is no documentary evidence that Morgan acquired it. The VE’s bare label, untethered to the record, does not satisfy SSR 82-41’s documentation requirement or the substantial-evidence standard.

Because the ALJ relied on both skills to support transferability to the three semi-skilled jobs, the court considers whether it can uphold the decision on the strength of recordkeeping alone (Zzyym’s “independent reasons” doctrine). The answer is no. The record does not show that recordkeeping by itself is sufficient for the identified jobs; nothing establishes that “verbal recording” was not also required for those occupations as the ALJ and VE framed them. Accordingly, the Step Five determination cannot stand, and remand is required.

Finally, the court denies Morgan’s request for a remand with instructions to award benefits. On the present record, further fact-finding is appropriate, not an outright award.

Impact

Although non-precedential, this decision offers strong persuasive guidance within the Tenth Circuit (and beyond) on the evidentiary rigor required for transferable-skills findings under SSR 82-41:

  • For ALJs: When relying on transferable skills at Step Five, identify each skill specifically, define it, and cite record-based documentation showing the claimant acquired it through past relevant work. Conclusory VE labels—especially undefined terms—are vulnerable to remand.
  • For VEs: If referencing taxonomies like the Revised Handbook’s work fields (e.g., “work field 231 – VERBAL RECORDING–RECORD KEEPING”), explain the underlying tasks, how the claimant’s actual job duties cultivated these abilities, and why they transfer to the target occupations. Provide DOT/SCO citations or comparable documentation linking skills to job requirements.
  • For claimants and counsel: This case strengthens challenges to Step Five denials built on vague, unelaborated “skills.” Demanding definitions and documentation—“skills of what, developed how, and transferable to which job tasks?”—is a potent litigation strategy.
  • Substance over labels: The decision signals skepticism toward “skill” descriptors that sound like abstract aptitudes (e.g., “verbal recording”) unless tied to concrete tasks evidenced in the work history. ALJs should avoid conflating taxonomic labels with proof of actual acquired skills.
  • Clerical skills count—but must be proven: The court affirms that clerical skills can be transferable. However, proof matters: the record must show the claimant actually performed and learned them, and that those skills genuinely transfer to the identified jobs.
  • Remand risk rises where records are thin: Cases hinging on skill transfer are likely to see more remands if ALJs and VEs do not lay out the documentation SSR 82-41 demands. Building a robust evidentiary bridge from past work to target jobs is essential.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Residual Functional Capacity (RFC): What a claimant can still do despite medical impairments. Here, the ALJ found Morgan could do sedentary work with restrictions.
  • Step Five: After finding the claimant cannot return to past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show there are other jobs in significant numbers the claimant can perform, considering RFC, age, education, and work experience—including transferable skills.
  • Transferable Skills: Specific abilities learned in prior skilled or semi-skilled work that can be used in new jobs. Under SSR 82-41, ALJs must identify the skills, provide documentation that the claimant acquired them, and show how they transfer to particular occupations.
  • Vocational Expert (VE): A specialist who testifies about job classifications, requirements, and the vocational implications of a claimant’s limitations and work history.
  • Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT): A Department of Labor publication classifying jobs and their requirements. VEs often align past work and proposed jobs with DOT listings.
  • Revised Handbook for Analyzing Jobs: A taxonomy used by vocational experts. “Work field 231—VERBAL RECORDING–RECORD KEEPING” is a classification label; it is not itself proof that a claimant acquired discrete skills unless tied to the claimant’s actual job tasks.
  • Substantial Evidence: A deferential standard: relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate. Even so, SSR 82-41’s documentation requirement means conclusions about transferable skills cannot rest on unsupported assertions.
  • “Agency’s path may reasonably be discerned”: Courts may uphold an agency decision if, despite imperfect articulation, the reasoning is clear from the record. Here, that salvaged “recordkeeping” but not “verbal recording.”
  • Independent reasons doctrine: If an agency offers two independent grounds for its decision, a court can affirm if one survives. The record did not demonstrate that “recordkeeping” alone supported the Step Five jobs, so this doctrine could not be applied.

Conclusion

Morgan v. Commissioner, SSA reinforces that transferable-skills findings at Step Five cannot be built on opaque vocational jargon or conclusory assertions. The Tenth Circuit clarifies two complementary points:

  • Clerical competencies, including recordkeeping, are recognized as transferable “skills” under SSR 82-41.
  • But the agency must document that the claimant actually acquired each identified skill through past work and explain how it transfers to specific occupations. A VE’s bare labels, especially undefined ones like “verbal recording,” do not satisfy SSR 82-41 or the substantial-evidence standard.

Because the ALJ relied on both “recordkeeping” and “verbal recording” to justify a Step Five denial—and the record did not show that recordkeeping alone would suffice—the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. For practitioners, the decision is a clear signal: press for precise, documented, and job-specific proof of skills and their transferability; for adjudicators and VEs, build the evidentiary record so that each identified skill is defined, grounded in the claimant’s actual work history, and explicitly tied to the demands of the proposed jobs.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

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