Unequivocal Withdrawal of Termination Requests in Texas Parental‑Rights Cases: Commentary on D.V. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

Unequivocal Withdrawal of Termination Requests in Texas Parental‑Rights Cases: Commentary on D.V. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in D.V. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, No. 24‑0840 (Tex. Oct. 31, 2025), sets an important procedural and substantive constraint on the State’s ability to obtain termination of parental rights. The Court holds that in parental‑termination cases a trial court may not terminate a parent’s rights when the Department of Family and Protective Services (the “Department” or “DFPS”) has, through someone speaking on its behalf, unequivocally and unrepudiatedly withdrawn termination as a requested form of relief.

While the Court deliberately reserves broader questions about abandonment of claims in ordinary civil litigation, it fashions a distinct and more protective rule for parental‑termination proceedings, grounded in the constitutional magnitude of the parent‑child relationship and the special procedural safeguards governing such cases.

The decision also clarifies that statements made in court by DFPS’s designated representative, when elicited by DFPS counsel and left uncorrected, can effectively bind the Department’s litigating position on whether it seeks termination, notwithstanding contrary language in the live pleadings.

II. Background and Procedural History

A. Underlying Facts

Petitioner D.V. (“Mother”) had a history of violent behavior and drug use. After a reported assault on her ex‑boyfriend and one of her other children, DFPS removed E.D., the child at issue, and filed a petition seeking to terminate both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.

As the case progressed, the Department’s position evolved. By the time of trial, DFPS reportedly favored Father as E.D.’s permanent sole managing conservator, meaning Father alone would exercise the traditional incidents of parental authority over E.D. However, DFPS’s live pleading still requested termination of both parents’ rights—even though no one at trial treated the pleading as an accurate reflection of DFPS’s actual litigation position as to Father.

B. Trial Before the Associate Judge

The trial was held as a bench trial via videoconference before an associate judge. DFPS had designated its caseworker as the Department’s representative under Texas procedural and evidentiary rules.

On the second day of trial, DFPS’s counsel directly asked this representative:

Q.   What is the Department's recommendation [to] the Court today?
A.   The Department is seeking to limit and restrict [Mother]'s rights, and give permanent managing conservatorship of [E.D.] to [Father], and to limit [Mother]'s rights to parent non-conservator with no visitation and contact.

On cross‑examination, Mother’s counsel sought explicit confirmation:

Q.   And [the Department] is not seeking to terminate [Mother]'s rights, but to ask the Court to name her as a parent non-conservator?
A.   Correct.

No party objected. DFPS’s counsel did not correct, qualify, or attempt to retract the representative’s testimony.

Later, a CASA volunteer recommended termination of Mother’s rights and joint managing conservatorship between Father and the grandfather (with Father primary). The child’s attorney ad litem, in closing, stated:

“Your Honor, I think the Department has met its burden as far as termination… However, if the Court is not inclined to terminate [Mother]'s parental rights, then I would request the Court name her a non-possessory conservator.”

Mother testified that she did not want termination and hoped at least to regain visitation. Her counsel’s brief closing asked the court not to terminate her rights. The Department made no opening or closing argument.

Immediately after the attorney ad litem’s closing, the associate judge announced termination of Mother’s parental rights and appointed Father as sole managing conservator. A final judgment followed accordingly.

C. De Novo Hearing and Appeal

Mother sought a de novo hearing in the referring district court. The district court initially declined, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a de novo hearing. See D.V. v. Tex. Dep't of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03‑23‑00098‑CV, 2023 WL 4494802 (Tex. App.—Austin July 13, 2023, no pet.).

At the de novo stage, Mother advanced several grounds to challenge termination. The only ground preserved for appellate review was that the associate judge lacked authority to terminate her constitutionally protected parental rights after the Department had affirmatively abandoned its termination request at trial.

The referring district court adopted the associate judge’s ruling and again terminated Mother’s rights. The Third Court of Appeals (Austin) affirmed in a published opinion. 716 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024).

D. The Court of Appeals’ “Contextual” Approach

The court of appeals accepted that pleadings can be abandoned by stipulation—that is, by agreements or concessions made in court—but emphasized that stipulations must be interpreted in light of:

  • the language used, and
  • the surrounding circumstances, including pleadings, allegations, and the parties’ attitudes.

Relying on In re I.L., 580 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019, pet. dism’d), and In re J.M., 352 S.W.3d 824 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.), the court deemed the relevant “context” to include:

  • CASA’s recommendation that termination was in E.D.’s best interest,
  • the attorney ad litem’s statement that the Department had met its burden for termination,
  • DFPS’s presentation of evidence that could support termination,
  • Mother’s own counsel’s request that the court not terminate, and
  • the fact that the abandonment statements came from the Department’s representative, not from counsel.

Considering these factors, the court of appeals “agree[d] with” DFPS that its representative’s testimony did not amount to an abandonment of the Department’s termination request.

E. The Supreme Court’s Review

The Texas Supreme Court granted review and reversed. Justice Young authored the opinion; Justice Hawkins did not participate. The Court reframed the case not as a generic civil‑procedure dispute but as one arising in the “distinctive context” of parental‑termination proceedings, where special constitutional and statutory protections apply and where the law has long operated with a strong presumption against termination.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

The Supreme Court holds:

“In parental-termination cases, a court may not terminate parental rights in the face of an unequivocal and unrepudiated statement made by someone speaking on the department's behalf that withdraws termination as a requested form of relief.”

Applied to Mother’s case, DFPS’s designated representative, directly questioned by DFPS counsel, unequivocally stated that the Department was not seeking termination of Mother’s parental rights but only restrictions and non‑conservator status. That testimony was immediately confirmed on cross‑examination and never repudiated or corrected.

The Court concludes that:

  • The representative’s statements were clear, unambiguous, and could bear only one reasonable interpretation: the Department had withdrawn termination as a requested remedy as to Mother.
  • DFPS’s failure to promptly and clearly repudiate or correct that position bound the Department for purposes of trial.
  • CASA and the attorney ad litem’s recommendations, DFPS’s presentation of evidence, and Mother’s closing argument cannot override DFPS’s own unequivocal abandonment.
  • The presence of a live termination request in DFPS’s pleadings does not preserve a remedy that has been abandoned in open court—especially where, as here, the same pleading also sought termination of Father’s rights, which DFPS had undisputedly abandoned.

The Supreme Court therefore:

  • reverses the court of appeals,
  • reverses the portion of the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights,
  • renders judgment appointing Mother as a parent non‑conservator (consistent with DFPS’s stated trial position and Mother’s prayer in the Supreme Court), and
  • remands to the district court to enter a judgment consistent with the opinion and to resolve any remaining issues, conducting further proceedings if necessary to aid rendition.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The New Rule: Binding Effect of Unequivocal Withdrawal of Termination Relief

The core legal innovation in D.V. is a bright‑line rule for parental‑termination cases:

An unequivocal statement by DFPS—or its designated representative—at trial that the Department is not seeking termination of a parent’s rights constitutes a withdrawal (abandonment) of the termination request unless the Department clearly and promptly repudiates that statement.

Several important features of the rule emerge from the opinion:

  • Limitation to parental‑termination cases. The Court expressly reserves the broader question of abandonment in ordinary civil cases (e.g., torts, contracts), focusing only on termination cases because of their unique constitutional dimension.
  • Unequivocality requirement. The statement must be clear and unambiguous. The testimony here (“not seeking to terminate [Mother]’s rights”) plainly meets that standard.
  • Binding absent repudiation. If DFPS’s true litigation position differs from the representative’s unequivocal statement, it is incumbent on counsel to alert the court and the parent. Silence amounts to acceptance.
  • Agency representation. For purposes of expressing litigation positions in a termination case, DFPS’s designated representative can speak for the Department. Counsel’s involvement in eliciting the testimony reinforces that conclusion.

By adopting this rule, the Court directly rejects the idea that a trial court can use a “totality of the circumstances” approach to effectively override an unrepudiated and unequivocal DFPS statement that termination is not being sought.

B. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1976)

Wiley is cited for foundational principles about the gravity of parental rights:

  • “Actions which break the ties between a parent and child can never be justified without the most solid and substantial reasons.”
  • Termination proceedings should be “strictly scrutinized.”
  • There is a “strong presumption that the best interest of a minor is usually served by keeping custody in the natural parents.”
  • The parent‑child relationship is “of constitutional dimensions.”

In D.V., these principles support a protective tilt in procedural questions: when in doubt about whether the State has abandoned termination, courts should err on the side of preserving parental rights unless the State clearly pursues termination.

2. In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. 2012) and Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)

The Court invokes In re E.R. and its reliance on Santosky to underline that:

  • Termination proceedings implicate interests “far more precious than any property right.”
  • Because of this, termination cases are “governed by special rules.”

Those “special rules” include:

  • a heightened “clear and convincing” evidence standard for termination, and
  • augmented appellate review standards (see In re N.G., discussed below).

In D.V., these authorities justify treating abandonment in termination cases differently from ordinary civil cases and rejecting an amorphous “totality of the circumstances” approach when DFPS says, in plain terms, it is not seeking termination.

3. Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. 1985) and Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)

Holick is cited for the rule that evidence supporting termination must be “clear and convincing,” a constitutional requirement later codified in Texas Family Code § 161.001(b). The Court connects this substantive evidence threshold to a broader theme: because termination is an extraordinary remedy, all aspects of the process—including procedural and pleading rules—must be carefully applied to protect parents’ rights.

4. In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2019)

In re N.G. is cited for the proposition that parents in termination cases enjoy an “elevated standard of appellate review.” Though D.V. does not elaborate, N.G. is known for requiring appellate courts to review certain statutory grounds for termination even when unchallenged, due to due‑process concerns about collateral consequences.

The citation in D.V. underscores that appellate scrutiny in termination cases is more exacting than in ordinary civil appeals, reinforcing why courts must be particularly careful when deciding whether DFPS has abandoned or preserved a termination claim.

5. Leithold v. Plass, 413 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. 1967)

Leithold is quoted for the rule that:

“Technical rules of practice and pleadings are of little importance in determining issues concerning the custody of children.”

In D.V., this principle serves a dual purpose:

  • It cautions against over‑reliance on the formal wording of pleadings (e.g., DFPS’s live request for termination), when the realities of the trial show something quite different.
  • It emphasizes that in child‑welfare litigation, courts must focus more on substantive fairness and clarity than on procedural technicalities that could trap parents or obscure the State’s true intentions.

6. Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Related Cases

The Court invokes several procedural rules and cases:

  • Tex. R. Civ. P. 301: A judgment must conform to the pleadings. This means a court generally cannot award relief on a claim that has been abandoned.
  • Tex. R. Civ. P. 165: A party that abandons part of a claim or defense may have that recorded “so as to show that the matters therein were not tried.”
  • Pathfinder Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Great W. Drilling, Ltd., 574 S.W.3d 882 (Tex. 2019): “When parties stipulate that only certain questions will be tried, all others are thereby waived.” This underscores that stipulations can implicitly waive claims or issues, functioning like abandonment.
  • In re Shaw, 966 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, no pet.): A court may not order termination where DFPS has stipulated that it is not seeking termination. D.V. expressly endorses this proposition.

Together, these authorities provide the procedural backbone for the conclusion that—once DFPS has unequivocally abandoned termination at trial—a judgment terminating parental rights is unauthorized.

7. Party Representative Rules: Tex. R. Civ. P. 267 and Tex. R. Evid. 614; In re N.H.

DFPS’s caseworker was its designated representative under:

  • Tex. R. Civ. P. 267(a) and Tex. R. Evid. 614 (sequestration rules allowing each party to designate a representative who may remain in the courtroom); and
  • Tex. R. Civ. P. 267(b), which contemplates that such a representative operates as the party’s “face and physical presence at trial.”

The Court cites In re N.H., No. 02‑22‑00157‑CV, 2022 WL 4374638 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 22, 2022, no pet.), where a private provider contracting with DFPS testified that the Department was not seeking termination as to one child, and the court treated the provider as effectively acting as DFPS’s agent for that purpose.

In D.V., the argument is even stronger: DFPS itself designated the caseworker as its representative, and DFPS’s own counsel elicited the critical testimony that the Department was not seeking termination of Mother’s rights.

8. Legate v. Legate, 28 S.W. 281 (Tex. 1894)

Legate is one of the earliest Texas authorities recognizing the presumption that a child’s best interest is served by remaining with the parents:

“[T]he law presumes that the best interest of the child will be subserved by allowing it to remain in the custody of the parents ….”

By invoking Legate, the Court situates D.V. in a long line of cases expressing a strong preference for maintaining the parent‑child relationship absent compelling justification and strict adherence to legal process.

9. In re A.L.R., 646 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. 2022)

In re A.L.R. is cited for the proposition that documents must give parents clear notice of what is required to avoid termination. There, labeling court‑ordered service plan requirements as merely “requested tasks” was held insufficient because it did not convey their mandatory character.

In D.V., the Court draws an analogy: a petition seeking termination serves, among other things, to:

  • put parents on notice of the potentially “grave results” if they do not remedy alleged deficiencies; and
  • trigger certain protections, such as statutory rights to appointed counsel under Texas Family Code § 107.013(a).

But the “flip side” is that when termination ceases to be appropriate, DFPS must clearly say so—just as service plans must clearly communicate mandatory requirements. Ambiguity is unacceptable in either direction.

10. Other Courts of Appeals Cases: In re I.L., In re J.M.

The Court references In re I.L. and In re J.M. primarily as background for how stipulations are interpreted in ordinary civil (and parental) cases, including consideration of surrounding circumstances and pleadings. But the Supreme Court effectively holds that such a flexible, contextual approach is inadequate in parental‑termination cases when DFPS has clearly said it is not seeking termination.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Parental‑Termination as a Distinct Procedural Category

The Court’s reasoning begins from the premise that parental‑termination proceedings are not just another type of civil litigation. They are treated differently because:

  • Parents’ natural rights to their children are of “constitutional dimensions” (Wiley),
  • Termination affects interests “more precious than any property right” (In re E.R., Santosky),
  • Termination requires clear and convincing evidence (Holick; Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)),
  • Poor parents have a statutory right to appointed counsel (Tex. Fam. Code § 107.013(a)), and
  • Appellate review is more demanding (In re N.G.).

In light of these features, the Court holds that procedural doctrines such as abandonment and stipulations cannot simply be imported from standard civil cases without accounting for the heightened protection owed to parents.

2. Reserving the General Rule for Ordinary Civil Litigation

The Court acknowledges that “perhaps even routine tort or contract cases” may require a more precise test than “totality of the circumstances” to assess abandonment of claims or defenses. But it expressly reserves this question for another day.

Instead, the Court adopts an asymmetric framing:

  • If a claim in an ordinary civil case would be deemed abandoned on facts materially indistinguishable from those in D.V., then certainly termination is abandoned in this case.
  • But the converse does not hold: even if a civil claim might be treated as preserved in an ordinary case, it may still be treated as abandoned in a termination case because of the special protections afforded to parents.

This “one‑way ratchet” explicitly places parental rights on a higher procedural pedestal.

3. Application to the Trial Record

The Court examines the representative’s testimony and the trial record with a focus on clarity of DFPS’s substantive position:

  • The representative unambiguously testified that DFPS sought to “limit and restrict [Mother]'s rights,” give Father permanent managing conservatorship, and make Mother a “parent non-conservator with no visitation and contact.”
  • On cross, she agreed DFPS was “not seeking to terminate [Mother]'s rights.”
  • DFPS’s counsel elicited the original statement and did nothing to correct it.
  • There was no later statement by DFPS (through counsel or any other spokesperson) contradicting or limiting those assertions.

The Court concludes these statements are:

  • Unequivocal: They leave no room for ambiguity about whether DFPS was seeking termination as to Mother.
  • Authoritative: The Department’s designated representative was expressly speaking “for” DFPS, not merely giving personal views, and counsel’s involvement further confirms this.

4. Rejection of the “Totality of the Circumstances” Approach

The court of appeals justified its refusal to treat DFPS’s statements as abandonment by invoking a “totality of the circumstances” approach and by pointing to:

  • CASA’s recommendation for termination,
  • the attorney ad litem’s assertion that DFPS had met its burden to terminate,
  • evidence that could support termination, and
  • Mother’s own request that her rights not be terminated.

The Supreme Court finds each of these considerations insufficient to override DFPS’s clear, unrepudiated abandonment:

  • Other parties’ recommendations (CASA and the attorney ad litem) are not determinative of what relief DFPS is seeking. Only parties that have actually pleaded for termination can support a judgment terminating rights. Here, Father’s pleadings did not request termination of Mother’s rights, and CASA/ad litem are recommending, not seeking, relief.
  • Evidence supporting termination is not decisive because the same evidence can be, and was, relevant to a less severe remedy (making Mother a non‑conservator with no visitation). The existence of such evidence cannot generate a remedy DFPS has abandoned.
  • Mother’s counsel’s request “not to terminate” does not rehabilitate termination as an option. At most, it could be read as partly predicated on DFPS’s own abandonment. It would be illogical to treat Mother’s plea not to be terminated as re‑opening termination as a legally available remedy.

Accordingly, “context” cannot be used to erase or neutralize DFPS’s explicit and uncorrected statement that it is not seeking termination.

5. Role of the Designated Representative vs. Counsel

DFPS and the court of appeals argued that because the abandonment statements came from the Department’s representative and not its counsel, they should not count as binding abandonment. The Supreme Court rejects that argument.

Key points:

  • The Department’s representative was formally designated under the rules precisely so that DFPS, a non‑natural party, would have a human “face and physical presence at trial.”
  • As such, the representative was authorized to express DFPS’s positions in the litigation.
  • Even if counsel’s participation were necessary, that requirement is amply satisfied here because:
    • DFPS’s lawyer directly asked the representative to state the Department’s recommendation; and
    • once the representative said DFPS was not seeking termination, counsel did nothing to correct or disclaim that statement.

The Court carefully qualifies its reasoning: it does not purport to decide when or whether a designated representative can bind an agency in all contexts or for all purposes. Its holding is expressly limited to:

  • the context of parental‑termination proceedings, and
  • the narrow question of when DFPS will be treated as having abandoned termination as a requested form of relief.

Within that domain, however, DFPS cannot treat its designated representative’s unequivocal courtroom statements as inconsequential.

6. Pleadings vs. Trial Conduct

DFPS also argued that because its live pleading continued to request termination, there was no abandonment. The Court makes two principal responses:

  1. Pleadings are a starting point, not the end of the inquiry.
    Without a pleading requesting termination, there is nothing to abandon. But once the case reaches trial, parties can abandon claims by stipulation or conduct. A live pleading does not immunize a claim from abandonment.
  2. DFPS’s own treatment of Father’s rights undermines overreliance on pleadings.
    The same live pleading also requested termination of Father’s parental rights, yet DFPS “undisputedly abandoned” that request in practice by advocating that Father be appointed as E.D.’s permanent sole managing conservator. If DFPS could abandon termination as to Father despite what the pleading said, there is “no huge leap” in concluding the same about Mother.

The Court emphasizes the dual nature of a termination pleading:

  • It alerts parents to the catastrophic potential consequence and the need to remedy alleged deficiencies.
  • It triggers protections such as the right to counsel under § 107.013(a).

But once DFPS determines, based on developments, that termination is no longer appropriate, it must acknowledge that openly. Termination is always a “last resort,” so the law expects and encourages DFPS to abandon it when a lesser remedy suffices.

7. The Requirement of Rapid Repudiation

The Court recognizes that mistakes and misstatements can occur at trial. Accordingly, it does not hold that any inaccurate statement by a DFPS representative is forever binding. Instead, it adopts a more modest but firm requirement:

If DFPS intends to pursue termination but its representative unequivocally states otherwise in court, the Department must rapidly and clearly repudiate that statement.

Examples (not exhaustive) of what DFPS could have done in this case:

  • Counsel could have immediately asked follow‑up questions to clarify or correct the representative’s testimony.
  • Counsel could have addressed the court directly to reaffirm that termination remained sought as to Mother.
  • Counsel could have used redirect or re‑examination of the representative to correct any misstatement.
  • Counsel could have made a closing argument explicitly stating that DFPS was still pursuing termination.

DFPS did none of these. Because there was no repudiation, the Court “takes [the Department] at its word as expressed at trial” and holds that termination had been abandoned.

Notably, the Court expressly leaves open “precisely what kind of repudiation is sufficient or just how soon it must come,” because resolving that issue is unnecessary on the facts of this case.

D. Impact and Future Implications

1. For DFPS and Child‑Protective Practice

D.V. will likely lead to significant changes in DFPS litigation practice:

  • Increased training and preparation of caseworkers/representatives. DFPS must ensure that designated representatives clearly understand the Department’s current requested relief before they testify, especially on sensitive questions like whether termination is being sought.
  • More active courtroom corrections. DFPS counsel now has a clear judicial mandate: any misstatement suggesting that termination is not being sought must be corrected “instantly,” in the Court’s words, like responding to a “blaring klaxon.”
  • Conscious decisions to abandon termination. The decision encourages thoughtful mid‑case reassessment: if termination is no longer appropriate, DFPS should explicitly say so and should not worry that abandonment will be treated skeptically.
  • Clear communication across the litigation team. Alignment between DFPS’s written pleadings, permanency plans, internal decisions, and courtroom positions is now critical to avoid unintended abandonment.

2. For Parent and Child Representatives

Parents’ attorneys—and, to a lesser degree, attorneys ad litem for children—gain a powerful procedural protection:

  • If DFPS clearly states in court that it is not seeking termination, parents can argue that:
    • termination is no longer a legally available remedy, and
    • any attempt to terminate—either by the trial court or late reversal by DFPS—must be rejected unless DFPS made a timely, clear repudiation on the record.
  • Defense counsel should be alert to such statements and, if they occur, consider:
    • seeking an immediate ruling that termination is off the table, or
    • building a clear record for appellate review that DFPS abandoned its termination request.

For children’s attorneys, the opinion clarifies that:

  • They may believe termination is in the child’s best interest and argue accordingly, but
  • They cannot expand the court’s authority to terminate beyond what is properly sought and preserved by parties with standing and live requests for that relief.

3. For Trial Courts

Trial judges in termination cases must now:

  • Closely attend to DFPS’s oral statements at trial about whether termination is being sought.
  • Recognize that once DFPS unequivocally abandons termination and does not clearly repudiate that abandonment, the court lacks authority to terminate based on DFPS’s petition.
  • Avoid “salvaging” termination through:
    • CASA recommendations,
    • attorney ad litem arguments, or
    • generic references to the strength of the evidence.

Practically, judges may choose to:

  • Clarify on the record at key junctures (e.g., end of evidence, before ruling) exactly what relief DFPS is still seeking, and
  • Confirm with counsel after any ambiguous or surprising statement by a representative whether it reflects DFPS’s official trial position.

4. For Appellate Courts

D.V. provides a clear standard for appellate review:

  • If the record contains an unequivocal DFPS statement withdrawing termination as a requested remedy, and no clear repudiation follows, a termination judgment is reversible error.
  • Contextual factors like recommendations by non‑party advocates, evidence strength, or even parent counsel’s closing arguments cannot outweigh or negate that unrepudiated statement.

Appellate courts must therefore examine the trial transcript closely for DFPS’s explicit trial positions, not just rely on the pleadings and the form of the final judgment.

5. Scope and Limitations of the Holding

Although broad in its implications for termination practice, the Court carefully limits its holding:

  • It applies to parental‑termination cases, not to all civil litigation.
  • It addresses DFPS’s abandonment of its own request for termination; it does not resolve what happens if another party (e.g., a private petitioner) independently seeks termination.
  • It does not define in detail:
    • exactly what constitutes a “clear repudiation,” or
    • how much time DFPS has to repudiate after a misstatement.

These reserved questions will likely generate future litigation and judicial clarification.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

To make the opinion accessible, this section explains key legal concepts appearing in or underlying the decision.

1. Termination of Parental Rights

Termination is the legal process by which a court completely and permanently severs the legal relationship between a parent and child. After termination:

  • The parent no longer has rights such as custody, visitation, consent to medical treatment, or inheritance from the child.
  • The child may be freed for adoption, and the former parent generally has no legal standing regarding the child.

Because termination is so drastic, it requires clear and convincing evidence and strict procedural safeguards.

2. Managing Conservator vs. Parent Non‑Conservator / Non‑Possessory Conservator

  • Managing Conservator: In Texas, this is the person (often a parent) with primary authority over the child—such as deciding where the child lives, what school they attend, and other major decisions.
  • Sole Managing Conservator: One person alone has the managing conservator role.
  • Parent Non‑Conservator / Non‑Possessory Conservator: A parent who retains the legal status of “parent” but:
    • is not given managing conservator powers, and
    • may or may not have rights of possession (visitation) or decision‑making.

In D.V., DFPS advocated that Father be sole managing conservator, while Mother become a parent non‑conservator with no visitation or contact—meaning Mother’s parental status would legally continue, but without practical rights to physical access or decision‑making.

3. Clear and Convincing Evidence

“Clear and convincing evidence” is a higher standard than “preponderance of the evidence” (more likely than not) but lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt” (the criminal standard).

In termination cases, the court must be firmly convinced that:

  • at least one statutory ground for termination (such as abuse, neglect, or failure to comply with a service plan) has been proved, and
  • termination is in the child’s best interest.

4. Abandonment of Pleadings / Claims

In civil litigation, a “claim” is a request for a particular type of relief, such as damages, injunction, or termination of rights. A party may:

  • Formally abandon a claim by amending pleadings to remove it or by putting an abandonment on the record (Tex. R. Civ. P. 165), or
  • Informally abandon it through agreements, concessions, or stipulations that remove the issue from trial (Pathfinder).

If a claim is abandoned, the court generally cannot grant relief on that claim. In D.V., the Court holds that DFPS abandoned its termination request through a clear stipulation in open court that it was not seeking termination as to Mother.

5. Stipulations

A stipulation is an agreement between parties on certain facts, issues, or the scope of the trial. For instance, parties may stipulate:

  • to the authenticity of documents,
  • to certain facts (e.g., the date of an event), or
  • to which claims are actually being tried.

In D.V., the Court treats DFPS’s representative’s explicit statement that the Department was not seeking termination as, in substance, a stipulation limiting the relief in play. When parties stipulate that only certain questions will be tried, “all others are thereby waived” (Pathfinder).

6. CASA and Attorney Ad Litem

  • CASA (Court Appointed Special Advocate): A trained volunteer appointed by the court to investigate the child’s circumstances and make recommendations regarding the child’s best interest.
  • Attorney ad litem: A lawyer appointed to represent the child directly, acting as the child’s attorney with the usual professional obligations to advocate for the child’s expressed or best interests (depending on the role defined by statute and appointment order).

While both may strongly influence the court and offer recommendations, neither can independently plead for termination nor override DFPS’s formal abandonment of that remedy when DFPS is the petitioner.

7. Designated Representative

Under Texas procedural and evidentiary rules, each party may designate a representative who:

  • is exempt from witness sequestration rules, and
  • serves as the “face” of the party at trial.

For a government agency like DFPS, this is often a caseworker. In D.V., the Court holds that such a representative may speak for DFPS regarding its trial position on whether termination is being sought, particularly when guided and questioned by DFPS’s counsel.

VI. Conclusion

D.V. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services reinforces and extends Texas’s longstanding commitment to robust procedural protections in parental‑termination cases. It establishes a clear, parent‑protective rule:

When DFPS, through its counsel or designated representative, unequivocally states in court that it is not seeking termination of a parent’s rights, and that statement is not promptly and clearly repudiated, a trial court may not terminate those rights based on DFPS’s petition.

The decision:

  • limits the weight that can be given to generic “contextual” factors when they conflict with DFPS’s explicit statements about its requested relief,
  • clarifies the binding effect of a designated representative’s unambiguous trial testimony about DFPS’s position,
  • signals to DFPS that abandonment of termination is a legitimate and expected outcome when circumstances no longer warrant the most drastic remedy, and
  • reaffirms that parental‑termination cases occupy a unique place in the civil justice system, warranting strict scrutiny and a presumption in favor of preserving the parent‑child relationship absent clear, convincing, and properly sought grounds for termination.

By reversing the termination of Mother’s rights and rendering judgment consistent with DFPS’s own stated trial position, the Supreme Court not only corrects an error in this individual case but also sets a precedent that will shape the conduct of child‑protection litigation across Texas. Trial courts, DFPS, and advocates alike must now pay careful attention to the alignment—or misalignment—between pleadings, trial testimony, and on‑the‑record representations about what relief the State is truly seeking when the family’s most fundamental legal relationships are at stake.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Texas

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