Unequivocal Invocations of the Right to Remain Silent and Novel MRTA Claims: Commentary on People v. Williams (2025)

1. Introduction

The Fourth Department’s decision in People v. Williams, 2025 NY Slip Op 07158 (Dec. 23, 2025), is significant in two distinct but related areas of New York criminal procedure:

Miranda/right-to-silence jurisprudence – sharpening when a suspect’s words amount to an unequivocal invocation of the right to remain silent and the obligation of police to “scrupulously honor” that invocation; and
Counsel’s duty to raise novel suppression theories – in particular, whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not invoking the Marihuana Regulation and Taxation Act (MRTA), Penal Law § 222.05(3), to challenge a pre-enactment search at a post-enactment suppression hearing.

Eric Williams, a backseat passenger in a lawfully stopped vehicle, was convicted on his guilty plea to criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03[3]) after police discovered a loaded handgun in his jacket and he later made inculpatory statements at the station. On appeal, he challenged both the seizure of the gun and the admissibility of his post-arrest statements.

The Fourth Department rejected his search-and-seizure arguments but agreed that his Miranda rights were violated. The court held that Williams’ statement, “I ain't got nothing to talk about. I just want to go to jail. I want to go to sleep,” was an unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent, and that police failed to honor that invocation. Because the Miranda violation tainted his statements, the court reversed the conviction, vacated the plea, and granted suppression of all post-invocation statements.

At the same time, the court held that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue that MRTA’s search-limiting provision (§ 222.05[3]) applied to a pre-enactment search where the suppression hearing occurred after the statute’s effective date. That part of the opinion clarifies the limits of ineffective-assistance claims based on unraised, then-novel legal theories.

2. Summary of the Opinion

2.1 Core Holdings

Search of Williams’ person was lawful
- The police lawfully stopped the vehicle for traffic infractions.
- They lawfully ordered Williams, a passenger, out of the vehicle without any particularized suspicion (citing People v Garcia, 20 NY3d 317 [2012], and related authorities).
- The observed marijuana on the center console gave probable cause to search all occupants of the vehicle, including Williams.
- The pat frisk that led to discovery of the handgun was therefore lawful under pre-MRTA law.
MRTA-based challenge not preserved; no ineffective assistance
- Williams argued on appeal that MRTA’s Penal Law § 222.05(3), which limits searches based on marijuana odor/possession, should be applied retroactively to invalidate the search.
- The court held that he did not preserve this argument because it was not raised in his suppression motion or at the hearing (citing People v Panton, 27 NY3d 1144 [2016]; People v Baker, 219 AD3d 1678 [4th Dept 2023]).
- The court declined interest-of-justice review under CPL 470.15(3)(c).
- It further held that counsel was not ineffective for failing to assert the MRTA retroactivity theory when there was no appellate authority supporting it and competing authority cutting against it (citing People v McGee, 20 NY3d 513 [2013]; People v Hayward, 42 NY3d 753 [2024]; People v Watkins, 42 NY3d 635 [2024]).
Miranda violation: unequivocal invocation of right to remain silent
- At the station, after being advised of his Miranda rights and acknowledging understanding, Williams was asked if he would waive those rights and speak.
- He responded: “I ain't got nothing to talk about. I just want to go to jail. I want to go to sleep.”
- The interrogating officer did not clarify or end questioning, but instead tried to re-engage Williams, saying, “Well, I don't want to waste your time but I am curious about the fight you had been in in the morning.”
- Williams then spoke further and made incriminating statements about the gun.
- The Fourth Department held that:
  - Williams’ statement was an unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent (citing People v Johnston, 192 AD3d 1516 [4th Dept 2021]; People v Glover, 87 NY2d 838 [1995]).
  - The officer failed to scrupulously honor that invocation (citing People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316 [1984]; People v Paulman, 5 NY3d 122 [2005]; Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291 [1980]).
Remedy
- The judgment is reversed, the guilty plea vacated, and that part of the omnibus motion seeking to suppress all statements made after invocation of the right to remain silent is granted.
- The case is remitted to Supreme Court, Monroe County, for further proceedings on the indictment (citing People v Corey, 209 AD3d 1306 [4th Dept 2022]; People v Hughes, 199 AD3d 1332 [4th Dept 2021]).
- The court does not reach Williams’ sentencing-severity challenge, and it finds his remaining contentions meritless.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Factual and Procedural Context

The facts are straightforward but legally rich:

Police lawfully stop a car for traffic infractions.
While speaking with the driver, another officer sees marijuana on the center console.
The driver admits to possessing a blunt and claims there is nothing else illegal in the car.
Officers direct Williams, a rear-seat passenger, to exit. He complies.
An officer begins a pat frisk. Williams pulls away and attempts to flee, but is quickly apprehended. A loaded handgun is found in his jacket pocket.
At the station, after Miranda warnings, Williams makes a statement that he obtained the gun earlier that day for self-protection.
He moves to suppress the handgun and his statements. The motion is denied; he pleads guilty to second-degree weapon possession; and he appeals.

On appeal, Williams challenges both:

The lawfulness of the search that produced the handgun; and
The admissibility of his custodial statements, focusing on whether he effectively invoked his right to remain silent and whether that invocation was honored.

3.2 The Search of the Vehicle Occupants

3.2.1 Authority to Order Occupants Out of a Lawfully Stopped Vehicle

The court first addresses a threshold issue: whether officers lawfully directed Williams to exit the vehicle. Relying on:

People v Garcia, 20 NY3d 317, 321 (2012),
People v Robinson, 74 NY2d 773, 775 (1989), cert denied 493 US 966 (1989),
People v Roberson, 155 AD3d 1683 (4th Dept 2017), lv denied 31 NY3d 1086 (2018), and
Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106 (1977),

the court reiterates the settled rule:

“In light of the heightened dangers faced by investigating police officers during traffic stops, a police officer may, as a precautionary measure and without particularized suspicion, direct the occupants of a lawfully stopped vehicle to step out of the car.” (Garcia, 20 NY3d at 321.)

Thus, once the traffic stop was lawful, officers needed no individualized suspicion regarding Williams to order him out. This is a bright-line rule grounded in officer safety; the legality of the order is independent of the reasons for the initial stop or suspicions focused on individual passengers.

3.2.2 Probable Cause to Search All Occupants Based on Marijuana in the Car

The more contested issue is whether the observed marijuana on the console provided probable cause to search Williams’ person. The Fourth Department answers “yes,” citing:

People v Singleton, 237 AD3d 1509 (4th Dept 2025);
Matter of Q.P., 225 AD3d 570 (1st Dept 2024);
People v Mills, 93 AD3d 1198 (4th Dept 2012), lv denied 19 NY3d 964 (2012);
People v Cuffie, 109 AD3d 1200 (4th Dept 2013), lv denied 22 NY3d 1087 (2014);
People v Chestnut, 36 NY2d 971, 973 (1975).

These cases represent the pre-MRTA line of authority that:

The visible presence or odor of marijuana in a vehicle can furnish probable cause to search the vehicle and containers within it, under the automobile exception; and
In some circumstances, that probable cause extends to the searches of the vehicle’s occupants, especially where there is a reasonable inference that any occupant could be in possession of contraband.

The Fourth Department explicitly states that, “based on the presence of marihuana inside the vehicle, the officers had probable cause to search all occupants.” That conclusion rests on the combined force of the cited precedents and the then-existing statutory regime (pre-MRTA). Under that framework, a pat frisk or search of Williams’ person for contraband was not constitutionally problematic.

3.2.3 The MRTA, Penal Law § 222.05(3), and Retroactivity

The defense tried to recast the marijuana-based probable-cause logic in light of the MRTA, which radically changed New York’s treatment of marijuana and its role in search-and-seizure analysis. The MRTA added Penal Law § 222.05, and subdivision (3) provides that the odor of marijuana or possession of marijuana in legally authorized amounts “can no longer be the basis for a police search” (People v Pastrana, 41 NY3d 23, 29 [2023], cert denied – US – , 144 S Ct 1066 [2024]).

Williams argued that this new rule should apply to his case because, although the search occurred before the MRTA’s enactment, his suppression hearing occurred after the statute took effect. The core questions are:

Does § 222.05(3) apply to searches conducted before the statute’s enactment?
Even if it does not invalidate earlier searches per se, should it govern the suppression analysis when the hearing occurs post-enactment?

The Fourth Department does not resolve these substantive retroactivity questions on the merits. Instead, it uses two doctrinal gates:

(a) Preservation

First, the court holds that Williams failed to preserve the MRTA-based argument:

He did not argue at his suppression motion or hearing that § 222.05(3) should apply to the police conduct in his case.
Under New York’s preservation rules, a party must raise an issue with sufficient specificity in the trial court to give the judge and the opposing party an opportunity to address it (see People v Panton, 27 NY3d 1144 [2016]; People v Baker, 219 AD3d 1678 [4th Dept 2023]).

Because suppression issues are highly fact-specific and time-sensitive, appellate courts are especially strict about preservation. Williams could not, on appeal, reframe the issue by invoking a statute and theory not presented below.

The Fourth Department also explicitly declines to review the MRTA argument as a matter of discretion “in the interest of justice” under CPL 470.15(3)(c). That discretionary power is sometimes used to correct clear errors affecting fundamental rights even if they are unpreserved. The court’s refusal to exercise it here underscores that—given the then-developing nature of MRTA jurisprudence and controlling authority—this was not viewed as a manifest injustice warranting extraordinary intervention.

(b) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Novel Legal Theories

Williams anticipates preservation problems and alternatively argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not advancing the MRTA retroactivity claim when it could have been raised. The Fourth Department rejects that claim, clarifying New York’s approach to ineffective assistance when a lawyer omits a novel argument.

The court invokes the standard from People v McGee, 20 NY3d 513 (2013):

For a single error or omission in an otherwise competent performance to amount to ineffective assistance, the omitted issue must be “so clear-cut and dispositive that no reasonable defense counsel would have failed to assert it,” and it must be evident that foregoing the argument could not have been a legitimate strategy (McGee, 20 NY3d at 518).

People v Hayward, 42 NY3d 753 (2024), elaborates that ineffective assistance generally does not arise when:

Success of the omitted argument depended on resolution of novel questions; or
There was no clear appellate authority supporting the omitted argument.

Against that doctrinal backdrop, the Fourth Department canvasses the state of the law at the time of Williams’ plea (October 2022) and thereafter:

When the case was pending at the trial level, no appellate authority supported the specific procedural-application theory Williams now advances (pre-enactment search, post-enactment hearing).
As of the Fourth Department’s 2025 decision, the only authority adopting the defendant’s view is People v Martin, 242 AD3d 18 (3d Dept 2025), a 3–2 decision, issued more than three years after Williams’ plea.
The court notes a “cf.” citation to People v Fasoli, 242 AD3d 900 (2d Dept 2025), suggesting some divergence or nuance in how departments approach MRTA’s application to older searches.
Critically, before Williams’ plea:
- The Second Department, in People v Babadzhanov, 204 AD3d 685 (2d Dept 2022), lv denied 38 NY3d 1069, reconsideration denied 39 NY3d 939, had rejected a retroactivity claim that Penal Law § 222.05(3) invalidated searches lawful when undertaken.
- The Court of Appeals later affirmed that non-retroactive view in People v Pastrana, 41 NY3d 23 (2023), stating that marijuana odor/possession in legal amounts “can no longer be the basis for a police search,” but not retroactively invalidating searches that were valid when performed.
- The Fourth Department itself, in People v Vaughn, 203 AD3d 1729 (4th Dept 2022), lv denied 38 NY3d 1036 (2022), aligned with the non-retroactive approach.
The court also references People v Watkins, 42 NY3d 635 (2024), cert denied – US – , 145 S Ct 459 (2024), reinforcing that failure to raise a novel argument not yet supported by appellate precedent generally does not render counsel ineffective.

Putting this together, the court concludes:

“Even assuming, arguendo, that we would now agree with the majority in Martin … it cannot be said that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to advance before the motion court what was then a novel argument.”

In other words, counsel is not constitutionally deficient for failing to be a seer. Where the law is unsettled, conflicting, or trending against the argument, the omission of that argument does not usually breach the “meaningful representation” standard under New York law.

3.3 Miranda and the Right to Remain Silent

3.3.1 Governing Principles

At the heart of the case is Williams’ interaction with police at the station. The sequence is critical:

Williams is arrested and brought to the station.
He is placed in an interview room and advised of his Miranda rights by one of the arresting officers.
He indicates that he understands those rights.
The officer then asks whether he will waive those rights and speak.
Williams responds: “I ain't got nothing to talk about. I just want to go to jail. I want to go to sleep.”
The officer does not seek clarification or end questioning, but instead says, “Well, I don't want to waste your time but I am curious about the fight you had been in in the morning.”
Williams then talks about that fight and, in doing so, makes incriminating statements about possessing the handgun.

The Fourth Department’s analysis is grounded in established Miranda doctrine, as developed in both New York and federal cases:

Miranda warnings and rights – The familiar warnings (right to remain silent, anything said can be used in court, right to counsel, etc.) exist to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation.
Invocation of the right to remain silent – New York precedents require that a suspect’s assertion of the right to silence be “unequivocal and unqualified” to obligate police to terminate questioning (see People v Glover, 87 NY2d 838 [1995]).
Mixed question of law and fact – Whether a particular statement is an unequivocal invocation is a mixed question reviewed with deference to the suppression court’s factual findings but subject to correction where those findings are “unsupported by the record” (see People v Johnston, 192 AD3d 1516 [4th Dept 2021]; People v Zacher, 97 AD3d 1101 [4th Dept 2012]).
Scrupulously honoring the invocation – Once a suspect clearly invokes the right to silence, police must cease questioning and may not reinitiate interrogation or use tactics reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response (see People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316 [1984]; People v Paulman, 5 NY3d 122 [2005]; see generally Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291 [1980]).

3.3.2 Was Williams’ Statement an Unequivocal Invocation?

The pivotal language is Williams’ response to the waiver question:

“I ain't got nothing to talk about. I just want to go to jail. I want to go to sleep.”

The Fourth Department frames the test using its prior decision in Johnston:

To terminate questioning, the assertion must be “unequivocal and unqualified.” Whether it is unequivocal requires examining “the circumstances surrounding the request[,] including the defendant’s demeanor, manner of expression and the particular words found to have been used” (Johnston, 192 AD3d at 1518, internal quotation marks omitted; citing Glover).

In applying that test, the court aligns this case with a series of Fourth Department decisions where similar statements were held to be clear invocations:

People v Marrero, 199 AD3d 1471, 1473–1474 (4th Dept 2021), lv denied 38 NY3d 929 (2022);
People v Johnston, 192 AD3d 1516, 1519 (4th Dept 2021);
People v Colon, 185 AD3d 1510, 1512 (4th Dept 2020), lv denied 35 NY3d 1093 (2020);
People v Reid, 34 AD3d 1273 (4th Dept 2006), lv denied 8 NY3d 884 (2007).

In those cases, defendants made statements essentially saying they did not want to talk or wanted questioning to end. The Fourth Department repeatedly held that such expressions, in context, clearly communicate a desire to stop interrogation.

Here, the court reasons that Williams’ language is at least as clear:

“I ain't got nothing to talk about” – an explicit rejection of conversation or questioning.
“I just want to go to jail” – indicates he wants the custodial process to proceed without further interrogation.
“I want to go to sleep” – reinforces that his preference is for rest or processing, not engagement with police questioning.

The court concludes:

“No reasonable police officer could have interpreted that statement as anything other than a desire not to talk to the police” (quoting Colon, 185 AD3d at 1512; see Marrero, 199 AD3d at 1474).

Accordingly, the suppression court’s contrary determination—that Williams did not clearly invoke his right to remain silent—is deemed “unsupported by the record” (Zacher, 97 AD3d at 1101; Johnston, 192 AD3d at 1518–1519). The Fourth Department therefore substitutes its own conclusion as a matter of law.

The court contrasts this situation with cases where a suspect’s words are ambiguous or equivocal, such as the Fourth Department’s decision in People v Brown, 240 AD3d 1278, 1279 (4th Dept 2025), cited as a “cf.” example, indicating that there the statement may have been less clear or contextually different. Williams helps mark the boundary: where a defendant plainly says he has nothing to talk about and wants to be processed, that is not ambiguity—it is invocation.

3.3.3 Failure to “Scrupulously Honor” the Invocation

Once Williams invoked his right to remain silent, the officer was constitutionally required to respect that decision. Instead, the officer effectively tried to sidestep the invocation by changing the subject:

“Well, I don't want to waste your time but I am curious about the fight you had been in in the morning.”

This statement is significant in two ways:

It implicitly minimizes Williams’ expressed wish not to talk by suggesting that further conversation would not “waste” his time.
It directly references a recent fight that Williams had already discussed with another officer, inviting him to continue talking about events closely connected in time and circumstance to the handgun offense.

Under Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 300–301 (1980), “interrogation” includes not only express questioning but also its “functional equivalent”: words or actions by police that they should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The Fourth Department applies this concept, via Paulman and Reid:

The officer’s comment about the fight was “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response” (Paulman, 5 NY3d at 129).
Thus, it constituted continued interrogation after Williams invoked his right to remain silent.

The court analogizes to:

People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316 (1984), where subtle police conduct in the presence of an accused was held to be the functional equivalent of interrogation; and
People v Reid, 34 AD3d 1273 (4th Dept 2006), where further questioning after invocation led to suppression.

Because the officer did not cease questioning or seek to clarify the invocation, but instead reinitiated a conversation calculated to elicit inculpatory statements, the police failed to “scrupulously honor” Williams’ right to remain silent. Any statements he made thereafter were obtained in violation of Miranda and are inadmissible in the People’s case-in-chief.

3.4 Remedy: Reversal, Vacatur of Plea, and Suppression

Having found a Miranda violation, the court orders a robust remedy:

The conviction is reversed on the law.
The guilty plea is vacated.
That part of Williams’ omnibus motion seeking suppression of all statements made after invocation of his right to remain silent is granted.
The case is remitted for further proceedings on the indictment.

This remedy aligns with New York practice in plea cases:

A defendant who pleads guilty after a suppression ruling typically preserves the right to appeal that ruling (CPL 710.70[2]).
If an appellate court later holds that suppression should have been granted, the guilty plea—having been entered without the benefit of the excluded evidence—must normally be vacated; the case reverts to the pre-plea posture.

The court does not engage in a harmless-error analysis, implicitly recognizing that an unconstitutional confession or inculpatory statement is rarely harmless in a plea context. Instead, it resets the case so that Williams can decide whether to proceed to trial or re-plead without the tainted statements in the calculus.

4. Impact and Future Significance

4.1 Clarifying “Unequivocal” Invocations of the Right to Silence

People v Williams strengthens and clarifies New York’s line of cases on what counts as an unequivocal invocation of the right to remain silent. The decision sends a clear message:

Statements like “I ain’t got nothing to talk about” and “I just want to go to jail / go to sleep” are not ambiguous hedges; they are clear assertions that the suspect does not wish to engage with questioning.
Police officers are not permitted to “test the waters” or re-engage the suspect in conversation about related events after such a statement, absent a clear reinitiation or fresh waiver initiated by the suspect.

This has direct impact on:

Police training – Officers must be trained to recognize and immediately honor statements of non-cooperation that clearly signal a desire to end questioning, even if phrased colloquially or without legalistic language.
Suppression litigation – Defense counsel will likely rely on Williams when arguing that everyday speech (“I’m done talking,” “I have nothing to say,” “Just take me to jail”) is enough to invoke the right to silence.
Trial courts – Suppression courts must scrutinize interrogation transcripts and recordings for these invocation markers and cannot dismiss them as equivocal without a strong factual basis.

4.2 Limits on Police “Soft” Persuasion After Invocation

Equally important is the decision’s reminder that post-invocation persuasion—whether framed as curiosity, empathy, or casual conversation—can still be “interrogation” under Innis if it is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The officer’s statement that he was “curious” about the fight illustrates a subtle but impermissible attempt to resume questioning under the guise of an informal chat.

Future interrogations will be judged against this standard:

Once the right to silence is invoked, officers should stop talking about the underlying events, not merely avoid direct questions.
Attempts to “keep the suspect talking” about related incidents are likely to be characterized as continued interrogation and lead to suppression.

4.3 Defense Counsel and Novel Legal Theories after the MRTA

On the ineffective assistance side, Williams has important implications, especially in fast-moving legal areas like cannabis reform:

It confirms that defense lawyers are not constitutionally required to anticipate or advance every creative theory that might later gain traction in another department or at a later time.
Where appellate courts have rejected a retroactivity argument (as in Babadzhanov), and the Court of Appeals later affirms that approach (Pastrana), trial counsel’s failure to argue the contrary view does not generally support an ineffective-assistance claim.
This protects counsel from hindsight second-guessing in areas where the law is evolving and intra-departmental or inter-departmental splits may arise (as seen in Martin and Fasoli).

At the same time, the decision underscores the continuing importance of:

Issue preservation – If defense counsel wishes to benefit from future favorable decisions on emerging legal issues, arguments should be raised early and specifically in motion practice.
Strategic choice vs. omission – Not raising a novel claim is not per se deficient, but counsel should be able to explain, if needed, why the omission was strategic, not negligent.

4.4 Appellate Practice and Interest-of-Justice Review

Williams also exemplifies how the Fourth Department exercises its discretionary power under CPL 470.15(3)(c):

Even on high-profile issues like MRTA-related searches, the court will generally refuse to reach unpreserved arguments absent extraordinary circumstances.
This encourages careful trial-level litigation and discourages sandbagging or reliance on appellate courts to rescue unmade arguments.

5. Complex Legal Concepts Explained

5.1 Probable Cause and Automobile Searches

Probable cause means there is a reasonable basis to believe that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. In the car context:

If officers lawfully stop a vehicle and see (or smell) evidence of contraband (under pre-MRTA law, marijuana), that can give them probable cause to search:
- the vehicle interior;
- containers in the vehicle; and
- sometimes, the persons of the occupants, where it is reasonable to think that any of them could possess the contraband.

This is an aspect of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, justified by the inherent mobility of vehicles and reduced privacy expectations in them.

5.2 The MRTA and Penal Law § 222.05(3)

The Marihuana Regulation and Taxation Act (MRTA), effective 2021, legalized adult-use cannabis in New York subject to quantity limits and regulations. Penal Law § 222.05(3) specifically addresses searches:

It provides that the odor of marijuana or the presence of marijuana in legally authorized amounts cannot by itself justify a search.
Pastrana confirms that, going forward, police may no longer treat lawful marijuana possession or its odor as a stand-alone basis for probable cause.

Retroactivity questions center on whether this new rule:

Invalidates searches conducted before the statute; or
Applies only to searches conducted after its effective date.

Babadzhanov and Pastrana hold that searches lawful when undertaken are not rendered unlawful retroactively by § 222.05(3). Williams adds a procedural twist: even if there is a question about applying § 222.05(3) at a post-enactment hearing for a pre-enactment search, counsel’s failure to raise that then-novel theory does not, by itself, render representation ineffective.

5.3 Miranda Warnings, Invocation, and Waiver

After Miranda v Arizona, police must give specific warnings before custodial interrogation:

You have the right to remain silent;
Anything you say can be used against you in court;
You have the right to an attorney; and
If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided.

Key concepts:

Waiver – A suspect may choose to speak after receiving and understanding the warnings. The waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.
Invocation of the right to remain silent – If a suspect says (clearly) that they do not want to talk or want questioning to stop, police must cease interrogation.
Equivocal vs. unequivocal – Vague or conditional statements may not count as an invocation; clear statements like “I don’t want to talk” do.

In Williams, the court treats “I ain't got nothing to talk about. I just want to go to jail. I want to go to sleep” as an unequivocal invocation requiring immediate cessation of questioning.

5.4 “Scrupulously Honor” the Right to Silence

To “scrupulously honor” the right to silence means:

Stop questioning immediately when the right is invoked;
Do not engage in conduct likely to prompt the suspect to talk about the crime;
Any re-initiation of conversation about the crime must be clearly initiated by the suspect, not by police.

In Williams, the officer’s expression of curiosity about a related fight was treated as further interrogation, not a neutral or administrative remark, and thus violated this requirement.

5.5 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Novel Claims

Under New York’s “meaningful representation” standard, ineffective assistance is found when:

Counsel’s overall performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness; and
The defendant is deprived of a fair trial or meaningful opportunity to contest the charges.

For a single omission to be ineffective (per McGee and Hayward):

The omitted claim must be so strong and obvious that no reasonable lawyer would fail to raise it; and
There must be no plausible strategic reason for omitting it.

When the omitted claim is legally novel, lacks supporting appellate authority, or is contradicted by existing case law, courts are generally reluctant to label counsel ineffective. Williams squarely applies this principle to MRTA retroactivity.

6. Conclusion

People v Williams is a dual-significance decision:

On the one hand, it reaffirms and sharpens Miranda protections in New York, holding that a defendant’s plain, colloquial refusal to talk—“I ain't got nothing to talk about. I just want to go to jail. I want to go to sleep”—is an unequivocal invocation of the right to remain silent. Police who persist in questioning after such an invocation violate constitutional safeguards, rendering resulting statements inadmissible.
On the other hand, it clarifies the limits of ineffective-assistance claims based on unraised, cutting-edge legal theories—here, MRTA’s Penal Law § 222.05(3) and its possible application to pre-enactment searches at post-enactment suppression hearings. In an area of evolving law, counsel is not constitutionally derelict for failing to predict or champion what was, at the time, a novel or minority view.

By reversing the conviction, vacating the guilty plea, and suppressing Williams’ post-invocation statements, the Fourth Department underscores that Miranda rights remain robust and enforceable even in cases involving serious weapons charges. At the same time, the opinion signals judicial restraint in second-guessing trial counsel’s tactical choices on novel statutory arguments, particularly where appellate courts and the Court of Appeals have provided contrary guidance.

Going forward, Williams will be a key citation for:

Defendants asserting that ordinary-language refusals to talk invoke the right to silence;
Courts evaluating whether questioning after such a statement was impermissible interrogation; and
Lawyers and judges navigating the interplay between rapidly changing substantive law (like MRTA) and the constitutional standard for effective representation.

In sum, the case stands as an important reaffirmation that constitutional protections at the interrogation stage are not merely formalities but operative rights that, when violated, demand meaningful remedies—even at the cost of vacating a guilty plea and reopening a serious felony prosecution.