Unequivocal Abandonment of Termination Requests in Texas Parental-Rights Cases:
Commentary on D.V. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in D.V. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, No. 24-0840 (Tex. Oct. 31, 2025), establishes a significant procedural safeguard in parental-rights termination litigation. The Court holds that when the Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) — including through its designated representative at trial — makes an unequivocal and unrepudiated statement that it is not seeking termination of a parent’s rights, a trial court may not nonetheless terminate those rights.

The case sits at the intersection of civil procedure and family law, but the Court makes clear that parental-termination proceedings are not just another species of civil litigation. Because termination of parental rights encumbers a fundamental, constitutional interest “far more precious than any property right,” the Court intensifies ordinary procedural rules regarding abandonment of claims when the State seeks to permanently sever the parent–child relationship.

This commentary will:

Explain the factual and procedural background of the case.
Summarize the Court’s holding and the new rule it articulates.
Analyze the precedents the Court relies on and how they shape the outcome.
Dissect the Court’s legal reasoning, including its rejection of a “totality of the circumstances” approach to abandonment in termination cases.
Assess the likely impact of this decision on DFPS practice, parental representation, and trial court procedure.
Clarify key legal concepts (e.g., “abandonment” of claims, “designated representative,” clear-and-convincing standard, conservatorship types).

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Parties and Underlying Family Circumstances

The petitioner, referred to as “D.V.” and called “Mother” in the opinion, had a documented history of violent conduct and drug use. After an incident in which she allegedly assaulted her ex-boyfriend and one of her other children, DFPS removed E.D. — the child at issue — and sought to terminate both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.

DFPS soon shifted course with respect to Father. By the time of trial, DFPS supported designating Father as E.D.’s permanent sole managing conservator, meaning Father alone would exercise the core bundle of decision-making and custodial rights. Nevertheless, DFPS’s live pleading still requested termination of both parents’ rights. Everyone involved understood that, as to Father, the live petition no longer reflected DFPS’s actual position.

B. The Associate Judge Trial and the Crucial Testimony

The trial was held before an associate judge via videoconference. During the second day of trial, DFPS called its caseworker, who had been formally designated as DFPS’s representative under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence.

On direct examination by DFPS’s counsel, the following exchange occurred:

Q. What is the Department’s recommendation to the Court today?

A. The Department is seeking to limit and restrict [Mother]’s rights, and give permanent managing conservatorship of [E.D.] to [Father], and to limit [Mother]’s rights to parent non-conservator with no visitation and contact.

Crucially, DFPS’s lawyer presented this as the Department’s recommendation, not a personal view of the witness. There was no attempt to qualify or correct this answer.

On cross-examination, Mother’s counsel sought clarity:

Q. And [the Department] is not seeking to terminate [Mother]’s rights, but to ask the Court to name her as a parent non-conservator?

A. Correct.

These two exchanges form the heart of the Supreme Court’s analysis: DFPS’s designated representative, in response to questions framed in terms of DFPS’s position, twice stated that DFPS was not seeking termination of Mother’s rights, but only a restricted, non-conservator role with no contact.

C. Other Trial Evidence and Arguments

Later in the trial:

A CASA volunteer recommended termination of Mother’s rights and a joint managing conservatorship between Father and Grandfather, with Father as primary.
E.D.’s attorney ad litem asserted in closing that DFPS had met its burden “as far as termination,” but urged, if the court declined to terminate, that Mother be named a non-possessory conservator.
Mother testified she did not want her rights terminated and wanted at least visitation (ideally, custody).
Mother’s counsel, in closing, asked the court not to terminate her rights.
DFPS made neither an opening statement nor a closing argument.

Immediately after the attorney ad litem’s closing, the associate judge orally announced termination of Mother’s parental rights and appointed Father as sole managing conservator. A final judgment later memorialized termination.

D. Post-Judgment Proceedings: De Novo Hearing and Appeal

Texas law permits a party to seek a de novo hearing before the referring district court to review an associate judge’s ruling. Mother requested such a hearing. The district court initially refused to grant it, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a de novo hearing. See D.V. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-23-00098-CV, 2023 WL 4494802 (Tex. App.—Austin July 13, 2023, no pet.).

At the de novo stage, Mother asserted multiple grounds against termination, but the only issue she preserved for further appellate review was narrow and procedural: the associate judge (and by extension the district court) lacked authority to terminate her rights once DFPS had “affirmatively abandoned its pleading for termination at trial.”

The district court adopted the associate judge’s ruling and again terminated Mother’s rights. The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed. 716 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024). It concluded that, considering the “context” of the trial, DFPS had not abandoned its request for termination.

Mother sought review in the Supreme Court of Texas, which reversed.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

A. Core Holding

The Supreme Court of Texas announces a clear, bright-line rule for parental termination cases:

“In parental-termination cases, a court may not terminate parental rights in the face of an unequivocal and unrepudiated statement made by someone speaking on the department's behalf that withdraws termination as a requested form of relief.”

The Court further crystallizes the rule later in the opinion:

“We hold that an unequivocal assertion by the department—including its designated representative—that it does not seek termination constitutes withdrawal of a request for that relief unless clearly repudiated.”

B. Application to Mother’s Case

Applying this rule, the Court concludes:

The caseworker’s testimony, as DFPS’s designated representative, was an unequivocal statement that DFPS was not seeking termination of Mother’s rights.
DFPS’s counsel elicited, confirmed, and never corrected that testimony.
No later conduct or statements at trial — from CASA, the attorney ad litem, Mother’s own counsel, or the existence of live pleadings still requesting termination — sufficed to “repudiate” DFPS’s abandonment of termination as a remedy.
Accordingly, the trial court lacked authority to terminate Mother’s parental rights, and the court of appeals erred in affirming the judgment.

C. Disposition

The Supreme Court:

Reverses the court of appeals’ judgment.
Reverses the portion of the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights.
Renders judgment that Mother be appointed “parent nonconservator (or alternatively, parent non-possessory conservator,” as she had requested), aligning with DFPS’s expressed position at trial.
Remands to the district court to enter a judgment consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision and to resolve any remaining issues (with discretion to conduct further proceedings if needed for implementation).

The substantive merits — whether statutory grounds and best interest justified termination under Family Code § 161.001 — are never reached. The case is resolved entirely on the procedural ground of abandonment of the termination remedy.

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Constitutional and Policy Foundations of Parental Rights

1. Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1976)

Wiley supplies the classic articulation of the special status of parental rights in Texas law. The Court quotes it for the principle that:

Actions severing the parent–child relationship “can never be justified without the most solid and substantial reasons.”
Proceedings that “permanently sunder” those ties must be “strictly scrutinized.”
There is a “strong presumption” that the child’s best interest is usually served by remaining with natural parents.
The natural parent–child relationship is of “constitutional dimensions.”

These concepts underpin the Court’s insistence that technical civil-procedure doctrines must be applied in a particularly protective way when the State seeks to destroy parental rights.

2. In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. 2012) and Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)

Citing In re E.R., which in turn relies on Santosky, the Court reiterates that termination proceedings implicate values “far more precious than any property right” and are subject to “special rules.” The primary rules highlighted here are:

The clear-and-convincing evidence standard for termination (see also Holick, below).
Heightened procedural protections to ensure fairness and reliability in decisions that irrevocably affect family integrity.

3. Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. 1985) and Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)

Holick establishes that termination must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, a requirement later codified in Texas Family Code § 161.001(b). The Court references this standard to emphasize that the law already treats termination differently from ordinary civil disputes — both substantively and procedurally.

4. Tex. Fam. Code § 107.013(a) and In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2019)

Two additional protections distinguish termination cases from ordinary civil litigation:

Right to appointed counsel: § 107.013(a) requires the State to provide attorneys for certain indigent parents in termination proceedings, a rarity in civil practice.
Elevated standard of appellate review: In In re N.G., the Court mandated written appellate review of endangerment grounds in termination cases because of their collateral consequences, again underscoring the unique scrutiny applied when the State seeks to end parental rights.

5. Legate v. Legate, 28 S.W. 281 (Tex. 1894)

Legate is cited for a very old but enduring principle: “the law presumes that the best interest of the child will be subserved by allowing it to remain in the custody of the parents.” This historical presumption strengthens the Court’s instinct to treat any apparent abandonment of termination not as an anomaly or error, but as an outcome to be respected unless clearly undone.

B. Procedural Doctrines: Abandonment, Stipulations, and Pleadings

1. Tex. R. Civ. P. 301 & 165

Rule 301 limits judgments to issues that are raised by the pleadings and supported by proof at trial. Implicitly, if a claim is abandoned, it is no longer a permissible basis for judgment.
Rule 165 explicitly contemplates abandonment of claims or defenses in pleadings and allows such abandonment to be “entered of record.” This is the formal, documentary route to “dropping” a claim.

However, the Court emphasizes that abandonment can occur not only formally (by amending or striking pleadings) but also functionally, through stipulations and statements narrowing the issues for trial.

2. Pathfinder Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Great Western Drilling, Ltd., 574 S.W.3d 882 (Tex. 2019)

Pathfinder states that “when parties stipulate that only certain questions will be tried, all others are thereby waived.” This is crucial for D.V. because:

It shows that parties can, through their conduct and express trial statements, narrow or abandon claims without amending pleadings.
This feeds directly into the Supreme Court’s conclusion that DFPS’s representative’s unequivocal statements withdrawing termination functioned as a binding narrowing of the issues, i.e., a stipulation that termination was not being pursued.

3. In re Shaw, 966 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, no pet.)

The Court expressly endorses the El Paso Court of Appeals’ view in Shaw that a court may not order termination when DFPS has stipulated that it is not seeking that relief. D.V. thus:

Confirms that Texas appellate precedent already recognized that DFPS can abandon termination at trial.
Extends and refines that principle by clarifying the binding effect of DFPS’s designated representative’s statements and the need for “clear repudiation” if DFPS wishes to undo such abandonment.

4. Tex. R. Civ. P. 267 and Tex. R. Evid. 614 (Designated Representative Rule)

DFPS had designated the caseworker as its representative under Rule 267 and Rule 614. These rules:

Allow a non-natural party (such as a corporation or an agency) to have a human representative at trial.
Permit that representative to remain in the courtroom and, effectively, to serve as the “face” of the entity in the proceedings.

The Court leverages these rules to support the conclusion that DFPS’s designated representative is capable of stating DFPS’s position — including abandoning a remedy — especially when DFPS’s own counsel invokes and confirms that position in questioning.

5. In re N.H., No. 02-22-00157-CV, 2022 WL 4374638 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 22, 2022, no pet.)

In N.H., a private service provider testified that the department was not seeking termination for one child. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that this provider “effectively served as the Department’s agent” for that purpose. While the Supreme Court does not broadly opine on when non-lawyer actors can bind agencies, it agrees with N.H. in the specific context of termination litigation.

D.V. goes a step further, making it even clearer: when DFPS formally designates a trial representative and then elicits testimony about “the Department’s” position from that representative, such testimony is treated as DFPS’s own statement — at least regarding whether termination is being sought.

C. Flexibility of Pleadings in Family Cases

1. Leithold v. Plass, 413 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. 1967)

In Leithold, the Court observed that “[t]echnical rules of practice and pleadings are of little importance in determining issues concerning the custody of children.” By invoking this case, the Court underscores that:

While rules of procedure still apply, rigid formalism is not favored in custody and termination cases.
Substance (what the State actually seeks at trial) controls over the technical content of the live pleading, especially where parental rights are at stake.

2. In re A.L.R., 646 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. 2022)

In A.L.R., the Court held that a service plan describing mandatory conditions as “requested tasks” did not clearly notify the parent of the mandatory nature of those tasks and thus could not serve as a predicate for termination. The Court uses A.L.R. by analogy:

Pleadings and service plans must accurately alert parents to the gravity of what is at stake.
Once termination is no longer appropriate, DFPS should expressly acknowledge that shift, both to prevent surprise and to honor the presumption against unnecessary terminations.

In other words, notice runs both ways: parents must be warned when termination is sought, and the system must acknowledge when the State no longer seeks that extreme remedy.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. The Special Context of Parental-Termination Cases

The Court begins by conceptually separating termination cases from “routine tort or contract cases.” While it leaves open what standard might govern abandonment of claims in ordinary civil litigation, it declares that such standards are “inadequate — or at least incomplete — for parental-termination cases.”

Key features of termination cases, highlighted by the Court, include:

The constitutional dimension of parental rights.
The presumption that maintaining parental ties generally serves a child’s best interest.
The clear-and-convincing evidence burden.
The appointment of counsel for indigent parents.
Heightened appellate review of termination grounds.
The long-standing recognition that “technical rules of practice and pleadings” are less central in custody matters.

This context informs a crucial asymmetry in the Court’s reasoning:

If a claim would be deemed abandoned in a “typical civil” trial, it will also be deemed abandoned in a termination case. But the converse is not necessarily true: a claim (here, termination) can be deemed abandoned in a termination case even when it might not be viewed as abandoned under generic civil-litigation standards.

This asymmetry is central: the Court is not relaxing protections; it is tightening them in favor of parents when termination is at issue.

B. Abandonment of Claims Through Stipulation or Trial Conduct

The Court reaffirms that:

A party can abandon claims formally through amended pleadings (Tex. R. Civ. P. 165).
A party can also abandon claims implicitly, through stipulations narrowing the issues for trial (Pathfinder).
Once abandoned, a claim cannot support a judgment (Tex. R. Civ. P. 301).

In termination cases, the Court builds on In re Shaw to hold that DFPS may not obtain termination when it has stipulated that it does not seek that relief.

C. Characterizing DFPS’s Representative’s Statements

The central analytic step is the Court’s characterization of the caseworker’s testimony. It finds the statements:

Clear: They explicitly state the Department is “seeking to limit and restrict [Mother]’s rights” and “is not seeking to terminate [Mother]’s rights.”
Unequivocal: There is no hedging, ambiguity, or internal inconsistency in these statements.
Attributable to DFPS: They were elicited by DFPS’s own counsel in terms of “the Department’s recommendation,” and counsel never corrected or contradicted them.

The Court bluntly rejects the court of appeals’ view that the statements could not be interpreted as an unequivocal abandonment of termination. The words, in plain English, admit of no other meaning.

D. Why Context Cannot Override Explicit Abandonment

The court of appeals had emphasized the “totality of the circumstances”: the CASA recommendation for termination, the ad litem’s statement that DFPS met its burden for termination, the evidence supporting termination, Mother’s counsel’s plea not to terminate, and the fact that the abandonment statement came from a representative rather than DFPS’s lawyer.

The Supreme Court systematically rejects each contextual factor as insufficient to undo the express abandonment:

CASA and Attorney Ad Litem Views Are Legally Irrelevant to DFPS’s Position

Whether other parties believe termination is warranted does not determine what relief DFPS seeks. Only DFPS’s own statements and pleadings define its requested remedy. The CASA and ad litem positions cannot “overrule” DFPS’s express disavowal of termination.
Evidence Supporting Termination Does Not Reopen the Claim

The court of appeals reasoned that presenting termination-related evidence is “inconsistent with abandoning” termination. The Supreme Court counters:
- The same evidence can support lesser forms of relief (e.g., restricting possession, naming a non-possessory conservator) without seeking termination.
- Even if some evidence made more sense in a termination posture, it cannot override an explicit, unequivocal abandonment, especially given the fundamental rights at stake.
At most, such evidence may create “cognitive dissonance,” not legal resurrection of an abandoned claim.
Mother’s Counsel Asking Not to Terminate Is Not a Waiver of Abandonment

The court of appeals suggested that if termination were truly off the table, Mother’s counsel would not have felt the need to ask the court not to terminate. The Supreme Court posits a more reasonable alternative: counsel’s request may well have been premised on the fact that termination was no longer legally available, reinforcing rather than undercutting the abandonment argument.

The Court finds it “bizarre” to treat a parent’s plea not to terminate as reviving the State’s ability to seek termination when the State has already forsworn that relief.
Statements by the Designated Representative Are Attributable to DFPS

Although in some prior cases abandonment came from DFPS’s attorney, the Court refuses to cabin abandonment solely to attorney statements. Here:
- DFPS formally designated the caseworker as its representative under Rules 267 and 614.
- Over DFFS counsel’s questioning, the representative stated the Department’s position.
- DFPS’s counsel did nothing to correct or limit her statement.
The Court agrees with In re N.H. that others can serve as DFPS’s “agent” for this purpose and expressly holds that a designated representative’s unequivocal statement about the Department’s relief request binds DFPS in termination cases unless promptly repudiated.
Live Pleadings Cannot Override On-the-Record Abandonment

DFPS argued that because its live petition still requested termination, no abandonment occurred. The Court finds this unpersuasive for two reasons:
- Without a termination claim in the pleading, there would be nothing to abandon; the pleading is a starting point, not the endpoint, for determining what relief remains live at trial.
- The same petition continued to request termination of Father’s rights even though DFPS was openly advocating that Father be named sole managing conservator. Thus, the pleadings were already out of sync with DFPS’s position as to at least one parent.
Given that DFPS had plainly abandoned termination as to Father, it is “no huge leap” to recognize abandonment as to Mother as well, notwithstanding boilerplate language in the live pleading.

E. The New Rule: Unequivocal Statement + No Repudiation = Binding Abandonment

The Court distills its reasoning into a clear doctrinal rule specific to parental-termination proceedings:

“An unequivocal assertion by the department—including its designated representative—that it does not seek termination constitutes withdrawal of a request for that relief unless clearly repudiated.”

Key elements of this rule:

Unequivocal assertion: The statement must be clear and unambiguous that DFPS is not seeking termination for a specific parent.
Spoken on the Department’s behalf: It may be made by DFPS’s counsel or its designated representative (and potentially by others acting as its agent for that purpose).
Withdrawal of request: Such a statement is treated as a stipulation narrowing or withdrawing termination as a form of relief for that parent.
Unless clearly repudiated: DFPS can, in principle, correct an inadvertent misstatement, but it must do so clearly and promptly; the Court does not specify exact timing or formalities, but stresses that “rapid correction” is “indispensable.”

In D.V., there was no repudiation: DFPS never corrected the representative, never made closing argument asking for termination, and defended the termination judgment only on appeal, too late to undo the procedural defect at trial.

F. Limits and Open Questions

The Court deliberately leaves certain issues for future cases:

It does not decide what test (including “totality of circumstances”) governs abandonment of claims in ordinary civil cases.
It does not define in detail what qualifies as a sufficiently “clear” or timely repudiation of a mistaken abandonment statement.
It does not attempt to define more broadly the capacity of agency representatives to bind their agencies in other substantive or procedural contexts.

Those questions are bracketed. The Court’s holding is explicitly confined to:

Parental-termination cases.
DFPS’s decision to seek or not seek termination as a remedy.
The effect of unequivocal, unrepudiated statements in the trial record regarding that remedy.

VI. Impact and Practical Consequences

A. For DFPS and Government Counsel

The decision has immediate, concrete implications for DFPS’s litigation practice:

Heightened need for message discipline: DFPS must carefully train its caseworkers and other representatives to understand that if they state that “the Department is not seeking termination,” that statement may be binding and dispositive absent quick correction.
Role of designated representatives: DFPS must treat its designated representatives not merely as fact witnesses, but also as individuals who can, through their testimony, bind the agency’s litigation position with respect to the remedy sought.
Immediate correction obligations: If a representative inadvertently misstates DFPS’s desired remedy, counsel should:
- Clarify the record on redirect examination.
- Directly inform the court that DFPS maintains its termination claim.
- Reiterate the request for termination in closing argument.
Failure to do so risks automatic reversal if termination is later ordered.
Case strategy and settlement posture: The opinion encourages DFPS to be explicit and transparent when it decides to step back from termination and to favor lesser restrictions when appropriate. It also means that once DFPS elects not to pursue termination (and says so unequivocally on the record), attempting to “reverse course” without clear, immediate repudiation will be difficult or impossible for that trial.

B. For Parents and Their Counsel

For parents’ attorneys, D.V. is a powerful procedural tool:

Vigilance during testimony: Counsel should listen carefully for any statement by DFPS’s representative or counsel disclaiming an intent to seek termination and consider locking that testimony in with precise follow-up questions, as Mother’s attorney did here.
Use of motions and objections: Once DFFS clearly disclaims termination:
- Counsel may move for judgment as a matter of law (directed verdict) on the termination claim.
- Counsel should object to any attempt to enter a termination order as beyond the scope of the relief being sought.
Preservation of error: If the trial court nonetheless terminates, the abandonment issue should be preserved and prominently raised on appeal, as it was here.

In a broader sense, the decision reinforces the principle that parents are entitled not only to substantive fairness (clear-and-convincing evidence, best-interest findings) but also to procedural integrity: the State cannot terminate a parent’s rights when the State itself has put those rights off the table for that trial.

C. For Trial Courts

Trial judges — both associate and district — must adjust their practices in light of D.V.:

Active management of relief sought: When DFPS’s representative or counsel states that the Department is not seeking termination, the court must treat termination as unavailable, absent clear and immediate repudiation.
Need for clarification on the record: If there is any ambiguity about what relief DFPS is seeking, trial courts should ask direct questions to clarify DFPS’s position before announcing judgment.
Judgment drafting: Courts must ensure that written orders conform to both the live pleadings and the narrowed issues actually tried — and that they do not grant more drastic relief than the State actually requested at trial.

D. Systemic and Doctrinal Impact

Doctrinally, D.V. strengthens a line of Texas cases emphasizing that when the State seeks to extinguish fundamental rights, ordinary procedural defaults and ambiguities must be resolved with a thumb firmly on the scale of protection:

It extends the heightened procedural scrutiny seen in In re E.R., In re N.G., and A.L.R. to the arena of remedy selection and abandonment of claims.
It further solidifies the idea that the State bears a special duty of candor and precision when it asks courts to terminate parental rights.
It diminishes the likelihood of “mixed signals” where pleadings say one thing but DFPS practice at trial says another.

On a systemic level, the decision may encourage:

More frequent use of non-termination outcomes: DFPS may feel more secure in narrowing relief requests midstream, knowing that courts will respect clear withdrawals of termination claims.
More appeals based on procedural irregularities in termination cases, particularly where trial records show equivocal or shifting State positions on whether termination is sought.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Termination of Parental Rights

Termination of parental rights is not merely a change in custody; it permanently severs the legal relationship between parent and child. After termination:

The parent generally loses all rights to possession, access, decision-making, and inheritance with respect to the child.
The child becomes legally free for adoption by others.

Because this is such a drastic, irrevocable step, Texas law requires clear and convincing evidence of both:

At least one statutory ground for termination (e.g., endangerment, abandonment, failure to comply with a court-ordered plan); and
That termination is in the child’s best interest.

B. Managing vs. Possessory (and Non-Possessory) Conservators

Texas does not use the term “custody” in its statutes; instead, it uses “conservatorship.” Major types include:

Sole Managing Conservator: A person (here, Father) who has primary authority over the child’s residence, education, medical care, and other major decisions and usually has primary physical possession.
Joint Managing Conservators: Two or more adults share the rights and duties of a parent, though one is often primary in terms of residence and decision-making.
Possessory Conservator: A person who has rights to possession and access (visitation), but not the full decision-making powers of a managing conservator.
Non-possessory conservator / parent non-conservator: Not a statutory term of art but commonly used in practice to describe a parent who retains the legal status of “parent” but has neither conservatorship nor visitation/possession rights. In effect, Mother here retains legal parentage but no active rights to see or make decisions for the child, unless modified later by court order.

C. Designated Representative in Civil Trials

Under Texas procedural rules, an organization (like DFPS) can name a designated representative to be present throughout trial, even if other witnesses are excluded under the sequestration rule. This representative:

Is not merely a fact witness; they stand in for the party itself.
Can testify about the party’s positions, knowledge, and recommendations.

In D.V., the Court treats the caseworker, as DFPS’s designated representative, as fully capable of expressing DFPS’s official position on what relief it seeks — particularly when DFPS’s own counsel frames questions in those terms and does not correct the answers.

D. Abandonment of Claims and Stipulations

In civil litigation, “abandonment” occurs when a party stops pursuing a claim or defense, either:

Formally, by amending pleadings to remove the claim, or
Functionally, by stipulating that certain issues are no longer in dispute or by limiting the questions to be tried.

A stipulation is an agreement or concession made during litigation that certain facts are true or that certain issues will or will not be litigated. Courts treat binding stipulations as conclusive on the issues they cover.

In D.V., DFPS’s statements that it was not seeking termination function as a stipulation that termination was not an issue to be tried. Thus, the trial court had no authority to order termination on that abandoned claim.

E. Clear and Convincing Evidence

“Clear and convincing evidence” is a higher burden of proof than “preponderance of the evidence” (more likely than not), but lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt” (the criminal standard). It requires:

Evidence that produces in the mind of the factfinder a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations.

While this standard typically governs factual findings in termination cases, D.V. deals with a logically earlier question: whether the State is even asking the court to consider termination as a remedy.

F. Attorney Ad Litem and CASA Roles

In child-protection cases:

An attorney ad litem is appointed to represent the child’s legal interests. They advocate for outcomes they believe serve the child’s welfare, but they do not control the State’s litigation posture.
A CASA (Court Appointed Special Advocate) is typically a trained volunteer who independently investigates and reports to the court on the child’s situation and best interests. CASA’s recommendations are influential but not binding on DFPS or the court.

In D.V., both CASA and the attorney ad litem recommended termination, but their recommendations could not resurrect a termination claim DFPS had abandoned.

VIII. Conclusion

D.V. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services establishes a critical procedural safeguard in Texas parental-termination law: once DFPS — including through its designated representative — unequivocally states that it is not seeking termination of a parent’s rights, the trial court may not order termination unless DFPS clearly and promptly repudiates that statement.

The decision:

Reaffirms the unique constitutional and human significance of parental rights.
Clarifies that in termination cases, civil-procedure doctrines like abandonment and stipulations must be applied with heightened sensitivity to the gravity of the remedy.
Holds DFPS to its word when it withdraws termination as a form of relief, unless it quickly and clearly corrects the record.
Protects parents from the State’s pursuit of the most extreme remedy — permanent termination — when the State has, on the record, receded from that position.

In effect, the Court demands that if the State of Texas intends to extinguish a parent’s legal relationship with a child, it must say so clearly and consistently, and it must not be allowed to salvage a termination order by pointing to old pleadings or contextual inferences in the face of express trial statements to the contrary. That principle not only vindicates Mother’s rights in this case, but also reinforces the integrity and fairness of termination proceedings across Texas going forward.

Unequivocal Abandonment of Termination Requests in Texas Parental-Rights Cases: Commentary on D.V. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services