Unequivocal Abandonment of Termination in Texas Parental-Rights Cases

Commentary on D.V. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Supreme Court of Texas (Oct. 31, 2025)

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in D.V. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services establishes an important procedural safeguard in parental-termination litigation. The Court holds that when the Department of Family and Protective Services’ (DFPS’s) designated representative makes a clear, unambiguous statement in open court that the Department is not seeking termination of a parent’s rights—and that statement is never repudiated—the trial court may not nevertheless terminate those rights, even if the live pleadings still request termination.

The case arises from a suit in which DFPS originally pleaded to terminate both parents’ rights to the child, E.D. As trial unfolded, however, DFPS’s own designated representative twice testified that the Department was seeking to restrict the mother’s rights, not terminate them, and to appoint the father as the permanent sole managing conservator. No one contradicted those statements at trial, and DFPS offered no opening or closing argument. Nonetheless, the associate judge terminated the mother’s parental rights, and the referring court later adopted that ruling.

On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the termination, relying on a “totality of the circumstances” approach, concluding that in context DFPS had not truly abandoned its termination claim. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed, emphasizing the distinctive constitutional status of parental rights and holding that an unequivocal, uncorrected statement that DFPS is not seeking termination is legally effective to withdraw that claim for relief in a termination case.

This commentary examines the opinion’s background, the Court’s reasoning, its reliance on prior precedents, and the future implications for child-protection litigation and Texas civil procedure.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

The petitioner, referred to as “Mother” (D.V.), had a history of violent behavior and drug use. After an alleged assault on her ex-boyfriend and one of her other children, DFPS removed E.D. and filed a petition to terminate both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.

By the time of trial, DFPS’s actual position had shifted as to Father: it wanted Father to be E.D.’s permanent sole managing conservator. Nonetheless, the live pleading still requested termination of both parents’ rights. No one treated that pleading as reflecting DFPS’s real position regarding Father; the Department clearly did not want his rights terminated.

The trial was conducted before an associate judge over videoconference. DFPS had designated the DFPS caseworker as its representative under Texas procedure. On direct examination by DFPS’s attorney, the caseworker testified:

Q. What is the Department’s recommendation to the Court today?

A. The Department is seeking to limit and restrict [Mother]’s rights, and give permanent managing conservatorship of [E.D.] to [Father], and to limit [Mother]’s rights to parent non-conservator with no visitation and contact.

On cross-examination, Mother’s counsel sought clarification:

Q. And [the Department] is not seeking to terminate [Mother]’s rights, but to ask the Court to name her as a parent non-conservator?

A. Correct.

No party objected to this testimony, and DFPS’s counsel did not attempt to correct, qualify, or walk it back.

Later, a CASA volunteer recommended termination of Mother’s rights. At closing, Mother’s counsel asked the court not to terminate her rights. E.D.’s attorney ad litem stated that DFPS had met its burden “as far as termination” but suggested, in the alternative, that if the court did not terminate, Mother should be named a non-possessory conservator.

DFPS made no opening statement, no closing argument, and never contradicted its representative’s testimony that it was not seeking termination. Immediately after the ad litem’s closing, the associate judge announced termination of Mother’s parental rights and made Father sole managing conservator. The written judgment followed.

B. Procedural History

Mother requested a de novo hearing in the referring district court. That court initially refused, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a de novo hearing. On remand, Mother raised several challenges to the termination; the only one preserved for further review was the argument that the associate judge lacked authority to terminate her parental rights after DFPS affirmatively abandoned its termination request at trial.

The district court rejected that argument and adopted the associate judge’s ruling. The court of appeals affirmed in a published opinion, D.V. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 716 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024), concluding that DFPS had not effectively abandoned its termination request when the “surrounding circumstances” were considered.

Mother sought review in the Supreme Court of Texas, which granted the petition.

C. Issue Before the Supreme Court

The preserved issue presented to the Supreme Court was:

Whether the associate judge (and by adoption, the district court) lacked authority to terminate Mother’s parental rights when DFPS’s designated representative unequivocally testified that the Department was not seeking termination, and that testimony was neither contradicted nor repudiated.

D. Holding

The Supreme Court of Texas held:

In parental-termination cases, a court may not terminate parental rights in the face of an unequivocal and unrepudiated statement made by someone speaking on the Department’s behalf that withdraws termination as a requested form of relief.

The Court reversed the court of appeals and the portion of the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights. It rendered judgment that Mother be appointed parent non-conservator (or non-possessory conservator) consistent with DFPS’s trial position and remanded for entry of a conforming judgment and resolution of any remaining issues.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. The Unique Constitutional Status of Parental-Termination Cases

The Court anchors its analysis in the long-recognized, uniquely protected status of parental rights in Texas and federal law. It emphasizes that parental-termination proceedings “stand apart” from ordinary civil litigation.

Key cited authorities and principles include:

Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1976):
- “Actions which break the ties between a parent and child can never be justified without the most solid and substantial reasons.”
- Proceedings that permanently sever the parent–child relationship must be “strictly scrutinized.”
- The Court reiterates the “strong presumption” that a child’s best interest is usually served by custody remaining with the natural parents.
- Parental rights are of “constitutional dimensions.”
In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. 2012), echoing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982):
- Termination proceedings encumber a value “far more precious than any property right.”
- They are governed by “special rules,” reflecting the gravity of the interest at stake.
Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. 1985):
- Termination requires “clear and convincing” evidence, now codified in Texas Family Code § 161.001(b).
In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2019):
- Parents in termination cases benefit from an elevated standard of appellate review.
Legislative protections:
- Indigent parents have a statutory right to appointed counsel in termination cases, Texas Family Code § 107.013(a)—a protection “practically unheard of” in ordinary civil litigation.

The Court underscores that these considerations justify approaching procedural questions in termination cases with heightened sensitivity. While general civil-procedure norms matter, the Court refuses to simply import a “totality of the circumstances” approach from ordinary litigation without modification. In termination cases, the law’s strong presumption against severing parental ties and its insistence on “solid and substantial” reasons tilt the scales toward protecting the parent when the State’s litigation position is ambiguous or internally inconsistent.

B. Abandonment of Claims and Stipulations in Texas Civil Procedure

The case centers on a procedural question: when is a claim for relief, pleaded in a petition, deemed abandoned at trial? The Court begins by confirming general Texas procedural principles:

Rule 301, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure:
- Judgment must conform to the pleadings and cannot grant relief on a claim that has been abandoned.
Rule 165, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure:
- A party may “abandon” any part of its claim or defense “as contained in the pleadings.”
- Formal abandonment may be “entered of record, so as to show that the matters therein were not tried.”
Abandonment by stipulation or limitation of issues:
- Pathfinder Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Great W. Drilling, Ltd., 574 S.W.3d 882 (Tex. 2019):
  - “When parties stipulate that only certain questions will be tried, all others are thereby waived.”
  - This principle extends beyond formal, written stipulations to agreements or concessions made in judicial proceedings.
- In re Shaw, 966 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, no pet.):
  - Cited approvingly for the proposition that a court cannot order termination when DFPS has stipulated that it is not seeking that relief.

The Supreme Court accepts the court of appeals’ basic premise: claims can be abandoned, and judgment may not be granted on an abandoned claim. It also agrees that abandonment can occur by stipulation or by limiting what issues will be tried—not only by formal amendment of pleadings.

The central question, then, is not whether abandonment is possible, but whether the DFPS representative’s statements in D.V. constitute such an abandonment in a parental-termination context.

C. The Court’s Core Reasoning: Unequivocal Abandonment by DFPS’s Representative

1. The meaning of the representative’s statements

The Court views the representative’s testimony as clear and unambiguous:

The representative, in response to DFPS counsel’s question about “the Department’s recommendation,” said DFPS was “seeking to limit and restrict [Mother]’s rights” and to appoint Father as permanent managing conservator, with Mother as a non-conservator with no visitation or contact.
On cross-examination, she confirmed that DFPS was “not seeking to terminate [Mother]’s rights” but instead was asking the court to name her as a parent non-conservator, answering “Correct.”

The Court characterizes this as bearing “only one meaning”—that DFPS had withdrawn termination as a requested remedy against Mother. Critically, DFPS’s counsel:

elicited these statements as the Department’s position, not merely the witness’s personal opinion;
did not object to the testimony;
did not conduct redirect to correct or qualify it; and
never contradicted it in argument (indeed, DFPS made no argument at all).

In the Court’s view, this is an “unequivocal assertion by the Department” that it was not seeking termination. In a termination case, such an assertion—if left unrepudiated—constitutes withdrawal of the termination claim.

2. Rejecting the court of appeals’ “context” arguments

The court of appeals relied heavily on the broader “context” of the trial to conclude that DFPS had not actually abandoned termination. The Supreme Court systematically rejects each contextual factor as insufficient to override the representative’s clear testimony.

CASA and ad litem recommendations for termination
The court of appeals noted that:
- CASA recommended termination; and
- the child’s attorney ad litem said DFPS had met its burden “as far as termination.”
The Supreme Court responds that what matters is whether DFPS is seeking termination, not whether other parties think termination is in the child’s best interest or think DFPS could prevail if it sought it. CASA and ad litem positions cannot substitute for DFPS’s expressed litigation posture. Moreover, Father’s pleading did not request termination of Mother’s rights, further undercutting any alternative source of a termination request.
Evidence supporting termination
The appellate court reasoned that presenting evidence supporting termination is inconsistent with abandoning a request for termination. The Supreme Court acknowledges that this argument would have more force if the evidence were relevant only to termination. But here, the same evidence supported a lesser remedy—appointing Father as permanent managing conservator and limiting Mother’s rights to those of a non-conservator with no contact.
Even if some aspects of the evidentiary presentation seemed inconsistent with abandonment, the Court holds that in the parental-termination context such implicit inconsistency cannot override explicit, unequivocal statements withdrawing the remedy of termination. The gravity of terminating parental rights requires that DFPS’s stated position control unless clearly and promptly repudiated.
Mother’s counsel still asking the court not to terminate
The court of appeals and DFPS argued that if termination were truly off the table, Mother’s counsel would not have asked the court “not to terminate” her rights in closing argument.
The Supreme Court offers a straightforward explanation: counsel could have been arguing, at least in part, that termination was not legally authorized because DFPS had abandoned that remedy. Even if counsel did not explicitly link the two points, it would be “bizarre” to treat a parent’s plea not to be terminated as somehow restoring a previously abandoned termination option.

The Court emphasizes that if DFPS had reasserted its termination request, Mother’s closing could be more easily read as a direct response. But absent such reassertion, a parent’s defensive plea cannot revive an abandoned claim.
The statement coming from the designated representative, not counsel
The court of appeals stressed that abandonment cases often involve express statements by counsel, not by witnesses. The Supreme Court rejects any categorical rule that only counsel’s statements can effect abandonment.
It notes that:
- In In re N.H., No. 02-22-00157-CV, 2022 WL 4374638 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 22, 2022, no pet.), a private provider contracting with DFPS who testified that DFPS was not seeking termination was treated as effectively serving as DFPS’s agent for that purpose.
- Here, DFPS formally designated the caseworker as its representative under Tex. R. Civ. P. 267 and Tex. R. Evid. 614, giving her procedural status as the “face” of the agency at trial.
The Court concludes that a designated representative may express the Department’s position at trial. Even if one demanded some participation by counsel in abandonment, that participation is present here: DFPS counsel elicited the representative’s testimony regarding the Department’s position and allowed it to stand uncorrected.

The Court carefully limits its holding: it does not decide when or whether a designated representative can “bind” DFPS in other contexts. Its analysis is expressly confined to parental-termination cases, where presumptions strongly disfavor termination.
Continuing existence of a live pleading requesting termination
DFPS emphasized that its live petition still sought termination of both parents’ rights. The Supreme Court dismisses this as both necessary and insufficient:
- A pleading requesting termination is a prerequisite to seeking that remedy; absent such a pleading there would be nothing to abandon.
- But the same live pleading also sought termination of Father’s rights, even though DFPS openly advocated at trial that Father be vested with full parental authority. No one doubted that DFPS had abandoned termination as to Father, demonstrating that trial conduct can and does supersede what remains in the pleadings.
Thus, the Court views reliance on the mere existence of the pleading as “proving too much.” The pleading serves important notice and procedural functions (e.g., triggering the right to appointed counsel), but it does not freeze DFPS’s position. When DFPS determines that termination is no longer appropriate, the system expects and encourages it to abandon that request.

3. The affirmative rule announced

Synthesizing these points, the Court articulates a clear rule specific to termination cases:

We hold that an unequivocal assertion by the Department—including its designated representative—that it does not seek termination constitutes withdrawal of a request for that relief unless clearly repudiated.

The Court emphasizes “best practices”: DFPS should prepare its witnesses and representatives so that they accurately articulate the Department’s litigation position. But when mistakes occur, “rapid correction” is “indispensable, given the gravity of the proceedings.” A statement asserting that DFPS does not seek termination should function as a “blaring klaxon” that demands an immediate correction if inaccurate.

Because DFPS never attempted to correct or repudiate its representative’s unequivocal statement, the Court takes DFPS “at its word as expressed at trial” and concludes that DFPS had abandoned termination as a remedy against Mother.

D. The Role of Designated Representatives and Agency “Voice” at Trial

The opinion also clarifies the litigation role of designated representatives in this context.

Under Tex. R. Civ. P. 267(a) and Tex. R. Evid. 614, a party that is a non-natural person (like DFPS) may designate a representative to sit at counsel table, remain in the courtroom despite “the rule” (witness sequestration), and effectively serve as the party’s physical presence.
The Court explains that the point of this designation is to allow such entities to have “a human who could serve as its face and physical presence at trial.” As such, when that representative is asked, in open court, to state “the Department’s recommendation,” her answer is necessarily more than personal opinion: it is the Department speaking through its chosen proxy.

The Court does not set a broad doctrine of agency binding DFPS in all situations. Instead, it grounds its conclusion in:

the formal designation of the representative;
the framing of the questions to elicit DFPS’s official position; and
the profound constitutional interests at stake in termination proceedings.

Under this framework, if DFPS’s internal or strategic position on termination differs from what its designated representative has said on the record, DFPS counsel bears an affirmative obligation to alert the court and the parent promptly. Silence in the face of an unequivocal statement that DFPS is not seeking termination is treated as acquiescence in that abandonment.

E. The Remedy: Rendering the Non-Termination Outcome

In a notable remedial step, the Supreme Court does more than simply reverse the termination and remand for further proceedings. It aligns its judgment with DFPS’s expressed trial position and Mother’s prayer for relief:

It reverses the portion of the judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights.
It renders judgment that Mother be appointed as parent non-conservator (or non-possessory conservator), consistent with what DFPS said it was seeking at trial.
It remands for the district court to enter a judgment consistent with this disposition and to resolve any remaining issues, conducting further proceedings if necessary.

This approach reflects the Court’s view that once termination is off the table, the remaining relief is not in serious dispute. DFPS itself, through its representative, asked for Mother to be a non-conservator with no visitation or contact, and Mother’s petition to the Supreme Court requested that very appointment. The remand is essentially administrative—to put the proper legal form around the non-termination configuration and to address any residual matters (e.g., clarifying conservatorship orders, child support, or other collateral issues).

F. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Several precedents play distinct roles in shaping the Court’s analysis:

Leithold v. Plass, 413 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. 1967):
- Quoted for the proposition that “[t]echnical rules of practice and pleadings are of little importance in determining issues concerning the custody of children.”
- This supports the Court’s willingness to subordinate strict pleading formalism when necessary to protect substantive parental and child interests.
Legate v. Legate, 28 S.W. 281 (Tex. 1894):
- Reaffirmed for the longstanding presumption that a child’s best interest is typically served by remaining in the custody of the parents.
- Used to justify a default orientation against terminating rights unless clearly and properly sought.
In re A.L.R., 646 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. 2022):
- The Court analogizes: a service plan describing mandatory criteria as “requested tasks” fails to give clear notice that those criteria are prerequisites to retaining parental rights and cannot support termination.
- Likewise, when DFPS’s conduct at trial signals that termination is no longer being pursued, the system cannot treat termination as still “on the table” based solely on formal pleadings.
In re Shaw (El Paso Court of Appeals):
- Directly supports the proposition that a trial court cannot terminate parental rights when DFPS has stipulated that it will not seek that relief.
- D.V. can be seen as extending or clarifying Shaw, holding that an explicit statement by a designated representative functions similarly to such a stipulation.
In re N.H. (Fort Worth Court of Appeals):
- The Court cites N.H. for the idea that a private provider testifying that DFPS was not seeking termination as to one child “effectively served as the Department’s agent” for that purpose.
- This precedent helps undergird the idea that someone other than DFPS’s trial counsel (including a designated representative) may, in the right circumstances, speak for the Department on whether it is seeking termination.

Collectively, these cases bolster the Court’s insistence that:

the law approaches termination proceedings with heightened sensitivity and caution;
strict technical pleading rules cannot be applied in the same way as in ordinary civil disputes; and
when DFPS signals that termination is not being pursued, the courts must respect that signal unless DFPS clearly corrects it.

G. Limits and Open Questions

Importantly, the Court declines to resolve a broader civil-procedure question: how abandonment should be evaluated in “typical civil litigation” (e.g., contract or tort cases). It assumes arguendo that the court of appeals’ “totality of the circumstances” approach may be adequate in ordinary civil cases but finds that it is “inadequate—or at least incomplete—for parental-termination cases.”

The Court also explicitly leaves open:

what precise forms of repudiation would be sufficient to reverse an erroneous statement that DFPS is not seeking termination; and
how quickly that repudiation must occur.

Because DFPS offered no repudiation at all in this case, the Court had no occasion to test those outer boundaries. Future cases may need to address, for example, whether a curative clarification later in the same day, or at the close of evidence, suffices, and whether any prejudice to the parent must be shown.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Termination of Parental Rights vs. Restriction of Rights

Termination of parental rights:
- Completely and permanently severs the legal relationship between parent and child.
- The parent loses all legal rights and duties regarding the child (e.g., custody, decision-making, inheritance, usually visitation).
- It is often a precursor to adoption.
Restriction or limitation of parental rights:
- The parent keeps the legal status of “parent” but may be stripped of conservatorship rights (decision-making power, possession, access).
- The court may appoint another person (here, Father) as sole managing conservator, who exercises all major parental powers.
- The limited parent may be a parent non-conservator or non-possessory conservator, with little or no access to the child, but the legal bond (including some duties, such as support) may survive.

In D.V., DFPS’s trial position was to restrict Mother’s rights—making her a non-conservator with no visitation or contact—while not seeking full termination.

B. “Clear and Convincing Evidence”

Termination requires proof by “clear and convincing evidence,” a standard higher than the usual “preponderance of the evidence” in civil cases:

Preponderance of the evidence: more likely than not (just over 50%).
Clear and convincing evidence: the evidence must produce in the factfinder’s mind a “firm belief or conviction” that the allegations are true.

This heightened standard reflects the severe, irreversible nature of terminating parental rights.

C. Abandonment of Claims and Stipulations

Abandonment:
- A party that initially asks for a certain remedy may later give it up—formally (by amending pleadings) or informally (by stipulation or limiting issues for trial).
- If a claim is abandoned, the court generally may not grant relief on that claim.
Stipulation:
- An agreement or concession between parties about certain facts or about issues to be tried.
- When parties stipulate that only certain questions will be tried, the unstipulated issues are treated as waived or removed from the case.

In D.V., DFPS’s representative’s statements function as a kind of stipulation, limiting what relief DFPS was seeking and thereby abandoning the request for termination.

D. Designated Representative of a Party

Because entities like DFPS cannot sit at counsel table in person, Texas procedure allows them to designate one individual as their representative at trial. This person:

may remain in the courtroom even if other witnesses are excluded;
often assists counsel with facts and strategy; and
can, as in this case, be the person through whom the entity’s formal litigation position is communicated to the court.

In parental-termination cases, the Supreme Court holds that when DFPS’s designated representative clearly testifies to DFPS’s position on whether it is seeking termination—and counsel does not correct or contradict that testimony—the court must treat it as DFPS’s operative position unless DFPS plainly repudiates it.

V. Impact and Future Implications

A. Practical Impact on DFPS and Trial Practice

The decision will likely have substantial impact on DFPS’s conduct in termination trials:

Training and preparation:
- DFPS will need to ensure that caseworkers and other designated representatives are thoroughly briefed on the Department’s exact litigation position before testifying.
- They must understand the distinction between termination and restriction of rights and the legal significance of representing that DFPS is or is not seeking termination.
Active monitoring and correction:
- DFPS counsel must be vigilant in real time. Any unintentional statement that DFPS is not seeking termination must be corrected promptly on the record.
- Silence will be construed as acceptance of that abandonment.
Use of closing arguments:
- In cases like D.V., a brief closing argument by DFPS reaffirming that it still seeks termination could have prevented this outcome.
- After D.V., DFPS is on notice that failure to argue termination after ambiguous or contradictory testimony may be used to show abandonment.

B. Enhanced Protection for Parents

For parents, the ruling is a meaningful safeguard:

Once DFPS has clearly and unambiguously stated that it is not seeking termination, parents may rely on that representation unless and until DFPS expressly retracts it.
Parents are protected against “surprise” terminations in which the court terminates rights even though DFPS has effectively signaled that it is not pursuing that extreme remedy.
The decision reinforces the presumption in favor of preserving the parent–child relationship and treats termination as a “last resort” remedy that must be deliberately and consistently pursued to be available to the court.

C. Guidance for Trial Courts

The opinion gives trial judges clearer guidance:

Judges must carefully attend to DFPS’s stated position during trial. If DFPS says it is not seeking termination and does not later retract that statement, the judge may not terminate on DFPS’s abandoned claim.
Judges should clarify on the record, where necessary, whether DFPS is or is not seeking termination, especially when there are mixed signals from evidence, pleadings, and witness testimony.
They must resist relying solely on live pleadings when the trial record shows that DFPS has shifted its requested relief.

D. Influence on Broader Civil Procedure

While the Court expressly confines its holding to parental-termination cases, the decision may influence future conversations about abandonment and stipulations in Texas civil procedure:

It confirms that pleadings do not have the final word: a party’s on-the-record trial conduct can narrow and even effectively waive pleaded claims.
It illustrates how courts may treat explicit litigation positions—articulated through testimony or stipulations—as controlling, particularly when adversaries and the court reasonably rely on them.
It also signals the Court’s sensitivity to context-specific procedural rules: what suffices in high-stakes, constitutionally protected contexts may differ from “ordinary” civil cases.

E. Potential Future Litigation Questions

The opinion leaves several issues that may arise in later cases:

What if DFPS’s representative makes an unclear or equivocal statement about termination—does that still count as abandonment?
How late is too late to repudiate an erroneous statement? Immediately after the witness steps down? Before the close of evidence? Before judgment?
Must the parent show reliance or prejudice, or is abandonment (and failure to repudiate) itself enough to bar termination?
How will courts treat situations where different DFPS witnesses offer conflicting representations about whether termination is being sought?

D.V. does not decide these questions, but it sets a strong baseline: in termination cases, when DFPS clearly says “we are not seeking termination” and never corrects that statement, termination is not legally available.

VI. Conclusion

D.V. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services reinforces the special, constitutional status of parental rights in Texas law and concretely operationalizes that status through procedural doctrine. The Court holds that in parental-termination cases:

an unequivocal, on-the-record statement by DFPS’s designated representative that the Department is not seeking termination amounts to abandonment of that remedy,
and unless DFPS clearly repudiates that statement, the trial court lacks authority to terminate parental rights on DFPS’s abandoned claim.

The decision harmonizes longstanding principles—strong presumptions favoring the parent–child relationship, strict scrutiny of termination, the centrality of clear notice, and the relative informality of pleadings in child-custody disputes—with practical trial realities. It sends a clear message: termination of parental rights is too grave a step to occur by default, inadvertence, or in disregard of the State’s own declared position at trial.

By reversing the termination and rendering judgment consistent with DFPS’s expressed request to restrict, but not terminate, Mother’s rights, the Supreme Court of Texas underscores that in termination litigation, the State must “mean what it says” and act with utmost clarity when it seeks to permanently sever the parent–child bond.

Unequivocal Abandonment of Termination in Texas Parental-Rights Cases: Commentary on D.V. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services