“When the State Says It Is Not Seeking Termination, Courts May Not Terminate”: Commentary on D.V. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in D.V. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, No. 24‑0840 (Tex. Oct. 31, 2025), imposes a significant procedural constraint on the State’s ability to obtain termination of parental rights. The Court holds that in a parental-rights termination proceeding, a trial court may not terminate a parent’s rights when the Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) has, through someone speaking on its behalf, clearly and unequivocally withdrawn termination as requested relief—and has never clearly repudiated that withdrawal.

Thus, the case establishes a protective rule tailored to the special status of parental-rights litigation: an unequivocal, unrepudiated statement by DFPS (including through its designated representative) that it is not seeking termination operates as a binding abandonment of the termination request, and a trial court may not enter a termination judgment in the face of that abandonment.

The decision lies at the intersection of fundamental constitutional family-rights doctrine and civil-procedure rules on pleadings, stipulations, and abandonment. It also clarifies the authority of DFPS’s designated trial representatives and the limits of “contextual” or “totality-of-the-circumstances” approaches that might otherwise dilute clear statements made during trial.

II. Case Background and Procedural History

A. Factual Background

The petitioner, referred to as D.V. (“Mother”), had a documented history of violent conduct and drug use. After an alleged assault on an ex‑boyfriend and one of her other children, DFPS removed E.D. (the child at issue) and filed a suit seeking termination of both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.

DFPS’s trial strategy evolved: it quickly changed its mind as to Father and came to view him as the preferred permanent sole managing conservator of E.D. Nonetheless, DFPS’s live pleading at trial still requested termination as to both parents. That pleading position, however, no longer reflected DFPS’s actual litigation posture with respect to Father—and, as the Supreme Court ultimately holds, it also did not reflect DFPS’s position with respect to Mother after its designated representative testified.

B. Trial Proceedings Before the Associate Judge

The referring court sent the case to an associate judge for a bench trial conducted by videoconference. The critical events occurred in the testimony of DFPS’s designated representative (a caseworker).

On direct examination by DFPS’s counsel, the representative was asked for the Department’s recommendation:

Q. What is the Department's recommendation [to] the Court today?

A. The Department is seeking to limit and restrict [Mother]'s rights, and give permanent managing conservatorship of [E.D.] to [Father], and to limit [Mother]'s rights to parent non-conservator with no visitation and contact.

On cross-examination, Mother’s counsel clarified:

Q. And [the Department] is not seeking to terminate [Mother]'s rights, but to ask the Court to name her as a parent non-conservator?

A. Correct.

This testimony—elicited by DFPS’s own lawyer, then reaffirmed under cross—stated unequivocally that DFPS was not seeking termination of Mother’s rights, but instead sought a non-conservator arrangement with no visitation or contact.

Later, however, two other key players expressed a different view:

The CASA volunteer (Court Appointed Special Advocate) recommended termination of Mother’s parental rights.
The child’s attorney ad litem told the court: “I think the Department has met its burden as far as termination,” but suggested naming Mother a non-possessory conservator if the court declined to terminate.

Mother testified that she did not want her parental rights terminated and wished at least to have visitation restored and, ideally, custody. In closing, her counsel asked the court specifically not to terminate her rights.

DFPS made no opening statement and no closing argument. Immediately after the attorney ad litem’s closing, the associate judge orally announced termination of Mother’s parental rights and appointed Father sole managing conservator. The written judgment followed.

C. Post-Judgment and Appellate History

Mother requested a de novo hearing in the referring district court. That request was initially rejected, but the court of appeals first reversed and remanded for the de novo hearing. See D.V. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03‑23‑00098‑CV, 2023 WL 4494802 (Tex. App.—Austin July 13, 2023, no pet.).

At the de novo hearing, Mother raised several challenges to termination but preserved only one for further appellate review:

The associate judge lacked the authority to terminate Mother’s constitutionally protected parental rights when the Department affirmatively abandoned its pleading for termination at trial.

The district court adopted the associate judge’s ruling, again terminating her rights. The Third Court of Appeals (Austin) affirmed in a published decision, 716 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024). It held that DFPS’s statement at trial did not amount to an abandonment of its termination claim, considering the “totality of the circumstances.”

The Supreme Court of Texas granted review, reversed the court of appeals, and rendered partial judgment in Mother’s favor.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

A. The Core Holding

Justice Young, writing for the Court, establishes this central proposition:

In parental-termination cases, a court may not terminate parental rights in the face of an unequivocal and unrepudiated statement made by someone speaking on the Department's behalf that withdraws termination as a requested form of relief.

Put differently, once DFPS—through its lawyer or designated representative—plainly tells the court it is not seeking termination, the State is bound to that position unless it clearly repudiates the statement. In the absence of such repudiation, the trial court lacks authority to terminate.

B. Application to the Facts

The Court finds that the caseworker—formally designated as DFPS’s representative—made an unequivocal statement that DFPS sought to restrict Mother’s rights and appoint Father as managing conservator, and not to terminate Mother’s rights. DFPS’s lawyer elicited this testimony and never attempted to correct or contradict it.

The Court holds that:

The representative’s testimony constituted a binding abandonment of DFPS’s request for termination as a form of relief.
The so-called “context” relied upon by the court of appeals (evidence supporting termination, CASA’s recommendation, the ad litem’s view, and Mother’s own closing) could not overcome that clear abandonment.
The live pleading’s continued request for termination did not save the termination judgment, because a claim once pleaded can later be abandoned at or during trial.

C. Disposition

The Supreme Court:

Reverses the court of appeals’ judgment.
Reverses the portion of the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights.
Renders judgment that Mother be appointed as a parent non-possessory conservator (consistent with the relief she requested and the Department’s articulated position).
Remands to the district court to enter a judgment consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision and to resolve any remaining issues, with authority to conduct further proceedings if needed.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Unique Context of Parental-Termination Litigation

The opinion begins by emphasizing that parental-termination cases are not ordinary civil suits. This framing drives the Court’s refusal to treat abandonment and stipulation questions here as it might in contract or tort litigation.

Key points:

Constitutional Dimension. The Court reiterates that the “natural right which exists between parents and their children is one of constitutional dimensions,” quoting Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. 1976).
Heightened Scrutiny. Citing In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. 2012), and Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), the Court notes that termination encumbers a value “far more precious than any property right” and is governed by “special rules,” including a clear and convincing evidence standard (fam. code §161.001(b); Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. 1985)).
Right to Counsel. Unlike most civil cases, Texas provides indigent parents a statutory right to appointed counsel. See Tex. Fam. Code §107.013(a).
Elevated Appellate Review. Parents receive a heightened standard of appellate review in termination cases. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. 2019).
Presumption Favoring Parents. The Court recalls its longstanding presumption that a child’s best interest is usually served by remaining with the natural parents. See Legate v. Legate, 28 S.W. 281, 282 (Tex. 1894); Wiley, 543 S.W.2d at 352.

This background justifies treating procedural issues—here, abandonment of a claim for termination—through a parent-protective lens. The Court signals that rules appropriate in commercial or tort litigation may be “inadequate—or at least incomplete—for parental-termination cases.”

B. Abandonment, Stipulations, and Civil Procedure

The Court next situates the case in general Texas civil-procedure doctrine.

1. General Rule: Claims Can Be Abandoned

The Court affirms well-settled principles:

Under Tex. R. Civ. P. 301, a judgment must conform to the pleadings and cannot grant relief on a claim that has been abandoned.
Tex. R. Civ. P. 165 expressly contemplates the abandonment of parts of a claim or defense.
Claims can be abandoned through stipulation. As the Court stated in Pathfinder Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Great W. Drilling, Ltd., 574 S.W.3d 882, 887 (Tex. 2019): “When parties stipulate that only certain questions will be tried, all others are thereby waived.”

In line with those principles, the Court endorses the El Paso Court of Appeals’ conclusion in In re Shaw, 966 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, no pet.), that a court may not order termination when DFPS has stipulated it is not seeking that relief.

2. The Narrow Question in D.V.

Against this backdrop, the Court frames the core issue as:

Whether the statements by the Department's designated representative amount to the Department's unequivocal abandonment of termination as a requested remedy.

Critically, the Court does not attempt to resolve broader questions about how abandonment should be evaluated in all civil cases. It expressly reserves that issue for another day, even as it assumes (for argument’s sake) that the court of appeals’ “totality of the circumstances” approach might be adequate for ordinary civil litigation.

For parental-termination cases, however, the Court holds that this “totality” approach is insufficient when set against an unequivocal, unrepudiated statement withdrawing termination as sought relief.

C. The Designated Representative’s Testimony as Binding Abandonment

The Court finds that DFPS’s representative’s testimony was:

Clear: She stated DFPS was “seeking to limit and restrict [Mother]'s rights” and to appoint Father permanent managing conservator, with Mother as “parent non-conservator with no visitation and contact.”
Unequivocal: On cross-examination, she explicitly confirmed that DFPS was “not seeking to terminate [Mother]’s rights.
Unrepudiated: DFPS’s counsel never corrected, qualified, or contradicted this statement—neither in further testimony nor in closing argument (indeed, DFPS gave no closing).

The Court therefore concludes this testimony “bears only one meaning” and that “her words convey no other possible meaning.” That meaning is a withdrawal of termination as the relief being sought.

Because the representative had been formally designated under Tex. R. Civ. P. 267 and Tex. R. Evid. 614, she was acting as DFPS’s trial “face and physical presence.” The Court agrees with the Fort Worth Court of Appeals’ reasoning in In re N.H., 2022 WL 4374638, that a similar witness “effectively served as the Department’s agent” with respect to stating DFPS’s position.

Although the Court is careful not to announce a general doctrine of when a designated representative can “bind” an agency in all contexts, it holds that, in parental-termination cases, such a representative’s unequivocal statement about DFPS’s position on termination is effective absent a clear and timely repudiation by counsel.

D. Rejecting the Court of Appeals’ “Totality of the Circumstances” Analysis

The Third Court of Appeals had held that, considering the trial “context,” the representative’s statement did not amount to abandonment. It relied on several circumstantial factors. The Supreme Court methodically rejects each one.

1. CASA and Attorney Ad Litem Recommendations

The court of appeals pointed out that:

CASA recommended termination of Mother’s rights.
The attorney ad litem stated DFPS had “met its burden as far as termination.”

The Supreme Court responds: what matters is whether DFPS itself seeks termination, not whether other participants believe termination is justified or likely. These third-party views, even when supportive of termination, cannot change the fact that DFPS—the party whose petition sought termination—unequivocally disclaimed that remedy at trial.

2. The Presentation of Evidence Supporting Termination

The court of appeals also reasoned that presenting evidence consistent with termination was “inconsistent with abandoning the request for termination.”

The Supreme Court finds this unpersuasive:

Much of the evidence introduced was equally relevant to lesser relief, such as restricting Mother’s rights or making her a non-conservator.
Even if some evidence arguably only made sense in a termination framework, such “context” cannot override an explicit, formal statement by DFPS that it is not seeking termination—especially given the heightened stakes in termination litigation.

The Court essentially rejects the idea that the type of evidence introduced can “undo” an otherwise clear stipulation limiting the relief a party seeks.

3. Mother’s Counsel Asking the Court “Not to Terminate”

The court of appeals reasoned that if termination were truly “off the table,” Mother’s lawyer would have had no reason to ask the court not to terminate her rights in closing argument.

The Supreme Court calls this argument backwards. It notes:

It is entirely reasonable for a parent’s counsel to remind the court that it lacks authority to grant termination relief that DFPS has abandoned.
Even if counsel did not clearly articulate the legal basis for that argument in closing, it would be “bizarre” to treat that request as somehow reviving termination as an available option.

4. The Fact the Statement Came from the Representative, Not Counsel

The court of appeals also stressed that abandonment had been announced by the caseworker, not by DFPS’s lawyer. The Supreme Court disagrees that this distinction is meaningful here:

The representative was formally designated under procedural and evidentiary rules to act for DFPS in the trial.
DFPS’s counsel elicited the statement directly, asking for “the Department’s recommendation.”
Counsel had every opportunity to clarify or correct the statement on redirect, through argument, or otherwise; the total silence amounts to tacit adoption of the representative’s position.

The Court emphasizes that, given the presumption against termination and the gravity of parental rights, if DFPS’s actual intention diverged from its representative’s clear statement, counsel had an urgent duty to correct the record.

5. The Live Pleading Still Requested Termination

Finally, DFPS argued—and the court of appeals accepted—that its live pleading still sought termination, so there was no abandonment of that claim.

The Supreme Court offers multiple responses:

Without the live pleading, there would have been nothing to abandon; that fact does not immunize DFPS from the effect of its later statements at trial.
The same pleading also still sought termination of Father’s rights—even though DFPS “undisputedly” had abandoned that request and in fact supported Father as the permanent sole managing conservator. The pleading’s text therefore could not reliably indicate DFPS’s true trial posture.
Once a party has clearly narrowed or limited the relief it seeks at trial, a court cannot later use the unamended pleading to re‑expand that relief.

The Court treats DFPS’s failure to conform its pleading to its trial position as practically irrelevant, given the clear, on‑the‑record abandonment of termination.

E. The New Rule: Unequivocal Abandonment and the Duty to Repudiate

Synthesizing its reasoning, the Court announces a concrete rule for termination cases:

We hold that an unequivocal assertion by the Department—including its designated representative—that it does not seek termination constitutes withdrawal of a request for that relief unless clearly repudiated.

Important components of this rule:

“Unequivocal assertion” – Ambiguous or conditional statements may not suffice, but a clear “we are not seeking termination” will.
“By the Department—including its designated representative” – The statement can be made directly by counsel or by a representative formally designated to speak for DFPS at trial.
“Unless clearly repudiated” – DFPS may correct a misstatement, but it must do so:
- Clearly (there must be no doubt that DFPS is seeking termination), and
- Promptly enough that parents and the court are not misled about what is truly at stake.

The Court notes that “best practice” is to avoid misstatements in the first place, but if they occur, “rapid correction” is “indispensable, given the gravity of the proceedings.” It likens an erroneous statement that DFPS is not seeking termination to a “blaring klaxon” demanding immediate correction.

Because no such repudiation occurred in D.V., the Court holds DFPS to its word and invalidates the termination judgment.

F. The Remedy: Rendering Non-Possessory Conservatorship

Mother’s petition to the Supreme Court requested that the Court render judgment appointing her:

parent non-conservator; or, in the alternative,
parent non-possessory conservator.

The Supreme Court chooses the latter, aligning with the Department’s trial request and the structure of the Family Code. It reverses the termination portion of the judgment and remands solely to allow the district court to enter a judgment consistent with that holding and to address any unresolved matters (e.g., specific conditions of managing and possessory conservatorship, visitation restrictions, etc.).

V. Precedents and Authorities: How They Shape the Decision

A. Fundamental Parental Rights and Strict Scrutiny

Several key precedents frame the decision’s strong solicitude for parents’ interests:

Legate v. Legate, 28 S.W. 281 (Tex. 1894). Established the presumption that a child’s best interest is served by remaining in custody of the parents. The Court cites this as a longstanding background principle: the law does not lightly sever the parent–child bond.
Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1976). Describes termination as a measure that can “never be justified without the most solid and substantial reasons” and mandates “strict scrutiny” of such proceedings. Also recognizes the “natural right” of parents as having constitutional dimensions.
In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. 2012). Reiterates that termination cases “encumber[] a value far more precious than any property right” and are governed by “special rules.” The Court relies on this language—and its citation to Santosky v. Kramer—to justify special procedural caution.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). The U.S. Supreme Court case requiring a “clear and convincing evidence” standard for termination proceedings, reflecting the high value placed on parental rights.
Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. 1985). Texas’s adoption of the clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard for termination, later codified in Tex. Fam. Code §161.001(b).
In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2019). Establishes an elevated standard of appellate review in termination cases, especially when findings may have collateral consequences for future interactions with DFPS.

Collectively, these cases undergird the Court’s insistence that any ambiguity in DFPS’s position must be resolved against termination, and that the State’s own representations to the court must be taken seriously and literally.

B. Flexibility in Child-Custody Procedure

The Court quotes a key line from Leithold v. Plass, 413 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. 1967):

“Technical rules of practice and pleadings are of little importance in determining issues concerning the custody of children.”

Traditionally, this principle has often been invoked to allow trial courts broad discretion and flexibility in crafting custody orders responsive to children’s best interests, regardless of technical pleading defects.

D.V. uses this flexibility in a different way: it holds that technical reliance on the live pleading’s termination request cannot override DFPS’s clear trial statement that termination is not being sought. In effect:

Flexibility in child-related litigation cuts both ways—it can enable a court to craft practical relief but also restricts the State from using pleading technicalities to justify extreme relief (termination) that it has abandoned in reality.

C. Abandonment and Stipulations

The Court’s reliance on Pathfinder Oil & Gas and In re Shaw marks an important doctrinal link:

Pathfinder Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Great W. Drilling, Ltd., 574 S.W.3d 882 (Tex. 2019). The Court reaffirmed that stipulations limiting issues for trial operate as a waiver of all other issues.
In re Shaw, 966 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, no pet.). Held that a court cannot terminate parental rights when DFPS has stipulated it is not seeking termination. The Supreme Court explicitly agrees with Shaw’s bottom line.

In D.V., the caseworker’s testimony—elicited by DFPS’s attorney—functions as just such a stipulation: a formal narrowing of the issues so that only restrictive conservatorship and non-possessory conservatorship, not termination, remain on the table.

D. Notice, Service Plans, and Clear Signaling to Parents

The Court also invokes In re A.L.R., 646 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. 2022), which held that a service plan using the phrase “requested tasks” did not sufficiently alert a parent to the mandatory nature of the requirements and therefore could not support termination.

The connection is twofold:

Parents must receive clear notice when their parental rights are at risk of termination.
Conversely, when the Department decides that termination is no longer appropriate in a particular case, it should acknowledge that change clearly, rather than remain formally silent while maintaining a termination request in boilerplate pleadings.

The Court explicitly states that, because termination is always a “last resort,” it should be unsurprising—and not met with skepticism—when DFPS abandons it in favor of lesser restrictions.

E. Designated Representatives and DFPS’s Trial Voice

The Court’s reliance on In re N.H., 2022 WL 4374638 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 22, 2022, no pet.), bolsters the conclusion that statements by DFPS’s non-lawyer agents can bind the Department regarding what relief it seeks:

In N.H., a private provider under contract with DFPS testified that DFPS was not seeking termination as to one child; the court of appeals held that the provider “effectively served as the Department’s agent” for that purpose.
D.V. finds the case before it is “even clearer” because the witness here was not merely a contractor but a formally designated representative under procedural rules.

Still, the Supreme Court deliberately cabins its holding: it “express[es] no view” on when a designated representative might bind DFPS “in some formal sense or in other contexts.” Its rule applies specifically to the withdrawal of a request for termination in parental-termination cases.

VI. Impact and Implications

A. For DFPS and Government Trial Practice

The decision sends a strong message to DFPS and to counsel representing government agencies in termination cases:

Words at trial matter. An unequivocal statement that DFPS is not seeking termination will bind the Department absent prompt, clear repudiation. Routine or careless questioning of caseworkers and representatives can carry profound legal consequences.
Training and preparation of designated representatives are critical. Caseworkers designated under Rule 267 should:
- Understand the specific relief DFPS seeks in each case (termination, conservatorship only, restrictions, etc.).
- Be clearly instructed on what they may and may not say regarding DFPS’s litigation position.
Trial counsel must monitor and, where necessary, correct. If a designated representative mistakenly states that DFPS is not seeking termination, counsel has a duty to:
- clarify immediately on redirect examination, or
- address the issue on the record (e.g., via a statement to the court, motion, or closing argument) to repudiate the misstatement.
Pleadings should be updated or at least harmonized with trial positions. Although D.V. does not require formal amendment, the opinion exposes risks when live pleadings are left to demand relief that DFPS, in reality, has abandoned.

B. For Parents and Their Counsel

From the parents’ perspective, D.V. is a significant procedural safeguard:

Close attention to DFPS testimony is now even more important. If a DFPS representative or witness clearly states that the Department is not seeking termination, parents’ counsel should:
- lock in that testimony on cross-examination (as Mother’s counsel did here),
- rely on it in argument, and
- object if the court nonetheless proceeds to terminate.
Appellate issues can be preserved through targeted objections. Mother here preserved an argument that the associate judge lacked authority to terminate after DFPS’s abandonment. Counsel in future cases should explicitly tie objections and arguments to the Department’s abandonment and to D.V.’s rule.
Strategic use of DFPS’s “changed mind.” When DFPS backs away from termination mid-case, parents may leverage that change not only to defeat termination but also to argue for more favorable conservatorship or visitation arrangements, citing the Department’s own view that lesser relief suffices.

C. For Trial Courts

Trial judges and associate judges in child-protection courts must now:

Clarify on the record what relief DFPS is actually seeking before ruling—especially when there is ambiguity or conflicting signals.
Honor clear abandonment of termination and refrain from terminating when DFPS has unequivocally withdrawn that request and not repudiated it.
Be cautious about relying on “context” to override explicit statements. Recommendations from CASA, attorneys ad litem, or even evidence that could support termination do not expand the scope of relief beyond what DFPS actually requests.

D. For Future Appellate Litigation

D.V. is likely to influence:

How courts treat stipulations and concessions in termination cases. When DFPS narrows the issues or shifts its requested relief at trial, those changes must be given full effect on appeal.
The development of a more general abandonment doctrine. Although the Supreme Court reserves general questions for future cases, D.V. offers a model: when a party clearly narrows the relief it is seeking on the record, appellate courts should view that as limiting what judgments the trial court may lawfully render.

The case may also encourage further doctrinal refinement: for example, future appeals might address what counts as “clear” repudiation or how quickly DFPS must repudiate to avoid being bound by a statement.

VII. Key Legal Concepts Explained

A. Termination of Parental Rights vs. Conservatorship

Termination of parental rights is the legal equivalent of severing the parent–child relationship entirely. The parent ceases to have all legal rights and duties as a parent (except, in rare cases, certain continuing obligations like child support if ordered).
Managing conservatorship refers to the right to make major decisions for the child (education, medical care, residence, etc.). A sole managing conservator holds all such powers; a joint managing conservator shares them.
Possessory conservatorship usually describes the right to have possession and access (visitation), subject to conditions imposed by the court. A non-possessory conservator has some parental status but may have no right of possession or visitation.
The Department and ultimately the Supreme Court decided in this case to leave Mother as a parent non-possessory conservator: she remains legally recognized as a parent but without the right to possess or visit E.D., subject to whatever terms the district court sets on remand.

B. “Clear and Convincing Evidence”

The Family Code and constitutional doctrine require termination findings to be supported by clear and convincing evidence. This standard:

Is higher than “preponderance of the evidence” (more likely than not),
But lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt” (the criminal standard).

“Clear and convincing” means the evidence must produce a firm belief or conviction in the factfinder’s mind about the truth of the allegations supporting termination.

C. Stipulations and Abandonment of Claims

A stipulation is an agreement by parties about certain facts or issues, often used to streamline trial.
When parties stipulate that only certain issues will be tried, “all others are thereby waived.” (Pathfinder Oil & Gas).
Abandonment of a claim occurs when a party intentionally gives up some part of its claim or defense, whether:
- formally (by amendment or written statement), or
- informally (through on‑the‑record stipulations or unequivocal statements limiting what relief is sought).
In D.V., the representative’s testimony functioned as a stipulation that termination was no longer sought; that stipulation abandoned DFPS’s termination claim.

D. Designated Representative (Rules 267 and 614)

Under Tex. R. Civ. P. 267 and Tex. R. Evid. 614, a party that is not a natural person (like DFPS) can designate an individual to act as its representative in the courtroom, remaining present throughout the trial even when other witnesses are excluded.
This person serves as the entity’s “face and physical presence” at trial and may testify about the entity’s positions and knowledge.
In D.V., such a representative—DFPS’s caseworker—was designated, and her testimony about what DFPS was “seeking” at trial was treated as the Department’s position.

E. CASA and Attorney Ad Litem

CASA (Court Appointed Special Advocate) volunteers are appointed to advocate for the child’s best interests, often providing independent recommendations to the court.
A child’s attorney ad litem represents the child’s legal interests and may advocate a position different from either parent or DFPS.
In D.V., CASA and the ad litem favored termination, but the Supreme Court emphasizes that their recommendations cannot substitute for DFPS’s own decision as the petitioner regarding what relief it is actually seeking.

VIII. Conclusion: The Significance of D.V. v. TDFPS

D.V. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services is a pivotal decision in Texas parental-termination jurisprudence, not because it changes substantive standards for when termination is justified, but because it strengthens the procedural guardrails around the most drastic remedy the State can impose in family law.

The opinion crystallizes three core takeaways:

Parental termination is uniquely grave and must be treated as such. The Court once again underscores that parental rights occupy a constitutionally protected, “far more precious” status than property rights. This status justifies heightened procedural protections, including a strict approach to what relief the State may obtain.
The State is bound by its own clear words at trial. When DFPS, through its designated representative or counsel, clearly states it is not seeking termination, that statement functions as an abandonment of the termination claim unless promptly and clearly repudiated. Courts may not terminate in the face of such abandonment, regardless of what the live pleadings say or what other participants recommend.
Trial practice in termination cases must be meticulous. DFPS and trial courts must align pleadings, witness testimony, and judgments; errors or ambiguities must be corrected quickly, especially where they affect whether parental rights are at stake. Parents and their counsel gain a powerful tool: they can rely on DFPS’s unrepudiated in‑court statements limiting the relief sought to prevent unauthorized termination orders.

In practical terms, D.V. ensures that termination truly remains a last resort. Once the Department itself recognizes that lesser restrictions suffice and communicates that recognition clearly to the court, the law will hold it to that choice. The decision thus reverberates beyond its specific facts, reinforcing the principle that, in matters as profound as the legal bond between parent and child, the State’s obligations of clarity, consistency, and candor are especially exacting.